

# THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN PERU: 2006

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Opinions expressed in this study correspond to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the points of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

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## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance are still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.



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## Prologue

### The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators,. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series

and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behaviour. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviours. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of

anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire was pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were

assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

## Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles in the Global Bureau of USAID, assisted by Eric Kite, Maria Barrón and Elizabeth Ramirez in the Latin American Bureau, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt’s Dean of Arts and Science, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas has strongly supported the project administratively and financially, and contributed key funding to enable the inclusion of the United States and Canada in this round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Her administrative assistant, Janelle Lees made lots of things happen efficiently. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, Vanderbilt University performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve my special appreciation for their efforts.

At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the

data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University</li> <li>•Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>•Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> <li>•José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
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Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP, and Professor at the Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>•Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations</li> </ul>
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Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Mark Bynoe, Director, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of</li> </ul>

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## Acknowledgements

Today research on Peruvian public opinion is more pertinent than ever. During the 2006 presidential elections, the degree of discontent in the population became evident, as did the possibility that this could lead to success for political options that might have an uncertain commitment to democracy. In this light, our study aims at examining the degree of citizen commitment to democracy and the challenges we face in a context of growing citizen insecurity and dissatisfaction. To this end we explore the population's conceptions of democracy and we examine their attitudes towards the political system and its institutions. We also study the impact that perceptions of criminality and corruption have on their attitudes. Also, we take a look at citizen perceptions of local governments, their political preferences, the levels of their participation in both community activities as well as in social and political organizations.

This study has been possible thanks to the collaboration of different institutions and people. First of all, we must thank the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for its financing and support. We especially want to thank Claudia Rohrhirsch and Catie Lott of USAID-Peru for their commitment and collaboration. In second place we would like to thank Martin Tanaka, director of the Institute of Peruvian Studies, for the institutional support and the encouragement for our work. Claudia Bielich collaborated as a research assistant in this project. We also would like to express our gratitude to *APOYO Opinion y Mercado*, and particularly to Guillermo Loli, Daniela Zacharias and Karina Miranda, who unhesitatingly offered their assistance and solid technical knowledge to produce our quality national sample and for executing the survey in an impeccable manner. We would also like to recognize the disinterested support of Dominique Zephyr and the other members of LAPOP at Vanderbilt University. Finally, our profound gratitude goes to Mitchell Seligson for trusting us and for his comments and suggestions to improve the text. We are grateful for his indefatigable efforts in producing high-quality national surveys that are accessible to all researchers.

## Executive Summary

As part of the comparative study directed by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), and financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a national survey was carried out in June, 2006. This took place some weeks after the presidential elections had transpired. The survey, which was administered by a private company (*Apoyo Opinión y Mercado*), interviewed 1,500 people in different places around the country, as a result of a sample framework which had been rigorously designed by LAPOP and which is similar to that used in the other countries in the region that were studied that same year.

This study took place in a context of change. The election of Alan García definitely ends the period of political transition that had started with the destitution of then president Alberto Fujimori in November, 2000. The weighty task of dismantling the authoritarian legacy and combating state corruption left by the Fujimori government was initially entrusted to Dr. Valentín Paniagua and, after the 2001 elections, passed on to President Alejandro Toledo. Although each president's success at this task is open to different interpretations, the truth of the matter is that the election processes in 2001 and in 2006 were impeccable. The legitimacy of the elected presidents was beyond question. Peruvian democracy is still imperfect and it faces several challenges that are discussed in this document, but the competitive nature of their elections is now guaranteed.

Currently the Peruvian context is characterized by a combination of uneven economic growth and political polarization. The election results in the last race showed a profoundly divided country. A broad sector of the population was willing to bet on a candidate with uncertain democratic credentials that promised radical change in the political system. However, the rest of the population was deeply concerned about the possibility of this triumph. This polarization appeared in conditions of sustained economic growth, one of the highest in Latin America over the past five years. But this growth has been uneven since it has not substantially reduced unemployment or raise income levels for the majority of the population. Our data register an expectant attitude in the population regarding said economic performance: few interviewees gave a negative evaluation of their personal economic situation or that of the country compared to the recent past. However, few are willing to proclaim that these conditions have improved either. The prevailing attitude is cautionary, stating that the economic situation remains the same.

A study that seeks to examine the political culture of democracy must begin by studying the definitions people have of democracy. However, there are different ways to approach these definitions. In this study we examine the population's conceptions of democracy from two perspectives, one that places the accent on traditional definitions (liberty, equality, participation and protection) and the other that places emphasis on rationality of the belief. This is to say, whether one supports democracy for what it represents, or conversely, for what it can provide us with. What we have found is that, regardless of the way we approach the definition, having an idea of democracy is important in and of itself, because those people who can define it are the most likely to support it. Besides, we have found that a majority of Peruvians define democracy

in a way that tends to favor support for it. For example, 43% define it as liberty (an average that is close to that of the countries in the 2006 survey) and 68% conceive it in normative terms, which means that it is valued for what it represents (a relatively high place in the regional distribution). Our research found that the elderly, those with a better educational level, better income and residents in areas other than the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) are more prone to defining democracy as liberty, that is, they conceptualize it in normative terms (as a good thing in and of itself).

Upon examination, citizen attitudes vis-à-vis the Peruvian political system evince a situation that is cause for concern, as they suggest that the attitudinal bases for a stable democracy in Peru are relatively precarious. The level of citizen support for the political system is one of the lowest in the region, just barely above those registered in Haiti and Ecuador. Survey data register a great deal of discontent with the way the justice system works in the country, as well as widespread scepticism regarding the manner the political system defends citizen rights. Few say they feel proud of their political system or that they think it should be supported. There is a pronounced level of discontent among those who have historically suffered social and political exclusion. The study shows in detail how residents of the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) whose parents speak a native language and who have a low income level, exhibit a level of support for the system that is significantly inferior to the national average. Support for the political system has also been corroded by contextual factors. People who are dissatisfied with presidential performance and have been affected by corruption are the most critical of the system. In addition, ideology and the degree of satisfaction with life in general affect these levels: people who are closer to the left and those who say they feel more discontent with the life they have show signs of lower levels of support for the political system.

The level of political tolerance with regard to minorities is not as low as the level of support for the system. The least tolerant people are those who say they have no interest in politics and reside in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*).

When both attitudes—support for the system and political tolerance—are combined, we find that, in comparative terms, a relatively small percentage of respondents are located in a position that is conducive to a stable democracy (that is to say, a high level of support for the system and high political tolerance). In Peru, only 1 out of every 5 people is in this situation. Again, this proportion is one of the lowest in Latin America for 2006. The three countries that present the lowest levels as for attitudes conducive to a stable democracy are the three central-Andean countries: Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru.

The frailty of citizen support for the political system also turns up when studying the level of confidence in political institutions. Although confidence in certain political institutions such as the National Electoral Board (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*—JNE) and the People's Defense (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) is relatively high (in comparison with the levels in other countries), confidence in the institutions that administer justice and the institutions of political representation is extremely low, one of the lowest in the region. Many of the same factors involved in the decrease of support for the political system, for example being of Andean origin, or residing in the *Sierra Sur*, and having been victim of corruption, also affect the level of political confidence. However, unlike support for the system, confidence in political institutions

is also influenced by citizen assessment of the economic situation. Those who consider that there has been deterioration in the personal or the national economy compared to the recent past, have a lower level of political confidence than those who hold positive appreciations of the economy.

One factor that has a negative effect on attitudes towards the political system and its institutions is the level of corruption. Corruption corrodes the social and political fabric in that it diminishes the level of confidence in public officials and it predisposes the population to accept it as a necessary evil. The perception that public officials are corrupt is generalized in Peru, and this perception is one of the highest in the region. Nevertheless, the number of persons who assert they have been victims of corruption is also high. In the survey, around 30% of the interviewees acknowledge having been victims of at least one act of corruption, whether in the public or private spheres. Although this percentage does not reach the levels of Haiti (where half of the respondents said they had been victims of corruption), it is significantly higher than those registered for Chile (9.4%), Colombia (9.7%) and Panama (11.3%). The level of victimization by corruption in Peru is very similar to that found in Ecuador (31.9%). Those most affected by corruption in Peru are young men who have parents that speak a native language and have a low level of income. Also, our study finds that the persons that are most affected by corruption are those that are most ready to accept it as necessary, in this manner creating an infamous vicious circle.

However, corruption is not the only challenge facing Peruvian democracy. It is widely known that the growth of crime casts doubts on the State's ability to effectively control the territory and provide citizens security. Our research in this area reveals data that are cause for concern. Peru appears to be the country with the greatest index of victimization by crime in the region (although it must be taken into account that countries with high levels of crime, such as Brazil and Venezuela were not included in this round of surveys). A little over 25% of those interviewed said they had been victims of a criminal act and even more troubling, almost 40% of them were victims of an act that included violence. As this study shows, with the exception of rural areas, crime is widespread throughout the country. Most affected by crime are men and youth. An important finding in our study is that the individual socio-economic condition is not a factor in explaining who has greater probability of becoming a victim of crime. This means that crime in Peru affects all people, and does not discriminate between social or economic class.

A pernicious aspect of crime is that it increases the sense of personal insecurity. Therefore, considering the large proportion of interviewees that say they have been victims of crime, it is not surprising that Peruvians exhibit the highest level of feelings of personal insecurity among the countries surveyed in 2006. Only 7% of those interviewed in Peru says they feel very sure, which is practically half of the percentage that declares the same in Bolivia, the country that follows Peru in terms of the feeling of insecurity.

The only heartening aspect is that being a victim of crime does not influence the attitudes towards the political system or towards democracy. However, the citizens' sense of insecurity does have a negative impact on attitudes towards the political system and its institutions because people who feel less safe are less willing to support or trust the political system.

Something similar to what was found when analyzing trust in political institutions, is that there is a rather low level of satisfaction with local governments in Peru. Part of the problem is that many people are dissatisfied with the way they have been treated when dealing with the local government. Likewise, citizen confidence in the municipalities is quite low, when compared with the levels registered in other countries in the region. However, it is not that citizens are unaware of activities at the municipal level. According to the survey, there is a high level of citizen involvement in meetings and many have requested help or have presented a petition to this institution. Nevertheless, this activism does not turn into a greater level of confidence in local government, partly because the majority (almost 60%) says they do not have any influence in its affairs.

According to survey data, the vast majority of Peruvians are ideologically middle-of-the-road. In comparison with other countries in the region, Peruvians are neither very much to the left nor very much to the right. However, what is different from what was found in other countries is that Peruvians have no trouble identifying those terms and placing themselves somewhere along the ideological spectrum. There is no doubt that the terms left-right are still important in Peru. As we have mentioned, in the recent presidential elections there was polarization and the aforementioned terms had a political effect. Voters that are inclined towards Ollanta Humala were placed more to the left than those that chose Alan García or Lourdes Flores.

The survey confirms what many observers of Peruvian politics had noticed, namely, that the 2006 elections revealed the profound fissures in Peruvian society. Support for Ollanta Humala was very strong among men, particularly among those in a disadvantaged socio-economic condition. Likewise, people who were raised in the countryside, those whose parents spoke a native language, those who showed a lower level of support for the system and of political trust, those who identified with the left, and those who considered that their economic situation had worsened, opted for favoring the nationalist candidate.

Finally, our study found that in spite of meager citizen support for the political system and little confidence in the political institutions, Peruvians actively participated in actions linked to the community or *barrio* and frequently attended the meetings of different civil society organizations. In both cases, the proportion of persons that participated in these actions is above the Latin American average. Peruvians have no problem in admitting their own participation in public demonstrations or protests, and their average is the second highest in the region, only lower than that registered for Bolivia. The high level of citizen participation in demonstrations and protests is consistent with the finding that the majority of Peruvians exhibit scant support for- and confidence in the political system.

In conclusion, although a solid majority of Peruvians supports democracy, this percentage is among the lowest in the region. Part of the problem is that there is a great degree of dissatisfaction with the political system and very little confidence in its institutions, including local government. Corruption and the feeling of insecurity due to crime corrode this support and trust. Fractures in Peruvian society became evident in the election preferences during the 2006 presidential election and, in spite of the political discontent, or perhaps due to it, Peruvians show higher levels of community activism and social participation. Therefore, the challenge is to



improve the quality of democracy, to get the institutions to more effectively respond to the population's demands, thus reducing popular discontent.

## 1 Context: Peru in the New Century

The recent presidential election and subsequent transfer of power from Alejandro Toledo to Alan García is an auspicious milestone for the emerging Peruvian democracy in that it marks the end of the democratic transition that started with the destitution of president Fujimori (1990-2000). The country entered a turbulent period of political crisis in 2000, when President Alberto Fujimori decided to push for a second re-election.<sup>1</sup> The public at large mobilized to protest this decision. Subsequently, the National Election Board and the National Office of Electoral Processes made changes that aimed at guaranteeing his reelection. However, all this was rapidly eclipsed when a video came to light showing Fujimori's security advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an elected congressman to get him to join the government party. The crisis came to a climax with the Congressional decision to remove President Fujimori on the grounds of "moral incapacity" after he himself sent his presidential resignation from Japan by fax. Valentín Paniagua, then President of the Congress, was appointed interim president and given the task to call for new presidential elections and set off the process of democratic transition. This process led to the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 and appears to have reached its conclusion with the election of Alan García in June, 2006. Nonetheless, the end of the transition does not mean that Peru has a consolidated democratic regime. It only means that the crisis that had been caused by the continued authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori has terminated. The challenges currently facing the emerging Peruvian democracy are related to more long-term issues: deepening of democracy, full establishment of the rule of law, reduction of the deep-seated citizen distrust of the political system, economic development and the fight against poverty, among others.


In this chapter, our objective is to briefly describe the current economic and political context in the country. However, before embarking on this discussion it is necessary to look at the country in the regional context, describing where it is in terms of relative development.

### 1.1 Peru in the Andean Context

Peru is a country that faces important challenges related to underdevelopment. Several development indicators place it at an intermediate position, both in the Andean sub-region and in the Latin American region. One measure that sums up its position quite well is the Human Development Index (HDI) created by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).<sup>2</sup> In 2003, Peru's HDI was above Bolivia's but below that of Colombia and Venezuela and very close to that of Ecuador (Figure 1.1).

<sup>1</sup> Law Number 26657 (called the Law of Authentic Interpretation) authorized president Fujimori to run for re-election in 2000, arguing that his second period 1995-2000 was really his first under the 1993 constitution. The three members of the Constitutional Tribunal who declared that this norm was not applicable were indicted and removed by the pro-Fujimori majority in the Congress.

<sup>2</sup> The Human Development Index is an index that measures a country's average progress in three dimensions: life expectancy, educational level and income level. The list of specific indicators included in the measurement can be found in the Technical Note on the *Human Development Report 2005*. (<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005>)

**Figure 1.1 Human Development Index for the Andean Countries and Latin America, 2003**


In general, the Andean sub-region has shown noticeable growth in its development indicators over the last two decades. Although all the countries have progressed, Bolivia's development is noticeable, showing a tendency toward closing the gap with other countries, though it has not caught up with them yet. On the other hand, Venezuela has lost its place as the leader in terms of development, and has been replaced by Colombia (Figure 1.2). It is widely accepted that the stagnation of living conditions in Venezuela is one of the factors that explain the dramatic collapse of its traditional parties and the rise of Hugo Chavez.

Other indicators of relative development (infant mortality and life expectancy at birth) also place Peru in a relatively low position in the Andean sub-region and below the Latin American average.<sup>3</sup> It would seem that the exception to this pattern of low-performance is education, where official data show Peru in the lead in the Andean sub-region in terms of educational coverage.<sup>4</sup> However, upon examining the educational quality indicators, it can be seen that Peru is in a low position in the Latin American region. For example, according to results from the PISA educational evaluation program (*Program for International Student Assessment*), some 55% of 15 year-old Peruvian students were at the lowest level on the combined scale for reading literacy (Cano 2004). This percentage was almost double the average registered in the Latin American region (27.2%). This gap between educational coverage and educational quality is a serious problem due to the expectations of social mobility that are generated and ultimately cannot come true, which may lead to feelings of frustration.

<sup>3</sup> The level of infant mortality (the number of children under 1 year of age that have died for every thousand living) in the 2000-2005 period was 33.4 in Peru, the highest in the Andean sub-region except for Bolivia (whose rate was 55.6). The Latin American average was 27.7 (ECLAC 2005). Life expectancy (average years) was 69.9 in Peru during the same period, again the lowest in the region except for Bolivia (which was 63.8). The Latin American average was 71.9.

<sup>4</sup> The percentage of 25 to 29 year old Peruvians that had finished secondary education in 2002 was almost 60%, compared to 53% registered for Ecuador (a country whose data include only urban areas, which obviously inflates the indicator) and 50% reported in Colombia.

Figure 1.2 Evolution of the Human Development Index in Andean Countries, 1975-2003



As for the per-capita income levels, Peru occupies the midway point on the Andean regional scale, although it is well below the Latin American regional average. In 2005, the average per-capita income in Peru (measured in dollars and adjusted for *Purchasing Power Parity*) was \$5,830, a figure that is inferior to that registered in Colombia (\$7,240) and Venezuela (\$6,440), albeit superior to that found in Bolivia (\$2,740) and Ecuador (\$4,070). The Latin American Average was \$8,111 (World Bank 2006).

In terms of urban poverty, Peru has achieved a substantial level of improvement in latter years, which has lead to its registering the lowest level of poverty in the Andean sub-region. Nevertheless, urban poverty in Peru is still greater than the Latin American average, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean data (ECLAC 2006a). In 2003, the percentage of urban poverty reached 43.1% in Peru, a figure that is way below that registered in Bolivia (52%), Ecuador (49%), Colombia (50.6%) and Venezuela (53%). The Latin American average for 2003 was 38.9%. On the other hand, the proportion of rural poverty in Peru is almost twice that of urban areas: 76.0% and 43.1%, respectively. The percentage of the population that lives below the poverty line in rural areas of Peru is higher than that registered for Colombia (50.5%) and Ecuador (54.5%), and only slightly under that found for Bolivia (80.6%).


In all, Peru is a country of relative contrasts when compared to its Andean peers. According to some development indicators, the country occupies the lowest position (child mortality, life-expectancy and birth, and educational quality, for example), whereas on other indicators Peru is at an intermediate level (Human Development Index and the per-capita income level). In terms of poverty, the country is much better off than its Andean neighbours.

## 1.2 Economic Context

The country's recent economic performance is noteworthy. After a disastrous decade during the eighties<sup>5</sup> and inconsistent growth in the nineties, Peru is currently in its fifth year of economic growth, sustained primarily by the significant rise of traditional and non-traditional exports. Figure 1.3 presents the evolution of the annual percentage variation in the Gross National Product over the past seven years. It can be seen that, aside from 2001, the Peruvian economy has grown at a rate of no less than 3% annually and that since 2004 growth has been greater than 5%. These figures have been greater than those registered for the Latin American region as a whole (ECLAC 2006b).


The growth of the Peruvian economy reflects the general growth of Latin America (ECLAC 2006c; Inter-American Dialog 2005). However, as has already been said, the economic growth of Peru has been greater than the Andean sub-region and the Latin American region. For example, the annual percentage variation of the Peruvian GNP for 2005 was 6.4%, which is greater than the 4.3% registered in Latin America. That very year, in the same Andean sub-region, the Peruvian GNP growth was only surpassed by that of Venezuela, which benefited from the important rise in the price of oil that year (Figure 1.4).

**Figure 1.3 GNP Annual Percentage Variation, 2000-2006**




<sup>5</sup> Literature on economic performance and economic policy in the eighties and nineties is quite extensive. Those who are interested can make use of Peter Flindell Klaren's useful bibliographic essay that appears at the end of his book (2000).

Figure 1.4 Andean Countries and Latin America: GNP Annual Percentage Variation, 2005



In spite of the economic growth, there is no record of any significant improvement in the living conditions of workers. Although the GNP rose in the past two years, the salary index for the Lima Metropolitan area not only appears to be flat, but it seems to be in a slight decline. The employment index shows only tenuous improvement (Figure 1.5)<sup>6</sup>. There is no reason to suppose that the situation in the rest of the country is different. Therefore, there is an important phenomenon to take into account in order to understand the political attitudes that will be discussed in this report, that is, the important economic growth over the past years has not represented a significant increase in employment (at least not in those businesses with 100 or more employees) neither has there been any improvement in salaries.

<sup>6</sup> The GNP index (at the national level) and the salary index use 1994 as a baseline. The baseline for the employment index (for companies with 100 employees or more in the Lima Metro Area) is October 1997.

**Figure 1.5. Growth Indices for GNP, Employment and Income, January 2005-July 2006**

However, it is undeniable that economic growth over the past years has had an impact on citizen expectations. In somewhat of a paradox, people tend to have a more optimistic view of their personal economic situation than that of the country. In order to probe their attitudes in relation to the economy, interviewees were asked the following questions:

- Now, about the economy... How would you evaluate the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very-good, good, neither-good-nor-bad, bad, or very-bad?
- How would you evaluate your personal economic situation in general? Would you say that it is very-good, good, neither-good-nor-bad, bad, or very-bad?

Also, in order to get a better idea of the dynamics of these evaluations, they were requested to say how they evaluated their personal economic situation and the country's with regard to last year. The specific questions are the following:

- Do you consider that the country's current economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?
- Do you consider that your personal economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?


Figures 1.6 and 1.7 present information regarding evaluations of the current economic situation, both individual and the country's. As pointed out before, interviewees have a better opinion of their individual economic situation than of the country's: Whereas around one half of them (52%) consider that the country's economic situation is neither good nor bad, the great majority (66%) use the same term to describe their individual situation. Similarly, a little less than a third describe the country's present situation as "bad" but only a little over 20% use the same adjective to describe their individual situation. Here it would seem that we have before us a situation that is the contrary of the popular saying, "the economy is doing well, but the people are doing poorly." Nevertheless, it is important not to exaggerate. As has been pointed out




before, most respondents have a cautious attitude, and describe their individual economy and the country's as average instead of good.

When we requested their opinion of the present state of the economy compared to the previous year, we find that the majority of interviewees (around 58%) say that it remains the same, whereas around 25% say that it is worse (16% say it is better). What is significant here is that there are practically no differences in the assessment of the individual's economic situation and that of the country (the differences do not exceed one percentage point and therefore, we do not present the graph to save space). Again, the attitude is cautionary; the appraisal is neither openly optimistic nor pessimistic.

**Figure 1.6 Peru: Evaluation of the Individual's Economic Situation, 2006**



**Figure 1.7. Peru: Evaluation of the Country's Economic Situation, 2006**

On the whole, the dynamic growth of the economy has not yet translated to a significant growth in employment or income. For this reason, although people have a better opinion of their individual economic situation than of the country, the general attitude is cautious.

### 1.3 Political Context: Election Normalcy and Political Polarization

Peru is going through a period of political change. In 2000, Peru went through a serious political crisis caused by President Alberto Fujimori's decision to run for a second presidential re-election (Comisión Andina de Juristas 2000; Defensoría del Pueblo 2000). The mobilization that followed to counter this move, the international community's demands, and the appearance of a video showing his intelligence advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an opposition-party congressman to get him on the side of the government, enormously weakened his government. Finally, on November 19<sup>th</sup> that year, Fujimori sent a fax from Japan in which he resigned the presidency. This prompted the Congress to remove him from office due to moral unfitness.

This was how the president of the Congress, Dr. Valentín Paniagua became president. His government's central mission was to organize new presidential and legislative elections, which were called for April, 2001. When none of the presidential candidates was able to obtain a majority vote, a second round became necessary between the two candidates with the most number of votes: Alejandro Toledo, candidate for the *Perú Posible* party, and Alan García, candidate for the *Partido Aprista Peruano*. In the second election round, which took place on May 19, 2001, Alejandro Toledo was victorious. He obtained 53% of the valid votes.

In spite of the intensely negative content of the election campaign, which was loaded with accusations of a personal nature, it became evident that there was a basic consensus between the two candidates in the second round regarding the fundamental issues the country was facing at the turn of the new century (Carrión 2001). Both candidates recognized the importance of strengthening the political institutions that had been greatly affected during Fujimori's presidential period.<sup>7</sup> Also, although there were shades of difference in their opinions, both candidates accepted the fundamental existing economic model, and emphasized the need to encourage foreign investment while proposing the continuation of support for social programs to alleviate poverty.

Contrary to what had largely happened during Fujimori's administration, both the governments of Valentín Paniagua as well as that of Alejandro Toledo respected the democratic rules of the game, and guaranteed the truly competitive nature of the elections. For most of his term, Alejandro Toledo was criticized for his inaction and lack of political initiative, but at the start of the 2006 campaign, no-one doubted there would be clean elections. In this way, the 2006 presidential race marked the normalization of Peruvian politics in a fundamental sense: acceptance of the legitimacy of the election process and of the elected head of state.

Nonetheless, the electoral normalcy that the 2006 process represented came at the same time as the rupture in the basic consensus that had been evident in the 2001 presidential campaign. The break in this consensus was gradual and to a great degree was generated by President Toledo's mistakes. Although his administration was successful in maintaining economic growth, Toledo missed the chance to improve the targeting of the social programs and to adopt more aggressive policies aimed at promoting employment in order to counteract what was widely perceived to be the cost of economic liberalization. Likewise, his government became involved in a series of small scandals, some caused by the frivolity (real or imagined) of his administration. The Toledo government kept itself adrift instead of assuming a clear direction, and as a result his popularity rate fell to around 10%. The Humala brothers took advantage of the political vacuum, and one of them (Antauro) organized a revolt in the Peruvian high plains. It turned violent. Some policemen were killed. Although this misadventure was rejected by a large part of the population, it generated some support in the Southern High-Plain (*Sierra Sur*) and the central part of the country. The other brother, Ollanta, decided to create his own party (*Partido Nacionalista Peruano*, or Nationalist Party of Peru) and launched his presidential candidacy.

The emergence of Commander Ollanta Humala as a candidate marked an important milestone in recent Peruvian politics. Commander Humala, as his followers prefer to call him, proposed as main platform for his campaign the convening of a constitutional assembly to replace the 1993 constitution, the renegotiating of investment contracts with multinational businesses in the mining sector, greater state participation in the economy, and a protectionist commercial policy. Clearly, Ollanta Humala's proposals cast doubt on the continuation of the current political and economic order in Peru. Both Alan García the center-left candidate, and

<sup>7</sup> For a study of the way Alberto Fujimori's regime altered the political system's democratic bases, see the following: Carrión 2006; Conaghan 2005; Cotler y Grompone 2000; Dammert Ego Aguirre 2000; Degregori 2000; Pease García 2003; Marcus-Delgado y Tanaka 2000. (among others).

Lourdes Flores Nano the center-right candidate rejected the idea of calling for a constitutional assembly, and proposed an economic policy that essentially continued the existing model.

In the presidential elections that were carried out on April 9, 2006, twenty candidates competed for the presidency. Ollanta Humala obtained first place with 30.6% of the valid votes, followed by Alan García with 24.2%, and Lourdes Flores Nano with 23.8% of the votes. As none of the candidates got the absolute majority of votes, a second election round was called for June 4, 2006.

The second-round election campaign polarized the electorate in a way that had not occurred during the second round in 2001. Ollanta Humala's candidacy aroused a lot of suspicion and fear among the majority of the residents of Lima and the north-coast departments, which are the most economically-developed areas of the country. On the other hand, his candidacy was enthusiastically welcomed by the majority of the residents in the Andean departments, which are relatively less developed areas as well. As Mariel García and Carlos Melendez show (García and Melendez 2006) in their insightful analysis of the election results, Alan García won thanks to his impressive support in the Lima Metropolitan area, where he gathered votes that had gone to the center-right candidate Lourdes Flores Nano in the first round. Although Alan García won only 9 of the 25 regions of Peru, he was able to insure the definitive win because these were the regions with greater electoral weight. In the end, Alan García obtained 52.6% of the valid votes, whereas Ollanta Humala reached 47.4%.

One issue that increased the political polarization in Peru was Hugo Chávez' and Evo Morales' support for Ollanta Humala's candidacy. President Chávez went as far as calling Alan García a crook, and promised to cut off diplomatic relations with Peru were García to be elected. Likewise, Evo Morales expressed his support for Ollanta Humala, without directly insulting García, though. Using remarkable political skill García described Ollanta as Hugo Chávez' agent thus undermining the essence of his nationalist posture, and putting him in a defensive position.

Ollanta's parliamentary representation became divided at the end of his alliance with *Union por el Perú* (Union for Peru party). This division and other disputes have generated a crisis in the "Humala" movement, reflected in the poor performance in recent municipal and regional elections. Also, the *Aprista* party has been defeated in several of the regions where it had been in power. The dramatic defeat of these two parties reflects the recent emergence of a series of local and regional movements. It is still not very clear how these movements will evolve.

## 1.4 Public Opinion Studies in Peru

Peru has a vibrant public opinion industry.<sup>8</sup> The number of agencies tends to multiply around election time, such as was observed during the last election process, but there is a nucleus of businesses that maintain a constant presence.

<sup>8</sup> For a history of the most important agencies see Tuesta Soldevilla (1997).

*APOYO Opinion y Mercado* publishes its monthly *Opinión Data*. This is a monthly summary of public opinion polls that this group carries out, generally in the Lima Metropolitan area. More detailed results of these surveys are presented in the *Informe de Opinión Data* (Opinion Data Report), a report that began to be published during the eighties. This is not public, different from *Opinón Data*, and it is only for subscribers. Every month the APOYO public opinion surveys ask about approval for the main governmental officials (the president, certain ministers, other branches of government). The rest of the contents varies month-to-month, and focuses on issues that are salient at the time. These polls are carried out every month in Lima and three times a year (normally in April, August and at the year end) at the national level. Notwithstanding, during election periods, the number of nation-wide surveys increases, sometimes to two or three a month during the final campaign months.

Lima University (*La Universidad de Lima*) has The Public Opinion Group (*Grupo de Opinión Pública, GOP*), which is in charge of carrying out public opinion polls. These tend to focus on current issues and also deal with regular political and economic issues (such as approval for governmental figures). The GOP works in the Lima metropolitan area and in Callao every month, and some months in the rest of Peru. These polls tend to be more frequent during pre-election periods, which is the same as in the Apoyo case. The results are published monthly in *Barómetros* (Barometers) that are also subscription based.

In late 2005, The Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (*La Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú*) created the Public Opinion Institute (*Instituto de Opinión Pública, IOP*), in charge of carrying out public opinion surveys. Since December 2005, the Public Opinion Institute has provided the press and its subscribers its survey reports. From December to June 2006, monthly surveys were done. Nevertheless, once the pre-election period had passed, the reports stopped. In September 2006, the surveys were renewed with the coming municipal and regional elections. Just as the other two polling institutions had done, the Public Opinion Institute worked in the Lima metropolitan area and Callao almost every month, and throughout Peru on certain occasions, particularly when the circumstances called for it. The Public Opinion Institute has recently begun activities, which means that it is not as institutionalized as Apoyo or the University of Lima's GOP.

Academic studies of Peruvian public opinion, though still budding, are increasingly numerous. In general we can identify four areas that have drawn the attention of researchers: a) studies on presidential popularity; b) studies on democratic attitudes and values; c) studies on election behavior; and d) general studies on different attitudes (regarding drugs, the media, decentralization, and market reform).

No doubt the most developed issue is the analysis of presidential popularity. In the late nineties a series of papers appeared in print. Most of them had been written in English. They explained the reasons why President Fujimori drew significant support. Some pointed out the fact that, contrary to what had been found in industrialized nations, presidential support seemed not to be influenced so much by economic conditions (except for inflation), and more by strictly political variables (Carrión 1998; Carrión 1999; Stokes 1996; Stokes 2001; Weyland 2000).

Some years later, presidential popularity studies added the character of the government and the levels of political violence to the analysis (Arce 2003; Kelly 2003).

In the case of studies of democratic attitudes and values, which this study is part of, pioneer efforts focused on the analysis of popular sectors (Parodi 1993; Stokes 1995; Murakami 2000<sup>9</sup>). Later, other studies expanded coverage, taking into consideration democratic attitudes throughout the country (Seligson and Carrión 2002; Tanaka and Zárate 2002). Added to these efforts was the publication of an important study that was based on a national survey sponsored by the Peruvian office of the UNDP. Called “Democracy in Peru,” it was published in 2006.

Studies of election behavior and political participation in general are less numerous, but no less important.<sup>10</sup> The pioneer study in this area of research was published on a mimeograph and was not widely distributed. It was the study done by Carlos Aramburu, Enrique Bernales and Mario Torres (1977) on attitudes towards the constitutional assembly that started the transfer of power from the military to civilian hands. Next we have the foundational studies done by Henry Dietz (1980, 1998)<sup>11</sup> on political participation and election behavior of the poor in the Lima metropolitan area.

