



DEMOCRACY AUDIT: ECUADOR 2006

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Quito, July, 2006

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I. Introduction and Sample Design for 2006

Events in Ecuador from 2004 to 2006

The years 2004, 2005, and the beginning of 2006 have been the setting of a series of social, political, and economic events that have had profound consequences for the country. In the presence of the highest economic growth recorded within the last ten years in 2004, the profound political instability of the country stands out, caused by the decisions of the National Parliament, with the support and approval of the President of the Republic. At the end of the year, the president and Congress dissolved the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional and Supreme Electoral Tribunals. This decision resulted in the subsequent fall of President Lucio Gutiérrez, an event which Ecuadorians qualified as the event that had the greatest repercussion in 2005.¹ The change of government does not seem to have been the final solution, however, since Ecuadorians have felt the profound impact of the problems of political instability and the consequent economic and social instability.² Among other events, the expansion of Colombia's armed conflict with Ecuador, the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the demand for the nullification of the contract with OXY petroleum, have been subjects of worry for Ecuadorian citizens. We will briefly review these events.

Political Events

The lack of leadership and the political weakness of the country were evident during the government of Lucio Gutiérrez, who came to power with a speech about political renewal in which he sought to distinguish himself from the traditional parties, which he defeated at the ballot boxes. Nevertheless, confronted by the weakness of parliament and the opinion of critics against the government, Gutiérrez began ceding his position to the Christian Social Party (PSC), led by the representative and former president León Febres Cordero, and to others like the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE) and the Party of the Institutional Renovation of National Action (PRIAN). The consequence was the coalescence of an "institutional" majority among the above mentioned political parties into a group of "independent" representatives.

This political relationship reached its most critical moment in December of 2004, with the decision made by a simple majority of the National Congress to dismiss the Supreme Court of Justice, established in 1997, and the Constitutional and Supreme Electoral Tribunals. One of the clearest objectives of this change, that qualified as a constitutional break, was the formation of the new Supreme Court of Justice presided by Guillermo Castro Dáger, known as the "Pichi" Castro, who decreed the nullification of the court decisions against the former presidents Gustavo Noboa, refugee in the Dominican Republic, Abdalá Bucaram, refugee in Panamá, and the former Vice President Alberto Dahik, refugee in Costa Rica. The President of the Republic

¹ www.cedatos.com. The major events of 2005, according to the population

² *Ibid.* Ecuadorian opinions on the new government

maintained his silence, compromising his own position, in light of this decision of the “Pichi” Court and the three fugitive officials returned to the country within a few days.³

At this time, Leandro Despouy, special counsel of the UN, visited Ecuador to investigate and present a report on the events that had occurred regarding constitutional and human rights before the United Nations. In his report, Despouy concluded that the dismissal of the Supreme Court of Justice and the annulment of the Constitutional and Supreme Electoral Tribunals were unconstitutional decisions.⁴

All of these events increased the discontent of the citizens of Ecuador, which became apparent as a result of strong popular protests in cities like Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Latacunga and Ambato, during February of 2005.⁵ These events intensified during months that followed, especially with the return of Abdalá Bucaram to the country on April 1, 2005; according to a survey by CEDATOS / Gallup International, 81% of Ecuadorians considered that his return had been arranged by Lucio Gutiérrez and they disapproved of it. Two weeks of constant demonstrations followed, concentrated primarily in Quito, where Gutiérrez called the demonstrators “Forajidos.”

The culmination of Gutiérrez’s erratic decisions came on the night of Friday, April 15, 2005, when he declared an Emergency Decree limited to the city of Quito, but with a declaration of national impact that suspended the “Pichi” Court and called a meeting of the National Congress in order to formalize that suspension. In this way, Congress suspended the Court on Sunday April 17th by majority vote; the “Forajido” movement became unstoppable with a demonstration on the night of April 19th, which was brutally repressed by the National Police, resulting in the death of a Chilean photographer, 16 injured and more than 80 who were partially asphyxiated.⁶

At midnight on Tuesday the 19th of April, the Minister of Education ordered obligatory class attendance for the following day, since “there was calm in the city”, a decree that was changed at 7am on April 20th into an obligatory absence. But the students had already arrived for classes and upon finding the doors locked, they poured into the city streets, in a massive demonstration shouting “Out with Lucio.” That same morning the General Commander of the Police, Jorge Poveda, resigned from his position “to keep from attacking the people.” While President Gutiérrez worked in his office, the generals of the Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defense decided to “remove their support” from the President of the Republic, at the same time that the representatives abandoned both their positions in the National Congress and their President, and gather themselves at the International Center of Higher Education for Latin American Journalism (CIESPAL). At noon, 60 of the 100 representatives that make up the Congress, met in CIESPAL under the direction of Representative Cynthia Viteri. They resolved to dismiss the President of the Republic from office “for abandoning his responsibilities” and,

³ At: <http://hrw.org/spanish/docs/2004/12/17/ecuado9912.htm>

⁴ 2006. The prolonged political crisis obscured the economic achievements. *El Comercio*, 50

⁵ 2006. Quito turned into the centre of the Court protest. *El Comercio*, 52.

⁶ At: <http://www.eluniverso.com/core/eluniverso.asp?fecha=04/20/2005&page=noticia&id=8&tab=1&contid=FB776B53484D4A9FAB556A7BB9420A&EUID=>

minutes later, named Vice President Alfredo Palacio, as the new Constitutional President. Without police control, the students and the aroused townspeople, calling themselves “Forajidos”, entered Independence Plaza, while groups of indigenous followers of Gutiérrez brought there from several provinces could do nothing. Within minutes, a helicopter, made ready the night before, landed on the terrace of the government palace, in which the President of the Republic abandoned his position and the palace.

President Gutiérrez took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy, the country to which he traveled four days after his dismissal as a political refugee, a status which he renounced on June 6, 2005, in order to move to the United States. Days before, the Organization of American States (OAS) recognized the new government; nevertheless, Gutiérrez wanted to denounce the illegality of his dismissal before this Organization, but he was not received by the Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. Despite this, the former official declared in Washington before the international press that he continued to be the legitimate president of Ecuador in as much as his dismissal had been due to a coup d'etat. The new government considered that Gutiérrez was making an attempt against the security of the state with these statements and through the Minister of the Interior, Mauricio Gándara, charges that were formally made against him for sedition with the consequent prison sentence requested by the Attorney General, Cecilia Armas, to the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Quito.

In an attempt to be closer to Ecuador, the former official traveled to northern Peru and then to Colombia, a country that also granted him political asylum. In Bogotá he began circulating his book, “*The Coop*” and immediately renounced his asylum and traveled to Ecuador on the 14th of October, where he was arrested by the national police upon his arrival in the country and transported to a maximum security cell in the former prison García Moreno. On March 3, 2006, after several hearings before judges, he was finally liberated by the new President of the Superior Court of Quito who declared a definitive dismissal of charges upon not having found causes of sedition nor sufficient evidence for his imprisonment.⁷

Alfred Palacio, medical cardiologist by profession, upon taking the position of the President of the Republic, announced the “renewal of the country” and that he would carry out a profound institutional reorganization by way of his call for a Constituent Assembly. However, he was unable to complete this promise; moreover, it has been the cause of constant confrontation with the National Congress, which has repeatedly denied several proposals of the Executive to call for a popular referendum. Furthermore, the hallmark of the new government has been the institutional and political instability, with more than 250 changes of high public officials in twelve months of management, in fundamental areas such as economy, national defense, foreign affairs, government, energy, and telecommunications.

After eleven months of irregularities in the Supreme Court of Justice and four months of the Court designated by the National Congress (from December 8, 2004 until April 17th) the Court was dismissed by the National Congress. For seven months there had been a total absence of this legal entity. Finally, 31 magistrates were chosen by a Qualifying Commission and took their positions on November 28, 2005, in the presence of civil society and the maximum representatives of the OAS and the UN. Those who obtained the best scores in a merit

⁷ At: <http://www.lacronica.com/edicionenlinea/notas/noticias/20060304/114819.asp>

competition were chosen, in which representatives of the judicial sector, lawyers in free practice, professionals and teachers participated.⁸

Among other events, the Government declared a state of emergency in Machala, due to various acts of violence stirred up in November of 2005, because of the death of the notary public José Cabrera, who it is presumed was involved in money laundering. More than 20 soldiers and police officers were arrested for taking part in the plundering of the offices of the notary public and of appropriating large sums of money. About 8,500 people confessed to having delivered money to the notary and receiving monthly interest of up to 10% of the deposited capital. Several people turned out to be involved in this crime, the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Machala, a final candidate for the Supreme Court of Justice, bank executives and sectional and provincial authorities, who had to leave their positions in light of the scandal. In turn, the Superintendent of Banks, Alejandro Maldonado, was accused of not having exercised the necessary and opportune control to avoid these undue extra banking transactions, of which there had already been evidence from the year 2004 regarding dubious transactions of the notary, according to reports of the city banks. Maldonado, who was politically indicted by Congress, was not present at his defense and the case was dismissed by the Parliament on November 30. This episode affected the image of the Armed Forces and of the Police.⁹

Another event of great importance that occurred in 2005 was the expansion of the armed conflict of Colombia with Ecuador. During July of 2005, the clashes between the Colombian army and the guerrillas crossed the border moving toward the interior of the country, making it necessary for Ecuador to place a greater control on its northern border. The National Government decided not to become involved in the Colombia Plan by considering it a threat to the security of the Ecuadorian State. The Colombia Plan includes in addition to operations of recovery and development of the border areas, military operations to fight violence and drug trafficking.¹⁰ On September 18th, the Ecuadorian President publicly asked his Colombian counterpart for the cessation of aerial fumigations in Ecuadorian territory, arguing that there was no proof that the chemicals used did not have side effects. Also, the Ecuadorian Government denounced the presence of illegal Colombians in the province of Sucumbios. On November 11, 2005, the Anti-Narcotic Police of Colombia violated the sovereignty of Ecuador with the presence of eight helicopters and 400 soldiers in Ecuadorian territory, resulting in several injured civilians during the clashes. This is a problem whose solution still seems distant.¹¹

⁸ 2006. Impact of the death of notary Cabrera in Ecuador. *El Comercio*, 74.

⁹ At: http://www.lainsignia.org/2005/diciembre/ibe_083.htm


¹⁰ To have a clearer idea of the armed conflict in Columbia and its consequences, see: (Izquierdo 2005)

¹¹ 2006. Impact of the death of notary Cabrera in Ecuador. *El Comercio*, 74.

Economic Events ¹²

The economic climate of the Equator between 2004 and 2005 went from a recovered state to a fragile economic stability. The macro and micro economic indicators showed, on the one hand, an economic growth of the 7.7% registered in 2004, the highest growth of the previous decade, followed by a growth of 3.9% in 2005, with a fall observed as a result of the reduction of the direct external investment, smaller petroleum production and other items. For the year 2006, the official projection reaches 3.8%. On the other hand, the country experienced a considerable fall in the inflation: from 7.93% in 2003 it dropped to 2.74% in 2004, though with a worsening in the rhythm of the ascent of prices from 1.21% in April 2005 to 3.14% in December 2005; 4.23% in March and 3.4% in April 2006, at year's end¹³. In turn, the unemployment was maintained in records with little change (9.3% in December of 2003, 9.9% in December of 2004 and 9.3% in December of 2005), with some months within these three years that registered increases that carried the sum total up to 10 and 12%. (In April of 2006 this indicator was located at 10.26%).¹⁴

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS




(*) Year of the dollarization (sd) partially conclusive, (p) provisional, (p*) provisional: sum of trimesters, (prev) forecasts or projections
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006

Graph I-1: Gross Domestic Products

¹² This section was edited by Polibio Córdova, including information and graph design

¹³ INEC, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. Corrected numbers for inflation in March, 2006. BCE: Información Estadística Mensual No 1,850, April 30, 2006.


¹⁴ Central Bank of Ecuador. Monthly Statistical Information. 2003-2006; www.inec.gov.ec; www.cedatos.com.ec



(*) Year of the dollarization (sd) partially conclusive, (p) provisional, (p*) provisional: sum of trimesters, (prev) forecasts or projections
 Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006


Graph I-2. Real Growth of the GDP before and after Dollarization

**GDP PER CAPITA 1972-2003 (BEFORE AND AFTER DOLLARIZATION)
IN STANDARD DOLLARS**



(*) Year of the dollarization (sd) partially conclusive, (p) provisional, (p*) provisional: sum of trimesters, (prev) forecasts or projections
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006

Graph I-3. GDP Per Capita 1972-2003



(*) Year of the dollarization


From December of Each Year

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006

Graph I-4. Inflation 1997-2006


The petroleum sector took a different path from that of previous years for different reasons. First, the state production had a considerable decrease from 74.5 million barrels in 2003 to 71 million in 2005, while the production of private companies had an increase from 79 million to 123.2 million during the same period, with unit values that passed from \$25.42 to \$45.92 per barrel, resulting in the "punishment" of the international price that surpassed \$72 per barrel. Concerning petroleum exports, while the state went from \$444.4 million dollars in 2003 to \$1,156.5 millions, the private companies increased their revenues from \$1,242.3 to \$3,096.7 millions during the same period. Ecuador neither could not nor knew how to take advantage of the climb of oil prices and faced considerable drops in its production, caused in large part by the walkouts and strikes of the Amazon provinces that paralyzed production with violent measures and compromised the infrastructure of the storage and transportation of oil, all of which caused losses of millions of dollars to the country. The petroleum revenues in 2003 represented 32.7% of the Budget of the Central Government, 24.2% in 2004, and 27.5% in 2005.

PRICE FOR A BARREL OF PETROLEUM UNIT VALUE IN DOLLARS



Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006 www.bce.fin.ec

Graph I-5. Price for a barrel of Petroleum




Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006

Graph I-6. Petroleum Revenues of the Budget of the Central Government

A fundamental economic resource for the country has been the remittances sent by emigrants. This area constitutes the second most important source of revenue of the country, only surpassed by the foreign currencies originating from the petroleum exports. In the year 2004, according to the records of the Central Bank of Ecuador, they brought \$1,604 million dollars to the country, and in 2005, \$1,710 million.¹⁵ This sum represents 4.72% of the Gross Domestic Product, 16.9% of the total exports, 40.4% of the non-petroleum exports, and is 9.4% above the petroleum revenue that fed the budget of the central government in 2005. It is projected that for 2006, this figure will surpass \$2 billion dollars, which, in comparative terms will signify 27% of the national budget for the next period.¹⁶


¹⁵ Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Information, April 2006. The InterAmerican Development Bank has estimated the remittances of Ecuadorians in the year 2005 at \$2,005 million. GDP Report, April 2006.

¹⁶ Central Bank. At: <http://www.bce.fin.ec>



Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1850, April 2006 www.bce.fin.ec

Graph I-7. Labor Market



(*) Year of the dollarization

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information No.1848, February 2006

Report of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on the remittances of the Latin American Emigrants indicates revenue of 2005 million in remittances

Graph I-8. Emigrant Remittances

An event that has maintained the attention of Ecuadorians has been the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the negotiations that have developed between Ecuador and the United States, up to the XV round of talks held at the end of March in 2006. Peru and Colombia, in turn, have advanced in these negotiations and the door is practically opened in these respective countries for the signing of this agreement. In Ecuador there has been a lack of information and knowledge about the significance, content, and consequences of the FTA (more than 60% of the population¹⁷ expresses that they do not have this information). The opposition to this agreement has been greater each time, headed by indigenous groups that have caused walkouts and road blocks in several provinces, supported by students and liberal groups in the cities, while the businessmen have organized demonstrations in favor of the agreement, with their employees and workers. These demonstrations against the FTA intensified in February and March of 2006, led by the CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities), under the direction of Luis Flaws, former native saraguro legislator and former Minister of Agriculture for Lucio Gutiérrez.

These demonstrations also included the demand of the withdrawal from the country of the petroleum company OXY (Western Petroleum Corporation), the nullification of the contract with the company that was accused of transferring 40% of their stocks to the Canadian company

¹⁷ www.cedatos.com

ENCANA, without previous authorization from the government. The protests took a violent character, with losses officially estimated to be more than \$400 million dollars, making the government decree a state of emergency in several provinces affected by the protests.¹⁸

The culmination of these confrontations happened during the months of April and May of 2006, after which the National Congress on April 20, 2006 approved the Reformatory Law amendment to the Law of Hydrocarbons, which originated in the Executive office, changing the “Participation of the State in the surpluses of the sale prices of petroleum without negotiation or predict” stipulating that the company contractors “recognize in favor of the Ecuadorian State, a participation of at least 50% of the extra revenue generated by price differences.”¹⁹ This bill was passed during the XV round of negotiations of the FTA in Washington, which was suspended.

Days later, on May 15, 2006, the Minister of Energy, acting as the judge of the case, accepted the claim of Petroecuador which liquidated in August of 2005 and declared the nullification of the contract signed in 1999 with the Western company. The direct implication is the restitution of the production fields and all of the facilities and teams to the State, without cost to either Petroecuador or the Ecuadorian State. OXY is the largest private enterprise in Ecuador, which contributes around 40 million barrels of oil per year, approximately 19% of the total production of crude oil and 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In all of this, the national authorities and the establishment of economic politics lines play a role in minimizing possible assets and commercial relations as well as the flow of direct foreign investment.

Background to the 2006 Study

In the context of the economic and political events described above, in January 2006 a national sample of Ecuadorians was interviewed to find out what they think about democracy and how they behave politically. The study was carried out as part of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) with financial support coming from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ecuador. The data were collected by CEDATOS, the Gallup International affiliate in Ecuador, and were designed to represent all voting-age (non-institutionalized) adults in the country (with the exception of the residents of Galapagos). The prior publications, questionnaires and sample information can all be found on www.lapopsurveys.org.

To convey our results as clearly as we can, we include numerous graphs, methodological notes, and also include the complete text of our questionnaire as an appendix. Since the issues are complex, we have been compelled to include some (seemingly) complex multivariate data analysis in order to justify our conclusions, most of the key findings are conveyed with graphs that we hope most readers will readily comprehend. To further enhance the impact of the work, we compare our results with other countries of Latin America, drawing on our archive of data at LAPOP, including the results of the 2001 and 2004 national samples carried out in Ecuador in

¹⁸ At: March 16th, www.eluniverso.com and www.elcomercio.com

¹⁹ National Congress: Reformatory law to the Law of Hydrocarbons. Supplement of the Official Record No 257 Year 1. April 25, 2006.

the final months of those years. The 2006 survey is the first one taking place at the start of the new year, largely so that the results can be presented in the same calendar year as the survey.

An important goal of this study is to stimulate and contribute to the national debate on democracy and the importance of citizen democratic values and behaviors (i.e., the political culture). To help achieve that goal, Spanish and English versions of this study are available on www.lapopsurveys.org. Presentations of the results are being made in several locations in Ecuador in collaboration with our academic partners.

We conclude this introductory chapter with a general discussion of the sample design and include a detailed appendix providing a more technical description of the sample.

Sample Design

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under represented in the election.²⁰

Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

In this study of Ecuador, it was decided to design a sample that covered all non-institutionalized adults²¹ with the exception of those living in the Galapagos Islands, who were excluded for cost considerations. Since the sample is of probability design, i.e., it is “random” we wanted to make sure that all major geographic regions of the country were covered, and this meant that we would need to “stratify” the sample into three zones: the coast, the sierra and the Amazon (or Oriente). Without stratification, random chance could have resulted in very few interviews in any one of these areas. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample by guaranteeing that the respondents will come from each of the regions of interest.

Beyond the question of dividing the country into these three zones, we had to deal with the problem of the relatively small size of the population in the Oriente. Population totals, based on the best census projections were used to determine what percentage of the national population lives in each of those areas. For example, the 1990 census shows that 50.5% of the population

²⁰This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, former President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, “The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy.” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

²¹ That is, we did not include those in hospitals, mental institutions, or incarcerated in prisons.

lives in the coastal provinces, 45.5% in the Sierra, and 4.0% in the Amazon. This means that we would want the sample to reflect that division of the population, for if it does not, the results would under or over represent one of these geographic areas (but see the discussion on weighting below). Within each of those areas, there is a further breakdown, or stratification, of urban vs. rural, and again, we want the survey to reflect the relevant proportions of the population.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are three high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the three schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have three tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10th, 11th, and 12th), then a total of 27 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Ecuador it is important to further subdivide the three regions into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each province into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of provinces we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each province by population size. It is common practice in Ecuador to divide the population into strata by population, covering the large cities of Quito and Guayaquil, as well as middle-size cities and smaller areas. Our sample for each of the three major regions of Ecuador has been stratified in this fashion.

How accurate is our sample? We interviewed 2,923 people in 2001, 3000 in 2004, and 2,925 in 2006, which means that for the sample as a whole, the accuracy was $\pm 1.8\%$ in the worst case. A “worst case” arises when the responses are evenly split, 50/50; making it very difficult to judge which response is the most preferred to a given question. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario the survey provides accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 1.8% more or 1.8% less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing in Ecuador. Under more favorable conditions²² the results could be as accurate as $\pm 1.1\%$. Technically, the sampling error of $\pm 1.8\%$ means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Ecuador, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than $\pm 1.8\%$. Of course, factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a

²² For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.

confidence interval of $\pm 1.8\%$ is very good and unprecedented for political culture surveys of Ecuador. Indeed, most of those studies, as noted above, focused only upon the major cities.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the region and within each region by size of city/town, we have what is called a “multi-stage stratified sample design.” But now the question comes as to how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Ecuador. That is because the Amazon region would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample was very, very large.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a larger sample from the Amazon than the population size residing there would call for, since to draw a sample in proportion to the size of the population there would have resulted in a sample of only about 120 respondents. We increased the sample to 478 respondents (238 for the Northern Amazon, and 240 from the Southern). This gave us a sample larger than the population of this region merits given its proportion of the national sample, but at the same time it gave us sufficient cases to be able to examine this region alone with reasonable accuracy.²³ In order to correct for the deliberate over sample, however, we then apply sample weights, which means that the entire sample reflects the actual known distribution of the population between the coast, sierra and Amazon.