Finally, there is a series of public opinion studies that do not deal with any of the aforementioned issues. For example, there is the analysis of attitudes toward the market economy (Carrión 1996; Carrión 2006). Other studies have examined attitudes towards various issues such as political decentralization (Trivelli 2002, IEP 2002, Zárate and Trivelli 2005).

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<sup>9</sup> Alfredo Torres Guzmán’s study should be included here (Guzmán 1989) although it does not deal with the issue of democratic values, it does offer a quick map of political attitudes at the time.

<sup>10</sup> Basically we are referring to studies based on surveys. There are many studies based on the analysis of official results. Among others, see Bernales 1980; Cameron 1994; Tuesta Soldevilla 1983, 1985, 1989.

<sup>11</sup> On political participation also see Muller, Dietz, and Finkel (1991).

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## 2 Sample Framework: A National Survey

The vast majority of public opinion studies in Peru that we referred to in the previous chapter were based on urban samples or on samples from the Lima metropolitan area, overlooking—generally due to expense—the important rural sector of the country. Contrary to these studies, our survey's universe includes the entire country, with seven strata: Lima metropolitan area (including Callao), North Coast, South Coast, Northern Highland (*Sierra*), Central Highland, Southern Highland and the Amazon Jungle (*Selva*), divided into urban and rural areas. The units of our study are voting age persons, that is, people 18 years old or older. We excluded people in collective residences: hospitals, orphanages, military bases, hotels, penal centers and similar institutions.<sup>12</sup>

Our survey, carried out by *APOYO Opinión y Mercado*, is based on a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample. The stratified sampling insures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification is more efficient when the units in each stratum are more homogenous and when the strata are more heterogeneous. Even when these conditions are not strictly met, any stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the union of all strata conforms to the total study population. Stratification enables us to insure both representativity and sample dispersion.

Sampling was done in several stages. During the first stage, localities were chosen. In the second stage sample areas within localities were selected. For the third stage, households were chosen within the sample areas. In the last stage, the person to interview in the household was picked. Only one person was interviewed in each household.

In a probability sample, each unit of the universe of study has a selection probability that is known and is greater than zero. This type of sample allows for sample error calculation. At the same time, calculation of sample errors gives us the opportunity to generalize the results of the sample to the population of the study, because it allows us to specify the precision of our inferences. It is worth noting that the final stage of selection (the person in the household) is done by a “quota-system” in order to guarantee the sample will have the same distribution of the variables for gender and age in the universe.

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<sup>12</sup> A home-business may have been chosen, having made contact with the person only in the home. This is correct given that in poor areas it is very common for families to have a small storehouse in their garage or in a room on the side of the house.

## 2.1 The Sample

In the sample design, as a sampling frame we used the data of the total population at the district level that corresponded to the National Census of Population and Households 2005 (CENSO 2005) of the National Institute of Statistics and Information Management (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*—INEI) together with INEI population projections because the Census did not give the population results by urban and rural area. The sample framework used by *APOYO Opinión y Mercado* has codification for different areas at all the levels of aggregation, districts, zones and blocks. It was categorized according to basic indicators which facilitated the eligibility of areas and the adequate inclusion of the socioeconomic strata required for the study. The sample framework is updated using the new INEI<sup>13</sup> records and runs on a system developed at *APOYO Opinión y Mercado*'s Department of Statistics and Sampling to insure ongoing updating of the established indicators and classifications.

Peru is divided into 24 administrative departments and one constitutional province. The departments are divided into provinces and these in turn into districts. In total, there are 195 provinces and 1,832 districts. Each district is identified with a UBIGEO geographic location code, which is the national code to identify districts, provinces and departments. In some cases districts are grouped to form the urban area of a city. That is why this design works with “localities” that can be individual districts or an agglomeration of them. For example, in Ancash department there is a locality (or a city) called Huaraz, formed by the districts of Huaraz and Independencia. Therefore, for design purposes in this survey, 1,724 localities are counted in all.

### 2.1.1 Stratification

For the sampling frame we used the total population at the district level that corresponded to the INEI 2005 Census. This same source was used to calculate the proportion of people over the age of 18, at the provincial level. All the districts in a province were assigned this same proportion. Likewise, the composition by area of residence—urban or rural<sup>14</sup>—corresponds to INEI 2005 estimates. The distribution of the target population (persons over the age of 18) per geographical region<sup>15</sup> and area can be seen in Table 2.1 as follows.

<sup>13</sup> Survey maps are for the year 2001. These were the most recent available.

<sup>14</sup> According to the INEI, urban areas are those population centers with at least 2000 inhabitants or 100 contiguous households.

<sup>15</sup> The Arequipa & South Coast area was created taking into consideration the low population representativity of the South Coast by itself and its vicinity with Arequipa. The criteria for its stratification as a natural region and area is more adequate in our national sample than those in the departmental stratification, among other aspects due to the existence of departments that belong to two regions, and the fact that it belongs to the coast, highland (sierra) or Amazon jungle is a variable that generally characterizes opinion and behavior of the Peruvian population.

**Table 2.1 Peru: Population: Distribution per Regions**

Region	Urban	Rural	Total
North Coast	2,723,321	16%	3,177,814
South Coast (includes Arequipa)	1,429,997	8%	1,629,993
Lima	5,532,123	32%	5,588,003
Amazon jungle ( <i>Selva</i> )	1,000,428	6%	1,913,430
Central Highland ( <i>Sierra Central</i> )	692,959	4%	1,111,420
Northern Highland ( <i>Sierra Norte</i> )	409,993	2%	1,429,400
Southern Highland ( <i>Sierra Sur</i> )	1,084,368	6%	2,319,961
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,873,188</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>17,170,021</b>
			<b>100%</b>

Localities were also classified according to size (size of urban population over the age of 18), and the following strata were created:

- E1. Lima metropolitan area
- E2. Large localities: localities of over 100,000 inhabitants
- E3. Medium-sized localities: localities of 20,000 to 99,999 inhabitants
- E4. Small localities: localities of 5,000 to 19,999 inhabitants
- E5. Rural localities: localities of less than 5,000 inhabitants

Population distribution according to these criteria is shown in Table 2.2.

**Table 2.2 Peru: Urban and Rural Population Distribution**

Location		Population Over 18	
Urban	Lima metropolitan area	5,532,123	32%
	Large localities	3,166,887	18%
	Medium-sized localities	1,447,530	8%
	Small localities	1,431,063	8%
Rural	Rural localities	4,629,636	27%
	<i>Rural settings in urban areas</i>	1,018,663	6%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>17,225,901</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

It is worth noting that this classification allows us to select localities in a dispersed form. Localities that make up the rural sample correspond to strata 5 which is the segment of rural areas in urban clusters. The distribution of the sample is proportional to the distribution of the universe (shown in Table 2.1). The following is the distribution of the sample of our survey.

**Table 2.3 Peru: Sample Distribution per Region**

Region	Urban	Rural	Total
North Coast	238	16%	278 19%
South Coast + Arequipa	125	8%	142 9%
Lima	483	32%	488 33%
Amazon jungle (Selva)	87	6%	167 11%
Central Highland (Sierra)	61	4%	97 6%
Northern Highland	36	2%	125 8%
Southern Highland	95	6%	203 14%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,125</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>1,500 100%</b>

## 2.1.2 Selection Stages

*Selection of localities within each stratum (Sample Primary Units).* The selection of sampling points was carried out within each stratum by cross-tabulating the variables *natural region* and *location* (urban or rural). In urban areas we created a sub-stratification according to the type of locality (large, medium-sized or small). In rural localities the substrata correspond to the department. Within each substratum, localities were chosen proportionally to the over-eighteen population, urban or rural, according to each case.

*Cluster Selection (Cluster or Conglomerate).* Clusters are chosen randomly within each city (a conglomerate of approximately 40 blocks). The selection is carried out by systematic sampling, with a random start, insuring the dispersion within each locality with a selection probability proportional to size according to the number of dwellings there are. Blocks were chosen to be the starting point, and by means of the process explained in the following stages of sampling, each interviewer had to complete the interviews for five persons in the urban clusters. Both in the Lima metropolitan area and in the cities in the countryside, each of the blocks that belonged to a sample framework of *APOYO Opinión y Mercado* was assigned a predominant socioeconomic level per block. In these cities, proportional stratification was done by using the predominant socioeconomic level per block.

*Cluster selection in the rural area.* The interviewer went to the Town Square and identified clusters (north, south, east and west) from the center of town. On the route map it was specified where the interviewer was to start the run.

*Household selection.* During the second phase, dwelling<sup>16</sup> selection took place within blocks that were already part of the sample. Taking the chosen block as a starting point, the starting corner was fixed (in a random way, by way of a computer program), as well as the direction of the run and the initial jump for the selection of the first home the interviewer was supposed to select. In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or no-one home the interviewer chose the next dwelling. If the result was an effective survey, the interviewer skipped three dwellings to select the following house. In case the entire block is run without completing the quota of five surveys, the interviewer proceeded on the next block, according to the numbers on the map on his route map.

In rural clusters the start-up dwelling was identified using the instructions on the route map: direction, corner and door. The following dwellings were chosen using systematic skipping, and only one survey was done per block.

*The Selection of the persons to be interviewed.* Once inside the home, the member of the household was picked according to the required conditions: not a domestic employee nor a visitor, age eighteen or older. Each interviewer completed gender and age quotas, such that the final sample was to have the same distribution as the universe in these variables. If in the same household two or more persons were found of the same gender and age range, the person whose birthday was nearest was chosen for the interview.

### 2.1.3 Calculating the Margin of Error

Given that the sample design involves cluster sampling, the design effect must be considered (Kish 1965) in calculating the standard error of the estimates. The design effect is defined as the ratio between the variance estimator obtained by the sampling design and the variance estimator corresponding to simple random sampling.

The effect of the design on a two stage sampling depends on the size of the cluster ( $\beta$ ) and of the interclass correlation coefficient ( $\rho$ ), as can be seen in equation 1:

$$\text{Effect of the design} = 1 + (\beta - 1) \rho \quad (1)$$

The intra-class correlation coefficient  $\rho$  provides a measure of the degree of homogeneity within clusters.

The size of the “effective” sample for the sample design in two stages (by clusters) is equal to:

$$n_{\text{effective}} = n^* \times \text{effect of the design} \quad (2)$$

---

<sup>16</sup> In some dwellings there may be more than one household. In cases where there was more than one household in the dwelling chosen, one of the households was chosen randomly to take part in the sample. A household is a group of persons, relatives or not, that occupies all or part of the dwelling, share the main mealtimes and share responsibilities for other basic needs. Exceptionally, a household was considered to be made up of only one person. Domestic workers were not considered part of the household.

where  $n^*$  is the size of the sample in a simple random sample

In the case of this study, the effects of design are 1.4 for the urban area, and 1.8 for the rural area.

Therefore, we can conclude that by assuming a proportion of incidence of the phenomena studied of 0.5 (maximum variability) and a confidence level of 95% ( $Z=1.96$ ), the probable expected margins of error are as follows (Table 2.4)

**Table 2.4 Peru: Expected Margin of Error in the National Survey**

Strata	Maximum Expected Margin of Error
North Coast	8.2
South Coast + Arequipa	11.4
Lima metropolitan area	6.0
Amazon jungle (Selva)	11.4
Central Highland	14.6
Northern Highland	14.1
Southern Highland	10.5
Urban	4.0
Rural	9.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.6</b>


The sample size was 1,500 surveys. The sample distribution was proportionate to the population of each stratum and did not require weight factors. The strata are representative, but have different margins of error.



## 2.2 Sample Description

In this section, we will describe the sample's socio-demographic characteristics. To begin, we must point out that the sample distribution is homogenous according to gender, as 50.3% are women and 49.7% are men. As for age, the sample average is 39.4 years of age (note that we only interviewed only people who were of voting age). Young people (ages 18 to 24) make up 19.1% of the sample (Figure 2.1).


Figure 2.1 Peru: Sample Distribution per Age Group, 2006



The sample's educational pyramid is shown in Figure 2.2. A scant 1% say they have no formal education and around 27% of those interviewed said they had completed 11 years of education, which corresponds to having completed secondary education. Likewise, around 11% have completed 16 years of education, which means they have finished college.




**Figure 2.2 Peru: Sample Distribution per Completed Years of Education, 2006**



Note: The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval per respective group. If the error bars of two groups have areas in common (if they overlap), this means that the differences are not statistically significant.


Of those interviewed, 75% reside in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. The sample distribution by strata (natural regions) is presented in Figure 2.3. Thirty-two point five percent of those interviewed reside in the Lima metropolitan area. After Lima, the biggest cluster is the Northern Coast; then the Southern Highland and the Amazon jungle..

It is widely known that there are marked economic, social and ethnic differences among certain regions. Lima and to a lesser degree the rest of the Coast (North and South), tend to exhibit greater levels of relative income, and a smaller proportion of its population live in rural clusters. The Highlands and the Amazon jungle, and particularly the Southern Highland present lower levels of wealth and a greater proportion of persons living in rural clusters. Likewise, these regions have marked ethnic differences. The Highland residents, particularly those of the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) tend to have parents that speak a native language (as an exclusive first language, or in combination with Spanish). The parental language, in this case, is the proxy variable to measure the person's ethnic origin.

**Figure 2.3 Peru Sample Distribution per Region**

The differences we referred to can be clearly seen in the two figures that follow. In Figure 2.4 the distribution of the wealth variable is shown, measured in terms of possession of material goods. For each of the regional strata the respective value of the average attained on the wealth scale<sup>17</sup> is shown, along with the interval of 95% confidence. In Figure 2.4 we can see how residents of Lima metropolitan area have the greatest level of material wealth. The intermediate group is made up of Southern Coast residents and to a lesser degree those of the Northern Coast. The poorest group is concentrated in the Amazon jungle and the three Highland regions.

<sup>17</sup> Interviewees were asked whether they had nine different things (the list is in the R series of the questionnaire, annexed at the end of this study). A point was assigned for every positive answer. Therefore, the resulting wealth scale has a range from zero (has no items) to nine (has all the items sought for).


**Figure 2.4 Peru: Sample Distribution for Average levels of Possession of Material Goods per Region**

We close this chapter showing the distribution by ethnic background of the residents in each of the regions (Figure 2.5). The parental language variable as presented in this figure has two values: 0 for those whose parents speak only Spanish and 100 for those whose parents speak only a native language or speak it as well as Spanish. Using this coding, the respective averages have the same interpretation as a percentage.

Figure 2.5 shows the highest concentration of Andean-origin residents in the Southern Highland (again, if the error bars have no areas in common, this means that the percentage differences are statistically significant). Around 96% of them had at least one parent who spoke a native language. On the other end were residents of the Northern coast, where only 8% said they had a parent who spoke a native language. The second highest group of residents with parents who spoke a native language was in the Central Highland (57% of them). It is noteworthy that around one-third of the residents of Lima metropolitan area are of Andean background, at least in terms of the parental language. This percentage shows the significant migratory process towards this city over the past decades.



Figure 2.5 Peru: Average Number of Persons Whose Parents Speak a Native Language per Region





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### 3 The Concept of Democracy in Peruvian Public Opinion

The concept of democracy has many meanings, reflecting over 2,500 years of history. (Dahl 1989; Dunn 2005; Held 1996; Touraine 1997). Initially democracy described a system based on political equality among those who were considered citizens. In the ancient Greek city of Athens, the cradle of democracy, it was exercised directly, and several political offices were elected by lots (Finley 1983). As time passed, the concept acquired new dimensions. By way of progressive historical experiences and philosophical inquiry, democracy came to be associated with different tributary notions: republicanism, citizen protection, freedom, participation, equality, among others.<sup>18</sup> All these meanings survive to this day and are interwoven in contemporary political discourse.

In this chapter we look into the meanings that Peruvians associate with the notion of democracy. The question that immediately emerges is whether this is actually something important to identify. We believe that this is an empirical question, given that the answer implies examining the different conceptions of democracy that exist in people's minds, and comparing them to other central political attitudes, such as support for democracy, support for the political system, trust in political institutions, and political tolerance. For example, is it possible that those who cannot offer a definition for democracy—of any sort—are more likely to reject the idea of democracy itself? Likewise, is it possible that those who conceptualize democracy as freedom or protection are more tolerant than those who define it as equality or participation? These are, as we say, empirical questions.

There are several ways to examine people's conceptions of democracy. One is to explore the distribution of the traditional definitions: freedom, equality, protection, participation. Another is to examine them from the perspective of which rationality<sup>19</sup> is emphasized: is democracy defined as a system that allows us to access values or norms that are defined as desirable or necessary? Or, on the contrary, do we define democracy as a system that enables us to attain goals that are considered useful or instrumental? Or, finally, is democracy defined in negative or pejorative terms?

Herein we will examine people's definitions of democracy from two perspectives which we will call "traditional" and "alternative", respectively. Aside from describing the definitions people prefer, we will also examine the manner in which these conceptions vary depending on certain social and demographic characteristics and how they relate to central political attitudes (preference for democracy, system support, political trust and tolerance).

However, before taking on this study, it is necessary to determine the degree to which citizens support democracy in Peru. What is the level of attitudinal commitment to democracy in Peru? To obtain answers, the following question was asked:

- **DEM2.** Which of the following phrases do you agree with the most: (1) to people like us, it is the same whether the regime is democratic or non democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of

<sup>18</sup> For a description of the different connotations the ideal of democracy has acquired over time, aside from the aforementioned works, see the essays of C. B. Macpherson (1977) and Lakoff (1996).

<sup>19</sup> For further development of this alternative conception see Sarsfield (2003), Sarsfield and Echegaray (2006), and Sarsfield and Carrión (2006).

government. (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (8) NS/NR


We found that 62.3% of respondents in Peru preferred the democratic option to the other two. Although this percentage is not insignificant, it is, however, one of the lowest among the countries polled in 2006 (Figure 3.1). The greatest support for democracy is found in Costa Rica with 86.1% and in Honduras with 77.6% and the lowest support is registered in Nicaragua 56.8% and in Guatemala with 57.7%. The level of support for democracy in Peru is barely above levels found in Guatemala and is practically identical to that registered in Bolivia.

Support for the authoritarian option among Peruvians is relatively significant given that it borders 18%. This proportion is somewhat similar to that registered in neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador (19.6% and 17.4%, respectively). It is noteworthy that, in spite of their experience of Fujimorian-authoritarianism, the proportion of people who are willing to accept authoritarianism as preferable to democracy under certain circumstances is not inconsiderable. As will be shown throughout this document, the relatively low support for democracy in Peru, when compared to other countries in the region, stems from a series of factors. One is the capacity to provide a substantive definition of democracy, which we examine next.

### ***3.1 Traditional Conceptions: freedom, equality, participation and protection***

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the notion of democracy has different meanings. Traditionally democracy is associated with four central ideas: freedom, equality, participation and protection against political arbitrariness. In the first case, democracy is considered the expression of political and economic freedom. It is assumed that civil and political rights guarantee the autonomy of individuals and the free election of rulers. In the second definition, democracy is conceived as the expression of equality, which is to be understood both substantively (social, gender or ethnic equality) as well as procedurally (equality before the law). Likewise, democracy is defined as citizen participation or the power of the people. Finally, democracy may also be conceived as protection from the abuse of power, whether by rulers or by an intolerant majority.

Figure 3.1 Latin America: Governmental Regime Preferences, 2006



In order to examine the distribution of these conceptions among citizens, the following question was posed:

- What does democracy mean to you? Explain briefly.

This was an open-ended question, which meant that respondents were able to choose freely and put forth the meaning they themselves gave to this notion in their own words. Also, respondents could give it as many as three different meanings. The vast majority (62%) gave a single definition of democracy, and 87% gave only two definitions. Definitions offered by respondents have been grouped into four categories corresponding to the aforementioned dimensions of democracy. These categories and the definitions that correspond to each are described in Figure 3.1. Aside from these four central categories, two residual categories were created. The first is “other definition”, which allows for the incorporation of responses that did not match the four traditional dimensions of democracy.<sup>20</sup> The second residual category is “no definition” which, as its name indicates, includes those who said “democracy has no meaning” or refused to answer the question.

Table 3.2 presents the distribution of this variable in Latin American countries where the question was asked. In Peru, as in the rest of the countries where the 2006 survey took place, the majority identify democracy with its dimension of freedom, although only in four of them is this proportion equal or greater to 50% of respondents: Costa Rica, Panama, Chile and Jamaica. In general, the distribution of traditional definitions in Peru is close to the average, although there can be seen a slightly lower predisposition to give empty responses (“no definition”) and a slightly higher inclination to define democracy as equality (11.9% in Peru compared to the 7.9% average).

**Table 3.1 Definitions of Traditional Conceptions of Democracy**

<b>Freedom</b>	<b>Equality</b>	<b>Participation</b>	<b>Protection</b>
- Freedom (without defining type)	- Equality (not defined)	- Participation (not defined)	- Respect for human rights
- Economic Freedom	- Economic equality, class	- Minority Participation	- Justice
- Freedom of speech, to vote, to choose, to human rights	- Gender equality	- Power of the people	- Obedience to the law, less corruption
- Freedom of movement	- Equality before the law		
- Being independent	- Equality of race or ethnic group		- Living in peace, no war
- Free trade, free business			
- The right to choose leaders			
- Elections, voting			
- Free elections			
- Non-military government			

<sup>20</sup> The category “other definition” includes those who defined democracy as follows: ‘lack of freedom, ‘wellbeing, economic progress, growth’, ‘lack of wellbeing, progress or economic development’, ‘capitalism’, ‘free trade, free business, ‘more job opportunities, ‘lack of jobs’, ‘lack of equality, inequality, ‘limitations in participation’, ‘disorder, lack of justice, corruption’, ‘other response’.

As we said before, what matters is understanding whether the definitions of democracy correlate to other relevant political attitudes. Here we analyze the association of these definitions with four fundamental political attitudes. The first is support for democracy as an ideal system of government.<sup>21</sup> Our hypothesis is that those who cannot offer a definition of democracy, or in its place offer a non-traditional definition, are less likely to support democracy as an ideal system of government. Table 3.1 illustrates the relation between traditional definitions of democracy and political regime preferences. It can be seen that the ability to define democracy in a positive sense is associated with greater support for democracy as an ideal governmental regime. Familiarity with the concept increases its acceptance. On the other hand, those who could not, or would not offer a definition tend to prefer an authoritarian regime. For example, while 24% of those who preferred an authoritarian government under some circumstances offered no definition of democracy, only 12% of those who said to prefer democracy were in the same situation.

**Table 3.2 Latin America: Traditional Conceptions of Democracy, 2006**


	Pais													
	México	Guatemala	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Panamá	Colombia	Perú	Chile	República Dominicana	Haiti	Jamaica	Total
Ninguna	21.3%	31.5%	34.7%	34.6%	32.1%	12.6%	21.8%	31.3%	19.3%	12.8%	33.6%	23.0%	25.0%	25.7%
Libertad	44.6%	38.4%	31.1%	41.4%	35.9%	50.5%	54.2%	33.6%	42.3%	53.0%	44.9%	32.1%	54.7%	42.8%
Igualdad	12.5%	8.3%	8.2%	5.1%	5.8%	4.1%	6.7%	9.6%	11.9%	15.1%	4.3%	9.2%	3.5%	8.0%
Participación	6.5%	2.3%	4.1%	1.5%	6.4%	3.7%	1.5%	12.5%	6.4%	2.9%	1.5%	1.7%	2.7%	4.1%
Protección	7.3%	9.9%	9.3%	8.6%	9.1%	18.7%	3.3%	5.7%	7.3%	6.5%	4.3%	20.8%	4.4%	8.8%
Otra definición	7.8%	9.5%	12.7%	8.8%	10.6%	10.4%	12.6%	7.3%	12.7%	9.7%	11.5%	13.2%	9.8%	10.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Similarly, as can be seen in Table 3.2, almost one-half of those who said they preferred democracy defined it as freedom.

Definitions of democracy, on the other hand, had no substantial effect on other political attitudes such as levels of support for the political system, confidence in political institutions, or levels of political intolerance. This is to say, that in all these cases, defining democracy in a specific manner, or even the inability to give a definition, did not influence the determination of these three attitudes (figures are not presented in order to save space).

Although no significant relation was found between the definitions of democracy and attitudes towards the political system and tolerance, it was found that the individual's definitions influence preferences of political regime. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine in greater detail the socio-demographic characteristics of those who uphold each of these definitions.

<sup>21</sup> Respondents were asked to choose from the following phrases: "For people like me it does not matter whether there is a democratic or a non democratic regime", "democracy is preferable to any other form of government", "under certain circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one."

**Figure 3.2 Peru: Traditional Conceptions of Democracy and Political Regime Preferences, 2006**

The best way to determine the factors that are related to the ability to define democracy is to run a regression analysis using socio-demographic variables as predictors for the definitions of democracy. Given that our dependent variable is nominal and has more than two categories it becomes necessary to use a multinomial logistic regression analysis. As the results are quite extensive they are reproduced in Table 3.5 in the Appendix to the chapter. Here we present a summary table with a list of the variables that are statistically significant (Table 3.3). The most important results are the following (we limit the comparison to those who define democracy as freedom and those who could not give a definition):

- The older the respondent, the greater the probability of defining democracy as freedom.
- A higher educational level increases the probability of defining democracy as freedom and reduces the probability of not being able to define it.
- Material wealth does not influence a person's decision to define democracy as freedom. However, the level of "subjective" income does.<sup>22</sup> People with great

<sup>22</sup> The variable for material income was measured on a scale of possession of goods. The procedure to create this scale has been described on the footnote on page 15. The variable "subjective income" is used in order to determine whether people consider that their income allows them to cover their basic needs. They were asked whether "the salary or pay you receive and the total family income: (a) Is enough, you have savings; (b) Is just enough to get by without great difficulties; (c) Is not enough, you have difficulties; (d) you run out before pay-day, you have great difficulties."

economic difficulties are less likely to define democracy as freedom (this is where the negative sign associated with the respective coefficient comes from).

- Women are more likely to be unable to offer a definition of democracy and are the least likely to define it as freedom.
- Residents in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*), by comparison with the residents of other regions, are less inclined to define democracy as freedom.
- The variables that have no significant statistical effect on the definition of democracy as freedom—once it is controlled for the factors mentioned above—are the following: residence in urban or rural clusters, the size of the city the person lives in, the type of locality (countryside, town or city) where the interviewees were raised as children, or the parental language.<sup>23</sup>

**Table 3.3 Peru: Explanatory Factors for Traditional Definitions of Democracy, 2006**

Predictors	Freedom	Equality	Participation	Protection	Other
Gender	✓	✓	✓		✓
Age	✓		✓	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Material Wealth			✓		
“Subjective” Income	✓	✓			
Size of locality					
Country vs. town or city		✓			
City vs. country or town					
Parental Language					
Sierra Sur vs. rest of country	✓				
Urban vs. rural					
R squared	.193				


Reference Category: No definition. To say whether a variable is statistically significant a check (✓) is placed in the respective box.

Next we will illustrate some of the results. First off, Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of traditional concepts of democracy according to gender. The most important difference that can

<sup>23</sup> The variable related to the place the interviewee was raised is based on the following questions: “When you were a child, where did you live mainly? In the country? Or in the city?” In order to include this question in the regression it was re-coded into two variables. In the first, the options are 0 for “grew-up in the country,” and 1 for “grew up in a town or city.” The second had value 0 for “grew up in the city” and 1 for “grew up in the country or in a town.” A third dichotomous variable is unnecessary as it would be redundant. In order to measure the person’s ethnic origin, a proxy variable was used, the parental language. The question was: “Speaking of the languages your parents know, do your parents speak or spoke only Spanish; Spanish and a native language; only a native language; Spanish and a foreign language?” The variable was re-coded so that it had only two values: 0 for those whose parents spoke only Spanish and 1 for those whose parents spoke only a native language, or a native language and Spanish.

be seen in the graph is that women have a greater tendency to not give a substantial definition of democracy, at a rate that is almost double that of men.


**Figure 3.3 Peru: Traditional Conceptions of Democracy According to Gender, 2006**




Another important variable to take into consideration is education. To illustrate its effect on the definitions of democracy we have collapsed the number of years of education in three main categories. The results are shown in Figure 3.4. Clearly, people who have no formal education or only have primary education are the ones that most frequently are unable to define democracy, and at the same time define it as freedom to a lesser extent.

One of the most important socio-demographic variables in Peru is where the individual lives. As pointed out before, there are important differences in voter behavior and in political attitudes in the different regions of the country. As residents in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*), who are mostly of Andean ethnic origin, tend to have political attitudes and exhibit political behaviors that are different from residents in other regions, we introduced a dichotomous variable into the regression analysis in order to take this fact into account. The results, as mentioned before, confirm that residents in the Southern Highland, as opposed to those who live in other regions, have greater resistance to giving a definition of democracy, or to define it as freedom. The relation can be clearly appreciated in Figure 3.5.

**Figure 3.4 Peru: Traditional Definitions of Democracy by Level of Education, 2006**




**Figure 3.5 Peru: Traditional Definitions of Democracy in the Southern High-Plain and in Other Regions, 2006**



It is significant that residence in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) shows up in the regression as an important predictor of traditional definitions of democracy but not so parental language. This indicates that ethnic origin itself does not influence the person's conceptions of democracy. What is important is the geographic or spatial concentration of people of Andean origin. Those whose parents speak a native language tend to define democracy in a similar manner as those whose parents speak only Spanish when they reside in an area different from the Southern Highland. On the other hand, if they reside in the Southern Highland, (where we remind the reader that 96% have parents who speak a native language) then their attitudes are markedly different. Emigration to other regions and being exposed to different cultural ways dilutes the influence of ethnic origin in their definition of democracy.

To conclude this section, we present the relation between traditional definitions of democracy and "subjective" income. Again, to see the relation more clearly, we have aggregated four original responses into two groups, one that admits the income is sufficient, and another that points out that the income is not enough. Figure 3.6 shows that people with low income have practically double the proportion as the high-income group in the category "no definition," whereas they have less participation than the former in the category "freedom."

**Figure 3.6 Peru: Traditional Definitions of Democracy per "Subjective" Income, 2006**



### 3.2 Alternative Conceptions Based on Rationality-of-Belief

An alternate way to address the issue of peoples' conceptions of democracy is to examine the rationality of these beliefs. One can hold a certain belief, in this case support for democracy, because it provides certain values that are assumed desirable in themselves (for example freedom, equality or justice); or because one thinks democracy produces certain gains or utilities (for example, democracy produces economic progress). In the first case, the commitment to democracy is normative; in the second it is instrumental or utilitarian. But democracy, from the perspective of rationality, can also be defined in pejorative terms (democracy "produces" some negative result, such as disorder or the absence of freedom). Naturally, one can also have an empty definition of democracy (that is, that it cannot be defined in any way). So, these four categories (normative, utilitarian, pejorative and empty) make up alternative conceptions of democracy based on rationality.

As in the case of traditional definitions, we must begin by asking whether these definitions based on the rationality-of-belief have an impact on other political attitudes. Our analysis indicates that, as in the previous case, alternative definitions of democracy affect only preferences for the political regime, but not at the level of support for the system, of confidence in the institutions or of political tolerance. Actually, people that define democracy in normative terms have a greater probability of accepting it as the preferable form of government. Conversely, those that have an empty conception of democracy are more inclined to preferring an authoritarian form of government, or to being indifferent to either authoritarianism or democracy (see Figure 3.7).

The percentage of the Peruvian public that conceives democracy in a normative manner is 67.5%, which places this country in the high-mid point in the region, behind Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico. Conversely, a minute fraction (1.7%) offer negative or pejorative definitions of democracy. Finally, around one fourth of the Peruvian sample offer an empty definition of democracy, which also shows up as an intermediate point between the relatively low proportions (around 15%) found in Chile and Costa Rica, and the relatively high proportions (35% or more) registered in Colombia, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador (Figure 3.8). In brief, the majority of Peruvians, in a proportion that is greater than the average of the surveyed countries, define democracy in normative terms.

Figure 3.7 Peru: Traditional Definitions of Democracy and Political Regime Preferences, 2006





Figure 3.8 Latin America: Alternative Conceptions of Democracy



As in the previous section, in order to determine the influential factors in the adoption of alternative definitions of democracy, a multinomial logistic regression was used. The independent variables are the same used in the analysis of traditional definitions. The summarized results are presented in Table 3.4 and the detailed results are in the appendices (Table 3.6).

**Table 3.4 Peru: Explanatory Factors for Alternative Definitions of Democracy, 2006**

Predictors	Utilitarian	Empty	Negative
Gender		✓	
Age		✓	
Educational Level		✓	✓
Material Wealth	✓		
“Subjective” Income		✓	
Size of Locality of residence	✓		
Country vs. town or city		✓	
City vs. country or town			
Parental Language			
Sierra Sur vs. rest of country		✓	
Urban vs. rural			
R squared	.131		

Reference Category: Normative.

Our analysis centers on those that conceive democracy in normative terms (our reference category in the regression) vis-à-vis those who assign it the “empty” category. The most important findings are the following:

- As in the previous section, here we discover that an increase in age is associated to a *lower* probability of belonging to the group that assigns an empty meaning to democracy, and a *greater* probability of defining it in normative terms.
- Also, an increase in the number of years of education reduces the probability that the interviewee conceives democracy in an empty manner.
- Although material wealth does not have an impact on alternative definitions of democracy, the level of “subjective” income does. Those who say they have great economic problems present a greater probability of assigning an empty content to democracy than to define it in a normative manner.
- Women have a lower inclination to define democracy normatively in comparison with men.

- People who were raised in the country or in a town have a greater probability of defining democracy in normative terms.
- Residents in the *Sierra Sur*, as opposed to residents of other regions, are more inclined to conceive of democracy in empty terms.

In all, as in the case of traditional conceptions of democracy, age, educational level, gender, level of “subjective” income and residence in the Southern Highland all have an important influence on the way democracy is conceived from the perspective of rationality. Besides, in this particular case the kind of cluster where the respondent was raised as a child also shows up as an explanatory factor. Parental language does not appear to be a factor that determines conceptions of democracy, nor does the area of residence (urban or rural). Therefore, we insist that neither the person’s condition nor the Native American background, in themselves, are what influences the definitions of democracy, rather it is the socialization process, economic condition and geographical concentration in a predominantly Native American area, that have an impact on these conceptions.

Next, we illustrate only three of these significant influences. It is evident that the respondent’s ability to assign a substantial content to democracy (either in the traditional sense or some alternative conception based on rationality) is sustained to a great degree by education. Particularly having post-secondary education is a fundamental factor in substantively defining democracy. In Figure 3.9 we can see how the higher the educational level, the greater the ability to define democracy in normative terms. Likewise, the greater the level of education is, the lower the predisposition to assign democracy empty content. This corroborates the widespread idea that education reinforces democratic convictions if we consider that people who define democracy in normative terms have a greater propensity to prefer democracy over authoritarianism (as shown in Figure 3.7).


Education is important, but so is the early socialization process. Our data show that people who were raised in the country or towns have a lower predisposition (or greater difficulty) to define democracy in normative terms, and contrarily, have a greater propensity to assign it an empty content (Figure 3.10). On the other hand, people who were raised in the city exhibit a greater inclination toward conceptualizing democracy in a normative sense. We must remember that the regression analysis showed that this association is significant even when it is controlled by educational levels (although we realize that education also affects these definitions).

Just as early socialization and education are important factors in molding of people’s attitudes towards democracy, so too is residence in the *Sierra Sur*, a region that has historically been marked by exclusion, both social and political. The residents of the Southern Highland have definitions of democracy that are clearly different from those of the residents in the rest of the regions (Figure 3.11). For example, the difference between this one and another group of residents is almost 11 percentage points when it comes to defining democracy in a normative sense. When democracy lacks any specific content for citizens, it is difficult to


conceive that they might defend it. In the case of the Southern Highland, it is entirely understandable that the segment of the population that defines democracy in a manner that lacks any clear content is a significantly higher proportion than the national average. Clearly the processes of marginalization and acute poverty that affect the region are part of the explanation of this phenomenon.

As we have seen in the results of the regression analysis, lower levels of education, lower income, and being raised in country or town settings reduce the probabilities that an individual conceptualize democracy in a normative sense, and therefore, decrease the level of support for democracy as a governmental regime. Unfortunately, the Southern Highland is characterized by levels of education and income that are lower than those in the rest of the country. Its population is likewise characterized for having its processes of early socialization in the country or town settings.


**Figure 3.9 Peru: Alternative Conceptions of Democracy per Educational Level, 2006.**



**Figure 3.10 Peru: Alternative Definitions of Democracy per Place of Origin, 2006**



**Figure 3.1 Peru: Alternative Definitions of Democracy per Area of Residence, 2006**



### 3.3 Appendix. Results of Regression Analyses

Table 3.5 Peru: Predictors of Traditional Conceptions of Democracy, 2006

Variable	Coefficient B	Standard Error
<b>I. Freedom</b>		
Size of locality of Residence	.011	.088
Age	.023	.066**
Education	.166	.024**
Material Wealth	.091	.062
“Subjective” Income	-.336	.106**
Gender (0=women)	-.486	.157*
Country vs. town or city	-.121	.217
City vs. country or town	.315	.212
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	.255	.183
<i>Sierra Sur</i> vs. other regions	-.796	.261*
Rural vs. urban	.401	.307
Intercept	-1.166	.600*
<b>II. Equality</b>		
Size of locality	.019	.117
Age	.011	.008
Education	.194	.032**
Material Wealth	.111	.079
“Subjective” Income	-.296	.137*
Gender (0=women)	-.446	.204*
Country vs. town or city	-.675	.296*
City vs. country or town	.464	.297
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	.282	.248
<i>Sierra Sur</i> vs. other regions	.099	.314
Rural vs. urban	.427	.400
Intercept	-2.949	.796**
<b>III. Participation</b>		
Size of locality	.237	.145
Age	.046	.009**
Education	.248	.038**
Material Wealth	.238	.098*
“Subjective” Income	-.327	.173
Gender (0=women)	-.832	.262*
Country vs. town or city	-.304	.355
City vs. country or town	.147	.331

Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	-.023	.300
<i>Sierra Sur</i> vs. other regions	-.482	.404
Rural vs. urban	.338	.483
Intercept	-5.577	.979**
<b>IV. Protection</b>		
Size of locality	-.081	.134
Age	.026	.009**
Education	.111	.035
Material Wealth	.039	.093
“Subjective” Income	-.265	.160
Gender (0=women)	-.347	.238
Country vs. town or city	.451	.335
City vs. country or town	.217	.334
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	.303	.283
<i>Sierra Sur</i> vs. other regions	-.241	.396
Rural vs. urban	.099	.476
Intercept	-2.405	.908*
<b>V. Other definition</b>		
Size of locality	-.217	.116
Age	.030	.007**
Education	.108	.029**
Material Wealth	.128	.077
“Subjective” Income	-.156	.133
Gender (0=women)	-.517	.198*
Country vs. town or city	-.343	.275
City vs. country or town	-.101	.261
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	.311	.234
<i>Sierra Sur</i> vs. other regions	-.073	.330
Rural vs. urban	.644	.412
Intercept	-1.879	.746*

The reference category is “No definition.” \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .001$

Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .193$ ; -2 log proability = 4265.910, Pi squared 297.356; sig. = .000

Note: in regression tables, the B coefficient indicates the amount of variation in the dependent variable for every unit of variation in the independent variable. In the case of a logistic regression, the B coefficient indicates the proportion to which the dependent variable changes for every unit of variation in the independent variable. If the increase in the independent variable produces a corresponding increase in the dependent variable, then the B coefficient will have a positive sign. If, on the contrary, the increase in the independent variable produces a decrease in the dependent variable, then the B coefficient will have a negative sign. The B coefficient is expressed in the original values of the independent variable. The Beta coefficient (used in some tables in this study), different from the B coefficient, is expressed in units of standard error.

**Table 3.6 Peru: Predictors of Alternative Conceptions of Democracy, 2006**

Variable	Coefficient B	Standard error
<b>I. Utilitarian</b>		
Size of locality	-.346	.175*
Age	.010	.010
Education	-.033	.041
Material Wealth	-.276	.108*
“Subjective” Income	.019	.192
Gender (0=women)	.170	.281
Country vs. town or city	-.074	.419
City vs. country or town	-.023	.390
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	.602	.380
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	.922	.496
Rural vs. urban	.477	.628
Intercept	-1.897	1.077
<b>II. Empty</b>		
Size of locality	-.104	.073
Age	-.013	.005*
Education	-.131	.019**
Material Wealth	-.008	.049
“Subjective” Income	.318	.086**
Gender (0=women)	.298	.127*
Country vs. town or city	-.194	.177
City vs. country or town	-.404	.171*
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	-.203	.149
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	.426	.210*
Rural vs. urban	-.125	.256
Intercept	.622	.481
<b>III. Negative</b>		
Size of locality	.307	.226
Age	-.008	.015
Education	-.168	.063*
Material Wealth	.002	.165
“Subjective” Income	-.177	.286
Gender (0=women)	-.576	.431
Country vs. town or city	-.689	.613
City vs. country or town	.094	.537
Parental Language (0=only Spanish)	-.088	.515
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	-.580	.649
Rural vs. urban	-.587	.739
Intercept	-1.618	1.557

The reference category is “Normative”. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .001$   
 Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .131$ ; -2 log probability = 2224.149, Pi squared 162.562; sig. = .000

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## 4 Attitudinal Base for a Stable Democracy

This chapter will deal with the issue of the existing attitudinal base for a stable democracy in Peru. The starting point for this analytical exercise is the assumption that political attitudes have an important effect (though not necessarily a determinant one) in the establishment of a stable democracy. Obviously, this is a contentious affirmation. Some insist on the importance of political culture (understood to be attitudes, norms and values) for the consolidation of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1988, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris 1999; Putnam 1993; Pye and Verba 1965). Others argue that the notion of political culture is so full of conceptual problems that it is best to abandon it (Jackman and Miller 2004; Johnson 2003), or they are sceptical about its usefulness (Knight 2001). Critics of the notion of political culture as a conceptual tool prefer to highlight the role that institutions play in the development of a solid democracy (Jackman and Miller 2004). Others, while not directly criticizing the political culture model, rather emphasize the analysis of the form of government, that is, whether it is parliamentary or presidential (Linz 1994<sup>24</sup>). Finally, we must remember the body of work that links the emergence and development of democracy to historical and cultural factors (Mahoney 2001; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Skocpol 1979). This debate deserves more extensive consideration than what we can dedicate to it in this study.

In this study we will examine two basic attitudes: support for the political system and political tolerance. Our objective is not only identifying the correlates to these attitudes, but also determining the degree to which Peru has the necessary attitudinal basis for the consolidation of a stable democracy.

### 4.1 Support for the Political System

Support for the political system, aside from support for the incumbent government, is important in that it fosters the existence of a reservoir of “good will” that can save democracy during periods of crisis or emergency (Easton 1965). Naturally, this support is intimately tied into the performance of the political system and its institutions. Good institutional performance generates greater support for the system, and in turn, an increase in support for the system assists in legitimizing democracy. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with political institutions can, in the long run, reduce the legitimacy of democracy (Easton 1975). Therefore, authoritarian options that seek to completely eliminate democracy generally use the strategy of attacking political institutions. They accuse them of being inefficient, corrupt, or unheeding of citizen demands. They offer themselves as the solution to unsolvable problems (Linz 1978). A population that is disenchanted with its political institutions (since among other reasons, they may well be corrupt and unmindful of citizen demands), run the risk of being attracted to the anti-institutional discourse of non-democratic leaders. But as Norris (1999) points out, not all of the citizens who are critical of the system reject democracy. Many may be “dissatisfied democrats” who give little

<sup>24</sup> For criticism of Linz's proposal see studies compiled in Mainwaring and Shugart (1997).

or no support for the political system because they perceive that it is dysfunctional, and yet remain committed to the idea of democracy itself. In any case, whether dealing with citizens who abandon democracy because they reject the political system or citizens who remain true to democracy but are critical of the system, it is important to determine the existing levels of support for the political system.

The measure of support for the political system used here is a series of questions that have been used quite successfully in a variety of national contexts.<sup>25</sup> In our survey, the series exhibits a high degree of reliability (Alpha Cronbach 0.77). Also, a factorial analysis of the principal components<sup>26</sup> of these questions shows that only one component can be extracted, which means that there is a high correlation between these questions and a single underlying variable, which in this case is support for the political system. These questions, and their respective introduction, are the following:

- Now we are going to use a card. This card has a seven point scale: each one indicates a score that goes from one which means NOT AT ALL to seven which means A LOT. For example if I ask you how much you like to watch television, if you do not like it, NOT AT ALL, you would chose a score of one. If on the other hand you like television A LOT, you would say the number seven. If your opinion is between not-at-all and a-lot choose an intermediate score. So, how much do you like to watch television? **[Make sure the respondent understands correctly].**
- **B1.** To what extent do you believe the courts in Peru guarantee a fair trial? (*Probe: if you believe the courts do not guarantee justice at all choose number one; if you believe the courts guarantee justice a lot choose number seven, or choose an intermediate score*).
- **B2.** To what degree do you respect the political institutions of Peru?
- **B3.** To what degree do you think that the citizen's basic rights are being protected by the political system in Peru?
- **B4.** To what degree do you feel proud to live under the political system in Peru?
- **B6.** To what degree do you think you should support the political system in Peru?

What we will next show in great detail can be summed up in a few words: Peruvians present a very low level of support for the political system, one of the lowest registered in all the countries surveyed in 2006. As we will see, different factors affect this level of support. For example, citizens who are traditionally marginalized by the political system such as the residents of the *Sierra Sur* and those of Andean background, exhibit lower support for the political system. But before going into detail, it is necessary to compare the existing levels of support in Peru with those of the rest of the Latin American countries which we have information for.

Figure 4.1 presents the levels of support for the political system in the region.<sup>27</sup> It can be seen that in Peru support for the political system is not only low, it is one of the lowest in Latin America. Its average is only higher than in Haiti and Ecuador. This result is relatively surprising when you consider that both Haiti and Ecuador have recently gone through respective political crises, which would explain the low level of citizen support for the system. Haiti has had to


<sup>25</sup> The long list of studies is published on the LAPOP web page ([www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)). A recent article that uses this battery for the Peruvian case is Seligson and Carrión (2002). Also see Seligson (2002).

<sup>26</sup> The factorial analysis results are not included in order to save space.

<sup>27</sup> To facilitate interpretation, each of the questions was numerically transformed so that the resulting scale (the average sum of the five items) has a range from zero to one hundred.

endure an invasion of foreign troops, as well as political instability and violence. In Ecuador, since the nineties none of the popularly elected presidents has finished his term. By comparison, Peru has shown a greater level of stability after the 2000 political crisis that lead to the destitution of president Fujimori.

**Figure 4.1 Latin America: Average Levels of Support for the Political System, 2006**



What then can explain this widespread discontent with the Peruvian political system? Certainly, the low score is not a statistical mirage caused by the fact that Peruvians have a particularly negative attitude in only one of the five questions that make up our scale on support for the system. On the contrary, and as can be seen in the figures placed in appendix 4.4.1 in this chapter, Peruvians exhibit a very low level of support in each of the five questions. Actually, in the question about whether the courts guarantee a fair trial, Peru comes in last place in the region. Likewise, Peru is in penultimate place in the question about whether basic political rights are safeguarded by the political system. In the other three questions, Peru shows up among the four lowest countries in terms of support. As we will argue below, the extremely low level of support for the political system reflects a combination of influences that are structural, contextual, political and ideological.

We have developed seven explanatory models to identify the factors that determine support for the political system. Each of these models examines groups of similar variables that can have a significant effect in determining support for the political system. This is a conceptually more rigorous strategy than trying to group all possible factors in a single regression model. In the first model we incorporate the socio-demographic variables (gender, age, level of education, income, place of residence, size of locality of residence, residence in the

Southern Highland versus residence in other places around the country, parental language and the type of locality where they were raised).<sup>28</sup> We considered it important to add to these factors the respondent's opinion regarding the incumbent government (in this case, the government of Alejandro Toledo) as a control variable. The reason to do so stems from the fact that the relevant literature shows it is very difficult for the majority of the population to distinguish between the general political system and the particular incumbent government (Citrin 1974).

Our second model (or group of influences) includes the previous variables and those related to interest in politics and knowledge thereof. A great variety of studies demonstrate the importance of the knowledge of politics and interest therein for determining attitudes towards the political system in general, and democracy in particular.<sup>29</sup> The variables we introduce into this model are the following: the frequency of watching the news on the television, the degree of interest in politics and the level of knowledge of politics.<sup>30</sup> The third model includes all of the previous variables, and introduces three questions associated with social capital and Inglehart's theory (1977, 1988) that life satisfaction increases the level of support for democracy. The specific variables used are the level of interpersonal trust, the degree of participation in community activities, and the level of life satisfaction.<sup>31</sup> The fourth model includes the previous values along with variables associated with perceptions of threats to economic or personal security. Our hypothesis is that those with a greater sense of insecurity would be less disposed to support the political system because they would accuse it of being responsible for this insecurity. The feeling of economic insecurity is measured using the respondent's assessment of the country's economic situation, and of his or her own personal economic situation compared to the year prior to the survey. Our supposition is that those who assess these situations negatively have a greater degree of economic insecurity than those who assess them positively (that is, they say the country or they themselves are better off this year compared to last). Also, we assume that those who have been victims of corruption and crime will exhibit a greater degree of personal insecurity<sup>32</sup> and are therefore less inclined to supporting the political system.

<sup>28</sup> To measure income we used both the variable "subjective" income as well as the possession of material goods.

<sup>29</sup> For a brief sample see Althaus (2003), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), Grofman (1995), Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody (1996) and Zaller (1992).

<sup>30</sup> We asked "how often do you watch the news on TV (every day, once or twice a week, rarely, never)? We also asked "to what degree are you interested in politics: a lot, some, a little, nothing? Both questions were recoded so the answers went from the lowest to the highest degree of interest. The scale for political knowledge was created by adding the correct answers to the following questions: "What is the name of the current president of the United States? What is the name of the President of the Congress of Peru? How many departments does the country have? How long is the presidential term in Peru? What is the name of the President of Brazil?" The scale has a range from zero (low level of knowledge) to five (high level of knowledge).

<sup>31</sup> The questions used were the following: "In the past year, have you contributed to the solution of any problem in your community or neighbors in your barrio?" (If not) "Now talking about the people around here, would you say that the people in your community are very reliable, somewhat reliable, a little reliable, or not at all reliable." "Speaking of things in general, to what extent are you satisfied with your life? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?"

<sup>32</sup> The specific questions were the following: "Do you consider the country's current economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago? Do you consider that your current economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?" To measure the feeling of personal security we used two instruments. First, we used the victimization by corruption scale, and it is the total number of times a person has been a victim of corruption in the previous year. For more details on this scale see the chapter on corruption. The other instrument

The fifth model adds the variable of ideology to the previously stated values. The hypothesis is clear: those who define themselves as ideologically more conservative are more likely to have a greater level of support for the system than those who define themselves as less conservative. To measure ideology the respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is left and 10 is right.<sup>33</sup> The sixth model includes the previous variables and a variable of satisfaction with local government. The hypothesis is that people who are content with the local government's performance have a greater probability of supporting the political system in general.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, the last model we use to predict the levels of support for the system includes, aside from the previous variables, a variable that measures the respondent's authoritarian tendencies. The questions are related to the way in which people and children should be treated, and therefore are not "contaminated" by any political content. In this way, this scale of authoritarian attitudes can be used to predict political attitudes without running the risk of using variables that are too similar to the ones that we want to explain, an error that some researchers make. The authoritarian attitude scale is the average sum of the answers to four questions.<sup>35</sup> Our working hypothesis is that more authoritarian people—who are consequently more inclined to supporting the existing order and the established authorities—must present a greater level of support for the political system than those who are less authoritarian.

Each of these models was used to predict scores on the scale of political support for the system. This strategy allows us to determine two things: in the first place, what the control variables are (socio-demographic, and presidential approval) that have a more consistent effect on political support and, in second place it allows us to identify the specific effect each set of variables has on determining the degree of political support.

Interpreting the results of what are actually seven multiple regressions could be confusing. To make reading easier, we present a summary in which we list all the variables of the models and we present the variables that appear statistically significant (we use the symbol ✓ to identify them; the shaded area means the variables were not included in the respective

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is victimization by crime. Question: "Have you been a victim of an act of crime in the course of the previous 12 months? (Yes or no.)"

<sup>33</sup> "On this form there is a scale from 1 to 10 that goes from left to right. Nowadays many people, when they talk about political tendencies, talk about people who sympathize more with the left and people that sympathize more with the right. According to your understanding of "left" and "right," when you think of your political point of view, where do you place yourself on this scale? Point to the box that is closest to your position."

<sup>34</sup> Satisfaction with local government was measured by the following question: "Would you say that the service the municipality gives people is: Very-good, good, neither-good-nor-bad, bad, or very-bad?" The question was recoded so the evaluation goes from negative to positive.

<sup>35</sup> "Now we are going to talk about certain attitudes people have. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means you do-not-agree-at-all and 7 means you agree-very-much, to what degree do you agree with these statements? AA1. A very effective way to correct employee's errors is to reprimand them in front of other employees. AA2. The person who brings most money home should have the final say in decisions taken at home. AA3. At school, children should ask questions only when the teacher tells them to. AA4. When children misbehave, it is right for parents to spank them."

model).<sup>36</sup> Table 4.1 shows the consistent impact of ethnic origin and living in areas that are characterized by a greater degree of social exclusion on the levels of support for the political system. In all the models, the variable “parental language” emerges as significant. That is, having parents who speak a native language—whether exclusively or in conjunction with Spanish—reduces the levels of support for the system. Likewise, in all the models the place of residence of the respondent appears statistically significant. In six out of seven models, “subjective” income emerges as an explanatory variable for political support. The greater the individual’s perception of economic insufficiency (income is “not enough”), the lower is the support for the system. Neither gender, nor age, nor education, nor the size of the locality of residence, nor the kind of place they were raised in childhood, nor the urban or rural environment show up as significant predictors of the level of political support.

Similarly, and as had been expected, the levels of approval for presidential performance have a positive effect on the evaluation that respondents have of the political system. This is an indicator that the general attitude towards the system is affected by the way people evaluate the president. The consequence of this relation is cause for concern because it suggests fragility for the attitudes towards the political system in Peru and their dependence on the president’s effectiveness (and corresponding citizen assessment). A disastrous presidential performance can have a deep effect on the people’s disposition to support the system.

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<sup>36</sup> The total results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4.4, annex 4.4.3.

**Table 4.1 Peru: Variables that Predict Support for the Political System, 2006**

Predictors	MODELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gender							
Age							
Education							
“Subjective” income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Scale of possession of material goods	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Size of locality of residence							
Country vs. town or city							
City vs. Country or town							
Parental Language	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Sur vs. rest of the country	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban vs. rural							
Approval of president	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Watches the TV News							
Knowledge of politics							
Interest in politics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Interpersonal trust							
Community Participation							
Life Satisfaction			✓	✓	✓		
Retrospective Economic Evaluation of country							
Retrospective personal Economic Evaluation							
Victim of corruption				✓	✓	✓	✓
Victim of crime							
Ideology					✓	✓	✓
Satisfaction with local government						✓	✓
Authoritarian Values							✓
Adjusted R squared	.099	.111	.115	.127	.136	.143	.149

Note: To show a variable is statistically significant a ✓ check mark is placed in the respective box. The shaded areas indicate that the variable was not included in the respective regression analysis model.

Several additional results that merit discussion show up in the regression analysis. First of all, it is surprising to find that the amount of political knowledge does not have an impact on determining support for the system. Neither does following current events on the news on television. What does have a significant impact, however, is the degree of interest in politics. It increases the level of support for the system. This is a very strong effect that appears in all the models where the variable was included. Greater familiarity with the system—the supposed consequence of a greater interest in politics—has a positive repercussion on levels of support.

In second place, the results indicate that variables associated with the theory of social capital (e.g. participation in community activities and interpersonal trust) have no significant impact on support for the system. On the other hand, we find a partial confirmation of Inglehart's theory that says greater life satisfaction affects attitudes towards the political system. In three of the five models where it is included, the results show that people who are more satisfied with their life exhibit a greater degree of support for the system. Therefore, there is a political "bonus" associated with personal happiness.<sup>37</sup>

We have found that the relation between personal insecurity and support for the political system is complex. Economic insecurity—measured in terms of the perception of deterioration regarding the economic situation both at the personal and the national levels—does not significantly impact attitudes towards the political system. Likewise, there is no evidence for the hypothesis that persons who are directly affected by crime support the political system any less. Even so, data show a very strong support for the hypothesis that corruption affects the levels of support for the system, which is consistent with several previous studies (Canache 2005; Seligson 2006). An individual who has been affected by corruption supports the political system less than a person who has not been a victim of corruption.


The evaluations of the last three models show that each of the added variables turns out to be statistically significant. Just as expected, the respondent's ideology has an important role in determining the level of support, and those who place themselves more to the right exhibit greater levels of support. Also, satisfaction with the local government's performance increases support for the political system as a whole. This result is encouraging because it indicates that the negative effects that socio-demographic variables have on the level of support for the system can be countered by an effective government at the local level. Finally, we find that, as expected, persons with greater authoritarian tendencies tend to support the system to a greater degree than those who are less authoritarian.

Considering all this, the graphic representation of these results is important because it makes it possible to appreciate the direction and force of the association of these variables and support for the system. Next we present the figures that illustrate some of these relations.


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<sup>37</sup> There is a growing body of literature associated with the study of happiness, its causes and its consequences in politics. Aside from Inglehart's aforementioned studies, see Radcliff (2001) and Graham and Pettinato (2002).


**Figure 4.2 Peru: Support for the System per Parental Language, 2006**




**Figure 4.3 Peru: Support for the System per Place of Residence, 2006**




**Figure 4.4 Peru: Support for the System per Degree of Approval of President, 2006**




**Figure 4.5 Peru: Support for the System per Degree of Satisfaction with life, 2006**




**Figure 4.6 Peru: Support for the System per Level of Victimization of Corruption, 2006**



**Figure 4.7 Peru: Support for the System per Ideology, 2006**



**Figure 4.8 Peru: Support for the System per Level of Satisfaction with the Local Government, 2006**

## 4.2 Political Tolerance

Another fundamental attitude that contributes to the development of a stable democracy is tolerance of minorities. Tolerance is important because it forestalls the distortion of the basic democratic principle of government by the majority and it prevents it from turning into the tyranny of the majority. Similarly, tolerance is fundamental because it guarantees full functioning of a value that is intimately associated with democracy, which is liberty.<sup>38</sup> An added benefit of tolerance is that it helps to reduce the level of social conflict that has the potential of becoming a serious political conflict. Tolerance reduces the risk of the majority mobilizing against what they consider to be “provocative” or “treasonous” minorities; also, tolerance helps prevent violent reactions by the minorities who feel their liberties have been violated by “oppressive” or “abusive” majorities. Finally, tolerance is important because it is the psychological sustenance of civil liberties associated with a robust citizenry; in the end, tolerance is conceived as a principal component of democratic personality (Lasswell 1951; Sniderman 1975). In all—as has been argued on numerous opportunities—political tolerance strengthens democracy (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1982).

There is a lengthy debate about the best way to measure political tolerance. It is unnecessary to repeat it here. For the purposes of our research, and following the line of work at LAPOP, tolerance will be measured here as the will to accept the basic political and civil rights

<sup>38</sup> The classic argument for this position is in John Stuart Mill’s *On Freedom*.

of people “who always speak badly of the government”.<sup>39</sup> Although the questionnaire used several items to measure tolerance, the analysis that follows centers on four questions that specifically measure political tolerance. The questions are the following:

- The following questions are to get to know your opinion about different ideas that people who live in Peru have. Use the 10 point scale.
- **D1.** There are persons who always speak badly of the form of government in Peru, not only the incumbent government, but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of **the right** of these people **to vote**? Please read a number on the scale.
- **D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right of these people be able to carry out **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view? Please read me the number.
- **D3.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right of these people to be able to **run for public office**?
- **D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right of these people appear on television to **give a speech**?


Contrary to what we found in the previous section where Peru was placed at the lowest levels of support for the system, in terms of political tolerance Peruvians hold an intermediate rank in the region. In each of the previous four questions, the level of tolerance found in Peru is above that is registered in the other Andean countries that were surveyed in 2006, although the differences with Colombia are quite small (see the figures in Appendix 4.4.2, this chapter). Naturally, it can be said that Peruvian tolerance is below that found in some Central American and Caribbean countries like El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and even, surprisingly, Haiti.

In Figure 4.9 there is the distribution of tolerance scores in fifteen Latin American countries. The Peruvian average is slightly above 50, which means that tolerance in this country is practically at the intermediate point in the distribution. As noted, this average is practically the same as that registered in Colombia (53.6 and 51.8, respectively) but it is significantly greater than that found in Ecuador and Bolivia (46.8 and 43.9, respectively). In the Andean region, Peruvians and Colombians registered the highest levels of tolerance.

What factors affect the degree of tolerance in Peru? To answer this question, it is necessary to run a regression analysis as we did in the previous section, to examine the different possible influences. To this end we will use the same models that were previously employed to predict the levels of support for the system, except two. The first exception is that we included the evaluation of the president's performance only in the last model, and not in the others as we had done in the case of the analysis of support for the political system. This decision is based on the fact that there is no fundamental reason to assume that the perception of the president's effectiveness might affect the levels of political tolerance. That is why, instead of placing it as a control variable (present in all the models), we included it in only one of them to see if it did indeed have an explanatory effect (we found that it does not). The second exception is that in this analysis we did not include the scale of possession of material wealth. Neither this, nor “subjective income” appear as explanatory variables of tolerance, so we decided to eliminate them from the analysis and only keep “subjective” income as a control variable.

<sup>39</sup> For extensive support for this measure see Seligson and Córdova (1995).

Figure 4.9 Latin America: Average Level of Political Tolerance, 2006




In Table 4.2 there is a summary of the information from the results of the multiple regressions. We note in this table which variables turned up as statistically significant (the complete results are in Appendix 4.5). It is evident at first sight that the factors that explain political tolerance are quite scarce. In the first model, gender shows up as an explanatory factor (men are more tolerant than women), but this effect disappears when other variables are introduced into subsequent models. Actually, only three variables—two socio-demographic variables and one contextual variable—show up as important predictors of political tolerance.

**Table 4.2 Peru: Explanatory Variables for Political Tolerance, 2006**

Predictors	POLITICAL TOLERANCE MODELS						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gender	✓						
Age							
Education							
“Subjective” income							
Size of Locality of Residence							
Country vs. Town or City							
City vs. Country or Town							
Parental Language							
Sierra Sur vs. rest of the country	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban vs. rural							
Watches the TV News							
Knowledge of politics							
Interest in politics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Interpersonal trust							
Community Participation							
Life Satisfaction							
Economic Evaluation of country							
Personal Economic Evaluation							
Victim of corruption							
Victim of crime				✓	✓	✓	✓
Ideology							
Satisfaction with local government							
Approval of President							
Authoritarian Values							✓
Adjusted R squared	.009	.015	.014	.016	.017	.017	.018

The results consistently show that residence in areas different from the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) increases the level of political tolerance. This relation can be clearly seen in Figure 4.10. It seems—and somewhat paradoxically—that the strong rejection of the political system that is found in this part of the country, mostly poor and of Andean origin, does not predispose people to greater tolerance towards those who “always speak badly of the form of government.” It is clear that the residents of this region exhibit political attitudes that are markedly different from those in the rest of the country.

**Figure 4.10 Peru: Average levels of Political Tolerance per Region (Southern High-Plain vs. other regions), 2006**




The second variable that is consistently associated to tolerance is interest in politics. In the previous section we saw that people who said they had a greater interest in politics exhibited a greater level of support for the system. Here we find that they are also the ones with higher levels of political tolerance. The relation is a solid one: those who say they are very interested in politics have a tolerance average that is almost 10 points greater than those who say they have no interest in public issues (Figure 4.11). People who follow politics with interest have a greater probability of being exposed with greater frequency to basic democratic principles and to the emphasis they place on civil and political rights. That is why it is not surprising to find that those who are least disposed to curtailing the citizen's rights to vote, to public gathering, to participation and expression, even those who are opposed to the system, are those who have a higher degree of interest in politics.

Another variable that shows up as a consistent predictor of tolerance is the condition of having been a victim of crime. However, the direction of the relation is the opposite of what one might expect. The literature about authoritarianism argues that the feeling of personal insecurity increases a person's authoritarian tendencies.<sup>40</sup> Given this, it might be expected that people who have been victims of a recent crime should have a lower degree of tolerance than those who have not been victims. Evidence, however, shows that people who have *not* been victims have lower

<sup>40</sup> The classic version of this proposal can be found in Fromm (1941) and Reich (1970; originally published in German in 1933). A more recent version has been developed in Stenner (2005). Also see Adorno *et al.* (1950) and Altemeyer (1988, 1996).


tolerance than those who have (Figure 4.12). Admittedly the difference is not a dramatic one (just 4 points on the scale), but it is statistically significant.