We decided that a $\pm 4.5\%$ accuracy of the sample in the Amazon region of was a reasonable target, considering cost and time factors. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario within the Amazon the survey is an accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 4.5% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions the results could be as accurate as $\pm 3.5\%$.

What of the other two regions, the coast and the sierra? In the coast we interviewed 1,293 respondents (unweighed), which yield a sampling error of $\pm 2.8\%$. In the sierra, the sample was 1,154 (unweighed), yielding a confidence interval of $\pm 2.9\%$. We can say in rough terms that when we are talking about the results of the sample as a whole our sampling error is less than 2%, and when we are talking about the coast or the sierra it is less than 3% and, finally, we can say that in the Amazon it is no larger than 4.5%.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the nine provinces. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of

²³ Technically speaking, our sample, once weighted, is “PP”, that is, “population proportional to size.”


the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. According to the careful calculations carried out by CEDATOS, the confidence for the clustered stratified sample design actually implemented was $\pm 1.86\%$, a very small increase from the theoretical level of $\pm 1.8\%$ stated above. For the three main strata, the actual sampling errors were: Coast: $\pm 2.79\%$; Sierra: $\pm 2.97\%$; Oriente: $\pm 4.54\%$ It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection. The individual respondent within the household was selected and included up to three call-backs per household if the respondent selected was not home.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by CEDATOS, the Gallup International affiliate in Ecuador. This firm has had many years of experience, and carried out hundreds of surveys in the country. A full technical description of the sample is contained as an appendix to this chapter. The data set was sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt, where an audit was carried out. We did this by selecting a set of interviews and having CEDATOS ship to us the actual questionnaires, and we then compared those results to the data set. The quality of the data entry was uniformly high and met our contracted standards.

Overview of the Sample


It is best to begin the data presentation in this report with an overview of the characteristics of the sample, comparing the 2001 and 2004 samples to that of 2006. All of these results, as well as nearly all of the ones presented in the chapters that follow, are based on the weighted sample so that the results presented correctly reflect the distribution of the population. These weights correct for the over sampling in the Amazon, and also adjust for the distributions within each stratum (e.g., urban/rural) and correct for the inevitable biases that results from strict probability sampling at the household level (e.g., the overrepresentation of females).

The sample is distributed evenly by gender as is shown in Graph I-9. As can be seen, the distribution is identical for all three samples.



Graph I-9 Distribution of sample by year and gener


The distribution of the sample by age is shown in Graph I-10. As can be seen, the bulk of the sample is young, matching the distribution of the population of the country, which has long had a high rate of fertility. All three samples have nearly identical age distributions, indicating that even though the same respondents were not interviewed in each year, nearly identical portions of the age groups were interviewed.



Graph I-10. Distribution of the three samples by age


In terms of education, the results show levels higher than those of the census of 2001 earlier, an indication that the heavy investment in human capital is paying off. A summary is contained Graph I-11. In each of these samples, it appears that the survey produced a sample with a level of education above that of the national norm. For example, while the samples produced an average of 10 years of education per respondent, the 2001 national census yields a figure of 7.1 years. Part of the problem, however, is that the national census reports only on those who have 10 or more years of age, while our survey is of those 18 and older. The census, therefore, includes many individuals who were 10-18 years of age at the moment of the census, but who had not yet gone on to finish their educations because they were not yet old enough. Since Ecuador has high fertility rates, the proportion of the population 10-18 is large.²⁴ The sample, however, includes those 18 years of age and older, and therefore a larger proportion of the sample population that the opportunity to complete high school and college. As a result, the mean education level of the Census would be expected to be lower than the sample.

²⁴ The on-line version of the census shows that those younger than 25 represent 53% of the national population. The web information from INEC does not provide breakdowns by age for the 10-18 year cohort.




Graph I-11. Distribution of the three samples by education level

Ecuador is a poor country, and the income distribution in the sample reflects this reality. As can be seen, the great bulk of those in the sample have monthly family incomes of lower than \$300. What is also evident is that incomes have risen since 2001, in line with the increase national GNP per capita, as discussed above. With the exception of those with no income (unemployed, students, home makers, etc.) the proportion of the population in the lower income levels is higher in 2001 than in 2006, while the proportion with higher incomes has risen since 2001.



Graph I-12. Distribution of sample by income

Income does vary by residence, as is shown in Graph I-13. Quito and Guayaquil have the highest levels of income, and as city size declines, income declines as well. This is a common phenomenon world-wide as employment opportunities are generally better in cities, a factor that accounts for much of the rural-urban migration in Ecuador and elsewhere. In each location in Ecuador, the 2006 figures are higher than in prior years of the LAPOP surveys.



Graph I-13. Income and residence: comparison of 2001, 2004 and 2006

Conclusions

This chapter has provided background on the study of the political culture of democracy in Ecuador. We have presented the methodology of the study, and demonstrated that the three samples are virtually identical in their demographic characteristics. This means that any differences we find between the results in 2006 and those from 2004 and 2001 are not a function of differences in the sample, but arise as a result of true differences in opinion and behavior that has occurred over this period of time. As we will see, important differences do emerge. In the pages that follow, different aspects of Ecuador's political culture will be examined. The data set, however, contains much more information, that can be broken down into areas of interest to specific projects (e.g., a study of the sierra region that is interested in the participation of women in local government). Ecuadorians and international agencies are encouraged to make use of this data for their studies and project planning.

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II. Civil Society

The active political participation of civil society, or the existence of social capital, as Putnam (1993) called it, is a key factor in the operation of a democracy. This chapter will try to fulfill two objectives. First, we compare the levels of participation of the Ecuadorian civil society in the three years during which *Democracy Audited* has been carried out. Second, we will try to discover the reasons behind the patterns of participation. This means that we aspire to find the factors that best explain the presence of civil society in the political life of the country. Finally, this chapter tries to analyze the factors that cause people to move away from the traditional methods of participation to join other less traditional methods such as protests, walkouts or marches.

Levels of Participation over the Years

Civic participation can be happen at various levels. The questionnaire of LAPOP tries to measure a great variety of them. For this section, we will utilize the following battery of questions:

Now I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please, tell me if YOU attend meetings held by them at least once a week, one or two times a month, one or two times a year, or never [Please repeat: "once a week," "one or two times a month," "one or two times a year", or "never" to help the person being interviewed]

	One time a week	One or two times a month	One or two times a year	Never	NA	
CH6. Meetings of some religious organization? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH6
CH7. Meetings of a parent's association of a school? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH7
CH8. Meetings of a committee or group focused on community improvement? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH8
CH9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants or workers? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH9
CH10. Meetings of a union? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH10
CH11. Meetings of a cooperative? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH11
CH12. Meetings of some civic association? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH12
CH13. Meetings of a political party or movement? You attend....	1	2	3	4	8	CH13

These questions seek to measure the level of association that people have with different organizations. To facilitate the understanding of all the Graphs and since not all the scales of the questionnaire LAPOP are the same, we have standardized all the scales in this chapter. This means that, in all of the Graphs where the variable of civil participation is used, '4' will signify "once a week" and '1' will signify "Never."


The preliminary analysis of the responses of those polled shows a clear trend of decreased participation through the years. Although the participation of civil society has not been massive, the worrying thing is the decrease in the number of people that before participated frequently and now participate only sporadically. For example, in 2001, 5% of the population polled attended weekly community improvement meetings. In 2004 this percentage dropped to

3.8%, and finally in 2006 this number went down to 2%. The same trend is visible upon analysis of the remaining questions.

Nevertheless, there exists a notable exception that has to do with the level of attendance to meetings of religious organizations. In both 2001 and 2004, the level of weekly attendance to the churches and temples was just 24%. In 2006, 38% of those polled reported they attend meetings of some religious organization weekly. This increase is also visible in the people with a lower level of participation. In previous years, more than 48% of the citizens said they never attend church, in 2006 that number was reduced by half. It should be emphasized that the text of this question in 2006 changed slightly with respect to that in 2001 and 2004: In the previous questionnaires we asked about their attendance to “meetings of some committee or group within a church or temple?” in 2006, we asked about “meetings of some religious organization?” We suspect that this difference may be responsible for a part of the variation, although there is evidence in the data that also suggests an increase in religious participation.

To illustrate better this difference, we have created a total index of participation (CPTOTR) that includes all the variables previously mentioned except the attendance to religious organizations. The exclusion of this item in the index of participation is due to the fact that this variable moves in an opposite direction to all the others. Graph II-1 shows the clear difference that exists between participation in religious organizations in Ecuador and social involvement in all the other areas. In reference to the total index of participation, the Graph shows a clear decrease in social capital between 2001 and 2004. In 2006 there seems to be a slight increase; however, observing the margins of error, we see that the difference among these years is not statistically significant.²⁵ On the other hand, a clear rise is observed in the trend of church attendance, especially between the years 2004 and 2006.


²⁵ Saying that the difference is not statistically significant denotes that the apparent change produced between one year and another is due to the random error of the sample and not to a real change in the attitudes of the citizens.



Margin of error: Confidence Interval 95%

Graph II-1. Civil participation through the years.

Although Graph II-1 shows the gradual decrease of the civil participation in activities and public organizations, there is a more worrying factor. As we mentioned previously, the data shows a clear decrease in the levels of participation of those people who usually participated weekly in different organizations. This tendency also has its exception in reference to religious participation. While the other organizations show a very low level of civic participation, the churches and other religious organizations have seen a continual increase in participation. Graph II-2 clearly shows these tendencies. Although the non-religious organizations have never enjoyed a weekly participation of more than 7% of the population, this percentage has clearly decreased in the last 5 years. In the meantime, with regard to the church, there has been an increase in weekly attendance of almost 15% between 2004 and 2006. Both of these trends are statistically significant.



Graph II-2. Percentage of those polled during the years 2001-2006 that participate weekly in civic meetings.

The two previous Graphs have served to illustrate the decrease in the participation of civil society in the Ecuador in the last five years. The first shows the low levels of participation for the population in general. The second, on the other hand, directs our attention to the clear decrease in the number of people who before had participated actively in different community organizations. These trends, nevertheless, have not affected the religious organizations, which are the only organizations to have a large and growing participation. The following section of this chapter is dedicated to identify factors that motivate people to actively participate in different organizations.

Factors that determine civil participation

The absence or decrease of 'social capital' is not a problem exclusive to Ecuador. In established democracies like the United States, the academic community has been warning of the danger that the lack of participation of society can place on the system. Robert Putnam (1995)


carried out an exhaustive analysis of the possible causes of the disappearance of social capital. In the end, surprisingly, Putnam indicated that television was the source of the loss of social capital in the United States. Unfortunately, the questionnaire of LAPOP does not measure the amount of television that people watch, but it does contain questions that can help us compare our results with others obtained in diverse academic studies, as well as prove some other hypotheses.

Gender and marital status as possible explanations

A good part of the literature about civil participation has fixed its attention on gender studies. Traditionally it is the man who participates more in public matters relating to community, work or politics. However, nowadays in developed countries, women compete with relative equality in the labor market, receive equal educational opportunities and they are gaining more ground in the political arena, in spite of the fact that in the United States, for example, the number of women in elected positions continues to be low. In 1995, Schlozman et al (1995) carried out an investigation to determine the differences between civil participation of men and women.²⁶ The results showed that although the gap that divides the levels of participation has slightly narrowed, men still maintain superior levels of political activism and civil participation. The authors also found that the reasons that cause men and women to participate are the same, although not necessarily with the same objectives. The most important difference mentioned in this study has to do with the areas of civil participation. While men show greater levels of activism in areas such as unions and political rallies, women participate more in organizations dedicated to educational reforms and human rights.


Graphs II-3 and II-4 compare these results with the data obtained by *Democracy Audit* from 2001 until 2006. Graph II-3 coincides with the first two assertions made by Schlozman et al, that is to say, upon analysis of the index of total participation (CPTOTR) two things can be observed. First, the level of participation of the men is slightly higher than that of the women. Second, both graphs move together, which suggests that the factors that cause variation within the average participation, could be the same.

²⁶ Schlozman, Kay, Nancy Burns, Sydney Verba y Jesse Donahue. "Gender and Citizen Participation: Is there a Different Voice? American Journal of Political Science 39, No.2 (1995):267-93




Graph II-3. Total participation by gender.

Graph II-4 compares the assertion of Schlozman *et. al.* of the different areas of participation of men and women with what actually happens in Ecuador. This figure shows us the levels of participation of men and women in meetings of associations of family parents. The results are as expected, women present a higher level of participation than men and the difference is statistically significant. This can be due to the fact that women have only recently become active members of society, thus they have not been able to enter as fully into other areas of civil and political participation.




Graph II-4. Participation in family parent associations by gender.

Another factor that has been considered to be a possible cause of change in the levels of civil participation is marital status. Laura Stoker and Kent Jennings (1995) led a study between 1965 and 1982 in which they studied the levels of participation of the same people before and after marriage. Analysis of the data found that in the United States, the transition from single to married life, especially in young partners, has a negative effect on civil participation. Stoker and Jennings also found that partners with children tend to participate less than those that have no children. In Ecuador however, this theory is not supported. Comparing singles, we find that 44% of singles have an average of '1' (they never take part) in the total index of participation. This means that 44% of singles do not participate in any of the organizations of the index. On the other hand, the percentage of those married with an average of '1' in the scale is only 25%. This difference continues to be statistically significant after controlling for the variable that measures the attendance to the associations of family parents, since 95% of those married have children in comparison to only 40% of singles. This tendency of married couples to participate more is reflected in Graph II-5.



Graph II-5. Participation by Civil State

The results presented in Graph II-5 do not necessarily contradict the findings of Stoker and Jennings. This because their analysis uses the couple as the unit of analysis, while our study is based on the individual. With this said, it is necessary to verify the relationship between parenting and civil participation. Stoker and Jennings propose at the end of their article that couples with children have less time to participate and thus show lower levels of involvement than couples without children. Graph II-6 demonstrates that people who have children participate more on average than those without children. This difference is maintained while controlling for marital status.



Graph II-6. Participation according to the presence of children.

It is clear that factors such as marriage and parenting help increase civil participation in Ecuador instead of reducing it. This is an important discovery, since it contradicts the conventional theory generated by studies done in the United States. We have also seen that men have a slightly higher level of participation than women and there are differences between the areas in which they take part. But these are not the only factors that influence the development of social capital. There exist other possible factors that facilitate civil participation. In the following pages we will analyze these factors in detail and try to construct a statistical model that explains the differences in the general level of participation among Ecuadorians.

The influence of the media

The mass media can be a positive tool used to encourage community participation. On the other hand, it can be tell of the most recent scandal of corruption and of the red chronicle in our cities. Many studies have been carried out on the influence of the mass media on voting, above all in countries like the United States, where voting is not obligatory. Robert Putnam (1995), mentioned previously, has been one of few North American academics to analyze the influence of the media on social capital. The LAPOP questionnaire from 2006 contains the following questions designed to find out how often and from where people receive their information.

Use of the mass media: Ecuador 2006


<i>Frequency</i> ...	Every Day	One or Two times a week	Rarely	Never	NA	
<i>A1. Listen to news on the radio.</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A1
<i>A2. Watch news on TV.</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A2
<i>A3. Read the news in newspapers.</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A3

Robert Putnam indicates that television is primarily responsible for the decrease of social capital in the United States. Although our survey only references television as a means of obtaining news, it is the most important source of media among those included in the questionnaire. Through the years, more than 73% of the people interviewed in Ecuador report that they watch the news on television every day. This percentage surpasses the 21% who read the newspaper daily and the 42% who listen to the news on the radio every day. But, what effect does the media have on the civil participation of society? A bi-variable analysis of this relationship does not show a clear trend in the effect of the mass media on the levels of participation. We will try to clarify this relationship and its importance when we generate a statistical model to explain the principal factors that motivate civic participation within the sample population.

Participation and Urbanization levels

The level of urban development within a country has a large impact on the participation of its citizens. In the majority of Latin American countries, people who participate the most are those that live in rural areas; as Graph II-7 shows, this is also true for Ecuador. However, there have been two phenomena that may have contributed to the gradual decrease of civil

participation in Ecuador. First, due to the unstable economic situation that people generally experience in rural areas, some immigrate to the city in search of work, leaving the community organizations they had attended. Second, the level of urban development in Ecuador has been gradually increasing. That is to say, counties that were considered rural have been incorporated into urban areas. This causes the economic activity of the population to increase, demanding more hours of work and leaving less time to participate in community organizations.



Graph II-7. Levels of participation based on residential area.

Graph II-7 clearly describes the differences in the participation levels of people who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas. Between 2001 and 2004, there was a clear reduction in civil participation, while urban development in Ecuador saw an increase of almost 1%. In the past two years the level of development has not risen, coinciding with relatively stable levels of participation.

Factors that explain participation: a statistical model

In the course of these pages we have analyzed the factors that have contributed to the reduction in civil participation in Ecuador during the last five years. Analysis has led to several conclusions about the simple relationships between civil participation and gender, marital status, parenthood, exposure to mass media and the level of urban development. However, it is necessary to point out that these relationships can be affected by a large number of factors that have not been mentioned. Some of these factors are: education, income, government approval, the perception of the economy, and even the region where one lives. To be able to measure the impact of all these variables in civil participation, we have developed a model of linear regression.

	<i>B</i>	S.E.	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Constant	1.195	.035	33.711	.000
Gender	-.030	.008	-3.658	.000
Urban-rural	.064	.010	6.613	.000
Evaluation of the President's work	-.016	.005	-3.516	.000
Civil State	.000	.000	2.819	.005
Wealth	.005	.002	2.354	.019
Support of the Democratic System	.001	.000	3.026	.002
Education	.062	.007	9.350	.000
Age	-.007	.003	-2.357	.018
Coast	-.004	.010	-.421	.674
News by TV	-.015	.006	-2.664	.008
News by Radio	-.029	.004	-7.645	.000
News by Newspapers	-.035	.004	-7.807	.000
Mountains	.036	.010	3.668	.000
White	-.020	.012	-1.746	.081
Indigenous	.068	.025	2.708	.007
Black	.022	.023	.950	.342
R Square Add	.079			

Table II-1. Factors that explain civil participation: results of linear regression

The results of regression confirm the relationships that we had established previously in this chapter. Gender is significant, with men participating more than women. Married couples tend to take part more than singles and those that have children are more inclined to participate than those who do not. The influence of the media is also statistically significant and it is

possible to see in the regression that it has a negative impact. If we take into account that going from one to two forms of media consumption means listening to less news on the radio, watching less television, and reading the newspaper less, the regression indicates that this smaller consumption of news has a less of a negative impact on social participation. Finally, the model of linear regression reasserts the idea that people who live in rural areas participate more than those that live in urban areas. However, there are other factors that contribute to the increase or decrease of social capital. Education is one of them. The numbers show that citizens with higher levels of education are prone to participate much more than those with less education. Another variable that contributes to the development of social capital is support of the political system. Those people who support the political system of Ecuador are more likely to participate in it. This is a very important factor that must be taken into account because as we will see, the support of the political system in Ecuador is falling to levels that can jeopardize democratic continuity.

As for demographic factors, the data shows that the people in the high lands tend to participate more than the people on the coast and in the East. With regard to ethnicity and participation, we see that the indigenous people participate most, while those that identify themselves as whites are much less inclined to take part in community organizations, in comparison to those of mixed ethnicity.


In the end, there are many motives that can cause a person to become involved in civic activities and politics. Many of them may not be in our model; however, in this section we have reviewed those factors that commonly cause the development of social capital. Furthermore, civil participation does not only demonstrate itself within production unions, political movements, and associations of family parents. Many people express their dissatisfaction by means of another type of civil participation, like protests, walkouts and strikes. The following section will analyze those people who join these alternative forms of civil participation and why they do it.

Protesting as an alternative form of civil participation

In the previous sections we had concentrated on the traditional forms of civil participation. A democratic system, however, must allow its citizens to express their dissatisfaction by another means of participation, like protests and peaceful demonstrations. These are legitimate forms of participation that people generally use as a last resort. The American political scientist Arthur H. Miller (1974) referred to protests as the consequence of the lack of confidence in a system coupled with a feeling of being excluded by the same system. This discovery was later corroborated by Muller and Seligson (Muller 1979; Muller, et al. 1982; Seligson and Muller 1990). In Ecuador, public protests and peaceful demonstrations have been the preferred recourse for the marginalized and many minority groups, such as the retired and indigenous movements. In the previous versions of *Democracy Audit* completed in Ecuador, the questionnaire did not include a measurement of public protests. This year this measurement has been included, through the following question:


PROT1. Have you taken part in a demonstration or public protest? Have you done this: a few times, hardly ever or never?	(1) a few times	(2) almost never	(3) never	(8) NA	PROT1
--	--------------------	---------------------	--------------	-----------	--------------

As previously mentioned, protests are generally the resort of people who do not feel adequately represented by the government. In Ecuador, these people have been almost always the same ones. However, analysis of the data from 2006 brings surprising results. The information shows that a statistically significant difference does not exist for the participation in protests with regard to ethnicity. This means that white, racially mixed, African-Ecuadorian, and indigenous people have the same tendency to participate in public protests. Also, there is no significant difference between those who live in urban and rural areas. Graphs II-9 and II-10 show that the people who have taken part in public protests are not those you would expect to see.