**Figure 4.11 Peru: Average levels of Political Tolerance per Interest in Politics, 2006**




A hypothesis that can explain this paradoxical relation is that the relation between tolerance and victimization by crime in Peru is mediated by the degree of support for the political system. People who have been victims of crime are more inclined to supporting the rights of those who criticize the existing form of government only when they themselves also reject the political system. Since, as seen in the prior section, the majority of individuals have a very low level of support for the system, it can be seen that the condition of having been a victim of crime increases the degree of political tolerance instead of reducing it. This relation can be clearly seen in figure 4.13. Among those who have a low level of support for the system, the victims of crime have *higher* tolerance than those who have not been victims. On the other hand, among those who have a high level of support for the system, victims of crime—as the existing theory argues—are *less* tolerant than people who have not been victims.

**Figure 4.12 Peru: Averages of Tolerance per Condition of Victim by Crime, 2006**




**Figure 4.13 Peru: Political Tolerance per Condition of Victimization by Crime and Level of Support for the Political System, 2006**



To end this section it is necessary to offer some words about the relation between ideology and political tolerance. Ideology—measured by a left-to-right scale—is not statistically significant at the strict level we have set for this study (0.05, which means our confidence level is 95%). The ideology variable does not reach this level but it gets very close to it (in the three models where it is included its significance is .056, .057 and .063, respectively). The coefficients associated to ideology have a negative sign, which means that people closer to the left tend to have a greater degree of political tolerance. This was expected because, after all, we are asking for an opinion regarding those who “always speak badly about the form of government,” and those who are placed more towards the left are no doubt the most critical of the form of government. Nevertheless, and as shown in Figure 4.14, the relation between ideology and tolerance is not lineal. Those closest to the left are the most tolerant but the closest to the right are also more tolerant than those who place themselves in the center of the political spectrum (though not as tolerant as those who are placed on the left). Finding that persons with the most extreme ideological positions (that is left or right) tend to be more tolerant is important because this contradicts the generalized idea that the people in “the center” are more tolerant, in political terms. This finding is consistent with the fact that people with greater interest in politics are the most tolerant, because it is reasonable to suppose that a greater interest in politics is related to the most extreme ideological positions.

**Figure 4.14 Peru: Average levels of Tolerance per Ideology, 2006**



### 4.3 Attitudinal Bases for a Stable Democracy

It has been argued that the combination of a high level of support for the system and a high level of political tolerance generate attitudinal bases that are favorable for the establishment of a stable democracy (Seligson and Cordova 1993; Seligson 2000). The assumption in this proposal is that a political community requires the active support of its citizens but this support must not translate to levels of intolerance towards those who challenge or criticize it. A high degree of loyalty towards the political system combined with low tolerance can produce stability, but an authoritarian character can emerge because the possible repression of dissident voices may be accepted by the majority of the population. On the other hand, a low level of support for the political system among the population endangers the continuity of democracy because it can generate sympathy for authoritarian options, particularly if the low level of support is combined with low levels of tolerance. Seligson and Cordova argue that when these two variables are crossed (high and low tolerance with high and low support for the system) four theoretical situations are produced: stable democracy (high support for the system and high tolerance), unstable democracy (high tolerance but low support for the system), authoritarian stability (low tolerance but high support for the system), and democracy at risk (low tolerance and low support for the system).<sup>41</sup> Our interest in this section is in identifying the percentages that each of these theoretical cases hold, and examine the factors that influence the placement of the respondents in the case “stable democracy” which is an attitude that favors democratic stability.

How are these attitudes distributed in Peru? This information is in Table 4.3. Around one fifth of the interviewees (21.1%) present attitudes that are favorable for the establishment of a stable democracy. Whereas, a significantly higher percentage (33%) is in the box for “democracy at risk,” that is, showing a low support for the system and low political tolerance. Almost a third more of those interviewed appear in the category “unstable democracy” where high tolerance is combined with low support for the system.

<sup>41</sup> It should be remembered that both the scale of support for the system as well as the scale for tolerance have a 0 to 100 range. For this analytical exercise, all those with a score below 50 are classified as “low” (support and tolerance) whereas those with a score of over 50 are assigned a “high” category.

**Table 4.3 Peru: Empirical Relation between Support for the System and Political Tolerance, 2006**

Apoyo al sistema		Tolerancia política		Total
		Alta	Baja	
Alto	21.2% (democracia estable)	16.1% (estabilidad autoritaria)	37.3%	62.7%
	29.7% (democracia inestable)	33.0% (democracia en riesgo)		
Total	50.9%	49.1%	100.0%	


Chi cuadrado: 12.127; sig= .000

To test whether the 21.2% of those interviewed are in the box for “stable democracy” it is necessary to compare it with where the other Latin American countries are. This comparison suggests that the attitudes that are conducive to a stable democracy in Peru are relatively scarce in comparison with the majority of Latin American countries. Actually, Peruvian percentages are among the lowest in the region, barely above those registered in Ecuador and Bolivia (Figure 4.15). It is significant to find that the three countries with the lowest levels of support for the system and political tolerance are the Central Andean countries. As we know, this sub-region has been marked by a high degree of political instability and dissatisfaction with heads of state and this has repercussions on citizen discontent with the political institutions.


According to the degree that the attitude of support for a stable democracy is combined with support for the system and political tolerance, it is reasonable to suppose that the factors that affect these attitudes also have an impact on the attitude that is the combination of both. That is why we focus the analysis on only some of the factors that were mentioned before.

Initially, it is necessary to insist once more on the important role that the people’s origin and ethnic background play in determining this important political attitude. People whose parents speak a native language—either exclusively or in conjunction with Spanish—exhibit attitudes that are less conducive to a stable democracy (Figure 4.16); so do those who live in the *Sierra Sur*—a mostly Andean-population area. Likewise, residents of this region—a region with the greatest levels of social and economic insufficiency in the country and a high proportion of Andean-origin residents—presents the lowest level of support for the system and of political tolerance (Figure 4.17).


**Figure 4.15 Latin America: Proportion of Respondents with Attitudes Conducive to Stable Democracy, 2006**



**Figure 4.16 Perú: Favorable Attitudes for Establishing a Stable Democracy per Parental Language, 2006**



**Figure 4.17 Peru: Favorable Attitudes for the Establishment of a Stable Democracy per Region of Residence, 2006**




Similarly, there is a strong correlation between the assessment of the president's performance and the attitudes that favor a stable democracy (Figure 4.18). This correlation is cause for concern because it suggests that the failure of a government and its concomitant lack of popularity can undermine the survival of democracy. Citizens in established or consolidated democracies have to distinguish between the performance of the incumbent government and the effectiveness of the political system in general. Precisely, a characteristic of non-consolidated democracies is that this separation does not exist and, therefore, the continuation of the precarious democracy to a great extent depends on relatively successful governments.


Ideology also has an important impact on attitudes that favor stable democracies. People who are to the left on the ideology spectrum tend to have attitudes that are less favorable than those who are on the other end of the spectrum (Figure 4.19). This reflects the low level of support for the system that is found among those who identify themselves with the left. As we remember, levels of tolerance are higher among those who define themselves as being on the right.

Finally, we find that the existing corruption in State offices and society in general has a negative effect on attitudes that favor a stable democracy (Figure 4.20). In general, and with only one exception, it can be seen that the greater the level of victimization by corruption, the lower the percentage of attitudes that favor a stable democracy. This clearly corroborates the pernicious effect that corruption has on the attitudes citizens have towards the political system.


**Figure 4.18 Peru: Attitudes that Favor a Stable Democracy per Approval of President's Performance, 2006**



**Figure 4.19 Peru: Attitudes that Favor a Stable Democracy per Ideology, 2006**




**Figure 4.20 Peru: Support for Democracy per Victimization by Corruption, 2006**




## 4.4 Appendix. Additional Graphs and Regression Analyses

### 4.4.1 Comparative Graphs: Support for the Political System


Figure 4.21 Latin America: Average levels of Support for the Courts, 2006




**Figure 4.22 Latin America: Average levels of Support for Political Institutions, 2006**




**Figure 4.23 Latin America: Average levels of Rating of People that Believe their Basic Rights are protected, 2006**



**Figure 4.24 Latin America: Average levels of Rating of People that are Proud to live in the Political System, 2006**




**Figure 4.25 Latin America: Average levels of Rating of People that Believe the Political System should be supported, 2006**




#### 4.4.2 Comparative Political Tolerance Graphs


**Figure 4.26 Latin America: Average levels of Tolerance towards the Right to Vote of People who speak badly of the Government, 2006**




**Figure 4.27 Latin America: Average levels of Tolerance towards People's right to participate in Peaceful Demonstrations, 2006**



**Figure 4.28 Latin America: Average levels of Tolerance towards People's Right to Run for Public Office, 2006**



**Figure 4.29 Latin America: Average Approval Rating for People's Right to Appear on TV, 2006**



### 4.4.3 Regression Analysis: Support for the System and Political Tolerance

Table 4.4 Peru: Predictors of Support for the System, 2006

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	65.625 (5.415)**	61.748 (5.758)**	62.574 (6.025)**	63.796 (6.104)**	56.733 (6.543)**	46.061 (7.175)**	41.658 (7.285)**
Gender (0=Women)	-.741 (1.014)	-.984 (1.074)	-.143 (1.074)	-.750 (1.074)	-.435 (1.111)	-.216 (1.110)	-.785 (1.21)
Age	-.015 (.036)	-.007 (.036)	-.005 (.037)	-.004 (.037)	-.007 (.038)	-.004 (.038)	-.009 (.038)
Education	-.088 (.148)	-.111 (.161)	-.102 (.161)	-.092 (.161)	-.054 (.166)	-.026 (.166)	.041 (.167)
Material Wealth	-.907 (.382)*	-.822 (.384)*	-.875 (.384)*	-.870 (.385)*	-.860 (.397)*	-.900 (.397)*	-.790 (.397)*
“Subjective” Income	-2.590 (.690)**	-2.555 (.691)**	-2.100 (.705)*	-1.690 (.717)*	-1.625 (.740)*	-1.450 (.740)*	-1.385 (.739)
Size of area of residence	.671 (.574)	.672 (.571)	.610 (.571)	.655 (.568)	.634 (.586)	.750 (.586)	.726 (.584)
Country vs. Town or city	2.146 (1.487)	2.025 (1.479)	1.952 (1.480)	1.842 (1.472)	1.911 (1.518)	1.856 (1.515)	1.936 (1.510)
City vs. town or country	.636 (1.383)	.316 (1.376)	.247 (1.374)	.244 (1.368)	.368 (1.411)	.524 (1.409)	.298 (1.406)
Parental Language (0=Spanish only)	-6.062 (1.210)**	-6.142 (1.206)**	-5.744 (1.210)**	-5.481 (1.205)**	-5.052 (1.247)**	-4.960 (1.245)**	-4.720 (1.243)**
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	5.957 (1.759)**	5.879 (1.748)**	5.436 (1.752)*	5.707 (1.741)**	5.167 (1.801)	5.242 (1.798)**	5.196 (1.792)*
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	-.214 (2.043)	-.211 (2.045)	.133 (2.046)	.304 (2.034)	.508 (2.099)	1.107 (2.102)	.905 (2.095)
Approval of president	-5.129 (.685)**	-4.943 (.682)**	-4.714 (.686)**	-4.171 (.716)**	-3.951 (.741)	-3.693 (.743)**	-3.598 (.741)**
Watches the TV News		-.022 (.646)	.038 (.647)	.092 (.644)	.004 (.664)	-.022 (.663)	.050 (.661)
Interested in politics		2.645 (.583)**	2.677 (.584)*	2.760 (.581)**	2.735 (.599)**	2.685 (.598)**	2.637 (.596)**
Political Knowledge		-.787 (.453)	-.741 (.453)	-.712 (.451)	-.633 (.466)	-.569 (.466)	-.432 (.466)
Interpersonal trust			.690 (.623)	.525 (.620)	.435 (.640)	.363 (.639)	.407 (.637)
Community Participation (0=no)			-.663 (1.034)	-.504 (1.028)	-.462 (1.060)	-.572 (1.059)	-.526 (1.055)
Satisfaction with life			-2.051 (.732)*	-1.783 (.730)*	-1.643 (.754)*	-1.426 (.755)	-1.425 (.752)

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Retrospective Economic Evaluation of country				-.793 (.879)	-.737 (.907)	-.585 (.906)	-.676 (.904)
Retrospective Personal Economic Evaluation				-1.300 (.882)	-1.200 (.910)	-1.136 (.909)	-1.177 (.906)
Index of victimization by corruption				-2.517 (.579)**	-2.514 (.597)**	-2.322 (.598)**	-2.377 (.596)**
Has been a victim of a crime (0=no)				.092 (1.158)	.207 (1.195)	.281 (1.193)	.365 (1.189)
Ideology					.976 (.247)**	.966 (.246)**	.955 (.245)**
Satisfaction with local government						2.584 (.719)**	2.505 (.717)**
Authoritarianism							1.367 (.433)*
R Squared	.099	.111	.115	.127	.136	.143	.149

The Standard errors are shown in parentheses under the corresponding regression coefficient.

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

Table 4.5 Peru: Predictors of Political Tolerance, 2006

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	48.718 (6.086)**	40.989 (6.632)**	38.387 (7.030)**	41.468 (7.338)**	45.490 (7.888)**	44.681 (8.702)	47.763 (9.289)**
Gender (0=Women)	2.903 (1.283)*	2.015 (1.361)	2.070 (1.363)	1.916 (1.370)	1.714 (1.423)	1.733 (1.430)	2.234 (1.450)
Age	-.024 (.045)	-.034 (.045)	-.032 (.046)	-.024 (.046)	-.022 (.048)	-.022 (.048)	-.020 (.048)
Education	.096 (.178)	-.100 (.198)	-.103 (.199)	-.136 (.200)	-.159 (.208)	-.158 (.209)	-.223 (.211)
“Subjective” Income	.547 (.828)	.901 (.838)	.708 (.864)	.962 (.886)	.917 (.919)	.933 (.924)	.915 (.925)
Size of place	-.391 (.710)	-.239 (.711)	-.232 (.712)	-.144 (.712)	-.129 (.738)	-.119 (.742)	-.070 (.741)
Country vs. town o city	-.1243 (1.877)	-.1482 (1.875)	-.1563 (1.881)	-.1518 (1.880)	-.1554 (1.948)	-.1560 (1.954)	-.1640 (1.953)
City vs. Country or town	-.1.813 (1.741)	-.1.902 (1.740)	-.1.858 (1.742)	-.1.522 (1.746)	-.1.622 (1.809)	-.1.611 (1.815)	-.1.398 (1.817)
Parental Language (0=Spanish only)	-.832 (1.527)	-.636 (1.528)	-.759 (1.538)	-.744 (1.539)	-.1.005 (1.600)	-.998 (1.606)	-.1.182 (1.607)
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	4.700 (2.213)*	4.704 (2.208)*	4.805 (2.221)*	4.657 (2.221)*	5.016 (2.309)*	5.018 (2.316)*	5.074 (2.320)*
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	1.258 (2.575)	.869 (2.587)	.765 (2.597)	.998 (2.597)	.848 (2.692)	.900 (2.710)	1.064 (2.713)
Watches the TV News		1.471 (.817)	1.497 (.820)	1.421 (.820)	1.477 (.850)	1.474 (.853)	1.398 (.853)
Interested in politics		1.896 (.739)*	1.877 (.742)*	1.846 (.742)*	1.868 (.768)*	1.863 (.771)*	1.915 (.772)*
Knowledge of politics		.292 (.572)	.294 (.573)	.242 (.575)	.191 (.597)	.196 (.599)	.067 (.601)
Interpersonal trust			.470 (788)	.497 (.790)	.559 (.819)	.552 (.822)	.511 (.823)
Community Participation (0=no)			-.494 (1.315)	-.481 (1.315)	-.504 (1.362)	-.513 (1.367)	-.543 (1.366)
Satisfaction with life			1.075 (.928)	1.156 (.933)	1.063 (.968)	1.081 (.974)	1.075 (.974)
Retrospective Economic of Country				-.1.520 (1.087)	-.1.590 (1.127)	-.1.572 (1.133)	-.1.504 (1.61)
Retrospective Persona Economic Evaluation				-.618 (1.121)	-.699 (1.162)	-.692 (1.166)	-.686 (1.171)
Index of victimization by corruption				-.408 (.740)	-.413 (.767)	-.397 (.772)	-.357 (.772)

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Has been a victim of crime (0=no)				3.125 (1.479)*	3.039 (1.533)*	3.047 (1.538)*	2.951 (1.539)*
Ideology					-.604 (.316)	-.605 (.317)	-.592 (.318)
Satisfaction with local government						.206 (.924)	.284 (.928)
Approval of president							.068 (.959)
Authoritarianism							-1.180 (.558)*
R squared	.099	.015	.014	.016	.017	.017	.018

The Standard errors are shown in parentheses under the corresponding regression coefficient.

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

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## 5 Citizen Trust in Political Institutions

The first section of the previous chapter examines the attitudes people have towards the political system in general. The objective is to determine whether or not people believe the system defends their basic rights and deserves to be supported. The intention in this chapter is more precise. It seeks to determine the level of trust citizens have in specific political institutions. In other words, while the previous chapter examined “diffuse” political support, in this one we aim to analyze “specific” support.<sup>42</sup> Adequate evaluation of the existing level of support in Peru requires placing Peruvian figures in a comparative perspective. This is how we can find out whether the degree of political confidence in Peru is low, high or similar to what is found in other countries of the region. Using the same 7-point scale described in the section on support for the political system in the previous chapter, our survey asked several questions regarding specific institutions. Here we focus on these questions:


- B11.** To what extent do you have confidence in the National Election Tribunal (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*)?
- B13.** To what extent do you have confidence in the National Congress?
- B14.** To what extent do you have confidence in the National Government?
- B21.** To what extent do you have confidence in political parties?
- B31.** To what extent do you have confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice?
- B17.** To what extent do you have confidence in the People’s Defense (*La Defensoría del Pueblo*)?

Our assessment begins with the comparative analysis of the level of confidence in the mentioned institutions,<sup>43</sup> and goes on to analyze the factors that determine the levels in Peru.

The fall of Alberto Fujimori’s government and the emergence of multiple videos and audio tapes opened an unusual window that made it possible to observe the internal workings of his government, and the corruption in his institutions (Conaghan 2005). These revelations, along with low efficiency on the part of the political institutions and other factors examined further on, exacerbated the grave crisis of trust in the political system. One exception is the level of citizen confidence in the electoral institution. Compared to other countries in the region, this confidence is relatively high in Peru, placing it at an intermediate-high position (Figure 5.1). Peru is at the lead of the group with intermediate levels of support, along with countries such as Bolivia, Jamaica, Colombia and El Salvador. The countries that register the greatest levels of confidence in electoral institutions are Mexico and Costa Rica, closely followed by Chile. The countries that exhibit the lowest degree of confidence are Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua.


<sup>42</sup> We base this on the distinction made by Easton (1965, 1975).

<sup>43</sup> To make comparison and interpretation easier, the questions were numerically transformed to a range from 0 to 100, and 50 was the midway mark. Inferior levels had to be considered low confidence and levels superior to 50 as high confidence. Based on these questions, a political confidence scale was created which is the averaged sum of confidence in all of the institutions except for the “People’s Defense” which was not included in the scale.

**Figure 5.1 Latin America: Citizen Trust in the Electoral Institutions, 2006**

Conversely, when analyzing the degree of citizen confidence in other institutions tied to the administration of justice or political representation (the Congress, national government or parties), we find that the Peruvian levels of confidence are the lowest in the region. Peru is in the third lowest position for levels of confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice, just above those found in Ecuador and Haiti (Figure 5.2).

**Figure 5.2 Latin America: Degree of Trust  
in the Supreme Court of Justice, 2006**




In recent years, one of the characteristics of Peruvian politics has been president Toledo's low level of popularity. His administration has respected democratic institutions, but his lack of political initiative and disorganized management of the government has been the cause of a great deal of discontent. Our survey registers this dissatisfaction: while a scarce 12% of respondents said his work was "very good" or "good", 27.7% describes it as "bad" or "very bad." Although the question about political confidence refers to the national government, many interviewees no doubt have the president's performance in mind when they answer this question.<sup>44</sup> That is why it is not surprising that the level of confidence in the national government registered in Peru is one of the lowest in Latin America, barely above levels registered in Ecuador (Figure 5.3). The average score for confidence in the government barely reaches 33, about half the average found in Mexico (59), and below those registered in Bolivia and Colombia, the other two Andean countries that LAPOP surveyed in 2006.


Levels of citizen confidence in the Congress are just as low, and in this case Peru is the lowest in the ranking of countries, only outdone by Ecuador (Figure 5.4).

<sup>44</sup> The correlation between the opinion of the president's performance and confidence in the national government in Peru is .35, which is a moderately strong correlation between variables.

**Figure 5.3 Latin America: Degree of Trust in the National Government, 2006**




**Figure 5.4 Latin America: Average levels of Trust in the National Congress, 2006**




As noted in a series of qualitative studies (see Camou 2001; Cavarozzi and Abal Medina 2002; Meyer and Reyna 1989), in practically all Latin American countries there is a great level of discontent with political parties. Our survey certainly registers this discontent empirically. In none of the countries in the 2006 survey do we find citizen confidence above the mid-point on the scale. The country with the greatest level of confidence in parties, Mexico, presents an average of only 43. This data leaves no doubt that currently there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the existing political parties, which creates an opportunity for movements based on personality to germinate and grow (Figure 5.5).

An institution that generates more confidence in citizens is the office of the Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*). This is a relatively new institution in Peru. It was created by the 1993 Constitution, and began functioning in 1996 when the Congress elected the first Ombudsman (*Defensor del Pueblo*), Dr. Jorge Santistevan de Noriega. The Ombudsman became an important presence on the political scene with its important role in overseeing the controversial 2000 election process. Among the State institutions during the last Fujimori term, the Ombudsman was the only one that was neither linked nor associated to cases of corruption. This fact, together with the open criticism the Ombudsman made of the 2000 election process (*Defensoría del Pueblo* 2000), generated a high level of citizen respect. That is why confidence in this institution is high among respondents, compared to other institutions like the Supreme Court or political parties. Citizen confidence in the office of the Ombudsman is similar to that in the National Electoral Jury (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*—JNE), and around 20 points above that of the congress, the national government and political parties. Comparatively speaking, Peruvians' confidence in the Ombudsman is at an intermediate point, between the very high level of confidence found in Costa Rica and El Salvador, and the scarce confidence registered in Ecuador (Figure 5.6).

**Figure 5.5 Latin America: Level of Trust in Political Parties, 2006**




**Figure 5.6 Latin America: Level of Trust in the Office of the Ombudsman, 2006**



Citizen attitudes towards the institutions discussed above (except the Ombudsman) have been combined into a political confidence scale.<sup>45</sup> As expected—taking into account the previous discussion—the levels of political trust in Peru are extremely low compared to those registered in other countries (Figure 5.7). Although political trust in Peru is higher than that found in Ecuador (a country that exhibits the lowest levels of support for the system and confidence in institutions), it is practically the same as those registered in Nicaragua and Haiti, countries whose trajectories have been more unstable than Peru's, which says a lot about the typical Peruvian's level of discontent with the political institutions.

**Figure 5.7 Latin America: Average levels of Political Trust, 2006**



To establish the factors that are influential in determining public trust we have developed—as in the previous chapter—seven models that correspond to possible theoretical explanations. The first model, our control model, includes socio-demographic variables. The second model includes interest and political knowledge variables. The third model incorporates factors related to social capital and life satisfaction. The fourth model includes variables for both personal and economic insecurity. The fifth model adds the variable for ideology. The sixth model adds the satisfaction with local government, and the last model includes the role of predisposition to authoritarianism.

As was done in the previous chapter, and keeping in mind the extension of the results in the regression, in annex 5.1.2 we present the specific results and here we show a summary table

<sup>45</sup> The reason the Ombudsman was left out of the scale is that this institution is not represented in all of the countries in the region. Therefore, had it been included in the scale, it would have meant eliminating several countries from the respective comparison.

listing all the factors or variables that show up as statistically significant (Table 5.1). An important difference between these models and the ones used to predict the levels of support for the system is that we do not use presidential popularity as a predictor variable. The reason is somewhat methodological as it is conceptual. A component of the political trust scale is confidence in the national government. As argued and demonstrated, there is a high correlation between this assessment and the degree of trust in the national government. Therefore, introducing it as a predictor variable would be wrong because it is too close to the dependent variable.

In Table 5.1 we clearly see the consistent influence of both socio-demographic factors: parental language and residence in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*) as opposed to residence in other regions of the country. As often mentioned, these two variables are indicative of the condition of Andean background. The results again suggest that people of Andean origin have a significantly lower level of confidence than the rest of the people. No doubt this reflects the mostly poor and historically marginalized condition that the majority of the indigenous population lives in.

We have found that in three of the seven models the level of “subjective” income (the person responds whether they consider their total income is enough to live on) influences the levels of political confidence in a manner that would be expected: the greater the level of economic difficulty, the lower the level of confidence in political institutions (Figure 5.8).


Likewise, as in the case of support for the system, the degree of interest in politics has a positive effect of the levels of trust. This is an effect that is found in each of the models where this variable is included. The interesting thing is that this relation does not appear to be monotonic: that is, a constant increase in the level of interest does not produce a constant increase in political confidence. On the contrary, the relation seems to be dichotomous, as seen in Figure 5.9. The most important difference is whether the person expresses no interest in politics or some interest (regardless of the amount). The ones who are entirely lacking in political interest have a lower level of confidence than those who show some interest (whether modest or high).

**Table 5.1 Peru: Explanatory Variables for Political Confidence, 2006**


Predictors	POLITICAL CONFIDENCE MODELS						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gender			✓				
Age							
Education							
Income	✓	✓	✓				
Size of locality							

Country vs. town or city							
City vs. Country or town							
Parental language	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Sur vs. Rest of country	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban vs. rural	✓	✓					
Watches the TV news							
Knowledge of Politics							
Interest in politics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Interpersonal Confidence			✓	✓			
Participation in Community							
Life Satisfaction			✓				
Economic Evaluation of the country				✓	✓	✓	✓
Personal Economic Evaluation				✓	✓	✓	✓
Victim of corruption				✓	✓	✓	✓
Victim of crime							
Ideology					✓	✓	✓
Satisfaction local government						✓	✓
Authoritarian Values							✓
Adjusted R squared	.059	.074	.080	.105	.119	.139	.148


**Figure 5.8 Peru: Degree of Political Trust by Subjective Income, 2006**



**Figure 5.9 Peru: Average level of Political Trust by Interest in Politics, 2006**



**Figure 5.10 Peru: Average Level of Political Trust by Evaluation of Economic Situation, 2006**



Finally, we find that other factors which had been identified in the previous chapter as predictors for support for the system also predict the levels of political trust. This is the case of corruption (the more the citizen has been affected by corruption, the lower the level of political confidence), ideology (more conservative people tend to have a greater degree of political confidence), and satisfaction with the local government (the greater the level of satisfaction with the local government, the greater the level of political confidence). In order not to extend this chapter unnecessarily, the graphs that illustrate these relations are in appendix 5.1.1.

## Appendix. Additional Graphs and the Results of the Regression Analyses

### 5.1.1 Additional Political Trust Graphs

Figure 5.11 Peru: Political Trust per Victimization by Corruption, 2006






Figure 5.12 Peru: Political Trust by Satisfaction with Local Government, 2006



**Figure 5.13 Peru: Political Trust per ideology, 2006**



### 5.1.2 Regression Model Results

Table 5.2 Peru: Explanatory Models for Political Trust, 2006

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	47.045 (4.915)**	41.662 (5.328)**	40.561 (5.650)**	48.167 (5.824)**	40.017 (6.213)**	24.200 (6.774)**	19.534 (6.844)*
Gender (0=Women)	-1.368 (1.035)	-1.968 (1.093)	-2.117 (1.095)*	-1.653 (1.088)	-1.243 (1.121)	-.868 (1.113)	-1.586 (1.123)
Age	-.046 (.036)	-.042 (.036)	-.051 (.037)	-.044 (.037)	-.048 (.038)	-.044 (.037)	-.047 (.037)
Education	-.078 (.143)	-.180 (.159)	-.210 (.160)	-.240 (.159)	-.192 (.164)	-.157 (.162)	-.063 (.163)
“Subjective” Income	-2.484 (.669)**	-2.325 (.673)**	-1.851 (.694)*	-1.065 (.704)	-.974 (.724)	-.650 (.720)	-.628 (.716)
Size of place of residence	-.642 (.573)	-.602 (.572)	-.660 (.573)	-.622 (.566)	-.651 (.581)	-.451 (.577)	-.521 (.575)
Country vs. Town or City	1.917 (1.516)	1.744 (1.506)	1.752 (1.512)	1.631 (1.492)	1.705 (1.534)	1.584 (1.521)	1.702 (1.513)
City vs. Country or Town	.440 (1.407)	.136 (1.398)	.138 (1.400)	.347 (1.386)	.550 (1.425)	.778 (1.413)	.472 (1.408)
Parental Language (0=Only Spanish)	-5.749 (1.233)**	-5.777 (1.228)**	-5.417 (1.236)**	-5.153 (1.222)**	-4.624 (1.261)**	-4.482 (1.250)**	-4.217 (1.245)**
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	6.713 (1.788)**	6.609 (1.774)**	6.005 (1.785)**	5.999 (1.763)**	5.273 (1.819)*	5.314 (1.803)*	5.252 (1.793)*
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	-4.009 (2.080)*	-4.063 (2.078)*	-3.489 (2.087)	-3.029 (2.061)	-2.724 (2.120)	-1.711 (2.110)	-1.959 (2.099)
Watches the TV News		.417 (.656)	.404 (.659)	.524 (.651)	.412 (.670)	.356 (.664)	.465 (.661)
Interested in Politics		3.022 (.594)**	2.940 (.596)**	2.986 (.589)**	2.942 (.605)**	2.848 (.600)**	2.779 (.597)**
Knowledge of Politics		-.438 (.459)	-.448 (.461)	-.441 (.457)	-.338 (.470)	-.246 (.466)	-.062 (.466)
Interpersonal Trust			1.525 (.633)*	1.226 (.627)*	1.100 (.645)	.958 (.640)	1.021 (.637)
Participation in Community (0=no)			.930 (1.057)	.992 (1.044)	1.038 (1.073)	.861 (1.064)	.906 (1.059)
Life Satisfaction			-1.464 (.746)*	-.954 (.741)	-.765 (.762)	-.405 (.758)	-.401 (.754)
Retrospective Economic Evaluation of Country				-2.365 (.863)*	-2.222 (.887)*	-1.857 (.882)*	-1.979 (.878)*
Retrospective Personal Economic Evaluation				-2.310 (.890)*	-2.145 (.915)*	-2.000 (.908)*	-2.020 (.903)*
Index of victimization by				-2.456	-2.445	-2.137	-2.197

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
corruption				(.587)**	(.604)**	(.601)**	(.598)**
Has been a victim of crime (0=no)				-1.233) (1.174)	-1.059 (1.207)	-.907 (1.197)	-.779 (1.191)
Ideology					1.224 (.249)**	1.197 (.247)**	1.181 (.246)**
Satisfaction with Local Government						4.035 (.720)**	3.933 (.716)**
Authoritarianism							1.679 (.432)**
Adjusted R squared	.058	.074	.080	.105	.119	.139	.148

The Standard errors are shown in parentheses under the corresponding regression coefficient.

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

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## 6 The Impact of Corruption

Corruption has been defined as a phenomenon in which a public official is driven to act in a manner that differs from the normative standards of the existing system in order to favor personal interests in exchange for reward (Bobbio, Mateucci and Pasquino 1991). Following this definition, corruption is not a new phenomenon in our countries. However, in Peru, and as a consequence of the government of Alberto Fujimori, in which corruption practically became State policy (Conaghan 2005; Degregori 2000; Dammert Ego Aguirre 2000; Diez Canseco 2002; Durand 2003), corruption has become a recurring issue, both in political literature and legislation. A series of laws on transparency and citizen control have been passed within the framework of State reform.

In 2000 Alberto Fujimori created the Anticorruption Bureau (*Procuraduría Anticorrupción*) to carry out investigations after the disclosure of a video showing his advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bribing a recently elected congressman. A year later, during the transition government presided by Valentín Paniagua, the Bureau was ratified and its scope of action widened to look into the entire Fujimori governmental period. Paniagua instated the National Anti-corruption System (*Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción*) through which several norms were adopted which made possible the creation of specialized anti-corruption bureaus and courts, special measures for the preventive detention of persons involved in acts of corruption and the concept of efficient collaboration was established. Also, the Financial Intelligence Unit (*Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera*) was created. This was a crucial entity in the struggle against money laundering and the crimes that foster it. Through Supreme Decree 038-2001-JUS, the Decentralized Anti-corruption Public Bureaus were created.

Part of this process is that state entities have *transparency portals*, where the norms and activities of the respective institutions appear. Issues regarding budgets, hiring, and acquisitions must be included as well. These *portals* have reached different sub-national governmental levels. The regional governments are under the obligation of doing this; so are the provincial and district municipalities. This policy is been implemented progressively.<sup>46</sup>

During the months prior to the application of our survey, the debate on corruption reached a new level, among other reasons, because the country was going through an election period.