Graph II-8. Participation in protests according to the level of schooling.

Graph II-8 shows the clear difference that exists between levels of education and participation in protests. More than 35% of the people with higher educations have taken part in public protests, whereas less than 20% of the people with lower levels of education have done the same. This can be due to the fact that people with higher levels of education are usually better informed about the political situation of the country and more often find motives for protesting. However, Graph II-9 teaches us that education is not the only factor in which significant differences exist in the participation of public protests.



Graph II-9: Participation in Protests by level of income


As we have mentioned previously, television images show the protagonists of protests and demonstrations in Ecuador have almost always been the poor, the marginalized and the minorities. Graph II-9 describes a different reality. In this graph there is a clear difference between those that receive a low level of income (\$0 to \$200), those of an average level (from \$201 up to \$750) and the people who report having a high level of monthly income (more than \$751).

There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is the recent fall of the government of Lucio Gutiérrez. The demonstrations in April 2005 were led by members of the middle and upper-middle classes, and included members of the economic and political elite of Ecuador. These have been the last strong protests in Ecuador against the government before this field work was carried out,²⁷ it is very possible that the people who took part in these demonstrations are the ones who appear in our data.

²⁷ In February and March of 2006, the government of Alfredo Palacio faced serious political protests, demonstrations and road blocks in several regions of the country.

The second explanation is the notion commonly accepted in Ecuador that the poor who protest are mistaken. Television images can be confusing, focusing solely on the poor and allowing journalists to “blame” them for these protests. In fact, world-wide, it is students who make up the majority of the demonstrators and in Ecuador, students in high school and college usually come from middle-class families. This does not mean that the poor do not take part in protests, just that people with higher incomes tend to participate more.

These findings are even clearer when we examine the tendency of people to participate in protests according to age. As it is shown in Graph II-10, people between the ages of 18 and 35 years, university students and young professionals, participate the most in public protests.




Graph II-10. Participation in protests according to age.

Voting in Ecuador:

The vote is the essential expression of civil participation. In Ecuador, this is not a voluntary expression and every person older than 18 years must vote in the local and national elections. The last election registered by our questionnaire is the presidential election of 2002. According to data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Ecuador,²⁸ the electoral register was comprised of approximately 8,100,000 voters. In the first round, to which the LAPOP questionnaire refers, approximately 5,850,000 people voted, representing 71% of the eligible voting population. Graph II-11 shows us what the interviewees answered in reference to this question.

¿Did you vote in the 2002 presidential elections?



Graph II-11. Percentage of people who voted in the 2002 presidential elections.

²⁸ www.tse.gov.ec

The percentages presented in Graph II-11 are different from those reported by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal by almost 13 points. These differences can be due to the following reasons. First, the electoral register used by the Tribunal for the elections is not completely up to date, since many people who appear in it have either deceased or emigrated from the country and are no longer living in Ecuador. Thus the number of eligible voters is probably less than what the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has reported. Our poll, on the other hand, only includes people who currently reside in the country, resulting in a higher percentage of reported voters. Second, some participants in our poll may not have voted though they have reported that they did. This is because voting is obligatory and those who did not vote do not want to admit they have broken the law. Finally, a small percentage of interviewees between the ages of 18 and 20 have claimed to have voted in this election. This is impossible, since in 2002 they were not legally eligible to vote. These are the three principal causes of the disparity between the information from *Democracy Audit* and that of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. In any case, our results confirm that the majority of the people take part in the electoral process, which is at least a partial indication, due to mandatory voting, that these processes are free and the majority of people have access to them. However, in another question (ABS5), a majority (54.1%) said: “Things are not going to improve” because of the vote. Thus, it is not possible to overestimate the importance of these voting figures.

Conclusions

Civil participation in Ecuador has decreased notably in the last 5 years. This decrease has occurred on two levels. First, the people who had been participating regularly are now only active sporadically. Second, the number of the people who don't participate has also increased. The difference between 2004 and 2006 is not statistically significant, but there is a significant difference between these two years and the year 2001. The factors that motivate people to participate will never be completely clear, however, in this chapter we have tried to differentiate between those factors that have an effect and those that do not, and we have tried to determine the direction and magnitude of these factors. One of the factors that it motivates civil participation is marriage. The information shows that married couples, especially those that have children, tend to participate more; as do people who live in rural areas.


Finally, we have referred to the levels of voting in the last elections and to the gap that exists between our data and the results from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The results presented in this chapter must attract attention to the frailty of civil participation. A society that participates actively is an invaluable asset to the democratic process of a country. The institutional, economic and political advances that they produce in Ecuador during the next years will be key in determining future levels of civil participation and that's why the next chapters of this report will focus on this analysis.

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III. Ecuador: Corruption and Democracy

Corruption is a serious problem in Ecuador. All prior LAPOP surveys have documented very high levels of street-level corruption, and comparisons made in the 2004 round of surveys with other countries in Latin America found corruption levels in Ecuador among the highest in the region. The LAPOP survey results are consistent with the World Bank Institute’s governance measures, specifically, their “control of corruption” index. As shown in Graph III-1 below, of the 18 countries covered by the World Bank, Ecuador scores fourth from the bottom in terms of control of corruption.



Graph III-1. World Bank Institute Control of Corruption for 2004: Ecuador in Comparative Perspective

In the 2006 survey we asked a series of questions on corruption victimization, and in this chapter we will analyze them individually and as an overall index. But we begin here using a different approach than we had used in prior studies. In this study we focus first on the justification of corruption by Ecuadorians. Much discussion of corruption of late has focused on

its pragmatic nature; in order to get things done, one has to pay bribes, and therefore, paying bribes is seen as justifiable. How common is this view. We begin our analysis with an answer to that question.


Justification of Bribe-Paying

In order to determine the extent to which Ecuadorians justify paying of bribes, our survey asked the following question:

EXC18. Do you think, as the things are, that sometimes the bribes are justified?

That is, we wanted to know if Ecuadorians believe that paying a bribe is justifiable. If so, this could explain why corruption is so common.

The analysis of this item appears in the figure below. As can be seen, only about one-in-five Ecuadorians justify bribery. This percentage has increased since the 2001 survey, but only slightly. These findings show that corruption in Ecuador is not high because most people think that it is justifiable. Rather, corruption is high *in spite of the fact the most Ecuadorians do not think that it is justifiable*.



Graph III-2. Percentage of respondents who would justify bribes

While four-fifths of Ecuadorians do not justify corruption, it is important to determine what factors help explain why some do. In order to make this determination, we ran a logistic regression, using justification of corruption as the dependent variable.²⁹ The results for the main demographic and socioeconomic factors are shown below.

²⁹ Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we used logit rather than OLS.

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban	.053	.211	.063	1	.801	1.055
Size (Size of place)	.116	.049	5.656	1	.017	1.123
Coast	.896	.312	8.228	1	.004	2.449
Highlands	-.045	.321	.019	1	.889	.956
Age (edad)	-.181	.036	24.921	1	.000	.835
Ed (Education)	-.018	.014	1.582	1	.209	.982
hombre	.320	.095	11.305	1	.001	1.377
Wealth	.042	.030	1.998	1	.158	1.043
Constant	-1.976	.353	31.340	1	.000	.139
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)

Model Summary

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
2769.673(a)	.052	.080


Table III-1. Predictors of Justification of Bribery: Logistic Regression Results a Variable(s) entered on step 1: urban, tamanor, costa, sierra, age, ed, hombre, wealth.

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

The results show that when controlled for all other variables, education and wealth, two variables that are often associated with attitudes, have not significant impact on the willingness of respondents to justify bribery.³⁰ In addition, we see that the urban/rural distinction, one that has been so important in the past for measuring corruption victimization, has no impact on justifying corruption; urban dwellers are no more or less likely than rural dwellers to justify bribery.

There are, however, some important factors that explain why some Ecuadorians are willing to justify bribery. First, we find that the place where a respondent lives makes a difference. The distinction between Guayaquil and the rest of Ecuador sharply differentiates citizens, as is shown in Graph III-3. Residents of the city of Guayaquil are generally twice as likely as the residents of most other locales to justify the paying of bribes. We know from the regression results that these differences are significant, net of the impact of all other demographic and socio-economic factors.

³⁰ Wealth is measured by a composite scale based on the "R" series in the questionnaire. We add up the number of household signs of wealth and produce this index. We also have the variable of monthly household income, but many respondents did not reply to that question, so we used the wealth measure instead. We use that measure throughout the report.



Graph III-3. Justification of paying of bribes by city and area


An examination of Table III-2 shows in more detail just how different Guayaquil is from the rest of Ecuador in this respect; while 37.3% of the residents of Guayaquil believe that paying bribes is justifiable, in the rest of the coastal region, no more than 22.1% (in the small cities) believe that it is justifiable. At the other extreme from Guayaquil is the Oriente Norte, where fewer than 10% would justify paying of bribes, although one needs to exercise caution in the interpretation of this finding because the sample size in this sparsely populated region of the country is quite small. Nonetheless, the distinctive character of Guayaquil in terms of corruption justification is of note, and should give those who are interested in fighting corruption some clear ideas for targeting their programming efforts to persuade Ecuadorians that corruption should not be justified.

<i>Estrato</i>	<i>Tamaño de la Ciudad</i>	<i>Promedio</i>	<i>N</i>
1 Urban Cost	2.00 Guayaquil	37.3%	631
	3.00 Big Cities grandes	20.7%	361
	4.00 Mid-sized cities	18.4%	24
	5.00 Small Cities	22.1%	144
	Total	29.9%	1,160
2 Urban Costo	6.00 Rural Areas	20.6%	250
	Total	20.6%	250
3 Urban Mountains	1.00 Quito	13.7%	484
	3.00 Big cities	21.8%	340
	4.00 Med-sized Cities	.0%	22
	5.00 Small Cities	11.6%	69
	Total	16.2%	916
4 Rural Mountains	6.00 Rural Areas	10.3%	384
	Total	10.3%	384
5 North East	5.00 Small Cities	9.6%	18
	6.00 Rural Areas	6.5%	37
	Total	7.5%	56
6 South East	5.00 Small Cities	12.1%	27
	6.00 Areas rurales	15.1%	35
	Total	13.8%	62
Total	1.00 Quito	13.7%	484
	2.00 Guayaquil	37.3%	631
	3.00 Big Cities	21.2%	701
	4.00 Mid-sized cities	9.5%	46
	5.00 Small Cities	17.4%	258
	6.00 Rural Areas	14.0%	706
	Total	21.2%	2,828

Table III-2. Justification of Bribery by Strata and Location


We can conclude from the analysis thus far, that size of place and urban-rural distinctions have no impact on Ecuadorian willingness to tolerate corruption. It is Guayaquil alone where corruption is more readily tolerated than in other areas of the country. The regression analysis shown above appears to show a related phenomenon; the entire coastal region is far more tolerant of bribe paying than the sierra or the Amazon. In fact, since Guayaquil represents such a large proportion of the population of the coastal region, reflected in our sample, it is Guayaquil alone that is raising the average level of justification of corruption, as is shown in the graph and table above.

The remaining significant differences are demographic. Males are more tolerant of corruption than females, as shown in Graph III-4.



Graph III-4. Impact of gender on justification of bribery

Finally, age plays a role in corruption justification. As shown in Graph III-5, bribery is more likely to be justified by the young than the old. This finding contradicts the assumed “idealism of the young.” It could also be a worrisome pattern if it represents a trend. That is, if the young do not reduce their tolerance for corruption as they grow older, national levels of tolerance for corruption will grow. Since we have seen an increase in corruption tolerance since the first survey in 2001, it may well be that the youth of the country, as the age, are taking with them their more tolerant attitudes toward corruption.



Margion of Error: 95% C.I

Graph III-5. Impact of age on justifying bribes


We will return to the question of the justification of corruption after we have examined corruption victimization experienced by the respondents to the survey. We will then be able to see if there is a relationship between being victimized by corruption and justification of bribe paying.

Corruption Victimization

In prior LAPOP studies we have explored in depth the question as to who are the victims of corruption in Ecuador. There is no need to repeat that analysis in this year's study. Rather, we wish to examine shifts in the patterns of corruption victimization, if any, and then link those to the justification of corruption.

We first compare corruption victimization for those survey items that were asked in all three years of the survey (2001, 2004 and 2006). Although all of the waves of the surveys have looked at a broad range of corruption items, it was only beginning in 2004 that we began to "filter" some of those questions by asking respondents if they had made use of the given service.


So, for example, beginning in 2004 we first asked respondents if they had had any dealings with their local government in the year prior to the survey, and only if they did, we then followed-up that question, asking if they had been asked to pay a bribe. As a result of this variation in the format of the questions, we believe that only those items the identical formats can be compared across all three survey years. We examine those first. As is shown in Graph III-6, there has been some change over the years. To focus on what LAPOP has normally used as the clearest indicator of bribery in the public sector, the last set of bars in the chart is illustrative. In 2001, 19% of respondents reported being victimized by public officials, compared to “only” 15% in 2004 and again in 2006. We say “only” because in surveys of other countries in the LAPOP series, we usually find lower levels of corruption on this item. The other items in the series do not show any systematic decline as the confidence interval bars demonstrate that all of the percentages found in 2006 were statistically indistinguishable from 2001. Thus while, for example 41% of respondents say that they saw the police asking for a bribe in 2006 compared to 44% in 2001, this difference is not significant. Overall, then, with the exception of one item, we do not find any significant decline (or increase) in corruption over the period 2001-2006.



Margion of error: 95% C.I

Graph III-6. Frequency of corruption victimization by year, 2001-2006, comparable measures

Turning now to the items which can be directly compared only for the 2004-2006 period, we present the results in Graph III-7. While most of the corruption rates do not change between 2004 and 2006, there was a notable decline in two areas: health service and schools. The decline in corruption in the schools is particularly notable. *However, the wording in the 2006 questionnaire, which asked directly about bribes, was different in 2004 for both the school and health service items.* In 2004, the item read: “En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Le han exigido pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?” We need to assume that the 2006 wording, one that was preferred in our pretesting in 2006 as being clearer than the 2004 wording, is responsible for the apparent decline in corruption levels. The same can be said about the wording for the 2004 health services question, in which we asked: “Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?” Again, the declines in these two areas seem to be a result of differences in question wording.




Margine of error: 95% CI

Graph III-7. Bribe payments among service users: 2004-2006

We can conclude this comparison of the 2001-2006 period by noting that little has changed in the frequency of bribery in Ecuador. On the items in which direct comparisons can be made, no significant shifts appear.


The creation of an overall index of corruption needs to take into account the changed wording from survey to survey. In this study, we construct an index for the 2006 set of items alone, which gives us a robust series of items to accurately measure corruption victimization.³¹ In total, we count eight different modes of corruption, giving a scale that ranges from 0-8. Since, however, only a very small number of respondents scored higher than 5, we collapse the 6-8 range to 5. It is that 0-5 range of forms of corruption experienced in the year prior to the survey that we examine in this report. Using this index, the results for our major sampling locations are shown in Graph III-8.



Graph III-8. Total index of corruption victimization, 2006, by place

³¹ The syntax for this item, which identifies the corruption items used is: count exc2r,exc6r,exc11r,exc13r,exc14r,exc15r,exc16r,exc17r (100).

This same information can be portrayed somewhat differently. In the chart below, we examine the percentage of Ecuadorians who have been victimized at least once during the year prior of the survey. The results are shown in Graph III-9. As has been reported before in prior LAPOP studies, Quito has the highest levels of corruption per capita. We hasten to note that the Guayaquil number is very close to that of Quito. What this chart shows is that between 35% and 46% of Ecuadorians, depending on where they reside, have been victimized by corruption at least once in 2005. *For the country as a whole, 41.5% of the voting age population suffered at least one form of corruption in 2005.* Once again, compared to many other countries in Latin America, as shown by the comparative LAPOP data, that is a very high proportion.




Margin of error: 95% C.I

Graph III-9. Percent of population victimized by at least once corrupt act, by locale: 2006

Finally, we can examine the number of times respondents have been victimized by corruption, looking again only those respondents who report having been victimized by

corruption at least once in the year prior to the survey. Those results are shown in Graph III-9. As can be seen, Guayaquil is the highest.



Margin of error: 95% C.I

Graph III-10. Total number of forms of corruption experienced by those who were victimized at least once, by locale.

Corruption Victimization and its Impact on Justification of Corruption


This chapter began by taking a close look at a variable not studied before in the LAPOP series on Ecuador, namely, the justification of paying bribes. To remind the reader, we looked at the question that reads:

EXC18. Do you think, as the things are, that sometimes the bribes are justified?

The question we ask now is, does being a victim of corruption somehow serve to increase Ecuadorians' willingness to justify such acts? If it does, we will have found a vicious circle by


which corruption increases tolerance of it, and we can safely assume that tolerance of corruption just serves to stimulate more of it.

For the nation as a whole, the results in Graph III-11 show the powerful impact of corruption victimization on respondent willingness to justify such acts. Among Ecuadorians who have not been victimized by corruption, fewer than 15% of them say that bribery is justifiable, a level *lower* than the overall national average. On the other hand, among those who have been victimized in five (or more) ways, close to half justify the acts. This is certainly a disturbing finding, suggesting that corruption is indeed a vicious circle.




Graph III-11. Impact of corruption victimization on justification of bribery

An analysis of gender differences in justification of corruption finds that men and women are virtually identical in their willingness to justify corruption, as shown in Graph III-12




Graph III-12. Corruption victimization and justification of bribe-paying by gender

The same pattern is found among both urban and rural residents, as shown in Graph III-13. As we have noted before, urban residents are somewhat more likely to justify corruption than rural residents, but the pattern of justification emerging from victimization is clear for both groups.



Graph III-13. Corruption victimization and justification of bribe-paying by urban/rural residence

Finally, we examine the impact of residence on this relationship. The results are shown in Graph III-14. As can be seen, the impact is the same for all areas in the country, but the high levels of justification of corruption found in Guayaquil stand out from the other regions.



Graph III-14. Corruption victimization and justification of bribe-paying by city

Conclusions

Ecuador has been plagued by frequent corruption scandals, and the public opinion data show that corruption is not restricted to elite-level acts. Our survey focuses on daily small acts of corruption at work, at school, in the health clinics, etc. We find that in 2005, nearly half of all Ecuadorian voting-age adults report being victimized at least once during the course of the year. We also find that while most Ecuadorians do not justify such acts, greater corruption victimization leads to greater tolerance, setting up a vicious circle that is going to be difficult to break. Finally, the study found very little change in the level of corruption over the course of the 2001, 2004 and 2006 LAPOP surveys.

IV. Confidence in Political Institutions of Ecuador

To determine how much citizens trust a democratic system, we study the trust that they place in the political institutions because the support that the citizens are willing to offer their government and the political system in general depends on the confidence that they have in the institutions of that system. The studies that LAPOP has carried out in the previous years in Ecuador and in other Latin-American countries show that the confidence that the citizens have in the political institutions of their country is an good indicator of the support they have for the system, like the general bibliography on the topic suggests (Lipset 1961). The extent, to which the levels of confidence in the institutions increase, is the same amount of support the people give to the system.

If citizens have confidence in the institutions of the State they will be more willing to accept the regulations and the legislation originating from the system because if the citizens trust in the institutions they tend to perceive the decisions of the State as more legitimate and consequently those decisions of the current administration as well. Weatherford considers political confidence to be one of the central components of legitimacy (Weatherford 1992).

Political confidence is an attitude resulting from an evaluation of the politicians and political institutions compared to the expectations placed on the political system. This evaluation does not automatically generate a political behavior, but it can be translated into an attitude of confidence or one of distrust (Easton 1965; Easton 1975). This attitude of confidence influences the support that the citizens give to the institutions, which can potentially be changed into action. The degree of confidence in the institution provides a justification for this political action.

Among all of the elements of the political system, confidence in the political institutions is central because the institutions are the most permanent elements of a political system as Mishler and Rose indicate, “(the) popular confidence in political and social institutions is vital for the consolidation of the democracy.... confidence is important because it creates ‘collective power’ allowing the government to make decisions and invest resources without resorting to coercion and without needing to obtain the permission of the citizenship for every decision” (Mishler and Rose 1997). In this way, the more the citizens trust in the political institutions, the greater the efficiency of the State.

The main objective of this chapter is to investigate what factors or characteristics of the political system in Ecuador influence the perceptions of its citizens, gaining their trust or losing their confidence in political institutions. A study of the confidence in the political institutions of Ecuador during the last two years is especially important in light of the political conflicts and economic problems that the country has been facing, as described in the first chapter.

We assume that in general there are different factors that influence the confidence in political institutions for the different sectors of the population and also for the different types of political institutions (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Citrin 2002; Citrin 1974; Hetherington 2005; Miller 1974; Moore 2002; Seligson 1980; Seligson 1998; Seligson 1999; Seligson, et al. 2004;

Seligson, et al. 2005). With this assumption, the political context in which the institutions function holds great importance in the analysis of the factors that change public opinion.

Since the factors that determine if people trust the institutions or not can vary according to the politics that they implement, the type of relationship that they have with the State, or their origin, the institutions cannot be completely separated from the political system. The perceptions that the citizens have of the institutions also has repercussions on the perception of the political system in general.

Continuity is important in monitoring the levels of support and confidence in the institutions in Ecuador according to LAPOP studies from 2001. In this chapter the levels of confidence that Ecuadorians have towards their political institutions is monitored between 2001 and 2006. At first, this chapter studies the levels of confidence in the political institutions in Ecuador in general and observes a total of 22 political institutions from different sectors of the politics, some relating directly with the functions of the Ecuadorian State or the implementation of regulations and state laws at national, regional and local levels, and others are focused on the civil sector of the political field.

This chapter begins by analyzing the confidence level that Ecuadorians have in political institutions in general during 2006. Then it studies the factors that generate distrust in the institutions through an analysis of the institutions with the lowest levels of confidence, and then it studies the factors that generate confidence with an analysis of the institutions with the highest levels of confidence. Next, the factors that determine the confidence that Ecuadorians have in different groups of institutions are analyzed with the groups being selected according to the role they play in the political system.

The confidence level of the institutions was measured by directly asking the interviewees how much they trusted in each of the institutions in the study on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 means that the interviewee does not trust the institution and 7 means that they have a lot of confidence in the institution. Later, upon analysis of the data, the 7 point scale was transformed into a scale from 1 to 100 that facilitated the interpretation of the institutional evaluations. In this new scale, a score closer to 1 represents a smaller confidence level, while a score closer to 100 represents the highest level of confidence for the institution.

All of those interviewed were given the opportunity to omit the score of any institution that they did not know or if they preferred not to express an opinion. The questions used to measure the confidence in the institutions are the following:


List of questions on the confidence of the institution
B10a. To what point do you have confidence in the justice system?
B11. To what point do you have confidence in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?
B12. To what point do you have confidence in the Armed Forces?
B13. To what point do you have confidence in the National Congress?
B14. To what point do you have confidence in the National Government?

B15. To what point do you have confidence in the General Prosecutor's Office of the Nation?
B16. To what point do you have confidence in the Attorney General of the State?
B17. To what point do you have confidence in the Public Advocate's Office?
B18. To what point do you have confidence in the Police?
B19. To what point do you have confidence in the Finance Office?
B20. To what point do you have confidence in the Catholic Church?
B21. To what point do you have confidence in the political parties?
B23. To what point do you have confidence in the unions?
B31. To what point do you have confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice?
B32. To what point do you have confidence in your Municipality?
B33. To what point do you have confidence in the <i>provincial prefect</i> ?
B37. To what point do you have confidence in the media?
B39. To what point do you have confidence in the chambers of private businesses?
B40. To what point do you have confidence in the indigenous movements?
B42. To what point do you have confidence in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)?
B44. To what point do you have confidence in the Constitutional Tribunal?
B46. To what point do you have confidence in the Commission of Civic Control against Corruption?
ECUB50. Have you heard of "Civic Participation"? To what point do you have confidence in "Civic Participation"?
B51. To what point do you have confidence in the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)?

Table IV-1. Questions from the questionnaire that measures confidence in the political institutions of Ecuador

Confidence in political institutions in 2006

The following graph, Graph IV-1, presents the results obtained in the 2006 survey for the general levels of confidence that Ecuadorians have in their political institutions. The results are organized in descending order, according to the score obtained by each institution on a scale from 1 to 100.



Graph IV-1. Confidence in the institutions in Ecuador 2006

Graph IV-1 clearly shows that the level of confidence in Ecuadorian institutions tends to be rather low, with an average of 39.38 in a scale of 100 points. Only three institutions received confidence levels greater than 50, which can be taken as an indication that there are very few institutions deserving of the interviewee’s confidence.


The institutions that have the highest levels of confidence of the Ecuadorian citizens are: the Catholic Church, the mass media and the Armed Forces. It is interesting to observe that after


these three institutions, the ones that gain the greatest level of confidence are: the NGO Civic Participation and the NGOs in general.

On the other hand, the political institutions with the lowest confidence levels are: the political parties, the National Congress and the National Government. The Supreme Court of Justice also receives very little confidence from the interviewees, which is not surprising given the problems the Court has had in the last two years.

At first glance, these results are very troubling since, in 2004 the confidence levels for all Ecuadorian institutions were much lower than other Latin American countries. For example, the level of confidence in the political parties in Ecuador is the lowest registered among all the Latin American countries studied by the LAPOP. This is also seen in the confidence levels of the National Congress and the National Government.

The confidence levels in 2006 are also worrying if they are compared to the levels registered in Ecuador in 2001 and 2004. The following graph shows the levels of confidence for the institutions that were studied during these three years in Ecuador.





Margin of error: 95% CI


Graph IV-2. Confidence in the institutions in Ecuador from 2001-2006.

The results shown in Graph IV-2 clearly indicate that the levels of confidence in the political institutions of Ecuador have all fallen to some extent between 2004 and 2006. Even the confidence level of the Catholic Church has decreased in these two years. Statistical analysis of the data indicates that in all cases- with the exception of indigenous movements- the average differences in confidence in 2004 and 2006 are statistically significant. This signifies that the data reflects a real reduction in political confidence between 2004 and 2006.

It can also be observed that between 2001 and 2004, institutional confidence had increased for the most part. In 2006, the confidence level in institutions in general is lower than it was in 2001. The differences measured between the years 2001-2004, 2001-2006 and 2004-2006 are all statistically significant.

These differences in confidence are greatest for the National Government and the National Congress, which have lost almost 10 points in the scale of confidence, and for the Public Defender, which in spite of gaining more confidence than the majority of Ecuadorian institutions, has also lost almost 10 points in the scale between 2004 and 2006. Other institutions like the political parties, the Supreme Court and the General Prosecutor's Office of the Nation have also experienced a substantial reduction in the people's confidence over the last two years.

The most important information from Graph IV-2 is the general reduction in confidence in all institutions, which is not a desirable feature for a minimally stable democratic system. A substantial reduction of the confidence in a pair of important institutions or a reduction of confidence in institutions that have faced extraordinary problems can be worrying but foreseeable in troubled political systems, but a fall in the confidence level for a group of political institutions without distinction between the function or the position that these institutions occupy within the political system, is an indicator of a serious structural problem.



Graph IV-3. Levels of confidence in the National Government, the National Congress and political parties between 2001 and 2006.

Graph IV-3 reflects the levels of confidence that Ecuadorians have in the three institutions with the lowest levels of confidence: the political parties, the National Congress and the National Government. These are precisely the same three institutions that have held the lowest levels of confidence from the first LAPOP study in Ecuador in 2001. This fact has important implications, since these institutions are central to the political dynamics within any democratic system. Both the political parties and the National Congress are the main avenues of

political representation in the democratic system and the National Government is responsible for implementing the legislation and regulating the activities of all administrative sectors of the government.

In Ecuador, the central nucleus of the political system not only has the lowest levels of confidence among all political institutions, but its confidence level has fallen substantially in the last two years. Statistical analysis of the surveyed data indicates that the factors that influence this lack of confidence the most are: the perception of general corruption within public administration, a negative perception of the national economic situation, and the level of wealth held by those interviewed, measured according to material possessions. The interviewees that consider it justifiable for the President to close Congress tend to have less confidence in these institutions than the people who believe that the closure of the National Congress is not justified.

All these factors are common to these three institutions with the lowest levels of public confidence. When the statistical analysis of the data is carried out for each of these institutions separately, the results do not change substantially, because of this, it is not necessary to present each institution individually in this section. Table IV-2 presents the results of the linear regression applied to the institutions with the lowest confidence levels, the National Congress, the National Government and the political parties.

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	22.747	4.904		4.639	.000
Gender	-1.628	.894	-.041	-1.821	.069
What is your age?	-.002	.034	-.001	-.059	.953
Wealth (based on possessions)	-.581	.268	-.055	-2.171	.030
Education	.681	.766	.024	.889	.374
Mountain Region	-2.876	2.294	-.072	-1.254	.210
Costal Region	-2.399	2.291	-.060	-1.047	.295
Perception of the national economic situation	.117	.024	.114	4.857	.000
Future of the national economic situation	.045	.015	.073	3.010	.003
The spread of corruption	-.096	.020	-.106	-4.812	.000
Political Knowledge	-.550	.444	-.032	-1.237	.216
Ethnicity: White	2.192	1.371	.035	1.599	.110
Ethnicity: Black	.545	2.725	.004	.200	.841
Ethnicity: Indigenous	1.103	2.759	.009	.400	.689
Perception of personal economic situation	.025	.026	.024	.959	.338
Personal economic situation in the next year	.039	.014	.069	2.675	.008
Closing of Congress	-3.891	1.176	-.090	-3.309	.001
Closing of the Supreme Court	2.065	1.092	.051	1.892	.059
National Pride	.028	.029	.021	.968	.333
Index of participation in organizations	2.073	1.361	.034	1.523	.128
R Square Add	0.061				
N	2.020				

Table IV-2. Factors that explain the lack of confidence in institutions with the lowest confidence levels: results of linear regression

Analysis of the results indicates that the lack of confidence in these institutions is generalized throughout the country. There are no differences in the confidence levels of inhabitants from different geographical regions, between men and women, between people of different age groups or between varying educational levels.

On the other hand, statistical analysis of the information relating to the factors that influence the confidence in political institutions that have the highest levels of confidence seems to suggest that in general, the same factors that influence the lack of confidence in some institutions creates a feeling of confidence in other institutions, like: the Catholic Church, the mass media and the Armed Forces. These institutions have gained the highest levels of


confidence on the part of Ecuadorians, even though the confidence in these institutions has also fallen slightly between 2004 and 2006.

The fact that even the institutions in which Ecuadorians trust the most have lower levels of confidence in 2006 is an important indicator that something in the Ecuadorian political context is affecting the democratic institutions as a whole, where even the most trustworthy institutions in Ecuador are still losing their capacity to generate confidence from the citizenship. The case of the Armed Forces is clearly illustrative of this phenomenon; between 2001 and 2006, the level of confidence in this institution fell 10 points in a scale of 100, that is to say that the level of confidence in the Armed Forces decreased by 10 % in five years.

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	41.393	5.597		7.395	.000
Gender	.392	1.021	.008	.383	.701
What is your age?	-.066	.039	-.041	-1.690	.091
Wealth (based on possessions)	-.779	.306	-.064	-2.545	.011
Education	-2.484	.874	-.077	-2.842	.005
Mountain Region	-.711	2.619	-.015	-.272	.786
Costal Region	-2.372	2.616	-.051	-.907	.365
Perception of the national economic situation	.059	.027	.050	2.140	.032
Future of the national economic situation	.082	.017	.114	4.765	.000
The spread of corruption	-.105	.023	-.102	-4.660	.000
Political Knowledge	.176	.507	.009	.346	.729
Ethnicity: White	1.325	1.567	.018	.846	.398
Ethnicity: Black	-2.348	3.113	-.016	-.754	.451
Ethnicity: Indigenous	-3.927	3.152	-.027	-1.246	.213
Perception of personal economic situation	.043	.030	.035	1.462	.144
Personal economic situation in the next year	.023	.016	.035	1.388	.165
Closing of Congress	3.353	1.343	.067	2.497	.013
Closing of the Supreme Court	-3.023	1.247	-.065	-2.425	.015
National Pride	.285	.033	.187	8.687	.000
Index of participation in organizations	3.126	1.554	.044	2.011	.044
R Square Add	.087				
N	2.026				


Table IV-3. Factors that explain the high levels of confidence in institutions: results of the linear regression

The results of the linear regression for the institutions with high levels of confidence, presented in the Table IV-3, are clear: the perception of the spread of corruption in public administration, the perception of the economic national situation, and the level of wealth of the interviewees influence the confidence level that citizens have towards different political institutions. The theory on political confidence indicates that a positive perception of the national economy tends to increase the institutional confidence, and the perception of an increase in corruption generates distrust in the institutions. Nevertheless, evidence exists that these theoretical expectations are not always fulfilled for every situation. For institutions with high levels of confidence, it is observed that the higher the education level of the interviewees, the lower their confidence will be in the Church, the mass media and the Armed Forces. The more national pride that the interviewees have and the more they participate in political organizations, the higher level of confidence they will tend to have in institutions.



Graph IV-4. Level of confidence in the institutions according to education level

In Graph IV-4 shows how the educational level of the interviewees influences the confidence levels that they have in different institutions. In the case of the Catholic Church, the mass media and the Armed Forces, it is observed that people with high levels of education tend to trust in these institutions less than others who were interviewed.



Graph IV-5. Level of confidence in the institutions according to the perception of the spread of corruption

Graph IV-5 illustrates how the perception that the interviewees have of the spread of corruption among public officials affects the confidence that they have in the institutions, even those institutions with the highest levels of confidence. According to the theory, the people who believe that corruption is widespread have less trust in the institutions, whereas the people who believe that the corruption is limited are those who trust more in the institutions.

Not all the elements that influence confidence in the institutions are common to all institutions. The Catholic Church for example, receives more confidence from women than men

according to the analysis, people considered racially mixed trust in the Church more than people who are considered to be white, and the more the interviewees knew of politics, the less they trusted in the Church. Nevertheless, the Church is the institution that holds the highest confidence among Ecuadorians.

Upon analysis of the mass media, it is possible to observe that national economic factors do not influence the confidence that Ecuadorians have in this institution. Rather, age and economic position seems to affect its confidence levels. Young Ecuadorians trust more in the media than older generations and people who have better personal economic perspectives in the immediate future have a greater predisposition to trust in the media than people with poorer economic perspectives.

Confidence in groups of institutions

To analyze what factors of the Ecuadorian political context influence the confidence changes that the citizens have in the institutions, the above mentioned institutions have been grouped into four groups according to the political sector in which they function and the sector of government to which they are related. These four groups of institutions are related to the following: the judicial system, the Executive Branch- fulfilling functions of regulation and administration, the representative institutions, and those institutions in the civil sector of politics. Each of the groups is composed of the following institutions:

a. the administrative institutions are a group of institutions tied to the Executive power, which carry out tasks of regulation and the maintenance of order. They implement the politics and the rules of the democratic system at the national and local levels. These institutions are: the National Government, the Armed Forces, the National Police, the Municipality, the Prefecture and the Internal Revenue Service.


b. the institutions of Judicial Power group those institutions that have a role within the judicial system: the General Prosecutor's Office, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court and the Public Defender.

c. the institutions of representation are tied to the representative processes through: elections, legislation, or the channeling of political participation. These institutions are: the National Congress, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the political parties.

d. the civil institutions group institutions of civil origin that directly or indirectly carry out political activities or are tied to the State. They represent groups of interest in civil society or facilitate the participation of the citizens in politics. These institutions are: the indigenous movements, the unions, the NGOs, the private businesses, the mass media, the Catholic Church, the Civil Commission of Control against Corruption and the NGO Civil Participation.

Each of these groups of institutions has been analyzed separately to find the factors that influence civic confidence in the institutions within the structure of Ecuadorian democracy. The criteria for the analysis is a combination of the observation of the political context in Ecuador and the empirical evidence presented in previous academic studies on institutional confidence in Latin American democracies and other democracies that are in the process of consolidation.

In a previous section we had observed that the levels of confidence in the democratic institutions of Ecuador have all decreased in the last five years. Graph IV-6 illustrates how the confidence levels have fluctuated between 2001 and 2006 for institutional groups.




Graph IV-6. Changes in the levels of confidence for groups of institutions between 2001 and 2006

The results shown in Graph IV-6 confirm what had already been observed in the previous section, that between 2001 and 2004 institutional confidence generally increased and citizens were more willing to trust in the institutions. The political context offered some incentives or it did not cause many obstacles because the citizens had a better predisposition towards the

political institutions. However, between 2004 and 2006, one or more elements within Ecuadorian politics reversed the trend of the previous cycle, generating a significant reduction of institutional confidence in Ecuador.

Considering the events that happened in Ecuador between 2004 and 2006 and the findings of previous investigations on institutional confidence, the following section will analyze the effects of: active participation in politics, Ecuadorian national pride, political knowledge, the perception of the spread of corruption in the public administration, the future economic perspectives at national and personal levels, the possible dissolution of the National Congress and the Supreme Court, differences in educational levels, wealth, age and gender, and the differences between individuals who reside in different geographical regions of the country on the confidence that the interviewees have in the different groups of political institutions.

Graph IV-7 illustrates the effect of the perception of the spread of corruption among public officials on the confidence of the institutions. As the interviewed perceive greater levels of corruption in the public administration, their confidence in the institutions tends to fall for each of the institutional groups.



Graph IV-7. Level of confidence for groups of institutions with the perception of the spread of corruption

All of these elements have been included in a model of analysis that has been applied to each of the previously described groups of institutions and in some cases to specific institutions, like the National Congress, the National Government, the Supreme Court, the political parties, the Armed Forces and the mass media.


The results of this analysis for institutional groups are presented next. For each group of institutions, a graph has been created illustrating the levels of confidence registered in 2001, 2004 and 2006 for each of the institutions that form the group. The Graph contains 3 horizontal lines that represent the general average of the group of institutions for each of the three years studied: the green line represents the average confidence in 2001, the blue line represents the average confidence for the institutions in 2004 and the red line represents the average confidence in 2006.

The advantage of presenting the average confidence in the institutions for the three years is that the reader can easily compare the averages of every year, giving a clear idea of the differences between one year and another, while noticing how the changes in the averages of confidence vary between groups of institutions.

A. Administrative institutions

The average confidence in administrative institutions in 2001 was 43.5 points in a 100 point scale. In 2006, the average confidence in the same institutions fell to 40.2 points out of a possible 100. Nevertheless, this change in confidence level for this group of institutions is relatively small- a maximum of 5 points in the scale of 100- in comparison to other groups as it will be seen shortly. At first, this difference does not seem important relative to a 100 point scale; however it is important to consider that the average has not fallen due to the effect of one or of two institutions in the group, but because of a collective reduction in the confidence levels of these institutions.

Graph IV-8 shows that there exist groups of institutions that have lost up to 10 points in the scale of confidence, like the National Government between 2004 and 2006 and the Armed Forces between 2001 and 2006. Other institutions have been relatively stable in their support, like the Municipalities.



Graph IV-8. Confidence in the administrative institutions of Ecuador: 2001–2006

Among the administrative institutions, the Armed Forces holds the most confidence whereas the National Government suffered an important loss of confidence between 2004 and 2006 that further reduced the little confidence that it has gained. The administrative institutions at the local level maintain relatively stable levels of confidence although the Prefect has gained less confidence than the Municipalities. The difference between public confidence in these local institutions and in the National Government is 20 points on a scale of confidence of 100 points.


Table IV-4 shows the results of the linear regression with the factors of the political and social context that are estimated to be affecting the confidence that Ecuadorians have in these institutions. The results obtained in this analysis are statistically significant with a level of confidence of 95%.

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	B		
1 (Constant)	24.644	5.099		4.833	.000
Gender	-1.522	.930	-.036	-1.637	.102
What is your age?	.037	.036	.025	1.037	.300
Wealth (based on possessions)	-.316	.278	-.028	-1.133	.257
Education	-.417	.797	-.014	-.523	.601
Mountain Region	-5.033	2.387	-.118	-2.109	.035
Costal Region	-4.848	2.384	-.114	-2.034	.042
Perception of the national economic situation	.138	.025	.127	5.520	.000
Future of the national economic situation	.072	.016	.109	4.599	.000
The spread of corruption	-.103	.021	-.108	-4.959	.000
Political Knowledge	.891	.462	.048	1.929	.054
Ethnicity: White	2.127	1.427	.032	1.491	.136
Ethnicity: Black	-.209	2.834	-.002	-.074	.941
Ethnicity: Indigenous	.503	2.869	.004	.175	.861
Perception of personal economic situation	.038	.027	.034	1.414	.157
Personal economic situation in the next year	.056	.015	.095	3.728	.000
Closing of Congress	1.810	1.223	.040	1.480	.139
Closing of the Supreme Court	-1.108	1.135	-.026	-.976	.329
National Pride	.173	.030	.124	5.805	.000
Index of participation in organizations	2.360	1.415	.036	1.667	.096
R Square Add	.098				
N	2.021				

Table IV-4. Factors that explain the confidence in administrative institutions: results of linear regression

The results of the linear regression indicate that the factors that influence confidence in the administrative institutions in Ecuador are principally: the perception of the national economic situation both at present and in the near future, as well as the personal economic perspectives for the near future. This means that while the economic perspectives of the interviewees at personal and national levels change for the better, their trust in the administrative institutions of the country will subsequently increase. The results also indicate that the perception of the expansion of corruption in the public administrations causes the confidence in the institutions of this sector

to diminish. Finally, the prouder a person is of being Ecuadorian, the greater is his or her predisposition to trust in administrative institutions.



Graph IV-9. Level of confidence in administrative institutions as a perception of the economic situation in 2006

Graph IV-9 reflects the effect of the perception of the national economic situation on civil confidence in the Ecuadorian administrative institutions. The result of statistical analysis indicates that as the perception of the economic situation worsens, confidence in the administrative institutions of the State tends to fall significantly.