In Peru, there have been some studies about perception of corruption, and victimization by corruption. The National Council for Public Ethics (*El Consejo Nacional para la Ética Pública—Proética*) and *Apoyo Opinión y Mercado* have carried out national surveys about corruption over the last four years (2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006). Every year, the National Institute of Statistics and Information Management (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*—INEI), carries out a National Household Survey (*Encuesta Nacional de Hogares*—

<sup>46</sup> The problems with the implementation are basically financial and technical. Not all district municipalities have electrical power or a phone line.

ENAHO) and in 2002 and 2004 it applied a Governability Module that included a series of questions about corruption in different state institutions.<sup>47</sup> The *Proetica* and *Apoyo* samples differ from those of the INEI because they only include principal cities (urban), whereas INEI has a sample that is nationally representative.

What we find in the studies on corruption at the national level is that it particularly affects the least excluded sectors: those who live in urban clusters, particularly in big cities, those with the best level of education, those with the best socio-economic level, and men. This is so because the presence of the state, an indispensable prerequisite to speak of corruption *per se*, is very unequal in our country. And the State offices (except for health and education) are almost exclusively in urban areas.

Taking into account the results from *Proetica* and *Apoyo*'s last survey on corruption (October 2006) we can see that citizen perception of the issue of corruption is less critical than what had been registered in the previous survey in October 2004. This can follow the political context in which both surveys were done. The first survey was carried out with a president who was finishing term with a very low approval rating (12%) whereas the latest survey was done a few months before president García took office (with a 70% citizen approval rating). Although the feeling remains that little is being done to fight corruption.

At the international level, there are different surveys and Corruption Indices, all created by Transparency International<sup>48</sup> in Africa and the Middle East (Kenya, Morocco), America (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela), Asia (Armenia, Bangladesh, China, India) and Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). The corruption measurements have not been standardized for all the countries. As Knack mentions (2006), corruption indicators are aggregates from different sources—in order to increase the precision of the measurement—but do not always produce a measurement that is more appropriate than using one indicator or one database. There is a loss of conceptual precision when indicators are aggregated.

On the other hand, some surveys only measure corrupt transactions in the public or the business sectors. In this sense, they provide a more limited view than the surveys that define corruption more broadly.

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<sup>47</sup> The objective of the National Household Survey (ENAHO) is to generate indicators that follow the evolution of poverty, well-being and living conditions in households, as well as allow for the diagnosis of the living conditions and poverty in the population, among others. The 2002 ENAHO—IV Trimester, was done only in the months of October, November and December 2002. On the other hand, the 2004 ENAHO was done continually from May 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Transparency International's Index of Perceptions on Corruption has been carried out every year since 1995. It analyzes over 150 countries based on the perceived levels of corruption. There also exists the Global Barometer on Corruption, which evaluates general public attitudes towards experiences of corruption in dozens of countries around the world. Finally, the Surveys and Indices of Bribe Payers analyzes industrialized countries' tendency to enter into the dynamics of bribery.

Based on the ENAHO 2002<sup>49</sup> data, Herrera and Roubaud (2003) assert that, contrary to contemporary consensus (World Bank, 2000), the poor are the least affected by corruption in Peru. The incidence of corruption increases according to the standard of living. However, these authors also affirm that there are two elements which affect this diagnosis: a) the difference in access to public services is due to corruption, which discourages people with less capability (the poor) to effectively insure the protection of their rights; b) the corruption coefficient does not vary substantially regarding socio-economic strata, and the payments are more onerous for the poor.

As expected, considering problems such as unemployment and poverty affecting Peru, the great majority state that the country's main problem is unemployment (32.4%), followed by poverty (21.8%) and the economic situation (15.2%). Only 6.9% of those interviewed in Peru mentioned corruption as the main problem in the country. This percentage is higher than that registered in neighboring countries like Chile (1.1%) and Colombia (2.5%), but it is not as high as that found in Honduras (10%), Nicaragua or Panama (9.3% each). Actually, the percentage of people that mentioned corruption as the main problem in the country was identical to that registered in Mexico.

In this chapter we examine citizen perception of the degree of corruption among public workers, as well as victimization by corruption and its impact on attitudes towards the rule of law and democracy.

## 6.1 Perception of Corruption


The following question was made to analyze the perception of the state of corruption in the country:

- **EXC7.** Taking into account your experience or what you have heard, corruption of public workers is (1) Very widespread (2) Somewhat widespread (3) A little widespread (4) Not-at-all widespread (8) Does not know/Does not remember

The perception of corruption among public workers being widespread<sup>50</sup> is very high in the case of Peru, with figures that are close to countries that are at the extreme level such as Ecuador, Jamaica, Nicaragua or Guatemala (Figure 6.1). No doubt this reflects not only the perception produced by the widely documented corruption during the Fujimori government, but also journalistic exposés, many unsubstantiated, of corruption in Alejandro Toledo's government.

<sup>49</sup> ENAHO in the fourth trimester 2002, carried out by INEI. The sample size and geographic scope of ENAHO are superior to those in other surveys on the same issues: approximately 20,000 households were surveyed based on a survey design of homes that was representative at the departmental level.

<sup>50</sup> In order to build the index in Figure 6.1, the score 0 was assigned to those who answered that corruption was "not at all", 33 for "a little" 67 for "somewhat" and 100 for "very widespread."

**Figure 6.1 Latin America: Citizen Perception of State Corruption, 2006**

A multivariate regression analysis that includes the socio-demographic variables interest in politics and knowledge about politics reveals that the perception of state corruption is associated—as we shall see next—with age, education, news consumption, and knowledge of politics (Table 6.1).

The older the person, the greater the probability is that they have contact with the State. Likewise, there is greater probability of interacting with other people that have dealings with the state. That is exactly what we find in Peru, as can be seen in Figure 6.2.

**Table 6.1 Peru: Determiners for the Perception of State Corruption, 2006**


		Estimación	Error típ.	Wald	gl	Sig.
Umbral	[Percepción= Nada]	-1.532	.470	10.605	1	.001
	[Percepción = Algo]	.531	.443	1.435	1	.231
	[Percepción = Mucho]	2.059	.445	21.362	1	.000
Ubicación	Edad	.024	.004	34.335	1	.000
	Educación	.037	.017	4.661	1	.031
	Ingreso "subjetivo"	.077	.071	1.175	1	.278
	Conocimiento político	.247	.049	25.623	1	.000
	Mira noticias por TV	.138	.067	4.261	1	.039
	Interés en la política	-.078	.064	1.491	1	.222
	Sexo= mujeres	.059	.115	.265	1	.607
	[Sexo=hombres]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.
	Lengua de los padres= sólo castellano	-.110	.129	.729	1	.393
	[lengua= castellano/nativo]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.
Creció en el campo	Creció en el campo	-.046	.159	.083	1	.774
	[Creció= otro]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.
	Creció en la ciudad	-.077	.146	.278	1	.598
	[Creció=otro]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.
	Reside en la Sierra Sur	-.136	.182	.559	1	.455
	[Reside= otro lugar]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.
	Reside en zona rural	-.035	.145	.059	1	.808
	[Reside= zona urbana]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.

Función de vínculo: Logit.


a. Este parámetro se establece en cero porque es redundante. R cuadrado de Nagelkerke: .077.

Another variable that influences the perception of corruption is education. It is not clear if this relation is due to the fact that people with higher levels of education have a greater propensity to be affected by corruption (which is actually the case, as we will see further on), or because they are more conscious of its existence, or due to both. The reality is that people with a greater level of education, particularly with higher education, think that there is a greater level of state corruption than those who only have a primary or secondary education (Figure 6.3).

**Figure 6.2 Peru: Perception of State Corruption by Age Group, 2006**




**Figure 6.3 Peru: Perception of State Corruption by Educational Level, 2006**



Consistent with the previous issue, people who show a high level of knowledge about political affairs (having reached a high score in our political knowledge scale) show a greater perception of corruption. There is no doubt that greater awareness of politics yields a greater level of sensibility towards the issue of corruption. The media, particularly TV news broadcasts, frequently report cases or exposure of corruption related to public officials. That is why, we found that people who watch the TV news have a greater tendency to believe that state corruption is widespread, as our regression analysis shows and as can be seen in Figure 6.4.

**Figure 6.4 Peru: Perception of State Corruption by TV News consumption, 2006**



It is also important to point out the factors that are not associated to corruption in the citizen's view. We found no significant differences related to gender, place of residence, or size of locality. Neither did we find differences between those who grew up in the country versus those who grew up in a town or a city. There were no differences between those whose parents speak only Spanish and those whose parents speak a native language. The differences in perceptions of corruption emerge particularly from age and cognitive variables such as level of education, knowledge of politics and news consumption.

## 6.2 *Victimization by Corruption*

The previous section examines citizen perceptions of state corruption. In this segment, on the other hand, we will analyze the different ways a person can be a victim of corruption. To this end we base our work on the following questions:


- EXC2. Has a police officer ever asked you for a bribe over the past year?
- EXC6. Has a public worker asked you for a bribe over the past year?
- EXC11. Have you done any paperwork at the Town Hall over the past year? To complete the paperwork (like a permit, for example) over the past year, have you had to pay anything besides what is required by law?
- EXC13. Are you employed? At work, have you been requested a bribe over the past year?
- EXC14. Over the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? Have you had to pay a bribe at the courts over the past year?
- EXC15. Did you use public medical services over the past year? To get attention at a hospital or a health clinic over the past year, have you had to pay a bribe?
- EXC16. Have you had a child in school over the past year? At school over the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?
- EXC17. Has anyone requested payment of a bribe in order not to have your electric power supply cut?

Some of these instances are related to the state, others to the private sector. Besides, not many people have had dealings with the institutions we are asking about; this means the percentages presented refer only to those who had some process done at the institution.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, the important thing here is to see what institutions are the ones that exhibit the greater level of victimization by corruption and how being a victim of corruption (whether in the state or private sectors) affects certain central political attitudes (the issue in the next section). Figure 6.5 illustrates the percentage of affirmative answers to the questions that refer to being affected by corruption.

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<sup>51</sup> About 65% declared not have had any dealings with the municipality, 38% said to be unemployed, some 81% said they had not done paperwork at a court, some 46% did not have dealings in a hospital, and 54% did not have school-age children.

**Figure 6.5 Peru: Instances of Victimization by Corruption (Percentage of interviewees that claim to have been affected by corruption), 2006**



Approximately 19% declare that a police officer requested a bribe the past year (although we do not know what total percentage of interviewees did not interact with the police). Some 15% claim to have been victims of corruption in a municipality. The lowest percentage of victimization by corruption was at hospitals.

Based on the previous questions (except for a bribe to the power company worker to avoid getting the lights cut), we put together the index of all the times a person was a victim of corruption in the past year. The theoretical distribution is from 0 (not affected by any kind of corruption) to 7 (was affected in all ways). The range that was actually found was 0 to 5, in the Peruvian case. The great majority of those interviewees (that is 70%) were not affected by any act of corruption. This means that 30% of those interviewed say they have been the victims of corruption at least once over the past year.<sup>52</sup> Is this percentage low or high?


Naturally, to respond to the previous question we need to put the Peruvian figures in a comparative context. Figure 6.6 provides the information regarding the percentage of persons that have been victims of corruption at least once over the past year in each one of the countries surveyed in 2006. The information suggests that corruption in Peru is moderately high, without reaching the extreme levels registered in Haiti. Figure 6.6 shows that there are three clear groups in terms of victimization by corruption. In the first group the percentage of people who have

<sup>52</sup> Some 18% had been the victims of a single act of corruption, and around 7% had been affected twice; less than 5% were victims 3 or more times.

been affected by corruption varies from 10% to 20% and this is relatively low. Here, Peru is next to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia and Mexico. In the third group victimization by corruption is high. It borders or exceeds 50% and Haiti is the only country in this group.<sup>53</sup>

Who is most affected by corruption? The respective regression analysis (Table 6.2) shows, first of all, that women are less affected by corruption than men. Actually, while only 24% of women say they have been victims of an act of corruption, some 36% of men say the same. Second, the probability of becoming a victim of corruption decreases as age increases and when the parents only speak Spanish. Otherwise, the possibility of being affected by corruption increases with the level of education and economic disadvantage (measured in terms of “subjective” income). The results also suggest that neither the size of the locality nor the area of residence have a significant impact on the possibility of becoming a victim of corruption.

**Figure 6.6 Latin America: Victimization by Corruption  
(victims of at least one act of corruption), 2006**



<sup>53</sup> On November 6, 2006, Transparency International presented the Index of Perception of Corruption 2006 (IPC). This is a ranking of 163 countries based on an assessment of the scope of corruption by national, resident and non-resident experts, and the directors of resident businesses assessing their own country. This ranking also pointed to Haiti as the most corrupt of 163 countries.

**Table 6.2 Peru: Predictors of Victimization by Corruption**

Variables	Coefficient B	Standard Deviation	Wald	Sig.
Size of locality	.048	.065	.540	.462
Age	-.009	.004	4.245	.039
Education	.036	.017	4.767	.029
“Subjective” Income	.153	.076	4.027	.045
Gender (women)	-.626	.119	27.721	.000
Place of Origin (countryside)	.268	.176	2.330	.127
Place of Origin (city)	.244	.165	2.192	.139
Language (Spanish only)	-.444	.138	10.430	.001
Region (So. High-Plain/Sierra sur)	-.305	.199	2.334	.127
Place of residence (Rural)	-.273	.237	1.333	.248
Intersect	-.954		5.080	.024
-2 log probability	1707.419			
$\chi^2$ -2 log probability (sig)	57.752 (.000)			
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.055			

The reference category is “Not a victim.”


### 6.3 Victimization by Corruption and Political Attitudes

Corruption is illegal. It undermines the rule of law, which is the basis for democracy. Besides, corruption yields additional pernicious effects in that it affects people's disposition to defend the law and it decreases the level of support and confidence in the system and its institutions. In this section we examine the attitudinal consequences of victimization by corruption.

In the first place, victims of at least one act of corruption are more inclined to accept that corruption is necessary than those who have not been victims. In this sense, corruption generates a vicious circle that affects the rule of law, because the greater the level of victimization by corruption, the greater the will to accept it as a necessity. For instance, the question: “Do you think that, as things stand, sometimes it is justified to pay a bribe?” We found that 28% of the victims of corruption are willing to justify a bribe, but only 19% of the people who were not victims of corruption have the same attitude.


Similarly, the question “Do you think that in our society, paying bribes is justified due to poor public services, or is it unjustified?” Then, 26.5% of the victims find it justified, but only 19.3% of non-victims think so (Figure 6.7).

**Figure 6.7 Peru: Attitudes Towards Corruption by Condition of Victimization of Corruption, 2006**



Finally, corruption also affects the assessment of the political system and the level of confidence in political institutions. Although attitudes among those who have not been victims and those who have been victims just once are quite different, data shows unequivocally that a greater level of victimization has a very negative repercussion on the level of support for the system and political confidence (Figure 6.8). The victims of two or more acts of corruption have a much more negative attitude towards the political regime than those who have not been victimized.

**Figure 6.8 Peru: Average Support for the System and Confidence in Political Institutions per Victimization by Corruption, 2006**



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## 7 Citizen Security and Democracy

Citizen security has ceased being just a police issue to become an importantly central political issue. As seen time and again, crime and violence have reached epidemic levels in the last years. The challenge that ordinary crime and organized crime represent for Latin American states is considerable. Several countries in the region are unable to control important sections of their territory or to provide security to their citizens. Not only have non-violent crimes increased, so have the number of abductions. The increase of violent and non-violent crime in the region coincided with the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies which increased the level of unemployment and poverty in the nineties (Portes and Hoffman 2003). No doubt the increase of poverty is a factor that contributes to the growth of crime, but it must not be overlooked that the State downsizing produced by these economic policies has been an additional cause. Presently crime has increased enormously. To get an idea of the extent of the phenomenon we point to World Health Organization Statistics (WHO 2002), that show 8 out of 10 of the worst countries worldwide in terms of homicide rates are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Moreover, existing data show a clear upward tendency in homicide rates. According to information gathered by Paulo de Mesquita Neto (2002), the homicide rate for every 100,000 inhabitants grew between 1980 and 1995, from 11.5 to 23.3 in Brazil, 37.2 to 60.8 in Colombia, and 2.1 to 11.0 in Panama. In Peru, homicides grew from 2.4 in 1980 to 11.5 in 1990.

These national statistics hide even more dramatic data regarding the level of violence in several of the most important cities in the region, where homicides and violent crimes have attained extraordinary levels. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB 2006), homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants was 63.5 in Rio de Janeiro, 48.5 in São Paulo, 112 in Cali, 248 in Medellin, 95.4 in San Salvador, 25 in Lima, and 76 in Caracas around 1990.

The question that arises out of this violent state of affairs is this: What impact can this increase in citizen insecurity have on maintaining the rule of law? Can the deterioration in security lead the population to support actions that undermine democratic legitimacy? Is it possible that people affected directly by crime, violent or not, or those who feel a great degree of insecurity, are less willing to support democracy? This is the issue that we will look into in this chapter.


### 7.1 The challenge of crime

One way to examine the degree to which crime affects people is by asking them whether they have recently been victims of crime. We are the first to acknowledge that information gathered this way is imperfect because it requires that people use their memory, which is always a problem. But it is a beginning, and it does provide an approximation of the percentage of people affected by violent or non-violent crime. In this regard, we asked the following:

- **VIC1.** Have you been a victim of an act of crime over the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Unknown.

The results (Figure 7.1) show great differences in Latin America. Some countries show relatively low levels of victimization, like Panama and Jamaica (10% or less of the respondents say they have been victims over the past year). A sizeable group of countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Haiti) have percentages between 15% and 17%. Next are countries with a high level of victimization by crime, with percentages of 20% or higher (Ecuador, Mexico, Chile and Peru). It is difficult to find the factors that explain these groupings. Panama and Jamaica, the countries with the lowest levels of victimization, have a lot of tourism, but much less than Costa Rica which has a greater level of crime. Mexico, Peru and Chile, the countries with the highest levels of victimization, could not be more dissimilar in their relative levels of development and recent political developments. Everything suggests that the level of victimization is basically determined by national factors.

**Figure 7.1 Latin America: Percentage of people who say they were victim of a criminal act, 2006**




Peru shows up in the previous graph as the country with the highest percentage of people who have said they had been victims of crime over the past year. The proportion is slightly over 25%. Naturally, this comes as no surprise to Peruvians, who live with the daily anxiety associated with crime, who hear their relatives and friends complain, and watch on TV how crime affects a broad sector of society.


It has generally been assumed that people who live in big cities are most susceptible to becoming victims of crime. It has been suggested that this is due, not only to the greater

population density, but also to the fact that large cities house people from different social conditions. There are high-income and mid-income sectors living relatively close to low-income sectors. Also, life in large cities fosters anonymity, which in turn generates social anomie which increases the level of crime. We found no support for these hypotheses in the Peruvian case. Figure 7.2 shows that there are no statistically significant differences in the level of victimization by crime in the Lima metropolitan area, the large, the medium-sized or even the small cities. Only residents in rural areas say the levels of victimization are significantly lower than those registered in Lima and in the large cities. In other words, crime affects all urban residents at relatively the same level.

**Figure 7.2 Peru: Victimization per Size of City of Residence, 2006**




However, there are important differences to be found when examining the distribution of victimization by region (Figure 7.3). The regions that are most affected by crime are the Southern Coast, Lima Metropolitan area, and the Central Highland. The lowest levels are in the Northern Highland and the Amazon jungle. This reveals that, with few exceptions, there is crime throughout the country, and it affects several regions, not only the Lima Metropolitan area.

**Figure 7.3 Peru: Victimization by Crime per Region of Residence, 2006**

Not all crime is equal. Violent criminal acts have a greater psychological impact and erode the social fabric in a more pernicious way than non-violent crime. What kind of crime affects Peruvians most? To find out we posed the following question:

- **VIC2.** What kind of criminal act did you experience? (1) Robbery without assault or physical threat (2) Robbery with assault or physical threat (3) Physical Assault without robbery (4) Rape or Sexual Assault (5) Abduction (6) Property Damage (7) Household Robbery (88) NA (99) Inappropriate (non-victim)

The distribution of the responses is in Figure 7.4. The majority of people who say they were affected by crime (almost 50%) experienced robbery without physical assault. Around 10% said their houses had been robbed (it cannot be determined whether they were present or not). Around 30% said they had been victims of robbery and assault or physical threat. A much smaller number of interviewees said they had been victims of physical aggression or sexual assault. If we add up the criminal acts that involve violence (robbery with physical assault, physical assault without robbery, sexual aggression and damage to property) we find that 37% were victims of a violent criminal act. This not only means that an important number of Peruvians say they have been victims of crime (26%, the highest among countries surveyed in 2006), it also means an important percentage of these were victims of violence.

**Figure 7.4 Peru: Victimization by Type of Criminal Act, 2006**

Who tend to be victims of violence? To answer this question we ran a logistic regression analysis that included our socio-demographic variables as predictors, and the fact of being a victim or not of a criminal act as the dependent variable. The results are interesting both because of the factors that turn up as significant, as for those that appear unimportant.

The regression results (Table 7.1) indicate that only two variables are significantly associated to victimization. First the data suggest that older age reduces the probability of being in the group of victims of crime, although the effect is not very strong. As can be seen in Figure 7.5, the older the age is, the lower the probability is of being a victim. Still, a greater proportion of people 65 or older are affected by crime than in the 46 to 64 year-old group. This means, the transition from young age to adult significantly reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime, but seniors have a greater propensity to becoming victims than do adults. Second, these results suggest that women have a lower probability of being directly affected by crime than men (Figure 7.6).

It is also important to point out factors that do not appear important when predicting who is more likely to becoming a victim of crime, because this helps to discard some commonly held misconceptions. As pointed out before, no significant difference was found in the level of victimization according to the size of the city or region of residence. This indicates that crime in Peru is widespread and is not focused in one region or in cities of any specific size. Also, we did not find educational level or even level of wealth to be associated with the probability of becoming a victim of crime. Again, this indicates that crime in Peru does not seem to be only a

phenomenon of the poor against the rich; it is also the poor against the poor. Crime is widespread not only in all regions but also in all socio-economic levels.


Most victims of crime (56%) did not report it to the authorities, because most (60.4%) said “it is of no use,” some 19.8% thought the crime “was not serious,” and some 12.4% thought they “had no proof.” The rest did not do so because they “considered it dangerous and feared reprisal” (5.1%) and others did not know where to report it to (2.3%).

**Table 7.1 Peru: Model to Estimate Victimization by Crime, 2006**


Variables	Coefficient B	Standard Error	Wald	Sig.
Size of locality	-.116	.069	2.819	.093
Age	-.009	.004	3.691	.055
Education	.016	.018	.720	.396
Material wealth	.063	.046	1.914	.167
“Subjective” Income	.064	.083	.595	.440
Gender (women)	-.338	.123	7.538	.006
Place of origin (countryside)	.060	.191	.099	.753
Place of origin (city)	.205	.171	1.437	.231
Language (Spanish only)	-.105	.145	.520	.471
Region (Sierra Sur)	.013	.214	.004	.953
Place of residence (Rural)	-.076	.256	.088	.767
Intersect	-.823		3.209	.073
-2 log probability	1625.8			
$\chi^2$ -2 log probability (sig)	42.6 (.000)			
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.042			

*The reference category is “Persons who have not been victims of crime.”*

**Figure 7.5 Peru: Victimization by Crime per Age Group, 2006**



**Figure 7.6 Peru: Victimization by Crime per Gender, 2006**



## 7.2 *Perceptions of Personal Insecurity*

Crime affects citizens directly when they are victims of a criminal act, but also indirectly because a climate of psychological insecurity is generated. This can also lead to political consequences. Whereas in the previous section the objective aspect of crime was discussed (whether or not they were victims), here we are interested in the subjective aspect, that is, the perception or feeling of citizen security—or rather insecurity. To determine the degree of the feeling of citizen insecurity we use the following questions:

- **AOJ11.** Talking about where you live, and thinking about the possibility of being a victim of theft or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?
- **AOJ11A.** And talking about the country in general, to what degree do you think the level of crime we have now represents a threat for the wellbeing of our future? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) Does not know or does not respond

Again Peru shows the highest levels of citizen insecurity in the region, followed closely by El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica (Table 7.2). In Peru, 21.1% of respondents said they felt “very insecure” and 46% said they felt “a little insecure.” These figures were significantly higher than the regional averages that were 14% and 30% respectively (Table 7.2).

It is clear that in the Peruvian case the high percentage of victimization also translates to a strong feeling of personal insecurity, which obviously reinforces citizen concern about crime. Chile is a different case. There the high percentage of victimization (the second highest after Peru, as we saw in the previous section) did not translate to a strong feeling of insecurity, as only 15.7% of Chileans said they felt “very insecure” and 30% more said they felt “somewhat safe,” which are figures that almost match the regional average. In countries like El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, we find a phenomenon that is different from the Peruvian or Chilean situation, because what comes up is that in both countries the feeling of citizen insecurity is quite high (almost as high as the levels found in Peru), although the degree of victimization by crime is relatively lower (at least in relation to that found in Peru). In any case, the central point is that in Peru we have the worst combination possible: a high degree of victimization and a strong feeling of citizen insecurity.


**Table 7.2 Latin America: Feeling of Personal Insecurity, 2006**

		Hablando del lugar o barrio donde Ud. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente Ud. muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?				
País	Méjico	Muy seguro	Algo seguro	Algo inseguro	Muy inseguro	Total
	Méjico	18.1%	41.7%	26.8%	13.4%	100.0%
	Guatemala	18.7%	42.7%	29.6%	9.0%	100.0%
	El Salvador	22.4%	30.4%	26.8%	20.3%	100.0%
	Honduras	32.1%	32.9%	25.0%	10.1%	100.0%
	Nicaragua	25.4%	36.6%	28.5%	9.5%	100.0%
	Costa Rica	23.6%	28.2%	29.6%	18.7%	100.0%
	Panamá	17.6%	46.7%	26.7%	8.9%	100.0%
	Colombia	26.9%	35.8%	24.3%	13.0%	100.0%
	Ecuador	17.2%	34.8%	35.3%	12.7%	100.0%
	Bolivia	11.7%	37.2%	34.3%	16.7%	100.0%
	<b>Perú</b>	<b>7.0%</b>	<b>26.0%</b>	<b>46.0%</b>	<b>21.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Chile	18.4%	36.0%	30.3%	15.3%	100.0%
	República Dominicana	16.4%	33.3%	31.2%	19.1%	100.0%
	Haití	17.1%	26.6%	40.6%	15.7%	100.0%
	Jamaica	20.2%	53.3%	16.8%	9.8%	100.0%
	Total	19.5%	36.1%	30.1%	14.2%	100.0%

Chi cuadrado: 1324, sig. .000

An alternative way of examining the feeling of citizen insecurity is by creating an “index of the feeling of security,” based on question A0J11, described previously and shown in Table 7.2. What we did was to give the response options numerical values so that the index had a theoretical range of 0 (“very insecure”) to 100 (“very secure”).<sup>54</sup> This way we can classify the countries in the 2006 survey according to the feeling of security, where higher levels mean a higher perception of security. The results are presented in Figure 7.7, which shows Peruvians have the lowest feeling-of-security average in the region, whereas Hondurans, Jamaicans and Nicaraguans have the highest levels of citizen security.

<sup>54</sup> The following procedure was used: the value 0 was assigned to “very insecure”, 33 to “somewhat insecure”, 66 to “somewhat secure” and 100 to “very secure”. This index had the advantage of using the information from each of the options in the question, and it produces a unique value that can be easily compared.

**Figure 7.7 Latin America: Personal Security Averages, 2006**

Upon examining people's attitudes towards the issue of the way crime can affect the country's future, some interesting contradictions come into view. It would be expected that countries that show the greatest proportion of victimization by crime and the highest level of personal insecurity should also be the ones that register greater concern with the way crime can affect the future of the country. On the contrary, we find that this is not the case, which suggests that countries vary in terms of making the connection between crime and their political future. In Table 7.3 we see the distribution of responses to the question about the way crime can affect the country's future. The most concerned are the inhabitants of the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Those who exhibit the least degree of concern live in Nicaragua, Mexico and Panama.

There are interesting contrasts between the cases in Costa Rica and Peru. Costa Rica has a 16.5% percentage of victimization by crime, whereas in Peru the figure is 26.2% (the highest among surveyed countries, as shown before). In Costa Rica, the index for perception of personal security is 51.9%, significantly higher than 39.3% registered in Peru. However, almost 90% of Costa Ricans say that crime can affect the future of their country "a lot," while in Peru the figure is 80%. This means, that in spite of the lower levels of crime and insecurity in Costa Rica, the connection between that and the future of the country is higher.

**Table 7.3 Latin America: Crime and Perceptions of the Country's Future, 2006**

		Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?				
País		Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	Total
México		64.9%	25.1%	7.8%	2.3%	100.0%
Guatemala		71.0%	18.3%	8.6%	2.1%	100.0%
El Salvador		86.5%	6.8%	5.5%	1.3%	100.0%
Honduras		84.3%	11.5%	3.0%	1.1%	100.0%
Nicaragua		56.6%	18.9%	16.4%	8.2%	100.0%
Costa Rica		87.2%	8.0%	3.1%	1.7%	100.0%
Panamá		64.5%	19.9%	12.5%	3.2%	100.0%
Colombia		67.5%	20.7%	9.5%	2.3%	100.0%
<b>Perú</b>		<b>77.9%</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>6.6%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Chile		79.0%	14.4%	5.1%	1.5%	100.0%
República Dominicana		90.2%	6.3%	2.1%	1.4%	100.0%
Haití		67.0%	12.6%	9.8%	10.7%	100.0%
Jamaica		79.8%	15.7%	3.3%	1.2%	100.0%
Total		75.2%	14.7%	7.1%	2.9%	100.0%

Chi cuadrado: 1600, sig. .000

## 7.3 Citizen Security and Democracy

It has already been pointed out that the experience of victimization and the feeling of insecurity are quite high in Peru. The question is whether they have an important effect on the attitudes related to democracy and the rule of law. We will now focus our attention on this.

### 7.3.1 Citizen Security and the Rule of Law


The rule of law, or the subordination of the authorities (elected or appointed) to the existing laws, is a central characteristic of a democratic state. Respect for the rule of law gives substance to the democratic ideal of political equality: all are equal before the law, and none has the right to be above it; moreover only the legitimate authorities can exercise the law over citizens. Unfortunately, we know that in Latin America the rule of law leaves a lot to be desired, and as Guillermo O'Donnell repeatedly points out (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), poverty is a threat to the ideal of legal equality. But people's attitudes are also important, because citizens can require the rule of law be respected, or in its stead, support or be indifferent to the violations of the rule of law. The rule of law also determines that the sanction of those accused of a crime be the result of due process, guaranteeing protection by law and presumed innocence. Acts of

“private justice,” where citizens apply the law by their own hand are incompatible with the rule of law. Our interest here is to determine whether those Peruvians who have been victims of crime, or have a strong feeling of personal insecurity, are more willing to support the violation of the rule of law by authorities (in order to apprehend criminals) or that citizens take justice into their own hands. The specific questions we will use to examine these issues are the following:


- **AOJ8.** To apprehend criminals, do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or on occasion can act outside the law: (1) They must always respect the law (2) On occasion they can act outside the law (8) Does not know.
- This new card has a 10 point scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disagree and 10 means that you strongly agree. I am going to read you a list of actions or things that people can do to get their political goals or objectives. I would like you to tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove people doing these actions. **E16.** When people take the law in their own hands when the state does not punish criminals.

Data in this survey show that people who have been victims of crime are more inclined to supporting the authorities acting outside the law to apprehend criminals than those who have not been victims (Figure 7.8). Criminal activity unquestionably undermines citizen disposition to choose the respect of due process by the authorities.

**Figure 7.8 Peru: Degree of Victimization and Support for the Rule of Law, 2006**



However, the previous statement should be qualified. The condition of being a victim does not have a significant effect on the disposition towards supporting “private justice” to punish crime. The differences in the support average for “private justice” between people that have been victims and those that have not are practically identical (41 and 39, respectively; see Figure 7.9).

**Figure 7.9 Peru: Approval for Private Justice per Condition of Victimization, 2006**

In the same way, regarding the role of the feeling of personal security in support for the rule of law or of “private justice,” according to the available information we can say that these two attitudes are in no way correlated.<sup>55</sup> The aforementioned leads us to conclude that although crime does have a certain impact on people’s attitude towards the rule of law, this impact is limited, as we have explained before.