These factors are common to all of the institutions, independent of the level of confidence that they gain. Nevertheless, the results of the regression show that inhabitants of the mountains and the coast trust the administrative institutions less than the inhabitants in the East of the

country. These regional differences in perception have particular importance for this group of institutions.

B. Institutions of Judicial Power

Institutions related to judicial power in general register lower levels of confidence than the administrative institutions. Ecuadorians also trust the judicial sector of the government less than the executive sector. The average level of confidence for these institutions in 2006 is 32.8 points in a scale of 100, a loss of 8 points compared to the average in 2004. In this group only the Public Defender obtains a level of confidence greater than 50 points in 2004. In 2006, none of the institutions surpasses the midway point on the scale and only the Public Defender and the Constitutional Tribunal surpass 30 points in the scale of confidence.

In Graph IV-10, the green line represents the average confidence for the judicial institutions in 2001, the blue line represents the average confidence in 2004 and the red line represents the level of confidence in 2006.




Graph IV-10. Confidence in the institutions of judicial power in Ecuador: 2001-2006

The biggest loss in confidence for this group is suffered by the Public Defender between 2004 and 2006, a period in which confidence diminished by 10%. The Supreme Court also has large losses in confidence due to a period of high instability and political manipulation in 2005.

The perception of corruption, the national economic perception and individual economic perspectives for the near future have the same effect on the institutions in this group that it had on the previous group. The inhabitants of the coast have less confidence in the judicial institutions than those from the East and those from the mountains. The distribution of wealth also influences the confidence in these institutions, since the more wealth the interviewee had, the lower their confidence level was in these institutions.

C. Institutions of representation

Confidence in institutions is important in democratic systems because it is a key element in the relationship of representation between the elected representatives and the citizenship (Mishler and Rose 1997). If the elected representatives do not have the trust of the citizens, their decisions lack legitimacy and may not be implemented.



Graph IV-11. Confidence in the institutions of representation of Ecuador: 2001–2006

The institutions of this group register the lowest levels of confidence among all the analyzed groups. In 2006, the average confidence in this group of institutions was only 21.7 in a 100 points scale. From 2001, this group of institutions has been the one with the lowest levels of confidence.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the institution that receives the highest confidence levels in this group and from Graph IV-11 it is possible to see that in contrast to other institutions, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has maintained a relatively stable level of confidence between 2001 and 2006. The difference between the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the National Congress and the political parties has increased considerably over the last two years, with a difference of more than 15 points between the tribunal and the average of these two institutions in 2006.

On the other hand, the level of confidence registered for the political parties in 2006 is one of the lowest, if the not lowest, registered for any political institution in the Latin American countries that are a part of the LAPOP studies.

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	25.137	4.808		5.229	.000
Gender	-.958	.876	-.024	-1.094	.274
What is your age?	.005	.034	.004	.155	.877
Wealth (based on possessions)	-.780	.263	-.075	-2.969	.003
Education	-.261	.751	-.009	-.347	.728
Mountain Region	-2.284	2.248	-.058	-1.016	.310
Costal Region	-4.623	2.245	-.117	-2.059	.040
Perception of the national economic situation	.141	.024	.139	5.974	.000
Future of the national economic situation	.044	.015	.072	2.977	.003
The spread of corruption	-.081	.020	-.091	-4.139	.000
Political Knowledge	-.567	.435	-.033	-1.302	.193
Ethnicity: White	2.015	1.344	.033	1.499	.134
Ethnicity: Black	1.558	2.672	.013	.583	.560
Ethnicity: Indigenous	-.717	2.705	-.006	-.265	.791
Perception of personal economic situation	.035	.025	.034	1.385	.166
Personal economic situation in the next year	.054	.014	.097	3.785	.000
Closing of Congress	-3.378	1.153	-.079	-2.931	.003
Closing of the Supreme Court	1.652	1.070	.042	1.544	.123
National Pride	.034	.028	.026	1.215	.225

Index of participation in organizations	2.152	1.334	.036	1.613	.107
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
Table IV-5. Factors that explain the confidence in institutions of representation: results of the linear regression

According to the results of the analysis of linear regression for the institutions of representation shown in Table IV-5, the factors that influence the confidence of Ecuadorians in these institutions are no different from those that affect the institutions of other groups. Corruption decreases the confidence in the institutions and the wealthiest people tend to trust the institutions less than others, while the hope of a better economic situation both personally and nationally raises confidence in these institutions. People who live in coastal regions have trust in these institutions less than those in the mountains and those in the East of Ecuador. The people who support the closure of the National Congress by the President trust in the institutions less than those who do not agree with the dissolution of the Congress. It is interesting to observe that in contrast to other groups of institutions, national pride does not increase the levels of confidence.

D. Institutions of civil society

The importance of confidence in civil society is clear because it provides the bases for the creation of such civil institutions as: unions, committees, affiliations and even political parties, all of which complement the state institutions with the potential of increasing its efficiency and its scope (Mishler and Rose 1997). Confidence motivates voluntary participation in politics and provides the citizens with alternative ways to participate in politics.

In Graph IV-12, the horizontal green line represents the average level of confidence for the civil institutions in 2001, the blue line represents the average confidence in 2004 and the red line represents the average level of confidence in these same institutions in 2006.



Graph IV-12. Confidence in the civil institutions of Ecuador: 2000–2006

This group of institutions is not only receives the highest levels of confidence, but it has also been the best at maintaining stability for its average confidence. In 2006 the average confidence in this group of institutions was 47.12 in a scale of 100, almost exactly the same level of confidence registered by these institutions in 2001. This signifies that the problems that affect the confidence other institutions does not affect civil institutions in the same way, although the factors that influence greater confidence in the institutions of this group are the same as those that influence the rest of the institutions.

Some of the institutions that inspire the highest levels of confidence among Ecuadorians belong to this group. Institutions like the NGOs, for which information was not provided prior to 2006, register higher levels of confidence than many of the institutions belonging to the state structure, despite being directly related to the government.

The indigenous movements are the only institution from among all of the institutions studied in this chapter, which did not suffer a real loss of confidence between 2004 and 2006.

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	31.515	4.888		6.447	.000
	Gender	-1.282	.901	-.032	-1.422	.155
	What is your age?	-.096	.035	-.070	-2.771	.006
	Wealth (based on possessions)	-.350	.269	-.033	-1.301	.193
	Education	-.868	.772	-.031	-1.124	.261
	Mountain Region	-3.166	2.283	-.080	-1.387	.166
	Costal Region	-5.410	2.276	-.136	-2.377	.018
	Perception of the national economic situation	.095	.024	.093	3.898	.000
	Future of the national economic situation	.046	.015	.075	3.030	.002
	The spread of corruption	-.069	.020	-.077	-3.443	.001
	Political Knowledge	.130	.449	.007	.289	.772
	Ethnicity: White	-2.081	1.378	-.034	-1.510	.131
	Ethnicity: Black	-2.131	2.701	-.018	-.789	.430
	Ethnicity: Indigenous	-.203	2.742	-.002	-.074	.941
	Perception of personal economic situation	.018	.026	.017	.677	.499
	Personal economic situation in the next year	.067	.015	.121	4.591	.000
	Closing of Congress	1.942	1.189	.045	1.633	.103
	Closing of the Supreme Court	.941	1.102	.024	.854	.393
	National Pride	.209	.029	.161	7.260	.000
	Index of participation in organizations	3.332	1.362	.055	2.446	.015

Table IV-6. Factors that explain the confidence in civil institutions: results of the linear regression

Table IV-6 shows the results of linear regression for Ecuadorian civil institutions. Civil institutions also see the negative effects of the perception of the spread of corruption and of pessimistic expectations for the economy in the near future at both personal and national levels. The inhabitants of the Ecuadorian coast are more distrustful of these institutions than inhabitants of the mountains or of the East, while people with national pride trust more in these institutions.

On the other hand, as opposed to other institutions, the youth are more likely to trust in these institutions than older generations and people who actively participate in politics across different political organizations tend to have higher confidence in these institutions as well.

Conclusions

Citizens take a variety of things into consideration when they evaluate the performance of the institutions. They can evaluate them individually and in relation to specific situations, or they can evaluate them as a whole, like the structure of the democratic system that governs their political community. In the case of the mass media for example, we found that the considerations of the interviewees were more personal than general, while the institutions more general in character or with a greater capacity to generate tangible consequences in the political field, were more vulnerable to influences from general considerations about the national situation and from the political processes of large or medium scope.

The fact that common factors exist between institutions with low and high levels of confidence indicates that there are important problems in Ecuadorian politics that have the potential to affect to the democratic system as a whole. On the other hand, there also exist more precise problems that are affecting specific institutions or a specific sector of institutions that are also important but have less potential of affecting the system as a whole. The specific problems of a sector or of an institution are common in any democratic system and although they are important and should be studied, they do not cause as much worry as the fact that the entire set of Ecuadorian democratic institutions seem to be losing the confidence of its citizens.

The distribution of confidence that Ecuadorians have in their institutions seems to indicate that the closer or more direct the relationship the institution has with the state structure or with the government, the less willing the citizens are to place trust in the institution, while the more independent and removed from the State the institutions appear, the more likely the interviewees will trust the institution. The exception to this model is seen in the municipalities, which have a direct relationship with the government and are a fundamental part of the state structure at the local level but which somehow, perhaps due to the high level of personalization in local politics, are not affected in the same way that other institutions are by their proximity to the State.

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V. Multiple Identities and the Political Culture on Ecuador*

This chapter has two objectives: the first is to illustrate how Ecuadorians identify themselves today in terms of: ethnicity, class, ideology, religion, and nationality, showing the evolution of these identities through time. Secondly, the chapter tries to establish relationships between different types of identities and the political variables that are the central focus of attention of this report, like political tolerance, authoritarianism, and the support of the system.

People usually have different types of identities that are activated or acquired according to the circumstances of their environment. Ethnicity, gender, social class, religion, nationality and political ideology are some examples of social dimensions that generate a sense of common identity in social groups whose individuals assume some characteristics that distinguish them from the rest of society.

Social identities are relevant to the study of democracy because they often turn into the basis of political action. Identity has many prominent roles in politics; from the institutionalized participation of the political parties in elections, which principally represent a specific social group but addresses the concerns of many other citizens in order to be elected, to the political protests or conflicts of a group that seeks the recognition of its social difference,.

Traditionally there exist two ways of understanding the role of identity in modern democracy. Some say that group identity is premodern and less democratic, and that any political participation based on a group identity should give way to more individualized type of politics. Another group affirms the centrality of the social groups to make decisions that truly represents the entire population.³² In any case, the role that group identities play in democracy is complex, and goes beyond both what the defenders and the detractors of identity-based politics argue.

Identities must be understood to be flexible and changeable categories within time. Not only can the identity of a person change within the same identifying category (for example, as it is shown in this chapter, a person can feel “white” in one moment of his or her life and feel “racially mixed” later); the social relevance of the grouping or identifying category also changes in the time (according to the characteristics of the context, to feel “indigenous” can be less relevant than to feel “evangelical”).

The construction of social differences is complex and is defined by the characteristics of the individuals and the historic circumstances of the social context. But this characteristic fluidity typical of identities does not imply that its study should be abandoned for not having a one-dimensional category of analysis. On the contrary, considering the relevancy and the complex character of identities, the social sciences have to make large methodological efforts to

* This chapter was writing by Daniel Moreno

³² For a wide discussion of different types of identities in modern democracies to see, among other, the recent book of Amy Gutmann (Gutmann 2003).

understand them as social and political phenomenon. This chapter looks to comprehend the relationship between a few identities and certain prominent attitudes toward Ecuadorian politics.

A methodological note on the statistical analyses of this chapter: the relations among variables that are statistically significant were obtained across a series of multivariable statistical analyses that include the specifications of the sample design. The fact that the relationships that are presented should remain significant after submitting them to multivariable analyses confirms that a relationship really exists and that it is not contrived, or the result of another variable “behind” the variable that we use as an explanation.³³ The use of the specifications of the design of the complex sample causes the calculation of large standard errors, which represent a test of the statistical reliability even more rigorous than the one that applies itself in the standard procedures.

Ethnic Identity


The first dimension of identity that we will consider in this chapter is ethnic identity. The ethnicity of a person is a combination of racial, cultural and historical attributes that form more or less stable groups and that generate a feeling of identity shared by different individuals. Understood this way, Ecuador is one of the 5 most ethnically diverse countries in Latin America (Fearon 2003).

But what distinguishes one ethnic group from others is not completely defined; instead of being permanent groupings, identities are fluid and flexible, and change according to the social circumstances. The set of attributes that distinguish one group from another also vary. This changeable characteristic of identification categories is particularly significant when ethnic identities are considered, although the result is not always obvious.

The LAPOP questionnaire of 2006 investigates the way in which the interviewees identify themselves in ethnic terms.³⁴ Graph V-1 shows the evolution in the proportion of each of the categories in three national studies of LAPOP in Ecuador.

³³ The relevant sample design characteristics for the statistical tests are: stratification, primary sample units more or less homogeneous and data weighting for national representation of population. For sample design effects on the margin of error in statistical tests, see, among others (Knott 1991).

³⁴ The question was: Are you considerate that who is the person: indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, (black), racially mixer, mulatto, white or other?




* The mulatto category was not available in 2001

Graph V-1. Ethnic Identification in Ecuador, 2001-2004

The identity of people changes with time, even when individuals consider racial factors or their own physical makeup (as unchangeable across the life of the person). The sample used for the poll of 2006 is not different from that in the studies in 2001 and 2004; thus, if the ethnic identities were stable and permanent, we should expect that the proportion of people identified by the different racial or ethnic categories should remain relatively constant. However, the percentage of people who identified themselves as “racially mixed” has grown significantly, by about 5 percentage points in the last five years. Those who identify themselves as “white” are now proportionally 5% less, with statistically significant differences, whereas other categories have stayed relatively stable. This has been a general tendency in all regions of the country.

Beyond purely sociological or anthropological interest in this change of identities, it is interesting to know the effects ethnic identity has on the political variables of which this report is concerned. In a society as deeply stratified by ethnic lines as Ecuadorian, social differences are

translated into cultural differences that might explain the effect of identity upon the disposition of authoritarian attitudes that is seen in Graph V-2.



Graph V-2. Authoritarian tendency through ethnic identification, Ecuador 2006

The variable that measures the authoritarian attitudes of people is a scale that combines three questions of the questionnaire used in 2006.³⁵ Chapter VII presents a more in depth analysis of this variable and explains its political relevancy. In the graph that corresponds to the information from 2006, the people who identify themselves as racially mixed tend to be less

³⁵ The questions used were:

AA1: A very effective way of correcting the errors of employees is to reprimand them in front of other employees. To what point do you agree with this practice?

AA2: The person who contributes the most money to the household is the one that should have the last word in the decisions of the family. To what point do you agree?

AA3: In school, children should ask questions only when the teacher asks for them. To what point do you agree?

authoritarian than those who identify themselves as whites and blacks, as the difference between the intervals of confidence of these three groups show. Since the questions of these scale measure elements of the culture of daily life, we can assume that cultural differences exist between the Afro-Ecuadorian populations of the country and the white elites as members of these groups are on average more authoritarian than all other Ecuadorians.

The indigenous identity in Ecuadorian politics

Relating to the proportion of indigenous populations in Ecuador, the different rounds of LAPOP surveys have found that about 3% of Ecuadorians identify themselves as indigenous. The National Census of the Population of Ecuador carried out in 2001, used the same question that is used in the LAPOP questionnaire³⁶, and found that about 6.1% of Ecuadorians older than 15 years old call themselves indigenous (Leon Guzman 2003). Thus there exist relevant, although small differences between the results of our survey and the official results found by the Census.

It is worthwhile to consider that if 2.6% is added to the estimate, due to the margin of error of 1.8%, our results would be over 4%, not much lower than the data from the census. These small differences between the information of LAPOP and the information of the Census can be due to different factors. One is that those who identify themselves as indigenous have on average less years of formal education than those who are identified as being part of other ethnic groups; in the LAPOP survey, the rate of refusal (the proportion of people chosen who preferred to interrupt or to not do the interview) is higher among people with less education. So those who have lower levels of education, including indigenous peoples, may be slightly under-represented in the LAPOP sample.

Despite these differences, the two sets of data show a similar reality: a very small percentage of Ecuadorians identify themselves as indigenous, when the Census question is used. However, the ethnic composition of Ecuador, and in particular the proportion of indigenous people, is a topic that generates strong debate in academic and political circles. Estimations of the percentage of indigenous people in Ecuador differ substantially according to the sources, from minimal figures, up to figures that encompass close to half of the entire population (Pallares 2002; Cott Goes 2005).

These differences among sources in the proportion of indigenous people in Ecuador are so large, that among other things, with different theoretical definitions for ethnicity and little sophistication available in the measurements to grasp a complex concept like this. The cultural, linguistic and racial attributes associated with categories like “racially mixed”, “indigenous”, or “white” are not clearly defined. Social scientists do not agree on the question: what does it mean to be part of an ethnic group? The question presented by the differences between the survey and the census is: what does it mean to be indigenous? Different definitions of ethnicity and of what it means to be indigenous generate different results.

³⁶ For the surveys of 2001 and 2004, the used question was exactly the same one that is used in the Census. In 2006, the question of LAPOP varied slightly, adding the racial contextualization (You considered yourself a person of the race..., while the previous question simply asked, how do you consider yourself?).

Since this chapter is focused on identities, self-identification has been chosen to be the indicator of ethnicity; the validity of this measurement is that it is a subjective indicator that depends on how the person sees themselves. Considering the data from LAPOP and the census, we can affirm that the percentage of Ecuadorians who identify themselves as indigenous is a relatively small minority, although the exact number is difficult to know for the reasons explained above.

Although those who identify themselves as indigenous are few in Ecuador, the recent political mobilizations occurring around the indigenous identity give an example of the importance that identities can have on national politics. The capacity of organization through communication networks, the possibility of collaborating in a politically favourable environment, and the change in the relationship between the citizens and the State with the neo-liberal model are some of the conditions that explain the relatively strong national political movement that has been generated by the indigenous identity in Ecuador (Yashar 2005); this national political movement that is based on the ethnic identity is so prominent that it has impacted constitutional reform in the country in a substantial way, modifying the electoral rules and formally defining the multicultural character of Ecuador (Cott Goes 2005). Beyond the institutional changes, the political participation of the indigenous movement in Ecuador seems to have acquired a well-known disruptive capacity (Pallares 2002), which links it directly with the fall of a constitutional government (in the year 2000), and involves it in the collapse of another (in 1996).

How can it be explained that a social group seemingly so limited should have such a profound impact in Ecuadorian politics? Two hypotheses appear as complementary and plausible explanations. First of all, being a part of an ethnic group goes beyond the identification categories used in the question of self-identification; this means that it is possible that there are more “indigenous” people in Ecuador than people who identify themselves as such.

The case of Bolivia can serve as a useful comparison with Ecuador. In Bolivia, about 17% of the people interviewed by LAPOP in 2004 identified themselves as indigenous using a similar question to the one described here; but when a different question was used, the percentage rose to about 70 % of all the interviewees (Seligson, et to. 2005). The fundamental difference seems to be in the presence of the category “racially mixed” that becomes the majority when the interviewees are able to choose it as one of the options. This seems to confirm the flexible character of the ethnic identities: one can be both “racially mixed” and “indigenous” at the same time.


The second explanation, which escapes the scopes of this study, has to do with the political movement lead by the indigenous people of Ecuador, which seems to have formed a set of social groups and political forces concerning demands and claims that are not solely ethnic in character (Pallares 2002). In other words, the social mobilizations in which the indigenous movements have had a leading role do not have a purely ethnic ideological platform and are not just composed of indigenous people.

Ideology as identity

Another relevant identification factor has to do with the political identity of the people, which can be defined according to the traditional criteria of left-wing and right-wing. The survey includes a question intended to grasp how Ecuadorians identify themselves ideologically.³⁷ It is worth while highlighting that the variable used to measure ideology does not come from certain attitudes that could be understood as right or left-wing, but from the self-identification of people on an axis that has left-wing and right-wing ideology on two opposite poles. It is clear that this self-identification is a simplification of ideology, forcing it to enter inside a single dimension. Many people found it difficult to locate themselves at some point between the ideological left-side and the right-side, which is verified by the fact that only two-thirds of the interviewees in 2006 gave a response to this question. Nevertheless, we think that this variable is a valid indicator, although limited, of the ideological tendencies of the population.

As it happens with other types of identities, the ideology of people changes due to different contextual factors. As Graph V-3 shows, in 2006 (the average value is shown by the red line) there was a significant turn towards the ideological right for the average Ecuadorian; whereas the average in 2004 (blue line) was statistically the same as the average in 2001 (green line), the change towards the right in 2006 is statistically significant. Although the differences are not very big in absolute terms, a change of almost half a point in the scale of 9 points of ideology in only two years is clearly suggestive of a turn towards the right.

³⁷ The question used was: L1. Nowadays many people, when they talk about political tendencies, speak of left-wing and right-wing, that is to say, of people that sympathizes more with the left and of people that sympathizes more with the right. According to the sense that you have for you the terms "left" and "right" when you think of your political point of view, where would you place YOURSELF in this scale? Indicate the box that best approximates your own position.