### 7.3.2 Citizen Security and Democracy


We now examine whether the degree of victimization and the feeling of personal insecurity has an impact on attitudes towards the political system in general, and on support for democracy in particular. The working hypothesis is that victims of crime or people that have a strong feeling of insecurity are less prone to supporting the political system, to having confidence in the institutions, or to supporting democracy.

Surprisingly, we found no support for this hypothesis. Figure 7.10 shows, for example, that the differences in averages for support for the system and political confidence between victims and non-victims are very much alike (36 and 38, in one case, and 42 and 44 in the other).

<sup>55</sup> The statistical analysis (omitted due to space constraints) shows that the differences in attitudes between victims and non-victims, and between those with strong or slight feelings of insecurity are not significant.

Likewise, we found no significant association between victimization and support for democracy as the ideal system of government (the graph is omitted to save space<sup>56</sup>).


**Figure 7.10 Peru: Average Support for the System and Political Confidence per Condition of Victim of Crime, 2006**



On the other hand, it can be seen that the feeling of personal insecurity has a greater impact on the aforementioned attitudes. People with a stronger feeling of insecurity, for example, tend to have a greater level of support for the political system. The difference in this attitude between those that feel less secure and those that feel more secure is around 10 points on the scale (Figure 7.11).

This graph suggests that both feelings of personal security and political confidence are also related, although in this case the relation is not as pronounced as in the previous one, because it is not completely monotonic.

<sup>56</sup> Among those who said they had been victims of crime, 26.7% chose the phrase “democracy is preferable to any other form of government,” 24.7% said that “in some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one,” and 28.2% said that “to people like us, it is the same whether the regime is democratic or non democratic.” The Pi squared test for the contingency table for victimization and preference of regime gives a value of 0.655 with a significance of 0.721, which allows us to reject the hypothesis.

**Figure 7.11 Peru: Feeling of Personal Security, Support for the System, and Political Confidence, 2006**

Next, similar to what has been registered before in the case of victimization, we found no relation between the feeling of personal security and support for democracy. Those that choose the democratic option have a score of 39.7 on the personal security scale, whereas those that preferred the authoritarian option register a score of 37.6 (with those that were indifferent reaching a high of 40.7). This analysis of respective variance shows that the differences are not statistically significant.

In conclusion, in spite of the high level of victimization by crime that was found in Peru, it has been seen that it does not significantly impact general political attitudes. In the first place, it does not make Peruvians particularly anxious about the way crime may affect the future of the country (the figures are similar to the regional average). Also, the condition of victimization does not affect the levels of support for the system, political confidence, or support for democracy. The feeling of security, on the other hand, does have an important impact, and affects both the levels of support for the system as well as confidence in the political system, although not the degree of support for democracy.

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## 8 Democracy at the Local Level: Public Opinion of Municipal Government

In Peru there are three major levels of government: the national, the regional, and the local levels. The municipalities are the representative institutions that are closest to the people. The mayor and municipal council are elected by universal suffrage, as part of the democratic exercise of government. There are 25 regional governments in total, and over two thousand local governments: 194 provincial municipalities and 1,830 district municipalities. They are all quite different in terms of size and population. For instance, the case of San Juan de Lurigancho in the Lima Metropolitan area, with population 843,961, and the district of Yurua in Atalaya – Ucayali where there are just 1,303 inhabitants.<sup>57</sup>

The year 2006 has been peculiar for Peru in that it has been an election year. The presidential and legislative elections took place in April and May, and the regional and district elections in November. This means that local governments will change hands on January first, 2007.

In Peru, elections for local authorities are different from presidential elections in that they do not require the majority plus one, just a simple majority suffices. This means that many local governments are traditionally elected with a percentage of votes that fluctuate around 20%, which in many cases is inferior to the sum of blank or void votes. For instance, in Susapaya, a district of Tarata province in the Tacna region, there were a total of 390 votes issued, of which 340 were valid in the 2002 municipal elections. The mayor was elected with 22.9% of the votes, second place obtained 17.8%. This difference represented a mere 17 votes.

Therefore, we have a great deal of local district governments that do not have a great deal of popular support, particularly in the rural areas of the country where the population is thin and disperse. This makes these governments fragile, in terms of election legitimacy, which in some cases leads to revoking processes to be initiated.<sup>58</sup> Because of the great number of signatures that are required for a revoking process to take place, in the long run there are not many that actually crystallize. For instance, 15 mayors were revoked in 2005. The regions in the country's Southern Highland (Sierra Sur) such as Cusco and Puno, places where there are the most number of revoked mayors (three each), followed by Apurímac and Lima, two each. In 2004, 45 mayors were revoked, and the regions with highest incidence were Lima (10), Huancavelica (6), and Arequipa (6).

On the other hand, local governments greatly depend on transferences from the central government, including the Municipal Compensation Fund (*Fondo de Compensación Municipal*—FONCOMUN), border taxes, land tax and land-use tax, donations and transferences.

<sup>57</sup> INEI, *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2005* (National Census of Population and Households 2005).

<sup>58</sup> Revoking authorities has been in the Constitution since 1993. However, to start this process there has to be a payment to the National Electoral Jury (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*—JNE, and the request has to be justified, this revoking tends to take place in small districts and outside the Lima Metropolitan area.

For their part, their own income includes direct taxes, other municipal levees and resources derived from credit operations, both internally and externally.

The government of president Toledo initiated a process of decentralization which continues today in Peru. This required a constitutional amendment on decentralization in the country. The Peruvian Constitution currently establishes decentralization as a permanent state policy with the country's global development as its objective. As a result, provincial and district municipalities are institutions of the local government. They have political, economic and administrative autonomy in those matters that pertain to them.

Part of the decentralization process was the 2002 creation of the Law for the Bases for Decentralization (*Ley de Bases de la Descentralización*—Ley N° 27783), and the Organic Law for Regional Governments (*Ley Orgánica de los Gobiernos Regionales*—Ley N° 27867). The following year, 2003, came the Organic Law for Municipalities (*Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades*—Ley N° 27972). In the latter, the first article establishes that local governments are the basic entities for the organization of the State territory, and immediate channels for neighborhood participation in public affairs. They institutionalize and manage the interests of their respective collectivities. The essential elements of the local government are its territory, population and organization. According to the second article, local governments enjoy political, economic and administrative autonomy in all affairs that concern them. Municipalities have the ability to exercise acts of government and administration, subject to legal ordinance. The national government is not to assume competences that can more efficiently be fulfilled by regional governments, and these in turn are not to do that which can be done by local governments. Article 53 says that municipalities are ruled by annual participative budgets. The participative budget is part of the planning system. Municipalities must regulate neighborhood participation in participative budgets. Article 111 establishes that neighbors in a municipal jurisdiction intervene either individually or collectively in the administration and municipal government by way of neighborhood participation mechanisms and the exercise of political rights. From article 112 to 122, several neighborhood participation and control mechanisms are established in the local area (referendum, neighborhood board, administration committees, land claims, open town-council meetings, local participation in the business sector, repeal) which in theory seek greater involvement of neighbors in local spaces.

This group of norms has created a new outlook in Peru, in which local governments gain increasingly greater levels of autonomy, strength and budget. Therefore we are in the middle of a long process of decentralization, which means more responsibility for local-level government.

In this chapter citizen attitudes towards local government will be examined. The chapter is divided into four sections: satisfaction, confidence and participation in the local government system, and citizen commitment to political decentralization.

## 8.1 Satisfaction with Local Government

In this section Peruvian citizens' satisfaction is measured in terms of the services the municipality provides as well as their satisfaction with the way they are treated at those institutions.

In the survey, we included the following service regarding the quality of services the local government gives.

- **SGL1.** Would you say that the services the municipality gives the people are... [Read the alternatives] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (average) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (awful) (8) Does not know


In chapter 4 we observed that Peru has one of the lowest levels of support for the political system of the countries surveyed in 2006. Similarly, here we see that by comparison with other Latin American countries, Peru has very low levels of satisfaction with the local government. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the three countries with the highest levels of satisfaction with the local government include the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador. Peru is among the 5 countries with the lowest levels of satisfaction with the local government. Peruvian averages are close to those found for Bolivia and Costa Rica.

It stands to reason that one thing which influences people's satisfaction with local government is the way they are treated when dealing with this institution. People who consider that they have been treated well are more likely to be satisfied with the municipality, and vice-versa. That is why the following question was made in certain countries:


- **SGL2.** How do you consider you or your neighbors have been treated at the municipality when you have gone there? Have you been treated very well, well, neither-well-nor-badly, badly, or very-badly? (1) very well (2) well (3) neither-well-nor-badly (average) (4) badly (5) very badly (8) Does not know.

Consistent with what had been found in the case of satisfaction, Peru also occupies a very low rank among countries regarding how people view the treatment they received in relation to the local government (Figure 8.2). A comparison of Figures 8.1 and 8.2 suggests that these two attitudes are highly correlated.

**Figure 8.1 Latin America: Satisfaction with Local Government, 2006**




**Figure 8.2 Latin America: Satisfaction with Treatment at Municipal Office, 2006**



The multivariate analysis of the factors that determine levels of satisfaction with the local government in Peru shows that there are relatively few factors that actually have an influence.<sup>59</sup> Satisfaction with local government is associated with the size of the locality: it is higher in rural areas and in Lima metropolitan area, and it is lower in medium-sized and large cities, although the differences are not very great (Figure 8.3). High satisfaction in rural areas can probably be explained by the closeness between the municipality and the population. In general it has to do with very small localities, where there are strong social ties, and where it is possible to have good citizen-control of local government. The high level of satisfaction found in Lima Metropolitan area is no doubt related to the high popularity the mayor of the city, who was reelected in November 2006, months after this survey was made.

**Figure 8.3 Peru: Satisfaction with the local government per size of place, 2006**




Results also show a relation between the interviewee's gender and satisfaction with local government. In this case, women exhibit a greater level of satisfaction than men.

<sup>59</sup> The results of this regression analysis are in Appendix 8-B, Table 8-B.1


Among the political and economic evaluation variables we have found, as already suggested in Chapter 5, an important relation between satisfaction with the local government and the levels of political confidence. The problem here is determining the direction of the relation: is satisfaction with local government a factor that influences the levels of political trust, or on the contrary, is it the level of political trust that determines satisfaction with the municipality? In any case, the relation between both variables is quite strong, as can be seen in Figure 8.4.

**Figure 8.4 Peru: Relation between Political Confidence and Satisfaction with Local Government, 2006**



The other variable that shows a relation to satisfaction with the local government is the perception of personal economic insecurity. People who perceive a worsening in their personal economic condition with regards to the recent past tend to feel less satisfaction with the local government than those who perceive an improvement in their situation (Figure 8.5). This suggests that the interviewees blame, not only the national government and political institutions for their worsening condition (just as we have seen in chapter 5) also the local authorities (although they are not responsible for the economic management of the country). Political discontent caused by the worsening of the economic situation does not distinguish between levels of government.

**Figure 8.5 Peru: Satisfaction with the Local Government per Evaluation of the Respondent's Personal Economic Situation, 2006**




## 8.2 Trust in Local Government

The following question was used to analyze citizen confidence in local government:

**B32.** To what extent do you have confidence in your municipality?

By comparison with other national political institution, such as the Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the national government, citizen confidence in municipalities is relatively higher. For example, the citizen support average for the Congress, the Supreme Court and the national government was 33, 34 and 37 respectively, whereas citizen confidence in municipalities got up to 42 on the 0 to 100 scale.

However, when the level of confidence in municipalities is compared with that registered in other countries in the region we find that Peruvian levels are extremely low (Figure 8.6). In fact, Peru has the second lowest level of confidence in the municipality. Only Haiti has a level of confidence that is lower, and this can probably be explained by the greater level of corruption that the Haitians have to put up with when they deal with municipalities.

**Figura 8.6 Latin America: Confidence in the Municipality, 2006**

Analysis of the factors that influence confidence in municipalities shows that no socio-demographic variable is of any importance.<sup>60</sup> What was found was that confidence in the municipality depends on four central factors, all of which are associated with the manner in which the population perceives municipal effectiveness: satisfaction with municipal government services, assessment of the way they were treated when dealing with the municipality, perception of citizen influence on municipal issues, and the perception of corruption in local government (the respective graphs that illustrate these relations are in Appendix 8.5.1). As expected, favorable evaluations of municipal work in terms of services rendered, the treatment of citizens, and the existing level of corruption all positively affect the levels of citizen confidence. Also, the greater the perception of citizen influence in municipal issues, the higher the level of confidence in local government.

### 8.3 Citizen Participation in Local Government

There are different ways to participate in local government. In this section we center on three forms of citizen participation: open town-council meetings, the drafting of a participative budget, and in requesting aid of the municipality. We will also examine the perception of the influence the population has on municipal issues as well as the perception of local authorities' will to motivate participation.


<sup>60</sup> The results of this regression analysis are in Appendix 8.5.2, Table 8.2.

In order to do this we used the following questions from the survey:

- **NP1.** Have you participated in an open town-meeting or a municipal council meeting over the past 12 months? (1) yes (2) no (8) does not know / does not remember.
- **NP2 .** ¿Have you requested help or presented a petition at any office, to any officer or council-member at the municipality over the past 12 months? (1) yes (2) no (8) Does not know/ does not remember
- **MUNI11.** How much influence do you feel you have in what the municipality does? Would you say that you have a lot, some, little, or no influence? 1. A lot 2. Some 3. Little 4. None 8. Does not know/does not respond


In terms of participation in municipal meetings, Peru has one of the highest attendance rates in the region. Only the Dominican Republic and Honduras have higher rates (Figure 8.7). This no doubt reflects the Peruvian laws which motivate citizen participation in local governments. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the law sets up different mechanisms that allow people to participate in municipal issues, both in preparing the budget as well as control over its administration, by means of referendums, neighborhood boards or committees, and others. But, as we shall see in a moment, there is a tradition of participation in municipal issues in rural areas, which obviously increases the national average shown in the previous graph.

**Figure 8.7 Latin America: Attendance at Municipal Meetings**




This high participation in municipal meetings goes along with a high proportion of citizens who say they have requested help or presented a petition to the municipality over the past year. In Peru, 21.1% of respondents say they have. This is the highest percentage among all the countries in the 2006 survey, very close to that registered in Chile, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Mexico (Figure 8.8).

**Figure 8.8 Latin America: Percentage of Respondents who say they have requested Aid or presented a Petition to the Municipal Government, 2006**




Therefore, it is clear that Peruvians have the highest level of participation in the municipality and frequently interact with that institution. Naturally, participation is not homogenous. Although we do not find significant differences in meeting attendance according to the educational level, we find that gender and age do have an impact on the percentage of attendance. For example, men participate more than women in municipal meetings: 17.4% and 11.9% respectively. Moreover, as shown in Figure 8.9, men participate more than women in each of the age groups. Besides, the graph shows that participation in municipal issues increases with age, particularly amongst women. It is probable that greater participation of older women can be explained by the fact that they no longer have young children; therefore, they have more time to spend on local government issues.

**Figure 8.9 Peru: Attendance at Municipal Meetings by Age and Gender, 2006**


As pointed out before, there exists a rural-Peruvian tradition of participation in local affairs. Actually, there are many areas where the municipal government coincides with traditional communities; therefore, participation in community affairs is equivalent to participation in municipal issues. In the case of the Lima metropolitan area, many districts have very broad population bases. This creates a situation in which the municipal government takes on a highly impersonal character, and very few people get involved in its dealings. That is why we find a marked association between the size of the locality the respondent lives in and the percentage of his or her participation in municipal issues: a smaller locality yields a higher degree of participation (Figure 8.10).

The significant level of citizen participation in municipal meetings (remember Peru has the highest levels among countries interviewed in 2006) does not necessarily translate into a widespread perception that people are influential in local government affairs. When asked about the degree of influence they believe they exert on local affairs, just 1.1% say they have “a lot” and 10.3% more say “somewhat.” The vast majority (59.5%) say they have “no influence,” and only 29.1% more say their influence is “little” (see Figure 8.11).

**Figure 8.10 Peru: Attendance at Municipal Meetings by Size of Locality of Residence, 2006**



**Figure 8.11 Peru: Perception of Personal Influence on Municipal Affairs, 2006**



## 8.4 Decentralization: more or less of it?

As mentioned before, since 2002 a process of State reform has been taking place. The main focus was decentralization, which implied granting more resources and autonomy to sub-national governments, among them local governments. A few years have gone by since the start of this new decentralization process and apparently the population is not really convinced that more decentralization at the municipal level is necessary or desirable. Some believe it is preferable to have the national government take on more municipal duties and services. To scrutinize the opinions of some regarding the centralization and the decentralization of municipal functions, we posed the following question:<sup>61</sup>

**LGL2.** In your opinion, should more obligations and money be given to the municipality, or should the national government be allowed to take on more municipal obligations and services?

- (1) More to the municipality
- (2) The national government should assume more obligations
- (3) Not change anything
- (4) More to the municipality if services improve
- (8) Does not know / does not answer

Compared to Peru, there are countries where a greater proportion of citizens are demanding more centralization of municipal services, that is, they are in favor of assigning more duties and funds to municipalities. These countries include Jamaica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Other countries, such as Chile, Haiti and Colombia, have a lower percentage of voters that request this. Peru is in the lower mid-point, as can be seen in Figure 8.12.


Obviously the will to decentralize is going to be greater in areas that have traditionally been abandoned by the central government. Actually, that is what was found. Residents in the Highland (*Sierra*) and Southern Coast were the most inclined to favor municipal decentralization, whereas residents of the Lima Metropolitan area were the least inclined to favor this type of policy (Figure 8.13).

In conclusion, Peruvians exhibit very low levels of satisfaction and confidence in their municipalities, and they are dissatisfied with the way they are treated at these institutions in general. On the other hand, it was found that their level of participation in municipal issues is very high compared with that in other countries. This high level of participation definitively does not increase the population's feeling of political efficiency in municipal issues. Almost 9 out of 10 people interviewed said they felt they had "little" or "no" influence in local government affairs. In spite of this, or perhaps due to this, people that live further from the capital or in rural areas, are in favor of assigning more duties and funds to local governments.


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<sup>61</sup> This question was recoded so that the higher values meant greater support for municipal decentralization. Also, the options were re-scored to have a range from zero (greater support for centralization) to 100 (greater support for decentralization).

**Figure 8.12 Latin America: Support for Assigning More Duties and Funds to Municipalities, 2006**



**Figure 8.13 Peru: Support for Greater Municipal Decentralization by Region of Residence, 2006**



## 8.5 Appendix. Additional Graphs and Regression Analyses

### 8.5.1 Additional Graphs

Figure 8.7 Peru: Confidence in the Municipality per Degree of Satisfaction with Services, 2006







Figure 8.8 Peru: Confidence in Municipalities per Assessment of Treatment Received, 2006



**Figure 8.9 Peru: Confidence in Municipalities per Perception of People's Influence in Municipal Issues, 2006**



**Figure 8.10 Peru: Confidence in Municipality per Perception of Municipal Corruption, 2006**



## 8.5.2 Results of the Regressions

Table 8.1 Peru: Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government, 2006

		Estimación	Error típ.	Wald	Sig.
Umbral	[satisfacción = muy baja]	-4.265	.624	46.657	.000
	satisfacción = baja]	-2.104	.608	11.977	.001
	[satisfacción = alta]	1.102	.606	3.306	.069
	[satisfacción = muy alta]	3.997	.672	35.401	.000
Ubicación	Edad	-.003	.004	.620	.431
	Educación	-.014	.018	.584	.445
	Tamano de la localidad	-.161	.064	6.369	.012
	Ingreso "subjetivo"	-.304	.080	14.552	.000
	Conocimiento político	-.084	.052	2.621	.105
	Mira noticias por TV	.077	.076	1.020	.313
	Interés en la política	.009	.067	.018	.895
	Confianza política	.017	.003	31.667	.000
	Evaluación económica retrospectiva del país	-.227	.098	5.329	.021
	Evaluación económica retrospectiva personal	-.010	.101	.010	.922
	Ideología	-.009	.028	.105	.746
	[Sexo= mujeres]	.237	.124	3.672	.055
	[Sexo= hombres]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[lengua= sólo castellano]	.143	.139	1.059	.303
	[lengua= indígena]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[Lugar de origen= campo]	-.146	.171	.723	.395
	[Lugar de origen= pueblo o ciudad]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[Lugar de origen= Ciudad]	-.005	.158	.001	.975
	[Lugar de origen= campo o pueblo]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
Participación	[Lugar de residencia= Sierra Sur]	.009	.208	.002	.966
	[Lugar de residencia= Otras regiones]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[Ambito= rural]	.737	.236	9.739	.002
	[Ambito= urbano]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[Participación comunal= No]	-.106	.118	.806	.369
	[Participación comunal = Sí]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.
	[Víctima de crimen= No]	.214	.130	2.707	.100
	[Víctima de crimen= No]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.

Función de vínculo: Logit.; R cuadrado = .087

a. Este parámetro se establece en cero porque es redundante.

**Table 8.2 Peru: Predictors of Confidence in the Municipality, 2006**

Modelo		Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	
		B	Error típ.	Beta	t
1	(Constante)	8.838	7.953		1.111 .267
	Dummy género 0=mujeres, 1=hombres	-.874	1.410	-.016	-.620 .535
	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.017	.047	.010	.363 .717
	¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.135	.205	-.020	-.657 .511
	El salario o sueldo que usted percibe y el total del ingreso familiar:	.278	.901	.008	.309 .757
	Tamaño del lugar	-1.303	.734	-.076	-1.77 .076
	Dummy Migración 0=Campo, 1=pueblo o ciudad	.142	1.927	.002	.074 .941
	Dummy Migración 0=Ciudad, 1=campo o pueblo	2.214	1.792	.041	1.235 .217
	Lengua de los padres 0=castellano 1=cast/indígena	-2.102	1.578	-.037	-1.33 .183
	Dummy Región 0=Sierra Sur, 1=Otras regiones	2.394	2.283	.030	1.048 .295
	Dummy para área urbana y rural 0=rural, 1=urbano	2.238	2.681	.036	.834 .404
	¿Con qué frecuencia mira noticias en la TV?	-.041	.842	-.001	-.049 .961
	Interés en la política	1.426	.763	.047	1.868 .062
	Escala de conocimiento político	-.784	.592	-.040	-1.32 .186
	¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?	-2.046	1.352	-.037	-1.51 .130
	¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?	-1.488	1.119	-.035	-1.33 .184
	¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?	-.107	1.148	-.003	-.093 .926
	Número total de maneras que han sido víctimas de corrupción en el último año	-1.711	.765	-.055	-2.23 .026
	Dummy Víctima de un crimen 0=no, 1=sí	-2.680	1.515	-.043	-1.77 .077
	Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa en su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala?	.431	.312	.034	1.381 .167
	¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio?	7.654	.997	.207	7.681 .000
	Percepción de influencia en los asuntos de la municipalidad	.079	.029	.070	2.765 .006
	Calificación del trato que brinda el gobierno local	.162	.037	.123	4.373 .000
	Calificación de los servicios del gobierno local	.414	.043	.279	9.645 .000

Variable dependiente: Confianza en los municipios. R cuadrado: .287

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## 9 Political Preferences and Electoral Behavior

Peru has a two-round election system for presidential elections. To avoid a second election round, the candidate with the highest number of votes has to receive over 50% of valid votes to win. If this does not occur, the candidates with the highest electoral support must face-off in a second round. Legislative elections for the single-chamber Congress and presidential elections take place simultaneously. There is no second-round for the legislative elections.

The 2006 election was the second to take place after the removal of Alberto Fujimori, whose bid for reelection in 2000 was the source of serious controversy (Carrión 2006; Conaghan 2005; Degregori 2000; *Defensoría del Pueblo* 2000; CAJ 2000). The 2006 election witnessed the breakdown of the fragile but evident consensus that existed in Peruvian politics since 2001 (Carrión 2001). This consensus rested on two central elements: the acceptance of the essentials in the economic policy implemented by the Fujimori government and a commitment to the existing game-rules after the fall of his government. The swift ascension of Ollanta Humala and his nationalist party broke this fragile consensus which had existed between the principal political players in the country. The significant electoral support Humala's candidacy got was no doubt the most notable fact in the recent elections because it laid bare the persistent social and economic fractures in Peruvian Society and the on-going attraction vast sections of the population have for populist candidates.

In this chapter we will discuss the ideological and political preferences of Peruvian voters, as well as the factors that determine their electoral behavior.

### 9.1 Ideology and Party Preferences

The most common way to examine voter ideological preferences is by asking them to place themselves in a left-to-right spectrum (giving them a card with a scale that goes from 1, “extreme-left,” to 10 “extreme-right”). Not all respondents are familiar with these terms and many refuse to place themselves anywhere on the scale. Noteworthy in the Peruvian case is that a high percentage of respondents know the terms and the vast majority place themselves on the scale. Over 90% of interviewees in Peru place themselves on some point on the scale; this is the highest found in the countries surveyed in 2006 (Figure 9.1). These results are not surprising because Peruvian politics have been marked by the left-right division since the eighties, although these terms were secondary during the better part of the Fujimori period, they came back with relative force after the transition.

Actually, one of the most important developments during the 2006 elections was the way in which election preferences were organized around the left-center-right options. But the meaning of “left” in 2006 was very different than what it meant in the eighties. In the 2006 elections, the “left” came to be represented by Ollanta Humala and his Nationalist Party, in spite of the fact that he himself rejected the label. Notwithstanding, as we shall see further on, Ollanta


voters placed themselves clearly more to the left than the voters for the other two important candidates.

**Table 9.1 Latin America: Ideological Self-Identification. Percentage of Valid and Lost Responses, 2006**

País	Casos			
	Válidos		Perdidos	
	N	Porcentaje	N	Porcentaje
México	1297	86.5%	203	13.5%
Guatemala	1035	69.0%	465	31.0%
El Salvador	1214	80.9%	286	19.1%
Honduras	1247	83.2%	253	16.8%
Nicaragua	1186	79.1%	314	20.9%
Costa Rica	1144	76.3%	356	23.7%
Panamá	1287	85.8%	213	14.2%
Colombia	1187	79.1%	313	20.9%
Ecuador	1004	66.9%	496	33.1%
Bolivia	1133	75.5%	367	24.5%
Perú	1297	91.6%	126	8.4%
Chile	1320	88.0%	180	12.0%
República Dominicana	1281	85.4%	219	14.6%
Haití	849	56.6%	651	43.4%
Jamaica	1140	76.0%	360	24.0%


Peruvians' disposition to classify themselves by ideology does not mean they were particularly inclined to one side or another of the political spectrum. In Figure 9.1 are the national left-right averages. The average closer to one means the average voter is inclined to the left, while an average closer to ten implies the voter is more inclined to the right. This graph suggests that the average Peruvian voter is not particularly inclined to either end of the ideological spectrum. The countries that are closer to the left are Panama, Haiti, Bolivia and Chile. Closer to the right are Jamaica, Colombia, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Peru is with the "middle-of-the-road" countries: El Salvador, Ecuador, and Costa Rica.

Figure 9.1 Latin America: Ideology Scale Averages, 2006



The Peruvian case exhibits an intimate link between ideological self-identification and recent presidential election preferences. Those that voted for Ollanta Humala in the first round were more to the left than voters for the other two more important candidates (Figure 9.2). The typical Ollanta Humala voter had a 4.8 average on the ideological self-identification scale, and this average was significantly different than the Alan García and Lourdes Flores average voters, whose scores on the respective scale were 6.0 and 6.2. Actually, the typical Alan García voter and the Lourdes Flores voter were not different from an ideological perspective (error bars for García and Flores were overlapping). Lourdes Flores Nano was the candidate for the *Unidad Nacional* party, which was clearly center-right. One of her election strategies was to appeal to poor voters (particularly women). This would explain the little ideological difference between a voter for García and a voter for Flores Nano.<sup>62</sup> However, this does not mean that there were no important economic and social differences between the typical García and Flores Nano voter, as shall be shown further on, there is a marked relation between the social-economic condition and election preferences.

<sup>62</sup> Lourdes Flores Nano's electoral strategy was to address the popular sectors of society, particularly women. She was successful to a certain extent (at least more so than in the 2001 election), but it was not enough. Official election results placed her in the mid-point after Alan García.

**Figure 9.2 Peru: Ideological Self-Identification and First Round Election Preferences, 2006**

In the second round of elections, Ollanta Humala faced Alan Garcia. Given the data presented in the previous graph, it is relatively easy to understand Alan Garcia's final victory. Clearly, Lourdes Flores' voters were ideologically closer to Alan Garcia than to Ollanta Humala.

## 9.2 Party Identification

It was pointed out in the previous chapter that people have little confidence in political parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that only 30% of respondents say they sympathize with a political party in Peru. This proportion is slightly lower than the average for the countries interviewed in 2006. Table 9.2 indicates, for example, that the percentage of people that say they sympathize with a party in Peru is significantly lower than that registered in Mexico and the Dominican Republic (these countries have a greater tradition of party identification), but greater than that found in Guatemala and Panama. The levels of party identification in Peru in 2006 are similar to those found in Chile, Colombia, and El Salvador. In general, data presented in this table show the low level of acceptance political parties have in the region. Even in countries with higher levels party sympathy, this percentage does not exceed 60%. It is evident that there is a crisis in political representation. The causes are many, but in general they have to do with poor governmental performance, political corruption, and the decline in ideologies (Cavarozzi and Abal Medina 2002; Hagopian 1998; Labastida Martín del Campo, Camou and Luján Ponce 2000; Lechner 1998; Urzúa and Agüero 1998). Of the 30% that say they are party sympathizers


in Peru, the vast majority (51.3%) said they sympathized with APRA, followed by sympathizers of *Unión por el Perú*<sup>63</sup> (27.6%), and *Unidad Nacional* (5.5%).

**Table 9.2 Latin America: Percentage of Respondents that Sympathize with a Political Party. 2006**

País	Méjico	Simpatiza con algún partido político		
		Sí	No	Total
	Méjico	49.2%	50.8%	100.0%
	Guatemala	14.7%	85.3%	100.0%
	El Salvador	31.3%	68.7%	100.0%
	Honduras	44.2%	55.8%	100.0%
	Nicaragua	49.8%	50.2%	100.0%
	Costa Rica	36.2%	63.8%	100.0%
	Panamá	20.8%	79.2%	100.0%
	Colombia	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
	Perú	29.9%	70.1%	100.0%
	Chile	25.6%	74.4%	100.0%
	República Dominicana	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
	Haití	37.9%	62.1%	100.0%
	Jamaica	47.1%	52.9%	100.0%
	Total	36.6%	63.4%	100.0%

Chi cuadrado: 1304.8, sig. .000

**Figure 9.3 Peru: Percentage Distribution of Party Sympathizers, 2006**



<sup>63</sup> This included Humala's Nationalist Party. After the general elections the Nationalist Party terminated the alliance with the UPP.

### 9.3 *Electoral Behavior*

Voting is compulsory in Peru. Those who do not exercise this right are subject to fines. Moreover, a series of official procedures cannot be carried out if the ID card does not show the bearer has voted (or has not paid the fine in case of omission). This fact, along with the great level of interest the 2006 elections caused, explains why most individuals who were able to vote in the 2006 general elections did so. Of all the respondents, 92% said they voted both in the first and second election rounds. The small number who had not voted mostly said they did not because they did not have an ID (34%) or because they could not find their names on the electoral roll (18%). An even smaller number said they had not voted because they had not been interested in the election (2.5%) or because they did not like any of the candidates (1.5%).

Due to the high percentage of people who said they had voted in both election rounds, there are very few socio-demographic or attitudinal factors associated with electoral absenteeism. Our analysis found that there is no relation between absenteeism and region of residence, the size of the place of residence, the urban or rural setting, the person's gender, the level of support for the political system, or income level. The only variables that we found were associated to absenteeism were age and level of education. Young people (18 to 24 years of age) registered a higher level of absenteeism, making the average age of non-voters younger by almost 6 years than the average age of voters (33.5 to 38.8 years, respectively). Also, the average level of education of those who did not show up to vote is almost two years younger compared to those who did: 9.1 and 11.0 years respectively.

When analyzing election preferences we do find that socio-demographic and attitudinal values play an important role. The following analysis is limited to preferences in the second election round. In our survey, if we only consider the valid votes, we find 57.5% say they voted for Alan García, while 42.5% say they voted for Ollanta Humala. These results are relatively close to the official figures (52.6% for García, and 47.4% for Humala). The difference is expected, not only because of the effect of the sample error, but also because it is possible that an indeterminate percentage that voted for Ollanta (who lost the elections) may have felt uncomfortable saying they had voted for a candidate who was widely attacked in the national press. Besides, voter-intention surveys found that a percentage of respondents hid their preference for Humala.

Second election-round preferences show the deep social and economic divisions that persist in Peru. The strong electoral pull of Ollanta Humala, a candidate with questionable democratic credentials and no prior political career, came to represent the anxiety and frustration of a portion of the electorate, generally the poorest, most indigenous, and most discontent with the political system.

Table 9.3 shows the variables that are statistically significant according to the regression models calculated (the results of the regression are included in Table 9.4 of the Annex). As our variable is dichotomous (those who voted for Alan García versus those who voted for Ollanta

Humala), we have used nominal logistic regression. The reference category is those who voted for Ollanta Humala. Following is the analysis of the results of our election decision models.

**Table 9.3 Explanatory Variables for Electoral Preference, 2006**


Predictor Variables	ELECTION DECISION MODELS						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gender	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Age							
Education							
Income (material possessions)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income (subjective evaluation)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Size of locality of residence							
Country vs. Town or City	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City vs. Country or Town							
Parental Language	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Sur vs. rest of country							
Urban vs. Rural							
Support for the Political System	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Watches the TV News		✓		✓	✓		
Knowledge of Politics							
Interested in Politic							
Interpersonal Trust							
Participation in Community Events							
Life Satisfaction							
Economic Evaluation of the Country							
Personal Economic Evaluation				✓	✓	✓	✓
Victim of Corruption							
Victim of Crime							
Ideology					✓	✓	✓
Satisfaction with Local Government							
Authoritarian Values							
Political Tolerance							
Adjusted R squared	.162	.166	.155	.179	.211	.203	.205

In the first model, the predictors are all the socio-demographic variables and the scale of support for the system. The latter variable was included because we thought that the 2006 vote was, to a great extent, a referendum for the existing political system in Peru. One of the central points of Ollanta Humala's election platform was the promise of calling for a constitutional assembly to "reconstruct the State and re-cast politics." This was stated in his electoral platform.


So, all the socio-demographic variables and support for the system became our baseline model or control model, to which diverse explanatory factors are successively added.

The results of the control model clearly show the important economic and social segmentation behind election preferences. First, it shows a clear gap between the preferences of men and that of women. As was noted during the election campaign, Ollanta Humala had great difficulty in attracting the female vote. His military status, radical discourse, and the fact that he was surrounded by retired military personnel who became a virtual praetorian guard, probably caused fear among women (as it did among middle class voters). Therefore, in each of our models we find that gender predicts the election decision: in comparison with men, women were more inclined to vote for García in the second round. This relation can clearly be seen in Figure 9.4.

**Figure 9.4 Peru: Second Round Vote by Gender, 2006**




The gender gap was not the only one observed. In practically all the models, the possession of material goods and perception of subjective income are clearly associated to the vote (Figure 9.5). It can be deduced that an increase in wealth increases the probability of voting for Alan García. Similarly, the greater the perception that income is insufficient to cover the person's basic necessities, the greater the probability of voting for Ollanta Humala.


**Figure 9.5 Peru: Election Choice by Material Wealth, 2006**

On another level, the results show the division in the country in socio-cultural terms. People whose early socialization processes took place in the countryside, contrary to those whose socialization took place in the city or town, were openly inclined to vote for Ollanta Humala. The nationalist discourse and praise for the Andean past no doubt were factors that explain the attraction for this candidate. Likewise, we find that persons whose parents spoke a native language greatly favored this candidate over Alan García. These results leave little doubt that Humala was the candidate for people of Andean parents and who grew up in the countryside. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 illustrate this aspect very well.

**Figure 9.6 Peru: Second Round Vote by Place of Childhood Residence, 2006**



**Figure 9.7 Peru: Second Round Vote by Parental Language, 2006**





An additional result in the regression model is that it showed the assessment of the political system had an important effect on the electoral decision. Given that Ollanta presented himself as the radical-change candidate, willing to completely re-cast the system by means of a new constitution, it was clear that those who were most discontent with the current political system were most likely to accept this message. The results in the regression show that this actually is the case. Persons who voted for Humala showed a lower average in the system support scale than those who voted for Alan Garcia (Figure 9.8).

The results of the regression model allow us to discard a commonly held notion regarding the 2006 election decision. Although we know that Ollanta Humala had an outstanding election performance in the Southern Highland (*Sierra Sur*), when controlled by the factors previously discussed, residence in the Southern Highland was not found to influence the electoral decision significantly. The Southern Highland variable did not show up as significant in any of our regression models. The reason is that Ollanta's performance was outstanding in other regions of the Peruvian Highland, and not only in that region. It did not matter whether the voters resided in the Southern Highland. What mattered was whether they shared the characteristics mentioned before: the place of childhood residence (countryside versus town or city), parental language, gender, levels of support for the system, and the level of material wealth.

The second vote-model introduces variables associated with watching the TV news and the level of political information. The results show that the influence of these variables on voters is modest. Neither the levels of political knowledge, nor the degree of interest in politics show up as explanatory factors for the electoral decision. What does show up, on the other hand, is how much TV news the person watches. People who said they watched the news on TV more often were more inclined to vote for Alan García. This is not surprising if you take into account the intense media campaign against the Ollanta Humala candidacy. No doubt the people who were most exposed to TV news were influenced by it. On the other hand, people who watched less TV news tended to favor the Humala candidacy (Figure 9.9).


**Figure 9.8 Peru: Electoral Decision and Level of Support for the System, 2006**



**Figure 9.9 Peru: Second Round Vote per Frequency of Watching TV News, 2006**

The third model incorporates two variables that are commonly linked to the social capital theory (interpersonal trust and participation in community activities) and Ronald Inglehart's theory that a greater level of satisfaction with life has an important effect on certain political attitudes. None of these three variables emerged as an important explanatory factor. Their inclusion reduces the goodness of fit of the model (which can be seen in the reduction of the adjusted R squared with regards to the previous model).

The fourth electoral decision model introduced variables that can be grouped under the general heading "perception of personal and economic insecurity." These are the following: retrospective perception of the personal economic situation and country's; the total number of acts of corruption the respondent has experienced; and whether the person has been the victim of a criminal act. Of all the variables related to the perception of insecurity, the only one that turns out to be important is the following: people who perceived a worsening in their personal economic situation in relation to the recent past were more inclined to vote for Humala than for García (Figure 9.10).

**Figure 9.10 Peru: Second Round Vote per Retrospective Assessment of Personal Economic Situation, 2006**

The next model incorporates only one additional variable and that is respondent self-placement on the left-right scale. As mentioned before, respondent ideology plays a central role in the electoral decision. The mere introduction of this variable increases the adjusted R squared from 0.179 to 0.211, an 18% increase in the model's capability of prediction. As can be expected, the farther from the left the voter is, the greater the probability is that he or she voted for Alan García in the second election round.

The last two models attempt to determine the role of two specific factors in determining the vote. The sixth model attempts to find out whether greater satisfaction with local government performance affects the vote. The results show that this is not the case. The final model tries to determine whether the presence of authoritarian values and the levels of political tolerance have a decisive effect on the vote. In both cases the answer is negative.

In conclusion, distribution of election preferences in the second round expressed the deep fractures in Peruvian society. Persons that grew up in the countryside, who are of Andean origin, who have lower income, who watch less TV news, who define themselves as being on the left, who are discontent with the system and who have a perception of personal economic insecurity, favored the candidate who represented a rejection of the political system with their vote.

## 9.4 Appendix. Results of the Regression Analysis

Table 9.4 Peru: Predictors of the Vote in the Second Election Round, 2006

Predictor Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Intersect	-1.330 (.530)*	-1.741 (.609)**	-1.600 (.684)*	-.985 (.771)	-1.820 (.836)*	-1.865 (.930)*	-1.595 (.969)
Size	-.079 (.076)	-.077 (.076)	-.070 (.077)	-.084 (.078)	-.100 (.083)	-.075 (.084)	-.080 (.084)
Gender	.432 (.133)**	.397 (.143)*	.415 (.145)*	.416 (.149)*	.349 (.157)*	.335 (.160)*	.300 (.164)
Age	-.001 (.005)	-.002 (.005)	-.002 (.005)	-.002 (.005)	-.005 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.004 (.006)
Education	.010 (.019)	.010 (.021)	.014 (.021)	.016 (.022)	.009 (.023)	.002 (.024)	.003 (.024)
Material Wealth	.112 (.052)*	.114 (.053)*	.111 (.053)*	.107 (.054)*	.123 (.058)*	.134 (.058)*	.128 (.058)*
“Subjective” Income	.164 (.090)	.176 (.091)*	.184 (.094)*	.247 (.099)*	.274 (.107)*	.271 (.109)*	.274 (.109)*
Country vs. Town or City	-.581 (.189)**	-.557 (.189)*	-.469 (.192)*	-.485 (.198)*	-.554 (.211)*	-.635 (.215)*	-.586 (.216)*
City vs. Country or Town	-.013 (.183)	-.008 (.184)	.007 (.185)	-.022 (.190)	-.058 (.200)	-.123 (.204)	-.094 (.205)
Parental Language (0=Spanish Only)	.700 (.151)**	.665 (.153)**	.648 (.154)**	.671 (.158)**	.608 (.166)**	.559 (.168)**	.564 (.169)**
Sierra Sur vs. other regions	-.346 (.228)	-.354 (.230)	-.326 (.236)	-.292 (.242)	-.040 (.268)	-.061 (.269)	-.108 (.271)
Urban vs. Rural (0=rural)	-.021 (.262)	.080 (.267)	.017 (.272)	-.041 (.277)	.019 (.293)	-.058 (.299)	-.088 (.300)
Support for the System	.013 (.003)**	.014 (.003)**	.013 (.004)**	.011 (.004)*	.007 (.004)	.008 (.004)*	.009 (.004)*
Watches TV News		.183 (.085)*	.165 (.086)	.200 (.088)*	.200 (.095)*	.165 (.097)	.167 (.098)
Interested in Politics		-.009 (.079)	-.016 (.080)	-.014 (.081)	-.014 (.086)	-.026 (.088)	-.037 (.088)
Political Knowledge		-.076 (.060)	-.066 (.061)	-.077 (.063)	-.060 (.066)	-.050 (.067)	-.053 (.068)
Interpersonal Trust			.021 (.083)	-.006 (.086)	-.038 (.091)	-.027 (.093)	-.021 (.094)
Community Participation (0=no)			.079 (.137)	.100 (.141)	.088 (.149)	.075 (.151)	.069 (.151)
Life Satisfaction			-.113 (.095)	-.120 (.098)	-.127 (.106)	-.112 (.108)	-.090 (.109)

Predictor Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Retrospective Economic Assessment of the Country				-.104 (.120)	-.083 (.124)	-.070 (.126)	-.090 (.126)
Personal Retrospective Economic Assessment				-.267 (.122)*	-.274 (.127)*	-.282 (.128)*	-.276 (.128)*
Index of Victimization by Corruption				-.115 (.075)	-.116 (.079)	-.100 (.079)	-.099 (.080)
Has been a Victim of Crime (0=no)				.220 (.160)	.235 (.167)	.203 (.169)	.175 (.170)
Ideology					.218 (.035)**	.208 (.036)**	.207 (.036)**
Satisfaction with Local Government						.074 (.105)	.083 (.106)
Political Tolerance							-.005 (.003)
Authoritarianism							-.011 (.061)
Nagelkerke R squared	.162	.166	.156	.180	.211	.203	.205

Standard Errors are presented in parenthesis under their corresponding regression coefficient.

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001. The reference category is “Voted for Ollanta Humala”.

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## 10 Social Participation

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a comparative view of citizen participation in Peru, and to discuss its diverse dimensions, in order to find the factors that are associated with it. Citizen participation certainly is a central element of democracy because it is implicit, not only in participation in elections and politics, but also in citizen intervention in organizations that represent different interest groups.<sup>64</sup> In spite of what Putnam suggests regarding social capital, a high level of participation in organizations in Peru does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a consolidated democracy or greater democratic attachment. It should be remembered that during the ten years of the Fujimori government, grassroots organizations—particularly those linked to social assistance—were part of the Fujimori regime support apparatus.

In Peru there is still a relatively important network of social organizations and there is an important degree of participation in community activities in general. The initial studies of democratic values done by the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (Carrión, Tanaka and Zárate 1999; Tanaka and Zárate 2002) showed that people who participated more in social organizations were not necessarily more interested in public issues, and did not reject military coups or civil authoritarianism any more than others did. This was explained by the fact that they were the poorest rural area dwellers, who participated more in organizations, being these the most depoliticized sectors, and the most likely to tolerate authoritarian forms of government.

Alberto Fujimori's government introduced different regulations in Peruvian legislation that were linked to participation. In the mid-nineties Peru became one of the most advanced countries in Latin America in this issue. These regulations basically had to do with mechanisms for direct democracy such as participation in referendum, legislative initiative, removal or renewal of authorities and accountability. Later, both the Valentín Paniagua transition government and Alejandro Toledo's government, issued laws on citizen participation, at the local level (participation in creating participative budgets, for example) and in aspects linked to the new regional governments and specific issues like citizen security.<sup>65</sup>

The existence of all these new participative mechanisms and the activity of diverse non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and state entities foster participation in a territorial as well as a sector sense. Currently discussion is underway to determine whether participation is really reaching the poorest sectors and whether it really helps to make the sub-national and the national governments more efficient. The LAPOP study allows us to better explore the dimensions of participation in the country and place it in the Latin American context. Here we will analyze three dimensions or types of social participation: participation in community activities; participation in social organizations; and participation in demonstrations or public protest.

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<sup>64</sup> Here we assume the *tocquevillean* idea of participation.

<sup>65</sup> At the end of this chapter there is a table with the legal regulations on citizen participation that have been issued in recent years.


## 10.1 Community Participation

We understand community participation to be involvement in activities for the betterment of one's community that do not necessarily imply participating in a particular social group. To this end we take into account the following items in the questionnaire:

- CP5. Over the past year, have you contributed to the solution of a problem in your community or the neighbors in your neighborhood?
- CP5A. Have you donated money or materials to help solve a problem in your community or neighborhood?
- CP5B. Have you donated your work or labor?
- CP5C. Have you regularly attended community meetings about some problem or some improvement?
- CP5D. Have you tried to organize a new group to solve a neighborhood problem, or to seek some improvement?

Compared to other countries, Peru registers a high level of participation in community activities, particularly in the question that has to do with the interviewee contributing to the solution of a problem in his or her community or neighborhood (Figure 10.1). In this graph we can see that Peru is in the highest range in the region for this type of activity along with Honduras and the Dominican Republic. In the case of Peru, 43.5% of the population has contributed to the solution of a community or neighborhood problem, whereas the regional average is just 34.6%.

**Figure 10.1 Latin America: Percentage that say they have Contributed to the Solution of some Community or Neighborhood problem, 2006**



If we observe the different forms of community participation, we find that Peru has the highest participation percentages in terms of attendance at community meetings and participation in forming groups to contribute to the solution of some problem (Table 10.1). No doubt there is a high level of interest in participating in issues related to the community and its particular problems. As we shall see further on, this participation is associated with an important action in social organizations.

In order to identify the variables that predict greater community participation we created four regression models.<sup>66</sup> The first of these included socio-demographic variables. The results are presented in a simplified way in Table 10.2 and the detail presentation is in Appendix 10.4.1 (Table 10.5). These show that older age, better education, being male, being a parent, and having been raised in a town or city, make it more likely that the individual participate in activities that aim to improve the community. Generally, they are heads of households who have the responsibility to participate to get improvements in their community, and who have more years of education which allows them to reap the benefits of participation. This participation is voluntary, but in some cases it is probably motivated by the need to obtain some benefit for the family's immediate environment. It is noteworthy that neither income nor ethnic background play an important role in determining community activism.

**Table 10.1 Latin America: Different forms of Community Participation, 2006**

País	¿Ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?	¿Ha donado dinero o materiales?	¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunales?	¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio?
México	30.6	16.1	21.0	17.4	9.3
Guatemala	30.8	21.1	23.8	17.1	10.6
El Salvador	35.0	17.9	25.8	16.5	11.0
Honduras	44.5	32.4	30.3	24.7	12.0
Nicaragua	21.8	12.7	16.2	12.5	7.7
Costa Rica	37.3	23.9	23.9	17.1	11.1
Panamá	27.2	15.2	20.4	15.0	11.0
Colombia	32.3	17.8	22.9	18.2	13.1
Ecuador	35.5	24.2	28.3	25.2	11.9
Bolivia	29.0	13.7	20.0	22.7	12.2
<b>Perú</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>20.1</b>
Chile	33.5	23.2	17.3	15.3	9.7
República Dominicana	43.5	27.9	28.9	23.6	15.5
Haití	36.6	22.8	26.1	22.2	14.6
Jamaica	38.3	23.6	29.6	17.8	13.2
Total	34.6	21.1	24.2	19.7	12.2

<sup>66</sup> Since the dependent variable just has two values (participated / did not participate), nominal logistic regression is used to estimate the models.

In the second model, we added variables to these socio-demographic factors, like interpersonal trust, watching TV news, political knowledge, and two attitudes towards local governments: whether they are satisfied with their service and whether they believe they influence their decisions. We found that the model's capacity to predict increases (the adjusted R squared increases from .061 to .105). All of the variables that were included are significant except for satisfaction with the local government. Greater interpersonal trust, watching the TV news more, greater political knowledge and having a sense that there is political efficacy (in municipal affairs) have an influence on increasing the level of community participation.

In the third model we added political variables that go beyond the local sphere, such as support for the system, perception of government performance, satisfaction with democracy and the assessment of the economic situation (both personal and national). Although the model adjustment improves, none of these political variables are significant.

**Table 10.2 Peru: Predictors of Community Participation, 2006**

Predictors	COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION MODELS			
	1	2	3	4
Gender	✓			
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓
Level of Education	✓	✓	✓	
Income (material possession)				
Income (subjective assessment)				
Size of locality of residence				✓
Country vs. Town or City	✓	✓	✓	
Parental language				
Parenthood	✓			
Sierra Sur vs. rest of the country				
Urban vs. rural				
Interpersonal Trust		✓	✓	
Watches the TV news		✓	✓	
Political Knowledge		✓		
Interested in Politics		✓		
Satisfaction with local government				
Influence in municipal affairs		✓	✓	✓
Support for the System				
Approval of the president's work				
Governmental Efficacy				

Satisfaction with democracy				✓
Economic Assessment of the country				✓
Personal Economic assessment				
Participation in social organizations				✓
Participation in public demonstrations				✓
Contact with government authorities				
Adjusted R squared	.061	.105	.112	.260

In the last model, more variables related to other types of participation were added to the regression. The expectation is that they appear important. Three types of participative variables are included: a scale of attendance at social organization meetings; participation in public demonstrations or protest meetings; and contacting the governmental authorities. As expected, all these variables (except for contact), show-up as important predictors of community activism. This means that a kind of participation “syndrome” exists: People who participate in one type of activity are more likely to participate in others, except for contacting State officials. In contrast, when these participation indicators are included in the model, variables that are related to assessment of democracy and the country’s economic situation become important. People who give a more favorable assessment to the way democracy works in the country are less prone to participating. On the other hand, people who perceive the national economic situation is worsening have greater level of community activism.

To sum up, the local context seems to be more important than the national context in explaining the reasons for greater levels of community participation. Also, more than the size of the locality, it is the level of education, the access to information, the responsibilities assumed (namely children), and the feeling that one can influence municipal affairs, which give rise to greater levels of participation in community issues.

## 10.2 Participation in Social Organizations


In order to analyze participation in social organizations, the following questions were used:

- Now I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me whether you attend their meetings at least once a week, at least once a month, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
- CP6. A religious group?
- CP7. A parents association at a public or private school?
- CP8. A community improvement committee or board?
- CP9. A professional, business, producer and/or countryside organization?
- CP10. A workers' union?
- CP13. A party or political movement?

The variables were re-coded in the following way: the options *Never* and *Does not respond*, were recoded as 0. The rest of the values were re-coded as 1. This means, one category

is for all those that frequently attend meetings of the aforementioned organizations and the other for those who just assist occasionally. The resulting scale is the averaged sum of each score per question, and it goes from a 0 for no-participation to 100 for high-participation. Figure 10.2 shows this distribution in the countries surveyed in 2006. Peru is at the upper half-way point of this kind of representation. Bolivia and Haiti have high levels of activism in social organizations, whereas El Salvador and Costa Rica have low levels.

**Figure 10.2 Latin America: Average Attendance at Social Organization Meetings, 2006**



We employed the same analytical strategy used in the previous section to analyze the factors that influence the levels of attendance at social organization meetings; that is, we used four models to predict the levels of social participation.<sup>67</sup> The results are presented in a simplified manner in Table 10.3 and in a more detailed form in Appendix 10.4.1 (Table 10.3).

An initial way to analyze the results is by comparing the factors that influence attendance at social organization meetings with regards to the variables that affect participation in community activities. The common socio-demographic factors indicate that activism, both social and community-based, is influenced by the person's age, level of education, whether they have children or not, and having been raised in a town or city. However, social participation, contrary to community participation, is affected by the person's socio-economic level. People with a lower average of possession of material goods have a greater tendency towards attending social organization meetings. This speaks of a need to participate in an organization as a probable compensation for those needs created by low-income conditions. Likewise, we find that the size

<sup>67</sup> In this case, an ordinary minimum squares regression was used, given that the dependent variable is an interval.

of the locality of residence had an effect on social participation (whereas there was none regarding community activism). This is logical because the greater size of the city, the greater the opportunities and the greater the number of organizations to participate in.

**Table 10.3 Peru: Explanatory Variables for Social Participation, 2006**

Predictors	SOCIAL PARTICIPATION MODELS			
	1	2	3	4
Gender				
Age				
Education	✓	✓	✓	
Income (material possessions)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income (subjective evaluation)				
Size of locality of residence	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country vs. Town or City	✓	✓	✓	
Parental Language				
Parenthood	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Sur vs. the Rest of the country				✓
Urban vs. rural				
Interpersonal Trust				
Watches the TV News				
Knowledge of Politics			✓	
Interested in Politics		✓	✓	✓
Satisfaction with Local Government				
Influence in Municipal Affairs		✓	✓	✓
Support for the System			✓	✓
Approves President's Work				
Governmental Efficiency				
Satisfaction with Democracy				
Economic Assessment of the Country			✓	✓
Personal Economic Assessment				
Participation in Public Demonstrations				✓
Contact with Government Authorities				✓
R squared	.132	.161	.174	.260

Relative to the variables introduced in the second and third models, we find that social participation, different from community activism, is motivated by attitudes towards the system. People who have a greater level of dissatisfaction with the political system exhibit greater levels of social participation. In the same sense, we find that those who are most discontent with the country's economic situation tend to be more active than those who show greater support for the system. This suggests that people who have more demands of the system are mobilized to a greater extent than those who are basically content with the economic and political situation. The results of the second model again confirm the important role that the feeling of political efficacy (the perception of the degree of citizen influence on municipal issues) has in increasing social participation. This is consistent with classic studies on political efficacy and its effects of participation (Gamson 1968; Milbrath and Goel 1977).

Finally, in the fourth model we included the participation variables and found that participation in public demonstrations as well as the fact of having requested aid from the authorities increases the level of social participation. As mentioned before, this suggests that people who participate actively do so in several dimensions.

### 10.3 Participation in Public Demonstrations

After Alejandro Toledo took office, a series of demands followed, requesting more resources and improved natural resource management. Those years were marked by a climate of ongoing social conflict. The weakness of political parties and unions lead the people to resort to street marches as well as building and roadway takeovers as ways to exert pressure. This situation continues to date. Although the government has changed hands the protests continue, with a lower degree of intensity. Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) have created offices to monitor social conflicts in different parts of the country. Therefore, this is a relatively current issue, and merits detailed examination. The survey asked:

- PROT1. Have you ever participated in a march or a public demonstration? Have you done this a few times, almost never, never?

It is clear that some people might have doubts whether to answer this question honestly. Probably some who had taken part in this type of activity denied their participation. Assuming there must be some non-sample error in the responses this error should tend to reduce the rate of participation in this type of activity, not to increase it.


Survey results show that Peruvians get a high score in public demonstration participation, the second highest in the region after Bolivia (Figure 10.3).<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> We assigned answers "never", "almost never" and "yes, several times" scores of 0, 50, and 100, respectively.

There are some important differences between the factors that help predict participation in public demonstrations and those that help predict social activism.<sup>69</sup> For instance, age plays an important role, the same way it did when we examined community participation. Contrary to the common idea that it is the youth that are more inclined to non-conventional participation, here we found that the older the age, the greater the propensity to participate in public demonstrations. No doubt the flux in student movements had something to do with this finding. Different from 20 to 25 years ago when it was young students that took to the streets, today the streets tend to be overrun by demonstrations with people from areas outside Lima making demands of the central government.

**Figure 10.3 Latin America: Average Participation in Public Demonstrations, 2006**



The second factor that seems to be exclusive to this kind of participation is gender. The influence of gender on community activism was relatively weak (it was only significant in two out of four models), and non-existent in determining social participation. However, it plays an

<sup>69</sup> For the effects of the multivariate analysis we grouped the participation variable in two, those who had never participated and those who had done so at some time. A nominal logistic regression was used to estimate the models.

important and ongoing role in predicting participation in public demonstrations. Being male increases the probability of being involved in this type of activity.

In third place, and different from the two kinds of participation previously analyzed, the respondent's parent's language, our *proxy* variable for ethnic background, emerged as an important predictor. People whose parents spoke a native language were more likely to participate in street demonstrations than those whose parents only spoke Spanish. This indicates that people of Andean background show an inclination towards this type of participation. This is not surprising considering that this way is preferred by those who feel excluded from the system.

Finally we find that discontent with the government is an important factor, and it is statistically significant, that it increases the probability of participating in a street protest.

**Table 10.4 Peru: Explanatory Factors for Participation in Public Demonstrations, 2006****MODELS FOR PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS**

Predictor Variables	1	2	3	4
Gender	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income (material possessions)				
Income (subjective assessment)				
Size of locality of residence	✓	✓	✓	
Country vs. Town or City				
Parental Language	✓	✓	✓	✓
Parenthood				
Sierra Sur vs. Rest of Country				
Urban vs. rural	✓	✓	✓	✓
Interpersonal Trust				
Watches the TV News				
Knowledge of Politics			✓	
Interest in Politics		✓	✓	
Satisfaction with the Local Government		✓		
Influence on Municipal Issues				
Support for the System				
Approval of President's work			✓	✓
Efficacy of Government				
Satisfaction with Democracy				
Economic Assessment of the country				
Personal Economic Assessment				
Social Participation				✓
Contact with Government Authorities				✓
Adjusted R squared	.115	.132	.143	.225

## 10.4 Appendix. Results of the Regression Analysis and Legislation on Citizen Participation

### 10.4.1 Results of Regression Analyses

Table 10.5 Peru: Predictors of Community Participation, 2006

Predictors	MODELO 1		MODELO 2		MODELO 3		MODELO 4	
	Coef. B	Std Error						
Intersect	-1.426	.417**	-3.648	.618**	-2.767	.810**	-2.980	.891**
Gender	-.240	.112*	-.105	.125	-.043	.131	-.018	.141
Age	.019	.004**	.019	.005**	.021	.005**	.020	.005**
Education	.078	.016**	.055	.019*	.043	.020*	.026	.021
Income (material possessions)	.005	.042	-.036	.045	-.025	.047	.008	.050
Income (subjective assessment)	-.098	.074	.025	.081	.039	.086	.042	.094
Size of Locality of Residence	-.025	.062	-.046	.065	-.014	.067	-.214	.075*
Country vs. Town or City	.346	.140*	.417	.149*	.408	.157*	.254	.170
Parental Language	-.047	.131	-.053	.138	-.065	.144	.025	.154
Parenthood	-.332	.147*	-.332	.154	-.303	.160	.051	.176
Sierra Sur vs. Rest of country	-.042	.188	.094	.202	.165	.217	.151	.237
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	.210	.220	.325	.236	.223	.247	.459	.270
Interpersonal Trust			.147	.071*	.149	.075*	.150	.082
Watches the TV News			.234	.077*	.250	.081*	.242	.088*
Knowledge of Politics			.111	.052*	.104	.055	.079	.059
Interested in Politics			.140	.067*	.118	.070	.019	.076
Satisfaction with Local Government			.037	.082	.058	.087	.133	.094
Influence on Municipal Issues			.253	.082*	.263	.086*	.170	.093
Support for the System					.001	.004	.005	.004
Approval of President's work					-.085	.093	-.062	.101
Government Efficacy					-.034	.062	-.084	.067
Satisfaction with Democracy					-.157	.104	-.240	.113*
Economic Assessment of the Country					-.130	.106	-.255	.114*
Personal Economic Assessment					-.027	.106	-.019	.113
Participates in social Organizations							.036	.003**
Participates in demonstrations							.175	.080*
Contact with State Officials							-.206	.158
Nagelkerke R squared	.061		.105		.112		.260	

Reference category is “Has not participated”

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

Table 10.6 Peru: Predictors of Participation in Social Organizations, 2006

Predictors	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coef. B	Std Error						
Intersect	7.364	5.687	-5.657	6.903	-14.362	8.611	-14.469	8.324
Gender	2.221	1.198	.141	1.271	.410	1.286	-.473	1.245
Age	.083	.047	.058	.047	.058	.048	.021	.046
Education	.847	.171**	.480	.187*	.516	.189*	.316	.184
Income (material possessions)	-1.354	.443*	-1.593	.448**	-1.450	.457*	-1.358	.441*
Income (subjective assessment)	-1.152	.795	-.322	.811	-.362	.842	-.533	.813
Size of Locality	4.230	.659**	4.313	.660**	4.476	.666**	3.947	.646**
Country vs. Town or City	-4.289	1.511*	-4.353	1.510*	-4.432	1.522*	-3.443	1.473*
Parental Language	.682	1.397	.915	1.399	.447	1.422	-.897	1.381
Parenthood	10.177	1.554**	10.269	1.563**	10.471	1.575**	10.062	1.522**
Sierra Sur vs. rest of country	-.541	2.027	-.643	2.026	-.729	2.061	-.938	1.994
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	3.123	2.353	3.400	2.378	4.078	2.403	2.978	2.326
Interpersonal Trust			1.035	.715	.968	.724	.773	.700
Watches the TV News			1.412	.757	1.273	.763	1.123	.737
Knowledge of politics			1.001	.527	1.207	.535*	.894	.518
Interested in politics			2.668	.681**	2.824	.692*	2.101	.672*
Satisfaction with Local Government			-1.468	.817	-1.346	.839*	-1.101	.812
Influence Municipal Issues			3.844	.831**	3.809	.839	3.503	.813**
Support for the System					-.105	.035*	-.095	.033*
Approves President's Work					-1.027	.915	-1.084	.886
Governmental Efficacy					.930	.592	.956	.571
Satisfaction with Democracy					1.707	1.011	1.738	.976
Economic Assessment of Country					4.065	1.040**	3.827	1.004**
Personal Economic Assessment					-.423	1.041	-.240	1.005
Participates in Demonstrations							5.203	.718**
Contact with State Officials							7.769	1.407**
Adjusted R Squared	.132		.161		.174		.230	

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

Table 10.7 Peru: Predictors for Participation in Public Demonstrations, 2006

Predictors	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coef. B	Std Error						
Intersect	-2.530	.466**	-2.431	.666**	-3.925	.894**	-3.211	.935**
Gender (0=women)	-.484	.125**	-.368	.139*	-.359	.145*	-.330	.151*
Age	.018	.005**	.016	.005*	.018	.005**	.016	.006*
Education	.116	.018**	.082	.021**	.080	.022**	.067	.023*
Income (material possessions)	-.029	.047	-.040	.049	-.010	.051	.006	.053
Income (subjective assessment)	-.019	.083	-.010	.088	.031	.095	.014	.099
Size of Locality	.179	.068*	.177	.070*	.199	.073*	.080	.078
Country vs. Town or City	.262	.155	.270	.162	.191	.171	.053	.178
Parental Language (0=Spanish only)	-.624	.142**	-.591	.148**	-.594	.155**	-.561	.161**
Parenthood	-.048	.162	-.089	.169	-.117	.177	.115	.188
Sierra Sur vs. Rest of Country	.188	.197	.328	.208	.321	.222	.358	.233
Urban vs. rural (0=rural)	-.753	.239*	-.768	.254*	.750	.268*	-.675	.279*
Interpersonal Trust			.055	.078	.053	.081	.030	.085
Watches the TV News			.027	.085	.017	.088	-.013	.092
Knowledge of Politics			.111	.058	.118	.061*	.105	.063
Interested in Politics			.173	.073*	.194	.077*	.128	.080
Satisfaction with Local Government			-.204	.090*	-.176	.096	-.174	.100
Influence in Municipal Issues			-.006	.090	.046	.094	-.055	.099
Support for System					-.003	.004	-.001	.004
Approves President's Work					.288	.101*	.367	.106**
Governmental Efficacy					.069	.069	.053	.071
Satisfaction with Democracy					-.010	.115	-.067	.119
Economic Assessment of Country					.091	.116	.011	.122
Personal Economic Assessment					-.078	.118	-.068	.122
Participation in Social Organizations							.022	.003**
Contact with State Officials							-.760	.157**
Nagelkerke R squared	.115		.132		.143		.225	

Reference Category is "Never participated"

\*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .001

## 10.4.2 Legislation on Citizen Participation

Year	Name	Brief description
1993	Political Constitution of Peru	Article 2, section 17 provides that every person has right to participate either individually or by association in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the Nation. Article 31, section 31 provides that citizens have the right to participate in public affairs by way of a referendum, legislative initiative, removal or renovation of authorities, and accountability. They also have the right to be elected and to freely elect their representatives.
1994	Law of Citizen Rights, Participation and Control. (Law N° 26300)	Article 2 provides participation rights for citizens which are the following: a) Initiative for Constitutional Reform; b) Initiative for the creation of laws; c) Referendum; d) Initiative in the creation of municipal and regional norms; and, e) Other participation mechanisms established by said law for the area of municipal and regional government. Article 3.- The following are citizen control rights: a) Revoking Authorities, b) Removal of Authorities; c) Request Report of Labors; and, d) Other accountability mechanisms established by this law for the area of municipal and regional governments.
2002	Law of the Legal Framework for the Modernization of State Management (Law 27658)	Article 8 states that the State must promote and establish mechanisms for adequate citizen participative democracy by means of direct and indirect mechanisms for participation. Article 7 stipulates that citizens have the right to participate in the processes of budget creation, accountability, execution and control of the management of the State.
2002	Law of Constitutional Reform Chapter XIV Title IV, on Decentralization. (Law 27680)	Article 197 states that municipalities are to promote, support and regulate neighborhood participation in local development. Article 191 states that Regional Council must be composed of provincial mayors and representatives of civil society.
2002	Law that regulates participation in Mother Clubs and Soup Kitchens in Nutritional Support Programs (Law 27731)	Stipulates that Mother Clubs, Popular Self-Managed Soup Kitchens and other charity organizations, are to participate by way of one representative each, that are volunteer delegates with voice and vote, in central and decentralized administrative organisms in charge of designing policies and objectives, determining beneficiary policy, definition of the basic food basket, resource control, supervision of adequate fulfillment of goals and plans of the Programs for Food and Nutrition Support. And the assessment of the workings of PRONAA relative to efficiency to get to the poorest sectors.