Graph V-3. Ideological of Ecuadorians, 2001-2004

The fact that the ideological position of the average population of Ecuador moves towards the right, countering the majority of other Latin American countries, is surprising. While the electoral results of Latin America show a turn towards the left within the entire region (with the exception perhaps of Colombia), average Ecuadorians are more on the right-hand side of the ideological spectrum than they were only two years ago. It is possible that these differences have to do with the combined influence of Colombia and of the investment of the U.S. in the Colombian Plan, a country historically close to Ecuador and influential on its neighbor to the southwest, but these factors can also have the opposite effect.

We cannot rule out that this difference is seen in only a portion of the sample, the ones who accept being identified in the scale that goes from left-wing to right-wing, and therefore these results are not necessarily representative of the Ecuadorian population.

What are the consequences of having an ideology which is more to the right or to the left? Although there are many who would answer this question with certainty by offering prompt arguments, it is found that as the population moves further away from the ideological centre (whether towards the left side or towards the right), they will tend to generate larger authoritarian dispositions. A possible explanation is that the extremes are not good for democracy, as the pioneering work on compared political culture (and many other studies afterward) shows (Almond and Verba 1970). History offers us many clear examples that verify the authoritarian character of the ideological extremes, whether towards the left or towards the right: examples of the first case, authoritarianism of the left-side, are the governments of Stalin in the Soviet Union and that of Pol Pot in Cambodia. Examples of authoritarianism of the right side are the Nazis in Germany and Latin American dictatorships like those of Pinochet in Chile or Videla in Argentina.



Graph V-4. Average authoritarian inclination according to ideology (quadratic projection), 2006


Graph V-4 shows the relationship between the inclination towards authoritarianism and the ideology of the people. The middle line represents the average according to a quadratic projection, while the outer lines represent the upper and lower limits of the interval of confidence. The "U-curve" of the graph is illustrative: those identified in the center of the ideological spectrum tend to be less authoritarian than those who have ideologies to the left and to the right, and the differences are accentuated as one approaches the ends of the ideological scale, with a slight greater tendency of authoritarianism in the extreme right of the scale in comparison to the extreme left of the scale.

Religious Identities

The social importance of being religious has been studied by social scientists since it was observed brilliantly by the German sociologist Max Weber in the beginnings of the last century (Weber 1999 (1905)). The religious identity of the people is an excellent way to determine the value system from which people make their everyday decisions; their ethical and moral conceptions as well as the practices generated from them, depend in a large part on the religious beliefs of the people.

In Ecuador, as in the majority of Latin American countries, the Catholic religion has had the majority of religious adherents. The Latin American population in general had been almost exclusively Catholic up to the last decades of the 20th century, during which time the religious Protestant groups have gained ground (Stoll 1990).

As Graph V-5 suggests, the change of religious identity is a valid process occurring in Ecuador today. Although the proportion of people identified as Catholic continues to be the majority, its numbers have been steadily decreasing from 2001, when little less than 87% of Ecuadorians were identified as Catholic, while this percentage in 2006 scarcely exceeds 82%, a statistically significant difference. Consistent with this decrease, the proportion of people identified as evangelical or Protestant has been increasing from 6% in 2001 to almost 11% in 2006. The data from this series of LAPOP surveys demonstrates the results that would be expected given the previous information.




Graph V-5. Religious Identification of Ecuadorians, 2001-2006

Since the percentage of people who identify themselves with other religions or none has stayed relatively stable, we can say that in 5 years, the Protestant religious denominations have recruited about 5% of the Ecuadorian population that had previously been Catholic. In other words, in only 5 years the proportion of non-Catholic Christians has almost doubled in Ecuador; if this growth rate continues, in less than 15 years the Protestant religion will represent the majority of the national population.

Beyond the sociological interest in the change of religions, it is interesting to know what the political consequences of these changes are. The data from the 2006 survey, illustrated in Graph V-6, suggests that the people who identify themselves as evangelical tend to be less tolerant than those from other religious identities. Although the averages for those who call themselves evangelical are lower, the difference is not statistically significant in the scale of political tolerance (which is described in Chapter VII of this report). Nevertheless, when we

consider the political rights of homosexuals,³⁸ Protestants are significantly less tolerant than the rest of the population, even when the effects of socioeconomic indicators such as income, education and age are controlled.



Graph V-6. Tolerance politic and tolerance towards homosexuals by ideology identity, 2006


Does this mean that the population of Ecuador is becoming less tolerant due to the growth of religious evangelical groups? This is an affirmation that would require different empirical evidence from that which has been presented; we cannot be sure if the reduction in tolerance is a consequence of religious affiliation (this is, if people become less tolerant when they become part of a religious evangelical group), or if people who were originally less tolerant tend to become part of a Protestant group. Upon analysis of the data presented in the previous graph, we can affirm that on average, evangelicals are less tolerant than those people who are not

³⁸ The question used was: D5. And now, changing the topic, to what degree do you approve or disapprove of homosexual people taking positions in public office?

religious, and less tolerant of the political rights of homosexuals than the rest of the population in the country.

Class Identity

Another important dimension of identity is social class. Although objective indicators of social class exist, defined by Marxist tradition according to the position of the people in relation to the ownership of productive means, in this chapter we consider social class to be an identity that people assume by comparing their material possessions with those of other people. This identity of class is subjective and relational, although the interrelation of this variable with income and wealth is strong and significant (0.30 and 0.38 respectively, sig. diff. <0.001); this suggests that the subjective factor of class identity depends strongly on objective economic considerations.



Graph V-7. Ecuadorian class identity, 2004 and 2006

Class identity can be relevant, for example, in choosing the candidates in an election. The political speech can address the socioeconomic majority directly, and class identity can help determine how the citizens will vote. But there are other less direct and more complex effects that class identity has on politics. One of them is the tendency toward authoritarianism that is illustrated in Graph V-8.



Sig. difference < .05

Graph V-8. Average authoritarian tendency according to class identity, 2006

People from the lower-class have higher authoritarian attitudes on average than the rest of the population, and these differences remain after controlling for factors like education and income. This is consistent with what some authors have called the “culture of poverty” (Banfield 1958; Lewis 1966), which states that poverty forms a type of distinctive subculture, which may include in this case, a set of authoritarian attitudes that are not directly improved through education. The theoretical and empirical ties between the social working class and


authoritarianism were previously studied by Seymour Martin Lipset in a classic work of contemporary political science (Lipset 1961).

Belonging to the political community

The idea of political community deals with the ties that join the citizens of a country; a political community is a group of people that recognizes the legitimacy of some type of common authority. The political community of democracy is an imagined community (Anderson 1993) in which individuals see themselves as citizens, as legitimate subjects with rights and obligations. In this community the State represents the authority of the citizens.

From opinion polls we can come to know the degree to which people feel that they are part of the political community of their country. This is an important consideration knowing that this sense of belonging to the nation is important to the participation of the people in national political processes. One of the ways in which it is possible to measure this sense of national identity is by asking the people how proud they are of being Ecuadorian.

This sense of political identity seems to be shared by all ethnic groups in the country. Other studies have shown that the level of Ecuadorian national pride is not high in comparison to other Latin-American countries (Seligson, et to. 2005); however, this feeling of collective identity has been steadily increasing for all the ethnic groups from the first survey in 2001. Although there has been a general increase for all the ethnic groups, it has been much larger in indigenous people, whose average has showed a bigger positive change than the rest of the categories of ethnic self-identification.



Sig. diff. between years <.001, among groups no sig. diff. exists


Graph V-9. Ecuadorian national pride according to ethnicity, 2001-2006

Diverse factors can positively affect national pride; one is undoubtedly, the successful role of the Ecuadorian national soccer team in the recent qualifying rounds of the World Cup. Given that the rising tendency in national pride has been constant since 2001 (Seligson, et to. 2004), before this event took place, it is apparent that this is not the only factor that increases the Ecuadorian sense of national pride. As the previous graph shows, These differences do not depend on the ethnic identity of the people.

¿ Is this sense of belonging to the political community equal in all regions of the country? The information from a similar question in the 2006³⁹ survey suggests that relevant differences

³⁹ The question used was: PN2. In spite of our differences, Ecuadorians have many things and values that unite us as a country. To what extent do you agree?

exist in the provinces in the Oriente of the country⁴⁰, whose inhabitants have on average, a weaker connection to the national political community, as Graph V-10 suggests. Differences between urban and rural areas are not significant for any of the regions, however it is the rural areas of the East that have a comparatively lower sense of shared values than the rest of the country. It is worth while to note that relating to the question of national pride, regional differences are not prominent.



Margin of Error: 95% CI

Graph V-10. Average acceptance of “Values common to all Ecuadorians” according to region and place of residence, 2006


This difference in the provinces in the East may be due to the fact that these areas have traditionally received less attention and state investment than the coast and the mountains, which can generate a different perception within this population of its incorporation into the national

⁴⁰ The countries that were included within the category “Oriente” are: Morona Santiago, Napo, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe, Sucumbíos, and Orellana

community. However, the Eastern region has two more characteristics that should be considered in the differences noticed here: first, this is the region where the oil companies have the greatest presence in the country; second, this is a border region, and often receives a “pooling” of armed conflict from Colombia. We do not find significant differences between the different ethnic groups described above in their perception of common values.

The sense of belonging to the national political community turns out to be strongly related to the legitimacy of the political system.⁴¹ The greater the level of national pride, the greater the support of the system tends to be, according to the support index discussed in chapter IV. Graph V-11 clearly illustrates this relation using the information from three surveys completed in Ecuador (2001, 2004 and 2006); the relationship is clear and its effect is very strong: the people, who have the most national pride, give twice as much support to the system on average than those who have the lowest levels of national pride. However, the majority of the people in Ecuador have high levels of national pride.

⁴¹ Most of the studies on the support to the system derive from the pioneering work of David Amazonon (Amazonon 1965; Amazonon 1975), which consider the political community as a part of the concept of the support to the system (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999)



Graph V-11. Average support of the political system in relation to Ecuadorian national pride, 2006

The legitimacy of the State depends on the authority that the citizens give it; if people do not feel that they part of the community, their recognition of the legitimacy of the political system will tend to be lower. Following this logic, the feeling of belonging to the political community places a type of “ceiling” on the support to the political system: it is difficult for a person to have a level of support towards the political system greater than his sense of belonging to the national political community.

Conclusions

Two main conclusions can be drawn from this chapter: first, the idea that people’s identities are fluid and changeable in time is fully supported in Ecuador. Not only has the national pride of being Ecuadorian been intensified since 2001, there have also been substantial changes in different categories of identity during the last few years. In terms of ethnic identity,

there are more people now who feel they are racially-mixed and fewer who identify themselves as whites; ideologically, the average Ecuadorian now feels more “right-winged” than they did only two years ago; religious identity also has changed, with about 5 % of the entire population of the country converting from Catholicism to become Evangelical or Protestant; finally, class identity has also changed recently, with a large proportion of people being defined as lower-class.

The second main conclusion deals with the effect different types of identities have on the variables that measure political attitudes and inclinations: identity is a relevant factor in explaining the differences in the political culture of Ecuador. It is worthwhile to remember the associations made between identity and some tendencies of political practice, like authoritarianism and political tolerance. Social context can activate an identity and generate political practices consistent with existing predispositions; but this is a complex process that cannot be considered outside of its historic context. Therefore, while trying to explain social or political practices, it is necessary to consider the existing predispositions of the citizens and the particular historic circumstances that make them possible and give them meaning.

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
VI. The Ecuadorian Judicial System

In spite of being the power of the State that is least analyzed by social sciences, in the last years several academicians have started recognizing the importance of the judicial branch in the democratic system (World Bank, Prillaman 2000) (Buscaglia 1997). The judicial system fulfils two fundamental roles: first, it helps strengthens the democratic system with respect to the legal system. Second, a country where legal security exists has many more possibilities of encouraging national investment, of developing small and medium businesses and of attracting foreign investment, through which a judicial system helps to encourage the economic growth of a country.

Although in the academic field the judicial branch has gained importance in recent years, in practice the strengthening of the judicial system in the Ecuador has not yet acquired the same level of importance that is given to other topics. Graph VI-1 shows us what Ecuadorians presently think of the strengthening of the justice system. Less than 10% of those polled think that strengthening the justice system is the most important way of improving democracy in the country. This is due to the fact that, as seen in chapter II, corruption is a serious problem in Ecuador and is always present in the mind of the Ecuadorians, reducing the importance of other factors.

The majority of the literature on this topic identifies three aspects that are key to a properly functioning judicial system. The first is accessibility, both citizens and legal people who operate under the dispositions of a legal framework should have access to the use of the services that the system offers. This implies that the judicial power must be proportionally represented at the geographical level, that is to say, that the people who live in rural areas must have access to courts without having to travel to the big cities. Also, there are must exist an institution that complies with the objective of informing the population about the legal processes available to them for different circumstances.

The second necessity is that of efficiency. A judicial system must be sufficiently effective to satisfy the demands of the population within a reasonable time period. Efficiency also implies being able to carry out the sentences dictated by the courts. A judgment on paper does not have any value if the judicial system is unable to act upon what has been decreed.



Graph VI-1 Forms of strengthening the democracy according to the Ecuadorians

The final requirement is that of independence. The modern State is composed of three powers that should be independent. A judicial system that constantly submits to the influences of the other two powers cannot function with sufficient freedom. The lack of judicial independence is extremely serious since it implies that the judicial branch cannot fulfil any of the previous requisites either. A politically controlled court cannot offer egalitarian access to people of different political and ideological viewpoints. In the same way, a court influenced by other powers of the State will not be able to pronounce just sentences or to carry out any sentences that are inconvenient to those who handle the political and economic power of the country. That's why judicial independence is an essential requirement for a properly functioning judicial system.

Another very important factor which is connected to the independence of the judicial system is accountability, although some academicians identify it as a separated requirement (Joseph Staats 2005). This means that in the event that the judicial system does not function correctly, there must be a mechanism of independent control that establishes responsibilities and arranges corrections. This requirement is the difference between a judicial independent power that acts inside the constitutional framework and one that is not accountable to the citizens of a country.

The objective of this chapter is to describe how Ecuadorians evaluate the judicial system of the country. Although the questionnaire designed for *Democracy Audited* does not go into depth on the attitudes of the citizens towards the judicial branch, it does contain questions that allow us to measure the operation of the judicial branch regarding the previously mentioned requirements.


Access to the Judicial System

As we previously mentioned, the requirement of accessibility to the judicial branch has to do with the citizens knowing the institutions which they must go to in defence of their rights and they have to have easy access to them. Regrettably, since the questionnaire covers a large diversity of topics, it was not possible to explore this question in depth; however, pair of questions has been developed to make an approximate estimation of whether people know where to go to denounce certain crimes. We will use these questions to measure accessibility, which are the following:

QUESTION 5A. Do you know which institution to go to: in order to denounce a case of labour exploitation? (1) Yes (2) No (8) NA

QUESTION 5B. To denounce a case of sexual exploitation?
(1) Yes (2) No (8) NA


One of the biggest problems of access to the judicial system is in the rural areas where people are not informed about where they must go in order to present an accusation. Graphs VI-2 and VI-3 show us the differences that exist between urban and rural areas when we apply the questions listed above.



Graph VI-2: Do you know what institution to go to in order to: bring charges against a case of labour exploitation?

The Graph VI-2 shows us that more than half of the people who live in urban areas know where to go to report cases of labour exploitation. Comparatively, 69% of the people who live in rural areas do not know where to go in these circumstances. The graph presents evidence that the people who live in urban areas have greater access to the judicial system than those who live in rural areas.

This evidence is supported by Graph VI-3, as the percentages are similar to those presented in the previous graph. The majority of people living in rural areas do not know where to go to make an accusation of something as serious as sexual exploitation. This turns out to be aggravated by the fact that approximately four of every ten inhabitants in urban areas do not also know where to go to carry out an accusation of this type.




Graph VI-3: Do you know which institution to go to in order to: bring charges against a case of sexual exploitation?

After comparing urban and rural areas it is possible to observe that approximately 5 of every 10 people in the country know where to go in order to bring charges on these types of crimes. This means that approximately half of the population does not have the necessary information to obtain the services that the judicial system should provide. Thus the judicial system has a long way to go to improve accessibility in Ecuador.

Efficiency of the Judicial System

The efficiency of the judicial sector has to do with the capacity to deal with judgments in an effective way and then to be able to execute the sentences dictated. Although we do not have way of measuring the function of the judicial system in this aspect, we can find out the level of confidence of the people in the aptitude of judicial branch to guarantee a just judgment. On having been consulted on the topic and in a scale of 1 to 100, the average level of confidence in

the judicial system of Ecuador is 34. In chapter IV, which analyzed the people's confidence in the institutions of the Ecuador, the National Congress, which represents the legislative branch and the National Government which is generally associated with the executive branch, were the least reliable institutions after the political parties according to Ecuadorians, with averages of 16 and 21 respectively on the 100 point scale. This means that within the three powers of the State, the judicial branch is the one that receives the most confidence on the part of the citizens, although in worryingly low levels, as shown in Graph VI-4.




Margin of Error: 95% CI

Graph VI-4 Confidence of Ecuadorians in the powers of the State

Another big problem that faces the judicial power in the Ecuador is that of corruption. As we observe in the beginning of this chapter, Ecuadorians consider corruption a serious problem in the country with 68% of the population believing that corruption among civil servants is widespread. Another serious problem, identified in chapter II, is that people justify corruption due to how things are in the country. Graph VI-5 shows us the difference in payments of bribes in the courts in the last year according to the justification of the payment of bribes from the people polled. Almost 80% of the people who say the payment of bribes is not justified avoided them while they were in the courts. However, only 31% of the people who said that the

payment of bribes is justifiable paid a bribe in the courts during the last year. It is necessary to say that the difference in payment of bribes between those who justify its payment and those who do not is statistically significant.



Graph VI-5: Payment of bribes in the past year and the justification of these bribes.


Graph VI-5 allows us two conclusions. First, the great majority of Ecuadorians are against the payment of bribes to the courts, as demonstrated in the actions of not only those who do not justify the payment of bribes, but also those who do. Second, the inefficiency of the judicial system is such, that although a person does not justify the payment of bribes, they sometimes have to pay in order to expedite a procedure.

Finally, an important measurement of the efficiency of the judicial system is the satisfaction of its users. For this we have developed a series of questions that measures the level of satisfaction of the citizens with two institutions of the judicial system represented:

Does you feel: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the court procedures that you or someone in your family have done with the following entities?

ST1. The national police
ST2. The courts or the tribunals of justice
ST3. The district attorney's office
ST4. City hall
ST5. The Public Defender

Although our analysis is only going to encompass the degree of satisfaction of the citizens with regard to procedures carried out in the courts and the tribunals of justice and in the district attorney's office, it is necessary to point out that a third of the reported population had carried out procedures in some of five institutions included in this index. Graph VI-6 shows the results in a scale of satisfaction modified so that 0 means 'very unsatisfied' and 100 'very satisfied.' As shown in the graph, both institutions obtained scores scarcely higher than 30. This is a very low figure even when compared to the other three institutions of the original index. On having calculated the average satisfaction of the users of the five institutions, (national police, city hall, public defender, the courts and the district attorney's office), the red line that describes the average satisfaction with these institutions has a score of 43, above both of the two institutions shown in the graph. This means that Ecuadorians feel that the procedures in police headquarters, city hall or the public defender's office are more efficient than what they receive in the courts and in the district attorney's office.



Graph VI-6: Satisfaction of the citizens in judicial institutions

Independence of the Judicial System

Finally, we will deal with the third requirement that is necessary for a properly functioning judicial system. As we mentioned at the beginning of this report, the Supreme Court has been restructured twice in the last two years. As it is explained in the chapter I of this report, in December of the 2004, a simple majority in the Congress, in which the government party was found (Patriotic Society), dismissed the members of the Supreme Court of Justice. A new Court was named, although this one lacked popular support during its entire term. In the short months in which the new Supreme Court was functioning, the President of the organization at that time, Guillermo “Pichi” Castro, annulled the penal judgments against the former-vice president Alberto Dahik, as well as former-presidents Gustavo Noboa and Abdalá Bucaram.


Acts like these untied the people in anger and many went out to the streets to protest and finally ended up ousting the government of Gutierrez on April 20, 2005. During the last days of the leadership of Gutierrez, the Supreme Court was dissolved again by a simple majority in Congress. The removal from office of Gutierrez and the political chaos that followed in the country caused the Supreme Court to remain vacant. Finally in December 2005, after a controversial process of selection headed by the Qualifying Committee composed of members of different unions and judicial associations in the country, 31 Magistrates of the new Supreme Court of Ecuador took office.

Judicial independence was key in this tortuous process of the restructuring of the Court. Originally, the Supreme Court was dissolved due to clamorous accusations that claimed that various Judges had a close relationship with the leader of a traditional political party. The displacement of the Court was the excuse used for all of the manipulation that happened during these months and was the principal consideration during the shaping of the new court. A legal resource that causes controversy is the mechanism of co-optation of the Supreme Court. This resource enables the court to choose its own members if a vacancy arises. Although this is a mechanism that gives certain independence to the Supreme Court, it can also be dangerous if there are no control mechanisms available (World Bank, WorldBank 2002).

In the questionnaire from 2006 we have tried to measure the attitudes of the people with respect to the degree of independence that the new Supreme Court has from the political parties. The following question has been developed:

ECUFJ3. To what point do you believe that the new Judges of the Supreme Court are independent from the political parties?						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all			Very Independent			

The Graph VI-6 shows us the distribution of answers to this question. More than 2,500 people responded and almost 30% answered with one (1), that is to say, approximately 3 out of every 10 Ecuadorians believe that the new Supreme Court is by no means independent from the political parties and only 5% answered that the new Court is very independent from the parties. This gives us an idea of the small amount of confidence that Ecuadorians have in the judicial system. On the following pages we will deal with finding out the causes that produce this doubt about the independence of the court that took office in December of last year.