2002	Law of Bases for Decentralization. (Law 27783)	<p>Article 4 states that decentralization is democratic, which presupposes it promotes equal opportunities of access to greater levels of human development, and stipulates that the relation between the State and society must be based on participation and consensus in governmental management.</p> <p>Article 17 stipulates that local and regional governments have the obligation to foster and guarantee mechanisms for citizen participation.</p> <p>Article 20 provides that regional and local governments are supported and directed by annual participative budgets.</p>
2002	Law of Demarcation and Territorial Organization. (Law 27795)	<p>Provides for citizen participation in territorial demarcation initiatives, and the in the creation of regions.</p> <p>Article 10 states that organized population can make petitions and advance works initiatives, which have to fulfill prerequisites and provide the required technical documentation.</p> <p>Article 11 stipulates that the creation of regions requires a referendum proposal by the population in the department involved.</p>
2002	Law of the National Youth Council. (Law 27802)	Provides the components for CONAJU, the Council for the Participation of Youth ( <i>Consejo de Participación de la Juventud</i> ), the organization in which youth-representatives from different social echelons, among these agricultural-worker communities, participate in the design and formation of policies, plans and programs for young people.
2002	Law of Participation of Professional Associations and Consulting Organizations in State Institutions. (Law 27843)	Stipulates that Consulting Organizations at Ministries, Decentralized Public Institutions and State Autonomous Institutions are to be composed of at least one (1) representative of the professional association of the respective specialization.
2002	Organic Law of Regional Governments. Law 27867. Law that modifies the previous Organic Law of Regional Governments. (Law 27902)	Articles 11, 11-A and 11-B describe the workings of the Regional Coordination Council ( <i>Consejo de Coordinación Regional</i> ), which involves the participation of civil society. It stipulates that representatives from civil society to the Regional Coordination Council are to be democratically elected for periods of two years by legally accredited delegates from regional and provincial level organizations, respectively, that are on the Regional Government's register. To be registered they must have legal status and a minimum 3 year proven institutional existence.

2003	Organic Law of Municipalities. (Ley 27972)	<p>Article 53 states that municipalities are ruled by annual participative budgets. Participative budgets are part of the planning system. The municipality must regulate neighborhood participation in the creation of participative budgets.</p> <p>Article 111 stipulates that neighbors in a municipal district participate individually or collectively in municipal administration and government through mechanisms for neighborhood participation and the exercise of political rights.</p> <p>Articles 112 to 122 provide diverse mechanisms for neighborhood participation and control in the local sphere (by referendum, neighborhood boards, administrative committees, land claims, open council meetings, local participation in the business sector, annulment).</p>
2004	Law that includes the participation of society in the institutions that control the Judicial Power and the Public Ministry. (Law 28149)	<p>Stipulates that the Control Office of the Judiciary and Judicial Power (<i>Oficina del Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial</i>) is to be composed of members of civil society: a representative of the country's associations of lawyers, a representative of the Law Schools of the five oldest public universities in the country, a representative of the Law Schools of the five oldest private universities in the country.</p>
2004	Law that modifies articles 23 and 29 of the Law of the Right to Citizen Participation and Control. (Law 28421)	<p>It stipulates that in order to revoke an authority, the majority plus one of valid issued votes is required. It also states that whoever has been removed from an elected post is apt to becoming a candidate for the same office in the following elections.</p>

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
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## Anexo I: Cuestionario utilizado

Versión # 23G-1R IRB Approval: 060187



### LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Perú, 2006

© Vanderbilt University 2006. Derechos reservados. All rights reserved.		
<b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia <b>11. Perú</b> 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	<b>PAIS</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>Estratopri:</b> (1) Costa Norte (2) Costa Sur (3) Lima (4) Selva (5) Sierra Centro (6) Sierra Norte (7) Sierra Sur (11) Ayacucho (12) Cusco (13) Huánuco (14) Junín (15) Pasco (16) San Martín (17) Ucayalí	<b>ESTRATOPRI</b>	<b>11</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>UPM.</b>	<b>UPM</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Departamento :</b>	<b>PERDEPT</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Provincia:	<b>PERPROV</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>DISTRITO:</b>	<b>PERDISTRITO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SEGMENTO CENSAL</b>	<b>PERSEGMENTO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Sector</b>	<b>PERSEC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>CLUSTER.</b> (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	<b>CLUSTER</b>	
<b>UR</b> 1. Urbano 2. Rural	<b>UR</b>	
Tamaño del lugar: <b>1. Lima (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande</b> 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	<b>TAMANO</b>	
<b>Idioma del cuestionario:</b> (1) Español	<b>PERIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Hora de inicio:</b> _____:_____ [no digitar]	-----	
<b>Fecha de la entrevista</b> día: _____ mes:_____ año: 2006	<b>FECHA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

**OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA**

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

Q1

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

A4

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflictos armados	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

PERA4A ¿Y cuál es el problema **más grave** que tiene su localidad? **[No leer alternativas; Sólo una opción]**

PERA4A

Falta o mala calidad del agua	19	Los políticos	59
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Medio ambiente	10
Corrupción	13	Migración	16
Crédito, falta de	09	Narcotráfico	12
Delincuencia,	05	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Conflictos sociales (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Drogadicción	11	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Falta de apoyo a proyectos productivos	71
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Otro	70
Electricidad, falta de	24	NS/NR	88

**PERA4B** Hablando sólo de problemas del medio ambiente en el país. ¿Puede decirme cuál es el problema más grave? **[No leer alternativas; Sólo una opción]**

(0) Ninguno (**Pase a DEM13**)

- (1) Tala o corte ilegal de árboles
- (2) Basura no recogida
- (3) Falta de rellenos sanitarios
- (4) La contaminación de los ríos
- (5) Las mineras, problemas ocasionados por
- (6) Contaminación ambiental
- (7) Otro .....

(8) NS/NR

**PERA4B**

**PERA4C** ¿Quién cree usted que debería encargarse de resolver este problema? **[No leer alternativas; Sólo una opción]**

- (1) La propia comunidad
- (2) Las municipalidades
- (3) El gobierno regional
- (4) El Presidente de la República
- (5) El Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales -INRENA
- (6) El Consejo Nacional del Ambiente - CONAM
- (7) Otra institución del estado
- (8) Gobierno Central
- (9) Empresas mineras
- (10) Otro
- (88) NS/NR .....

(99) INAP

**PERA4C**

	1 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?
		2 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13B	3 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13C
<b>No tiene ningún significado</b>	0		
<b>Libertad:</b>			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
<b>Economía:</b>			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
<b>Sufragio:</b>			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
<b>Igualdad:</b>			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la ley	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
<b>Participación:</b>			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
<b>Estado de derecho:</b>			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
<b>Gobierno no militar</b>	31	31	31
<b>Vivir en paz, sin guerra</b>	32	32	32
<b>Guerra, invasiones</b>	33	33	33
<b>Otra respuesta</b>	80	80	80

NS/NR	88 DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	88 DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	88 DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Código</b> (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]			
<b>DEM13D.</b> ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.] 88. NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]		<b>DEM13D</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

Ahora, cambiando el tema..... ....[ Despues de leer cada pregunta, repetir "todos los días", "una o dos veces por semana", "rara vez", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS/NR	
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A1</b>
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A2</b>
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A3</b>
<b>A4i.</b> Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A4i</b>

**SOCT1.** Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima)  
(8) NS/NR

**SOCT1**

**SOCT2.** ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

**SOCT2**

**IDIO1.** ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima)  
(8) NS/NR

**IDIO1**

**IDIO2.** ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

**IDIO2**

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún congresista	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad, prefecto, intendente)	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

<b>PROT1.</b> Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)	<b>PROT1</b>
--	-----	-----	-----	-----	--------------

en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? <b>[Si contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]</b>	algunas veces	casi nunca	nunca	NS/NR		
<b>PROT2.</b> ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>PROT2</b>

<i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...</i>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	<b>INAP</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		<b>CP5</b>
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5A</b>
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5B</b>
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5C</b>
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5D</b>

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]**

	<b>Una vez a la semana</b>	<b>Una o dos veces al mes</b>	<b>Una o dos veces al año</b>	<b>Nunca</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>LS3</b>
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
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (Leer alternativas)

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR

IT1

**ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1**

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa en su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que más se aproxima a su propia posición.

**Recoger Tarjeta # 1**

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR

NP1

NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

NP1B

NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR

NP2

MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap

MUNI10

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos

(3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR

SGL1

SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?

(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal

(regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR

SGL2

LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?

(1) Más al municipio

(2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones

(3) No cambiar nada **[NO LEER]**(4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios **[NO LEER]**

(8) NS/NR

LGL2

LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad?

(1)

Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos

(8) NS/NR

LGL3

MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?

(1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR

MUNI5

<b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI6</b>
<b>MUNI11.</b> ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS/NR	<b>MUNI11</b>
<b>MUNI15.</b> ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI15</b>

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC1</b>
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC4</b>
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC10</b>
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC12</b>
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC13</b>

<b>JC15.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC15</b>
<b>JC16.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC16</b>

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?	<b>POP1</b>
<b>POP1. [Leer alternativas]</b> 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrasé el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. 8. NS/NR	
<b>POP2. [Leer alternativas]</b> 1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], 2. Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso. 8. NS/NR	<b>POP2</b>

<p><b>POP3. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario],      2. Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP3</b></p>
<p><b>POP4. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],      2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.      8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP4</b></p>
<p><b>POP5. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario],      2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.      8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP5</b></p>

Hablando de otro tema...

<p><b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?      (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p><b>VIC1</b></p>
<p><b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física      (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física      (3) Agresión física sin robo      (4) Violación o asalto sexual      (5) Secuestro      (6) Daño a la propiedad      (7) Robo de la casa      (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p><b>VIC2</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?</p> <p>(1) Sí [pasar AOJ8] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a AOJ8]      (9) Inap (no víctima) [Pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p><b>AOJ1</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) No sirve de nada      (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias      (3) No tenía pruebas      (4) No fue grave      (5) No sabe adónde denunciar      (8) NS/NR      (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>AOJ1B</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?</p> <p>(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ8</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ11</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ11A</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ12.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ12</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ16A</b></p>

**AOJ17.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

**AOJ17**

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
<b>ST1.</b> La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>
<b>ST2.</b> Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>

**[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Nada</b>						<b>Mucho</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>

**Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

**B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia del Perú garantizan un juicio justo? **(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.)**

**B1**

**B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas del Perú?

**B2**

**B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político en el Perú?

**B3**

**B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político del Perú?

**B4**

**B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político del Perú?

**B6**

**B10A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

**B10A**

**B11.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones?

**B11**

**B12.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

**B12**

**B13.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

**B13**

**B14.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

**B14**

**B15.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación ?

**B15**

**B18.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?

**B18**

**B20.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

**B20**

**B21.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

**B21**

**B31.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

**B31**

**PERB31A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los juzgados de paz?

**PERB31  
A**

**B32.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?

**B32**

**B43.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser peruano?

**B43**

## Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	B17
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	B40
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	B47

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, ( <i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i> )	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.	N1
N3. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	N3
N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	N9
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	N10
N11. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	N11
N12. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.	N12

## [Recoja tarjeta A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Toledo es: [Leer alternativas]	M1
(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	

[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Un puntaje entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo					Muy de acuerdo		NS/NR

## Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los peruanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23

## RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. En general, ¿Usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en el Perú?	PN4
(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	


**PN5.** En su opinión, ¿Perú es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático  
(8) NS/NR

PN5

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprueba que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.



1-10, 88

**E5.** Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.

**E8.** Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.

**E11.** Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.

**E15.** Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.

**E14.** Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.

**E2.** Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.

**E3.** Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.

**E16.** Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales

E5

E8

E11

E15

E14

E2

E3

E16

**[No recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez.

**[Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C].** En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.



1-10, 88

**D32.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?


**D33.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político del Perú

**D34.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?

**D36.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?

**D37.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en el Perú. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].



<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Perú, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</b>	<b>1-10, 88</b>	<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>

**[Recoja tarjeta C]**

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:	<b>DEM2</b>
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático	
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.	
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático	
(8) NS/NR	
<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>	<b>AUT1</b>
(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido	
(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor	
(8) NS/NR	
<b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>	<b>PP1</b>
(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las últimas elecciones presidenciales <b>de la primera vuelta</b> ?	<b>PP2</b>
(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	

Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.

**DC1.** Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta una coima de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es **[Leer alternativas]**:

- 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- 2) Corrupto pero justificado
- 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8

**DC1**

**DC10.** Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 15 soles de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es **[Leer alternativas]**:

- 1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada
- 2) Corrupto pero se justifica
- 3) No corrupto
- 8)NS/NR

**DC10**

**DC13.** Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca/vara para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree usted que el político es **[Leer alternativas]**:

- 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- 2) Corrupto pero justificado
- 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8

**DC13**

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...

**EXC2.** ¿Algun agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?

**No**

**Sí**

**NS/NR**

**INAP**

**EXC2**

**EXC6.** ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno) en el último año?

**No**

**Sí**

**NS/NR**

**INAP**

**EXC6**

**EXC11.** ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año

**No**

**Sí**

**8**

**9**

**EXC11**

**No → Marcar 9**

**Sí → Preguntar:**

Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

**0**

**1**

**8**

**9**

**EXC13**

**EXC13.** ¿Usted trabaja?

**No → Marcar 9**

**Sí → Preguntar:**

En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima (o soborno) en el último año?

**0**

**1**

**8**

**9**

**EXC13**

**EXC14.** ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?

**No → Marcar 9**

**Sí → Preguntar:**

¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima (o soborno) en los juzgados en el último año?

**0**

**1**

**8**

**9**

**EXC14**

**EXC15.** ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?

**No → Marcar 9**

**Sí → Preguntar:**

Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)?

**0**

**1**

**8**

**9**

**EXC15**

	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP	
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió una coima (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima (o soborno)?	0	1	8		<b>EXC18</b>
<b>EXC19.</b> ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar coimas (o sobornos) es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC19</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR				<b>EXC7</b>
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Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...				
<b>GI1.</b> ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[NO LEER:</b> George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Perú? <b>[NO LEER:</b> Marcial Ayapoma ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene el país? <b>[NO LEER:</b> 24] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Perú? <b>[NO LEER:</b> 5] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[NO LEER:</b> Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>GI5</b>
<b>PERGI6</b> ¿Ha escuchado hablar del TLC (Tratado de Libre Comercio)? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>PERGI6</b>
<b>PERGI7</b> ¿Usted cree que su situación económica mejorará si el Perú aprueba el TLC? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe (9) No Responde				<b>PERGI7</b>

<b>VB1.</b> Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Tiene DNI (documento nacional de identidad)?] (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR		<b>VB1</b>
<b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales, de la primera vuelta? (1) Sí votó <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No votó <b>[Pasar a VB4]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pasar a PERVB2B, en la página 16]</b> ]		<b>VB2</b>

**PERVB3** ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta? **[NO LEER LISTA]**

0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la cédula en blanco, o anuló su voto)

01. Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú (UPP))
02. Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA)
03. Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional)
04. Martha Chávez (Alianza por el Futuro)
05. Valentín Paniagua (Frente de Centro)
06. Humberto Lay (Restauración Nacional)
77. Otro

Otro \_\_\_\_\_

88. NS/NR

99. Inap (No votó)

**(Después de esta pregunta, pasar a VB8)****PERVB3****VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron]**¿Por qué no votó en la primera vuelta? **[No leer alternativas: anotar una sola respuesta]**

- 1 Falta de transporte
- 2 Enfermedad
- 3 Falta de interés
- 4 No le gustó ningún candidato
- 5 No cree en el sistema
- 6 Falta de cédula de identidad
- 7 No se encontró en padrón electoral
- 10 No tener edad necesaria
- 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado
- 12 Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo
13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad
14. Otra razón
- (88) NS/NR
99. INAP

**(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a PERVB8C)****VB4****VB8. [Para los que votaron en la primera vuelta]** Cuando votó, ¿Cuál fue la razón más importante de su voto? **[Leer todos]****VB8**

- (1) Las cualidades del candidato
- (2) El partido político del candidato
- (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato
- (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó)

**PERVB8C.** ¿Recibió o tuvo conocimiento de materiales sobre los candidatos o partidos políticos, sus hojas de vida y/o sus planes de gobierno?**PERVB8C**

- (1) Sí
- (2) No
- (8) NS/NR
- (9) INAP

**PERVB8D.** ¿Vio usted alguno de los programas de "La mitad más uno" en Canal 7, en los que los candidatos presidenciales presentaron sus propuestas de gobierno?**PERVB8D**

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP

**PERVB8E. [Sólo para Lima]** ¿Escuchó los programas Cara a Cara de radio 1160 en los que presentaron las hojas de vida de los candidatos al Congreso por Lima?**PERVB8E**

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP

**PERVB8F. [Sólo para la sobremuestra]** ¿Vio usted algún programa de debate entre candidatos al Congreso de su región?**PERVB8F**

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP

<p><b>PERVB8G.</b> [Sólo si respondió <u>SI</u> a alguna de las preguntas: PERVB8C, PERVB8D, PERVB8E, PERVB8F] ¿Influyó alguno de estos materiales o programas en su decisión de por quién votar?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP (no vio ni leyó materiales)</p>	<p><b>PERVB8G</b></p>
<p><b>VB6.</b> ¿Votó usted para congresista en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>1. Sí [<i>Siga</i>] 2. No. [pasa a PERVB2B] 8. NS/NR [pasa a VB10] 9. INAP</p>	<p><b>VB6</b></p>
<p><b>PERVB7.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para congresista en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la cédula en blanco, o anuló su voto) 01. Unión por el Perú - UPP      02. Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA      03. Unidad Nacional      04. Alianza por el Futuro      05. Frente de Centro      06. Restauración Nacional      07. Perú Posible      08. Alianza Para el Progreso      09. Otro      88. NS/NR      99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p><b>PERVB7</b></p>
<p><b>PERVB8H.</b> En general ¿Qué es lo que más influye en usted para decidirse a votar por un candidato</p> <p>[Leer alternativas 1 a 5]</p> <p>(1) Ser líder de un partido por el que tiene simpatía      (2) La imagen de ese candidato      (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato o su partido      (4) La información de los medios de comunicación      (5) Lo que le digan sus familiares, amigos o compañeros del trabajo      (6) Otra razón      (8) NS/NR      (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>PERVB8H</b></p>
<p><b>PERVB2B.</b> ¿Votó Ud. en las últimas elecciones presidenciales, en la segunda vuelta?</p> <p>(1) Sí votó [<i>Siga</i>] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB10]</p>	<p><b>PERVB2B</b></p>
<p><b>PERVB3B.</b> ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en la segunda vuelta ? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>1. Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú - UPP)      2. Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA)      3. Blanco o viciado      8. NS/NR      9. Inap (No votó)</p>	<p><b>PERVB3B</b></p>

**VB10.** ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?  
 (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]

VB10

**PERVB11.** ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA].**

PERVB11

01. Unión por el Perú - UPP
02. Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA
03. Unidad Nacional
04. Alianza por el Futuro
05. Frente de Centro
06. Restauración Nacional
07. Perú Posible
08. Alianza Para el Progreso
09. Otro
99. INAP (no votó)
88. NS/NR99. INAP

**PERVB12.** ¿Qué tan cercano se siente usted de ese partido con el cual simpatiza? **[Leer alternativas]**

PERVB12

1. Muy cercano
2. Algo cercano
3. Poco cercano
4. No se siente cercano **[Pase a PERVB17]**
8. NS/NR
9. INAP

**PERVB13.** ¿Qué tanto cree usted que ese partido representa sus intereses? **[Leer alternativas]**

PERVB13

1. Mucho
2. Algo
3. Poco
4. Nada
8. NS/NR
9. INAP

**PERVB17.** En su opinión, ¿qué tan democráticos son los partidos políticos en su funcionamiento interno? **[Leer alternativas]**

PERVB17

1. Muy democráticos
2. Algo democráticos
3. Poco democráticos
4. Nada democráticos
8. NS/NR
9. INAP

**PERVB19.** ¿Está usted interesado en participar en el proceso de selección de los candidatos de los partidos o esto es algo que solo compete a los partidos?

PERVB19

1. Sí estoy interesado
2. Es algo que compete solo a los partidos
8. NS/NR
9. INAP

**POL1.** ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

POL1

- 1) Mucho
- 2) Algo
- 3) Poco
- 4) Nada
- 8) NS/NR

**POL2.** ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? **[Leer alternativas]**

POL2

- 1) A diario
- 2) Algunas veces por semana
- 3) Algunas veces por mes
- 4) Rara vez
- 5) Nunca
- 8) NS/NR

#### USAR TARJETA "B" OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde **1 significa muy en desacuerdo** y **7 significa muy de acuerdo**, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?

	Escala	NS/ NR	
	Muy En desacuerdo	Muy de acuerdo	
<b>AA1.</b> Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	<b>AA1</b>
<b>AA2.</b> La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	<b>AA2</b>
<b>AA3.</b> En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	<b>AA3</b>

**AA4.** Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den palmadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8

**AA4****RECOGER TARJETA "B"**

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:

**DIS2.** En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)

1) Sí                    2) No                    8) NS/NR

**DIS2**

**DIS3:** Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio

1) Sí                    2) No                    8) NS/NR 9) INAP (No buscó trabajo)

**DIS3**

**DIS4.** En reuniones o eventos sociales

1) Sí                    2) No                    8) NS/NR

**DIS4**

**DIS5.** En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)

1) Sí                    2) No                    8) NS/NR

**DIS5**

Ahora para terminar, le voy a hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, técnica, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11		
Superior	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
NS/NR	88						

**ED**

**Q2.** ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? \_\_\_\_\_ años (0= NS/NR)

**Q2** 

**Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? [no leer alternativas]

**Q3**

- (1) Católica
- (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)
- (3) Otra no cristiana
- (5) Evangélica
- (4) Ninguna
- (8) NS/NR

**[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E ]**

**Q10.** ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

(00) Ningún ingreso  
 (01) 100 soles o menos  
 (02) De 101 soles a 200  
 (03) De 201 a 400 soles  
 (04) De 401 a 600 soles  
 (05) De 601 a 800 soles  
 (06) De 801 a 1,200 soles  
 (07) De 1,201 a 1,600 soles  
 (08) 1,601 a 2,000 soles  
 (09) 2,001 a 3,000 soles  
 (10) Más de 3,000 soles  
 (88) NS/NR

**RECOGER TARJETA E**

**Q10A.** ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?

No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap

Sí → preguntar:

¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda]

**Q10B.** ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (99) INAP

**Q10C.** ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde]

(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente  
 (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países  
 (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)  
 (4) No  
 (8) NS/NR

**Q14.** ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR

**Q10D.** El salario o sueldo que usted percibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]

1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar  
 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades  
 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades  
 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades

8. [No leer] NS/NR

**Q11.** ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]

(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR

**Q12.** ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? \_\_\_\_\_ (00= ninguno) NS/NR.....88.

**Q10**

**Q10A**

**Q10B**

**Q10C**

**Q14**

**Q11**

**Q12**

**PERETID.** ¿Usted considera que es una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, oriental, Afro-peruana (negra), mulato, u otro?

(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-peruana (5) Mulata (6) Oriental  
 (7) Otra (8) NS/NR

**PERETID**

**PERETIDA.** Considera que su madre es o era una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, oriental, negra o mulata?

(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Oriental (7) Otra (8) NS/NR

**PERETIDA**

<b>PERLENG1.</b> ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena [Quechua, aymara, ashaninka, aguaruna, matsiguenga,etc.] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	<b>PERLENG1</b>
<b>PERLENG1A.</b> ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? <b>(Acepte una alternativa)</b> (1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena [Quechua, aymara, ashaninka, aguaruna, matsiguenga,etc.] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (7) Ningún otro NS/NR [8]	<b>PERLENG1A</b>
<b>PERLENG4.</b> Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3] Castellano e idioma extranjero [4] NS/NR [8]	<b>PERLENG4</b>

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **(leer todos)**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>		
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>		
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>		
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>		
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>

<p><b>OCUP1.</b> ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? <b>[No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar “No” en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</b></p> <p>1. Profesional, directivo      2. Técnico      3. Oficinista      4. Comerciante      5. Campesino o agricultor      6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)      7. Artesano      8. Servicio doméstico      9. Otros servicios      10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria)      11. Obrero no especializados      12. Estudiante <b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>      13. Ama de casa<b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>      14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista<b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>      88. NS/NR</p>	<b>OCUP1</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p><b>OCUP4.</b> ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <p>1. Sí <b>[Siga]</b>      2. No <b>[Pasar a DESOC2]</b>      8. NS/NR <b>[Pasar a MIG1]</b>      9. INAP</p>	<b>OCUP4.</b>	
<p><b>OCUP1A</b> En esta ocupación Usted es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Asalariado del gobierno?      2. Asalariado en el sector privado?      3. Patrono o socio de empresa?      4. Trabajador por cuenta propia?      5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago      8. NS/NR      9. INAP</p>	<b>OCUP1A</b>	
<p><b>OCUP1B1.</b> ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Menos de 5 empleados      (2) De 5 a 9 empleados      (3) De 10 a 19 empleados      (4) De 20 a 100 empleados      (5) Más de 100 empleados      (8) NS/NR      (9) INAP</p>	<b>OCUP1B1</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <p>1. Sí      2. No      8. NS/NR      9. INAP</p>	<b>OCUP1C</b>	
<p><b>DESOC2.</b> <b>[SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] =&gt; ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas</b>  <b>(88) NS/NR (99) Inap</b></p>	<b>DESOC2</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p><b>MIG1.</b> Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió Ud principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:      1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR</p>	<b>MIG1</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

**MIG2.** Hace 5 años, ¿dónde residía usted? [Leer alternativas]

1. En este mismo distrito [Pase a TI] 2. En otro distrito en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]

**MIG3.** El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas]

1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este  
 (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este  
 (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este  
 (8) NS/NR (9) INAP

**MIG2**

**MIG3**

Hora terminada la entrevista \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] \_\_\_\_\_

**TI**

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*

*Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.*

*Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_*


*Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_*

*Comentarios:*  
 \_\_\_\_\_


*Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_*

*Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_*


## Tarjeta # 1




**Tarjeta “A”**



**Tarjeta “B”**



### Tarjeta “C”



## Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) 100 soles o menos
- (02) De 101 soles a 200
- (03) De 201 a 400 soles
- (04) De 401 a 600 soles
- (05) De 601 a 800 soles
- (06) De 801 a 1,200 soles
- (07) De 1,201 a 1,600 soles
- (08) 1,601 a 2,000 soles
- (09) 2,001 a 3,000 soles
- (10) Más de 3,000 soles

## Anexo II: Efectos del Diseño

### Precisión de los resultados

Toda encuesta está afectada por dos tipos de errores: los errores de no muestreo y los de muestreo. Los errores de no muestreo son los que se cometan durante la recolección y procesamiento de la información. Éstos se pueden controlar construyendo un buen instrumento de medición, capacitando adecuadamente a los encuestadores, supervisando el trabajo de campo y con programas apropiados de captura de datos. Dichos errores se pueden controlar pero no se pueden cuantificar. Sin embargo la comparación de los resultados de la muestra con los de la población da una idea de si esos errores han generado sesgos que restan representatividad a la muestra. El uso de computadoras *palms* probablemente redujo estos errores al efectuar chequeos de consistencia de las respuestas y de flujo de la entrevista en el mismo lugar y momento en que ésta se efectuaba. Además, al eliminarse el proceso de digitación, se eliminaron los errores que se generan con esa actividad. Con el procedimiento tradicional de cuestionario en papel, hay que efectuar en la oficina procesos de codificación y crítica de la información (eliminados con las *palms*) en los que se pueden también generar errores. Con cuestionarios en papel, es solo después de varias semanas del momento de la recolección del dato que pueden efectuarse chequeos de consistencia en la computadora. Corregir los errores detectados en la oficina durante la crítica o por los programas que detectan inconsistencias es difícil o imposible dada la separación en tiempo y espacio entre los momentos de la entrevista en el papel y detección de estos errores.

Por otro lado, los errores de muestreo son producto del azar y resultan del hecho de entrevistar a una muestra y no al total de la población. Cuando se selecciona una muestra, ésta es una de las tantas muestras posibles a seleccionar de la población. La variabilidad que existe entre todas estas posibles muestras es el error de muestreo, el cual podría medirse si uno dispusiese de todas esas muestras, situación obviamente irreal. En la práctica, lo que se hace es estimar este error sobre la varianza obtenida a partir de la misma muestra.

Para estimar el error de muestreo de un estadístico (promedio, porcentaje o razón), se calcula el error estándar, el cual es la raíz cuadrada de la varianza poblacional del estadístico. Esto permite medir el grado de precisión con que el estadístico se aproxima al resultado obtenido de haberse entrevistado a todos los elementos de la población bajo las mismas condiciones. Para el cálculo de este error es muy importante considerar el diseño con el que se seleccionó la muestra. El efecto del diseño, DEFT, indica la eficiencia del diseño empleado en relación a un diseño de muestreo irrestricto aleatorio (MIA). Un valor de 1 indica que el error estándar obtenido por ambos diseños (complejo y MIA) es igual; es decir, el muestreo complejo es tan eficiente como un MIA con el mismo tamaño de muestra. Si el valor es superior a 1, el muestreo complejo produjo un EE mayor al obtenido con un MIA.

$$DEFT = EE_{complejo} / EE_{MIA}$$

En la tabla se presentan los intervalos de 95% de confianza (1,96 veces el EE) y los efectos de diseño (DEFT). La tabla muestra también el valor del estadístico en cuestión (promedio o porcentaje). Los EE se estimaron con el paquete de cómputo Stata 9. Valores extremos se originan en un alto grado de homogeneidad dentro de cada conglomerado. En otras palabras, en estos casos hay una importante segregación espacial de las personas según su condición socioeconómica, lo que resta eficiencia al muestreo por conglomerados para medir estas características.

Vale decir que el error muestral usualmente es entre 10% y 40% más grande que el que se habría obtenido con el muestreo irrestricto al azar. Por ejemplo, en el caso de Costa Rica, el importante índice de apoyo a la democracia (PSA5) tiene un error muestral de 0,66. Esto quiere decir que el intervalo de confianza a 95% (dado por 1,96 veces el EE) para el promedio de este índice (64,0) va de 62,7 a 65,3. De acuerdo con el DEFT de la tabla, este intervalo es 26% mayor que el que se habría obtenido con MIA.

País	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			it1r			Corvic		
México	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panamá	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Perú	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
R.Dominicana	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haití	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

País	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
México	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panamá	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Perú	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
R.Dominicana	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haití	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53