Graph VI-7 Opinion on the independence of the new Supreme Court

As expressed previously, judicial independence is key for a properly functioning judicial system. The lack of this requirement implies that the other two requirements, efficiency and accessibility, will not be fulfilled either. This is why we use the perception of independence as a dependent variable in the model of linear regression for this section and we try to discover the main causes. Table VI-1 shows us the results of the linear regression. It is possible to see that the only socio-demographic factor that influences the perception of the independence of the Supreme Court is gender⁴².

Women have a higher perception of independence than the men⁴³. As for other variables, it is surprising to see that the confidence in the capacity of the Ecuadorian legal system to guarantee a just judgment turns out to be insignificant. Satisfaction with the service offered in the district attorney's office and in the courts is also unimportant. The degree of confidence in the Supreme

⁴² Other regression models not presented in this analysis contain other socio-demographic variables such as education and age. These are statistically insignificant in all of the regressions done.

⁴³ Although in the regression multivariable the effect of the sex in the perception of independence of the court appears as significant and positive, when introducing controls, as for example education level, this relationship seems to be reverted. However the intervals of trust show us that the new address of the relationship, suggested when introducing control variables, is spurious.

Court has a statistically significant and positive relation to the perception of its independence, which means that the people who trust most in the court will perceive it to be more independent. The attitude of those polled towards the process of the selection of the new court is another important factor in the model. The greater the approval of the process of the selection of the court, the higher the perception of its independence.

	<i>B</i>	S.E.	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Constant	-.358	.628	-.570	.570
Attitude towards the formation of the Supreme Court of Justice	.664	.064	10.446	.000
Urban-rural	.396	.257	1.542	.126
Woman	.532	.206	2.579	.011
Marital Status	.001	.002	.491	.624
Wealth	-.090	.052	-1.727	.087
Satisfaction in the Courts	-.008	.005	-1.709	.090
Satisfaction in the D.A.'s office	.002	.005	.455	.650
Bribes Paid	-.108	.259	-.415	.679
Justification of bribes	-.054	.243	-.224	.823
Confidence in the Judicial System	.112	.006	1.693	.093
White	.603	.383	1.571	.119
Indigenous	-.368	.627	-.587	.158
Confidence in the Supreme Court	.342	.075	4.587	.000
R Square Add	.659			

Table VI-1: Factors that explain the perception of judicial independence: results of linear regression

The table VI-1 leads us to conclude the following: first, the apparent distrust in the capacity of the new Supreme Court to be handled without being influenced by the political parties or other interest groups does not respond to any social or economic factor. Except the relationship, without including ethnicity, education or age,⁴⁴ between gender and the perception of independence shown in the regression, the majority of the people are sceptical of this topic. More than half of the interviewees have a low level of confidence in the selection process of the new Supreme Court, although it was carried out with the attempt to pay strict attention to the

⁴⁴ To see item of previous page.

public opinion. This suggests that the Ecuadorian system of justice has been discredited from the events of recent years.

Conclusions

A good functioning judicial system is key to strengthening the democracy of the country. Although the people trust in the institutions of the judicial branch a little more than in those that represent the other two powers of the State, the levels of confidence are worrying low. The future governments of Ecuador will have to work hard in modernizing the judicial system, to make it more efficient and accessible to the people. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of civil society and the organizations of control to bring independence to the court from political parties. The results obtained in this analysis suggest that the Ecuadorian judicial system has a long way to go in order to gain the confidence of the people and to recover its legitimacy.

This chapter has tried to focus on three fundamental aspects of the judicial power from the perspective of public opinion. Although this is not an exact measurement of the function of the system, it can serve as an approximation, and in the opinion of the civic users of this system these three fundamental requirements are not being satisfactorily fulfilled. We hope to expand the number of questions on the functioning of the system in the near future to be able to carry out a more meticulous analysis and to be able to realize comparisons across the years.

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VII. Tolerance and Support for the Political System

The support given to the institutional system can say a lot about the perspectives of political stability: without support, without the confidence of the population in the legitimacy of the government, the system is more vulnerable. But an “institutional system” is not necessarily democratic; for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens must not only believe in the legitimacy of the system but also about being tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When the majority of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the rights of the minorities weaken. For those who support minorities, it is impossible for them to persuade others so that they accept this point of view if the majority does not allow them to express themselves publicly. Przeworski (1991) has argued that in democracies the majorities must agree to “submit their values and interests to the interaction of the democratic institutions and accept the [still unknown] results of the democratic process.” In summary, “democratization is the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In dictatorships there is no suspense: the winner is always the one who makes the decisions.

This chapter has two objectives. First, we examine the importance that tolerance and the support to the system have in a politically stable system. In the first section of this chapter we will refer to tolerance as dependent variable, that is to say, as the phenomenon that we want to explain, and we will do it across the traditional socio-demographic factors like: age, education, gender, income and geographical area. As the first step we will develop an index of political tolerance to measure the acceptance Ecuadorians have towards the rights of those people who constantly criticize and disagree with the form of government of the country. Next, we will analyze the factors that influence political tolerance in Ecuador through several descriptive figures and also by means of a model of linear regression. Finally, we will refer to another type of tolerance, social tolerance, which we will measure through the level of acceptance of the rights of homosexuals in Ecuador. The second objective of this chapter is to observe the empirical relationship that exists between tolerance and the support of the political system of the country. In the second section, we will analyze the support given to the political Ecuadorian system and its possible causes, as well as the effect that tolerance has on this support.

Tolerance in Ecuador

One of the many challenges that face the social sciences is how to appropriately measure political tolerance. This is not an easy task. Some investigators have prepared very general questions, such as: “Do you believe in the freedom of expression?” The responses which are widely favorable to these types of questions are opposed to more practical attitudes, demonstrating the limitations of this approach. Others have concentrated on the degree of support towards certain specific groups, but generally the interviewees refuse to identify with these groups. A third approach consists of raising questions about people who are victims of intolerance in society, but this approach depends to a great extent on the threat that the

population attributes to these people. For example, in the first half of the XXth century in the United States, the question was about the tolerance towards communist groups in the country. These groups of people were constant victims of intolerance during these years, but this intolerance was due principally to the fact that communism was, in this era, considered the greatest threat to the American society.

The Latin American Project of Public Opinion (LAPOP), uses a more general approach to measure political tolerance, with a particular emphasis on the possibility of doing comparisons throughout time and between countries. The survey covers four aspects of democracy and considers the people who criticize the form of government of the country as the group to be tolerated. The questions are the following:

Now we are going to speak about some actions that the State can take. We will continue to use a scale from one to ten. Please use the C card again. In this scale, 1 means that you disapprove firmly, and 10 mean that you agree firmly.

D1. There are people who always speak badly about the form of government in Ecuador, not only about the current government, but the form of government: with what resolution do YOU approve or disapprove of the **right** of these people **to vote**? Please read me the number of the scale: **[say: to what point?]**

D2. With what resolution do YOU agree or disagree that these people could carry out **peaceful demonstrations** with the intention of expressing their viewpoints? Please read me the number.


D3. With what resolution do YOU agree or disagree that these people could take **positions in public office**?

D4. With what resolution do YOU approve or disapprove with these people giving a **televised speech**?

This methodology seems to be the most appropriate because it does not exclude those who did not select a “less acceptable” group and it doesn’t link the answer to a specific group. Its disadvantage is that it only concentrates on those who “always speak badly about the form of government of Ecuador.” A consequence of this is that the people who disagree with the form of government in *Ecuador* are going to be more tolerant of those who think similarly. Despite its flaws, this group of questions has seemed to be the most appropriate way to measure political tolerance in the country.

Tolerance among Ecuadorians has been relatively stable in the three years that *Democracy Audited* has carried out this study. In 2001, in a scale from 1 to 100, Ecuadorians reported an average of 46, whereas in 2004, *Ecuadorians* had an average of 48, surpassing only Guatemala and Bolivia. In 2006, this average descended slightly to 46.9. To have a clearer idea of the importance of tolerance it is necessary to point out that none of the extremes is healthy for a democracy, since having less tolerance activates the authoritarian sense in the people,

supporting a more restricted system.⁴⁵ On the other hand, having high levels of tolerance, allows any type of system to be acceptable and the interests of each individual are not guarded. As Francis Fukuyama (1992: 215) argues, “tolerance in democratic societies returns the virtue that defines it.” This is why a democracy needs a balance in tolerance to lead to the permanent stability of the system. The objective of this section is to analyze the possible factors that contribute to greater levels of political and social tolerance. Graph VII-1 shows us the attitudes of Ecuadorians over the years for the questions that form the index of tolerance.




Graph VII-1. Political tolerance: support to the rights of those who criticize the system

In the graph, it is possible to observe that the levels of tolerance towards the rights of those who criticize the form of government of Ecuador have stayed relatively stable. Between 2001 and 2004, there was an increase in the level of respect towards the right of these people to vote, this growth was statistically significant and in spite of the small descent experienced between 2004 and 2006 there are no reasons to think that it has changed substantially. Another

⁴⁵ To have a clearer idea about the tolerance to see: (McKinnon and Castiglione 2003)

fact that stands out is the descent in tolerance of the right of these people to take positions in some public office, which is significant with an interval of confidence of 95%.

We will now analyze the factors that affect the political tolerance of Ecuadorians. In 2001, *Democracy Audited* found that factors such as gender, age, level of income and wealth did not affect the level of tolerance of the people. Graph VII-2 shows us the difference in the levels of tolerance for gender.




Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VII-2: Tolerance according to gender

As it has been shown in previous studies, men generally have more tolerance than women (Golebiowska 1999). It is necessary to emphasize that, for 2006, the difference in tolerance

according to the gender of the interviewees is not statistically significant, but this is due to the descent in the levels of tolerance of the men and not an increase in the levels of tolerance of the women.


As for the difference in the levels of tolerance for different age groups, Graph VII-3 demonstrates that in 2006 there has been an interesting change with regard to the two previous years in which this poll was carried out. Both in 2001 and 2004, the tolerance level of the groups tended to decrease the older age group.⁴⁶ However, in 2006 the levels of tolerance decreased among the youngest group of interviewees.



Graph VII-3. Tolerance according to age.


⁴⁶ When establishing the relationship among tolerance and age, we have excluded the group of people older than 65 years of age because this group represents only 6.8% of people in this study.

The only factor that has had a constant effect on the levels of tolerance in Ecuador both in 2001 and 2004 has been the level of education. Several studies have indicated the importance of education for a democracy, because a higher education increases the tolerance of the people (Moreno and Seligson 2006). Graph VII-4 shows us that in the previous years the difference in the levels of tolerance between people with elementary and high-school levels of education was very small, but this difference increased exponentially in people with a college education. In 2006 this does not happen. The people with an elementary education have the lowest levels of tolerance, as expected, but those with a high school education have the highest level of tolerance in Ecuador. Surprisingly, the people with a college education do not have the highest level of tolerance, as in previous years, their average is statistically indistinct from the people with high-school educations. It is necessary to emphasize that education continues to have a positive relationship with tolerance; in general, the more educated people are more tolerant than those who have lower levels of education.



Graph VII-4. Tolerance according to levels of education

On having controlled for tolerance by regions of the country, the East has a smaller level of tolerance. Graph VII-5 indicates that over time the tolerance of the people in the East has been a lower in comparison to other regions. In contrast, the coast is the region of the country with the highest levels of tolerance, except in the year 2001. These results show that differences in tolerance are even present between regions of the country and therefore it is necessary for *Ecuadorian* Government to pay attention to these differences in order to support the democratic stability between the regions of the country.



Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VII-5: Tolerance with respect to regions of the country

To finish the analysis of the political tolerance in Ecuador, we have designed a model of linear regression that includes all of the socio-demographic variables previously mentioned, as well as our measurement of support to the system. Table VII-1 shows which factors best explain the political tolerance of the country. As it can be seen, education is a positive and statistically significant factor, which means, that a higher level of education is associated with more tolerant people. Another factor that turns out to be significant is our index of support to the system, which we will discuss in greater detail on the following pages. As for the geographical variables, it is necessary to note that, compared to other regions; people who live in the mountains have higher levels of tolerance than those who live on the coast or in the East. Factors such as marital status and wealth, measured according to the possession of material

goods, do not have a significant effect on political tolerance. Finally, the gender of a person has a prominent effect on the level of political tolerance: the variable 'Woman' is a dummy variable, which means that, on having coded it, a value of zero is given to all interviewees who are not women and a value of one is give to those who are. The values of the linear regression also shows us, as Graph VII-2 established, that men are in general more tolerant than women.

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Education	2.054	.420	.059	4.894	.000
Support to the System	.075	.013	.064	5.867	.000
White	-.226	.802	-.003	-.242	.778
Indigenous	-.244	1.709	-.002	-.143	.886
Black	-1.065	1.564	-.007	-.618	.496
Coast	-.406	.662	-.008	-.613	.540
Mountain	1.850	.676	.034	2.736	.006
Urban/rural	.319	.658	.005	.484	.628
Wealth	-.149	.147	-.012	-1.009	.313
Marital status	-.010	.006	-.018	-1.685	.092
Woman	-2.471	.546	-.049	-4.524	.000
Constant	41.802	1.4633		25.591	.000
R Cuadrado Adj	.008				


Table VII-1. Factors that explain political tolerance: results of linear regression

Social Tolerance

In the previous section, we analyzed the factors that influence the political tolerance in Ecuador, that is to say, the acceptance of the political rights of those people who are not in agreement with the form of government in the country. Now we will shift our attention to another form of tolerance, one that has to do with respecting the decisions and lifestyles of others, which we have named social tolerance. Unfortunately, we had not included questions that measure this aspect of tolerance in the previous years, so it will be impossible to make comparisons across the years. However, in 2006, we have included a question that measures the attitudes of the people with regard to homosexual people and their right to hold positions in public office. In previous years, homosexuality in Ecuador was completely taboo. However, over the last years, although very slowly, homosexuality has become a topic about which it is possible to speak with relative openness. As this is a report that principally measures political attitudes, our question regarding the rights of the homosexuals is the following:

D5. And now, changing the topic, with what resolution do you approve or disapprove of homosexual people taking positions in public office?


On having analyzed political tolerance, we discover that the best predictors of this are gender and education. Graph VII-6 shows us the levels of social tolerance regarding men and women. The difference that existed between both sexes for political tolerance does not appear now when social tolerance is measured. The graph shows us that women seem to be slightly more intolerant than men, but the difference between them is not statistically significant.



Graph VII-6. Social tolerance by gender, 2006

Perhaps the most important factor in determining the levels of tolerance of the people is education. Previously we demonstrate that a higher level of education results in higher levels of political tolerance. Graph VII-7 tries to determine if this relationship is supported for social

tolerance. There exists a large difference between the level of tolerance of the people with a college education and the others. However, the general average of the people as for this topic is very low compared to the level of political tolerance. As we mentioned previously, the average political tolerance in Ecuador is approximately 47 on a scale from 1 to 100. Meanwhile, the average level of respect for the rights of homosexuals to take a public position is less than 35 on a scale of 100. This tells us that Ecuadorians have a long way that to go to respect the lifestyle of others.



Graph VII-7. Social tolerance regarding education level 2006

Finally we designed a model of linear regression that contains the same variables we used when we analyzed political tolerance. Table VII-2 describes the best predictors of social tolerance. The only variable that is statistically significant in both models of regression is

education. It is necessary to point out that, ethnic autoidentification has a strong effect on social tolerance and is a statistically significant factor. In this case, we can observe that the people who identify themselves as “whites” have less tolerance towards homosexuals than those who are considered to be “racially mixed.” On the contrary, those people who identify themselves as black in Ecuador they present the highest level of tolerance towards homosexuals.

We can conclude then that the most important factor in the creation of a culture of tolerance in Ecuador is education. Since we will see in the following section, tolerance and the support to the system have a narrow theoretical and empirical relation. That's why on having invested in education, the government also invests in the democratic stability of Ecuador.

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Education	6.976	1.047	.142	6.659	.000
Support System	-.010	.031	-.006	-.331	.741
White	-7.759	2.091	-.070	-3.710	.000
Indigenous	5.308	4.249	.024	1.249	.212
Black	9.770	4.446	.042	2.197	.028
Urban/rural	-2.081	1.633	-.025	-1.275	.203
Wealth	.593	.407	.031	1.459	.145
Marriage Status	.003	.014	.004	.233	.816
Woman	-.335	1.355	-.005	-.248	.805
Constant	18.503	3.979		4.651	.000
R Square Add	.031				

Table VII-2. Factors that explain social tolerance: results of linear regression

Support of the political system


In the studies of the Latin American Project of Public Opinion in Ecuador, we have frequently emphasized the importance of democratic stability to generate political legitimacy or what we call “the support of the system.” Now we are going to continue with the impact of certain threats on the support to the political system, for example the perception of a threat to personal and economic safety. The following questions were used to measure the amount of support that Ecuadorians give to the political system:

B1. To what point do YOU believe that the courts of justice of Ecuador guarantee a just judgment?
B2. To what point do YOU have respect for the political institutions of Ecuador?
B3. To what point do YOU believe that the basic rights of the citizen are well protected by the Ecuadorian political system?
B4. To what point do YOU feel proud to live under the Ecuadorian political system?
B6. To what point do YOU think that you should support the Ecuadorian political system?

To better understand the relationship between the support to the political system and the different types of threats, the previous questions were combined into a single index of “support to the system.”

It is essential to understand the magnitude of the importance of the support to the political system. There exist advantages and limitations to the support of the political system, since a democracy works better with citizens who maintain the balance of the system. Extreme levels of support to the system, whether high or low, can be negative for democracy. It is not healthy for citizens to unreservedly support the political system, since this can lead to the formation of an authoritarian system which limits the freedom and equality of the individuals. This happens when a person says “I support my country whether it is right or wrong,” this person may actually be losing the will to criticize and simultaneously to see his or her political system criticized.


On the other hand, by not supporting the political system, the respect for political institutions is lost, a situation that can lead to the type of political instability that has been seen recently in Ecuador. This happens when citizens give little importance to the system, therefore they do not worry about a possible fall of government due to massive protests. A democracy needs a balance of support that the political system receives, allowing a permanent consolidation of democratic values (Norris 1999). In the following graph we can observe a comparison of the support to the system over time.



Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VII-8. Support of Ecuadorian political system

Graph VII-8 shows that on a scale from 1 to 100 the average level of support given to the Ecuadorian political system was 39.5 in the year 2001 and increased to 42.1 in 2004. However, the support to the system decreased in 2006 to 37.4, even lower than it had been in 2001. These changes of support to the system are statistically significant, indicating that there has been a decrease in the scale from 1 to 100 of 4.7 points between 2004 and 2006. These results raise the question of what causes this decrease.



Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VII-9. Support of the political system according to regions in the country

Graph VII-9 demonstrates that the support to the system differs slightly for regions over time, except for the coastal region that is relatively stable during 2001 and 2004, but in 2006 it falls by an average of 7.6 on a scale from 1 to 100. It is important that the Government pays attention to this region and encourages their support to the system. As it was mentioned in previously, it is essential for the Government to receive support that is balanced across the regions in order to stabilize and consolidate the democracy in the country.

Support for stable democracy

In previous sections the two variables that have been examined, the support for the system and tolerance, form the entire measurement of support for a stable democracy in this study. We will continue with this combination to determine the proportion of the population

who express attitudes that would theoretically lead to a stable democracy and the proportion of the population who do not. The theory that sustains this study is that support to the system and tolerance they are necessary to permanently maintain democratic stability. Citizens must believe both in the legitimacy of their political institutions as well as be willing to tolerate the political rights of other people. In the above mentioned system, rules can exist where those in the majority attend to the rights of the minorities, a combination that is generally defined as the key for a stable democracy.

In previous studies, the relationship has been explored between the support to the system and tolerance in an effort to develop a model that predicts democratic stability. The structure presented in Table VII-3 indicates all the combinations that are theoretically possible for the support to the system and tolerance when these two variables are divided into either high or low.⁴⁷

Tolerance		
Support for the political system	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Table VII-3. Theoretical relationship between support to the system and the tolerance in institutionally democratic societies

Next the content of every box in Table VII-4 is explained. The political systems in which the majority of its citizens show a high level of support to the system and a high tolerance are those that tend to be the stablest. This prediction is sustained by the logic that a lot of support is needed for the system to avoid authoritarian tendencies and to be able to guarantee the stability

⁴⁷ The scale has a range of 1-100 so that the most natural point of division is 50 to separate the categories “high” and “low”, both for support of the system and tolerance. In fact, since in the scale zero is also a valid number, there are 101 points in the scale and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies, we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.

of the system. Also, the systems that are politically legitimate tend to enjoy a stable democracy when they receive positive support, and when the citizens are reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities.⁴⁸ If the citizens do not support the political system and have freedom of action there is inevitably a tendency in the system towards anarchy and lawlessness. Stable systems are not necessarily democratic unless the rights of the minorities are guaranteed, in such a way if the support to the system is very high and the tolerance is low, the society can become authoritarian.

A low support to the system is the situation characterized in two low boxes in the picture, which are linked to unstable situations. This instability does not necessarily result in a reduction of freedoms, since instability can cause the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values of the citizens tend to be political tolerance. This is why it is difficult to predict if in a situation of low support and high tolerance, the instability would result in a major democratization or in a period of instability characterized by the restriction of individual freedoms.

The rupture of the democratic order would be the most logical result when both low levels of support to the system and low tolerance exist. It is impossible to predict a democratic break based exclusively on information from public opinion, since there are many other factors, including the function of the elites, the position of the military and the support or opposition of the international community, factors that are crucial in such a process. However, systems are more vulnerable to a rupture of democracy when its citizens do not support the basic institutions of the country and ignore the rights of its minorities.

It is necessary to take in account two considerations in respect to this matter. First, the relationships described previously are only applicable in systems that are institutionally democratic where competitive and regular elections are carried out while extensive participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have completely different implications. For example, low support to the system and high tolerance can produce the break of an authoritarian regime and the installation of a democratic system. Second, it is assumed that in the long term, both the attitudes of the elites and the attitudes of the masses make a difference in the type of system. In fact, Seligson and Booth demonstrated that in Nicaragua such incongruities can eventually help to oust the government of Somoza. However, in the case of Nicaragua, the current system was authoritarian and repression had been used for a long time to maintain the regime, perhaps even in spite of the democratic attitudes of its citizens.⁴⁹


Empirical relationship between tolerance and support to the system in Ecuador

In this section we relate two variables that have been the center of interest of this chapter. First, it must be taken into account that in Ecuador, the support to the system and tolerance are positively associated with one other, although the magnitude of this relationship is very small; when we consider the variables in the original scale (continuous), the correlation between both in

⁴⁸ (Dahl 1971)

⁴⁹ (Seligson and Booth 1993)

the year 2001 was $r = .11$, in 2004 this indicator fell to $r = .06$ (sig. $<.001$) and then had an even smaller correlation in 2006 with $r = .02$. When we use the “reduced” version of the variables with only two categories (high and low), the relationship is a little stronger, as the following graph suggests.



Graph VII-10. Support to the system and tolerance over time


In Graph VII-10, it is possible to observe that a high support and tolerance to the system increased from 13% in 2001 to 15% in 2004, but from 2004 to 2005 it fell to 12%, a statistically significant change. To facilitate the comprehension of these results, we will continue to examine the joint distribution of this relationship.

Tolerance						
Support for the Political system	High			Low		
High	Stable Democracy			Authoritarian Stability		
	2001	2004	2006	2001	2004	2006
	13%	15%	12%	15%	18%	15%
Low	26%	27%	30%	45%	40%	43%
	Unstable Democracy			Democracy At Risk		

Table VII-4. Empirical relationship between the support to the institutional system and tolerance in Ecuador

Table VII-4 shows an evaluation of the political attitudes of Ecuadorians in three years of studies of *Democracy Audits*. The percentage of Ecuadorians at high level of support to the system and high tolerance has fallen in last two years (as shown in Graph VII-10), while the proportion of those with low support to the system and low tolerance has increased from 40% in 2004 to 43% in 2006. Also, the proportion of Ecuadorians that are in zones of authoritarianism (low tolerance) and instability (low support to the system) continues to be the majority.

What factors in the analysis differentiate those who characterize themselves within the boxes of democratic stability from other interviewees? We will try to answer this question of the tolerance and support to the system by controlling for: education, city and the personal economic situation of the people. In Graph VII-11, it is possible to observe the impact of the level of education on the values of support to a stable democracy. The lines for each year represent the percentage of people from each of the three educational levels that gave both high levels of support to the system and high levels of tolerance.




Graph VII-11. Support of a stable democracy based on levels of education

This information demonstrates that education is a factor that favors democratic stability in 2004, while in 2001 this relationship is negative. In 2006, the support from those people with a college-level education fell, with a statistically significant difference in this group between 2004 and 2006.

Now, we will continue our analysis by taking into account city size. To simplify the comprehension of the following graph we have excluded the information of the sample from 2001.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ For more information about the year 2001, you can reviewed Democracy Audit 2001 en www.lapopsurveys.org




Margin of error: 95% CI

Grafic VII-12. Support to a stable democracy according to cities

Graph VII-12 illustrates that the region has an impact on the proportion of people who support a stable democracy. Unfortunately, the proportion of people who demonstrate a large amount of support to the system and a high tolerance in 2004 has decreased considerably in 2006 for all of the regions. This is an important finding since a reduction in the support and tolerance provided to the system can place the stability of the democracy in danger. Graph VII-13 indicates the impact of the perception of the current personal economic situation on the value of support given to democratic stability. The question asked refers to the current economic situation of the interviewee compared across three years of studies of *Democracy Audit*. It is possible to observe in the graph that the people who perceive their current personal economic situation as very good, have an increased probability of demonstrating higher tolerance and

greater support to the system. As the perception of one’s personal economic situation decreases, in the same way their support of a stable democracy falls.



Graph VII-13. Support to a stable democracy according to the perception of the personal economic situation

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the support to the system and tolerance as variables of great importance to the proper function of a stable democracy. Comparitively, the values of these variables in Ecuador are low and in 2006 they have tended to decrease along all of the sub-

groups included in the sample. It is possible that this reduction is due to the events of political instability which have occurred in Ecuador in the last two years.

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VIII. The perception of Threat and Democracy

The perception of a threat against personal and economic safety and well-being can induce feelings of intolerance in people and activate an authoritarian disposition (Stenner 2005) that might have negative consequences for democracy. In previous studies by LAPOP, political tolerance in Ecuador has been lower than it is in other countries of the region; therefore if Ecuadorians feel more threatened, they could risk an even greater decrease in political tolerance. In this chapter, we present an analytical description of: the different types of threats, the causes of a decrease in tolerance and the cause of authoritarian attitudes in people. We will also show if the perception of a threat contributes to the decrease in the support of the political system. Finally, we examine the possible implications that our findings may have on the future of the Ecuadorian State.

Tolerance and authoritarian attitudes

We will begin this chapter with a comparison of different explanations for intolerance to better understand what causes these feelings among Ecuadorians.

A theoretical argument states that when people feel threatened and afraid, whether for reasons of economics, crime, the presence of immigrants, or other reasons, they tend to have less tolerance. Consequently, an authoritarian attitude is activated, referring to the traditional meaning of homogeneity, as well as the aversion to diversity (Adorno, et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Feldman y Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005).


We will try to demonstrate this argument through an empirical analysis using variables that present different types of threats as explanatory factors of the decrease in tolerance and the increase in authoritarian attitudes. Among these variables, some have become more controversial in the last year, like the expansion of the armed conflict with Colombia and the increase of Colombian immigration to Ecuador.

In the 2006 poll, some questions were grouped that related to the opinion of the people towards Colombian immigrants. These questions are:

<p>NEWTOL3. Due to the armed conflict with Colombia: do you believe that the arrival of Colombian immigrants is justified or not? (1) It is justified (2) It is not justified (8) NA</p>
<p>ECMIG1. In your opinion: what should the Government do with Colombians who are in the country illegally (READ)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deport them as soon as they are discovered 2. Investigate them and allow them to stay if they have no criminal records 3. Facilitate the procedures that give them residency so they can stay in the country 8. NA/NR
<p>ECMIG2. In general, Colombians who come to work in Ecuador:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do the work that Ecuadorians do not want to do, or 2. Take work from Ecuadorians. 8. NA/NR


The majority of Ecuadorians are not comfortable with the arrival of Colombian immigrants to Ecuador since they are perceived to be a threat to the personal and economic safety of the country. Some studies suggest that the majority of Colombian immigrants are displaced by the armed conflict within Colombia, and have fled their country for safety reasons. Once in Ecuador, the Colombian immigrants generally live in precarious conditions working illegally (Martínez 2005). It is clear that among Colombian immigrants, as in all other social groups within Ecuador, there are those that try to survive honestly, while others cause an increase in crime and drug trafficking. This creates a negative perception of the displaced people and consequently, a general rejection of them among the Ecuadorian citizenship, as Graphs VIII-1, VIII-2, and VIII-3 show. These are possible reasons why Ecuadorians feel threatened or are fearful of Colombian immigration.

Do you believe that the arrival of Colombian immigrants




GraphVIII-1. Is immigration justified?

In your opinion, what should the Government do with Colombians who are in the country illegally?



GraphVII-2. What should the Government do?


In general: Colombians who come to this country to work



Graph VIII-3. What do the Colombians who come to this country do?

The previous graphs show that the majority of Ecuadorians do not justify the immigration of Colombians, possibly because they think that Colombians take away their jobs. Nevertheless, this perceived threat against job security does not imply that the majority of Ecuadorians want the government to deport illegal Colombians. On the contrary, the majority think that illegal Colombians should be investigated and allowed to remain in the country if they don't have criminal records.

We will continue to illustrate the relationship between the perception of a threat with the level of tolerance and the arrival of Colombian immigrants to Ecuador.



Graph VIII-4. Ecuadorian opinion about the arrival of Colombian immigrants due to the expansion of the armed conflict and its impact on tolerance

Graph VIII-4 shows that on a scale from 1 to 100 the average level of tolerance⁵¹ among people who do not justify the arrival of Colombian immigrants is 46.1, whereas it is 48.8 among people who justify the arrival of Colombian immigrants. This difference is significant (<.05), but in absolute terms it is not large. This graph allows us to demonstrate the theoretical argument presented previously, which states that when people feel threatened, they have less tolerance, and consequently acquire an authoritarian disposition. These findings are relevant to the democratic future of Ecuador.

Does any relationship exist between the perception of a threat and authoritarian attitudes? Next, we will demonstrate evidence in favor of the theoretical argument raised previously, showing how the index of “authoritarian attitudes” was obtained and we will explain the factors that increase authoritarian attitudes in Ecuadorians.

Authoritarian Attitudes

The following questions were used to measure the authoritarian attitudes among Ecuadorians:

Now we are going to speak about some attitudes that people have. In a scale from 1 to 7, where **1 means not in agreement** and **7 means very much in agreement**, to what point are you in agreement with the following statements?


AA1. A very effective way of correcting the errors of employees is to reprimand them in front of other employees. To what point are you in agreement with this practice?

AA2. The person who contributes the most money to the household is the one that should have the last word in the decisions of the family. To what point are you in agreement?
--

AA3. In school, children should ask questions only when the teacher asks for them. To what point are you in agreement?

To facilitate the comprehension of the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and the position of Ecuadorians towards Colombian immigrants, the previous questions were combined into a single index called “authoritarian attitudes.” The relationship between authoritarian attitudes and the variables of Colombian immigration are averaged on a scale from 1 to 100.

⁵¹ The index used to measure the political tolerance has been described with depth in the previous chapter




Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VIII-5. Ecuadorian opinion about the arrival of Colombian immigrants due to the expansion of the armed conflict and the acquisition of authoritarian attitudes

The graph shows that in a scale from 1 to 100 the average index of authoritarian attitudes among people who do not justify the arrival of Colombian immigrants is 22, whereas among people who justify the arrival of Colombian immigrants is 17.1. This difference is statistically significant (<.05). The presence of higher authoritarian attitudes coincides with a lower level of tolerance. Since Ecuadorians feel threatened by the presence of Colombian immigrants, they have a lower tolerance level and thus the acquisition of authoritarian attitudes is observed.

The expansion of the armed conflict in Colombia into Ecuadorian territory has had repercussions on the perception of the threat that this represents (Izquierdo 2005; Montalvo


2005). According to Bonilla (1993: 30) “the displacement of the center of production, including the change of the head of consumption, seems to be, according to historical experience, a consequence of the militarization of the conflict (Colombian), and its elevation in status to a problem of national security.” The people who were displaced are the ones who suffer the consequences. They have no support from their country, so they feel the need to move to places will that offer them safety, like neighboring countries, but they do not find support in these countries because they are perceived as a threat by the citizens.



Graph VIII-6. Current authoritarian attitudes in Ecuador regarding Colombian immigration

Graph VIII-6 indicates that Ecuadorians who are afraid of Colombian immigration are more authoritarian than those who are not afraid of it (sig. <.05). Likewise, Ecuadorians who are afraid of the Colombian immigrants are also in favor of their deportation, while those Ecuadorians who are not afraid of the Colombian immigrants think that they should be investigated and those without criminal records should be allowed to remain. These differences are statistically significant (<.05).⁵²

In general, Colombians who come to the country to work:



Margin of error: 95% CI

Graph VIII-7. Current authoritarian attitudes with respect to Colombians who come to work in the country.

⁵² Due to the small percentage of Ecuadorians in favor of facilitating the procedures for the residence of Colombians in Ecuador (13%), we have excluded this group from the graph.

In Graph VIII-7, we can observe that Ecuadorians who think that Colombian immigrants take jobs away from Ecuadorians have greater authoritarian attitudes, and Ecuadorians who think that Colombian immigrants do the jobs that Ecuadorians do not want have less authoritarian attitudes. These results allow us to have a clearer idea of the perception that Ecuadorians have towards the Colombian immigrants.⁵³

The results of the linear regression presented in Table VIII-1 reveal diverse factors that explain the authoritarian values in Ecuador.⁵⁴ For example, significant factors are gender (women are more authoritarian than men) and education (more education means less authoritarian attitudes). People who live on the coast tend to have a higher average level of authoritarianism in comparison to those who live in the mountains. Finally, as predicted, the fear of Colombian immigration and the fear of an expansion of the Colombian armed conflict into Ecuador have a significant effect on the index of authoritarian attitudes.

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Gender	-4.775	.958	-.097	-4.985	.000
Education	-1.098	.131	-.181	-8.395	.000
Age	-.023	.035	-.014	-.652	.514
Coast	5.015	.988	.102	5.078	.000
East	-3.745	2.421	-.031	-1.547	.122
Armed Conflict	-.043	.011	-.077	-3.841	.000
Deportation	-.032	.015	-.042	-2.084	.037
Immigrant Work	-.047	.011	-.085	-4.171	.000
Against an expansion of armed conflict	-2.394	.969	-.048	-2.470	.014
R Square add.	.072				

Table VIII-1. Factors that explain the activation of authoritarian attitudes: results of linear regression

Summation: Fear of migration and authoritarian values

These results show that Ecuadorians feel threatened by the arrival of Colombian immigrants. It is possible that this perception of a threat has repercussions on the future of the democracy in Ecuador, since if the presence of immigrants is increased over time, this might lead to an increase in intolerance, causing the activation of authoritarian attitudes in the people and thus supporting an authoritarian system. It is necessary to point out that immigration brings

⁵³ It would be interesting to carry out in the future concerning questions to people's opinion toward the Chinese immigration, since this group has gone growing in the last years and presently one of the most important groups constitutes in the managerial sector.

⁵⁴ The variables that are significant are those that are in the last column from the chart to the .05 or smaller

positive elements to a democracy; immigrants stimulate commerce, capital, increase diversity and bring new ideas to a democracy. Therefore if Ecuador closes its borders, it would lose all of these elements that are key to maintaining a stable democracy.


In previous studies within Ecuador of the Latin America Project of Public Opinion, we have frequently emphasized the importance of democratic stability to build political legitimacy or what we call the “support to the system.”⁵⁵ Now we are going to continue with the impact of certain threats to the support of the political system, like the perception of a threat to personal and economic security.

Crime

Now we direct our attention to a completely different form of threat, but studies have demonstrated that it affects political attitudes in an important way. Crime, and the fear of crime are clearly a threat against the personal safety of the people. Therefore, we will test the hypothesis of whether people, upon feeling unprotected by the state institutions, (like the police), show less support to the political system and thus pose a danger to the stability of the democracy. Also, it is important to recognize that not all Ecuadorians are victims of a crime. In three years of study by *Democracy Audited*, the majority of Ecuadorians, an average of 80%, have not been victims of crime whereas an average of 20% have been victims. The fact that one out of five citizens are victims of crime yearly, causes other individuals to fear for their own safety. Thus crime can be an important threat in Ecuador.

In Graph VIII-8, it is clear that people who have been victims of crime support the system less over time, with statistically significant differences. On the other hand, people who have not been victims of crime give significantly more support to the system each year. It can also be observed that the year 2006 has the lowest indexes of support for the system compared to previous years.


⁵⁵ The index used to measure the support to the political system has been described with depth in the previous chapter



Margin of error: 95% DC

Graph VIII-8. Support to the system over time with respect to crime

The majority of Ecuadorians (55%) feel at least relatively safe in their neighborhoods. Only about 13% of Ecuadorians feel very insecure. Graph VIII-9 shows that in 2006 there has been an interesting change with respect to the two previous years in which this poll was carried out. Both in 2001 and in 2004, a rise in the levels of support in the system was evident as the people felt safer. In 2006, people who feel very safe tend support the system less, showing levels much lower in comparison to 2001 and 2004.




GraphVIII-9. Support of the system relating to the safety of people’s neighborhoods

In the study of *Democracy Audited* last year, the following question was added:

AOJ17. To what point would say that your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say: very much, somewhat, a little or not all?
 (1) Very much (2) somewhat (3) a little (4) not at all (8) NA


To what point would you say that your neighborhood is affected by gangs?



Graph VIII-10. Perception of gangs in the neighborhood

As noted in the graph, 17.7 % and 17.2 % of Ecuadorians think that their neighborhood is affected very much or somewhat by gangs, while the majority of people think that their neighborhood is affected a little or not at all, 29.3 % and 35.8 % respectively.


We will continue with the help of the graphs to facilitate our understanding of the relationship between the presence of gangs and the safety of neighborhoods.



Margin of error: 95% IC

Graph VIII-11. Cities affected by gangs

Graph VIII-11, shows that urban areas are affected most by gangs. For example the cities of Quito and Guayaquil have higher percentages of neighborhoods affected by gangs, while the rural areas are less affected. These differences are statistically significant. These findings indicate that people who live in urban areas feel threatened by the presence of gangs. The following graph illustrates this observation.



Graph VIII-12. The perception of the threat of crime in neighborhoods and the presence of gangs

It is important to point out that in Graph VIII-12 the numbers represent: (1) very insecure (2) somewhat insecure (3) somewhat safe (4) very safe. People who think that their neighborhood is not affected at all by gangs feel safer and do not feel threatened by crime, while those who think that their neighborhood is affected a lot by gangs tend to feel more insecure about the threat of crime. Therefore, the presence of gangs represents a threat to the security of people.

The Economy

For the rest of this chapter, we will analyze the perception of a threat against the economic situation of the country in general and the personal economic situation of Ecuadorians. To measure the economic situation of the citizens and of the country, the following questions were asked:

SOCT1. How would you rate the economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is very good, good, fair, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (average) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (the worst) (8) Don't know

SOCT3. Do you believe that in the next twelve months the economic situation of the country will be better, equal or worse than it is now?

(1) Better (2) Equal (3) Worse (8) Don't know

IDIO1. How would you rate your personal economic situation in general? Would you say that it is very good, good, fair, bad or very bad?


(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (average) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (the worst) (8) Don't know

IDIO3. And in the next twelve months: do you believe that your economic situation will be better, equal or worse than it is now?

(1) Better (2) Equal (3) Worse (8) Don't know

During the three years of studies by *Democracy Audited*, the majority of Ecuadorians (an average of 46%) rate the economic situation of the country as bad, whereas an average of 30% think that it is fair. Only an average of 0.3% of Ecuadorians think that the economy is very good, while an average of 18% think that the economic situation of the country is very bad. Also, the majority of Ecuadorians think that the economic situation of the country in the next twelve months will be worse than it is currently. An average of 13% of Ecuadorians in 2001 and 2004, thought that the economy would be better, while in 2006, this number decreased to 6.9%.

On having analyzed the perception of the personal economic situation of Ecuadorians, the majority consider their economic situation to be fair, while 25% think that it is bad, and only 0.3% think it is very good. Also, an average of 21% and 33% of Ecuadorians think that their economic situation will be better or just as good as it is currently, while 25% think that their situation in a year will be worse.




How would you rate the economy of the country?

Graph VIII-13. Perception of the current economic situation of the country and the support of the political system

Graph VIII-13 agrees with previous affirmations, strengthening the theoretical argument. The Ecuadorians, who think that the economy of the country is very bad, support the political system to a lesser extent each year, showing the lowest indexes in 2006. In contrast, people who thought that the economy was good in 2001, 2004 and 2006, gave significant supported to the system.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ We have excluded of the Graph VIII-13, the group of people that you/they think that the economy of the country is very good, since these they represent only an average of 0.3% during the three years of study.




In the next twelve months, you believe that the country's economy will...

Graph VIII-14. Perception of the economic situation of the country in the next year and the support to the system

In Graph VIII-14, it is possible to observe that Ecuadorians, who are less optimistic about the country's economy in the next year, tend to support the system less, while Ecuadorians who are optimistic give the largest support to the political system. It is important to remember that the support of the system has been decreasing over time, with the lowest support registered in 2006.

We will continue this analysis by indicating the public opinion of Ecuadorians regarding their personal economic situation.




How would you rate your personal economic situation?

Graph VIII-15. Perception of the personal economic situation of Ecuadorians and their support to the system

As Graph VIII-15 indicates, Ecuadorians give less support to the system when their personal economic situation is very bad, again affirming our theoretical argument. On the other hand, in 2001 and 2004 the people who thought that their economic situation was very good, supported the system at an average level of 46.3 and 48 respectively, on a scale from 1 to 100.

In 2006, those people with a very good perspective of their economic situation showed lower levels of support in comparison to previous years.⁵⁷



In the next twelve months, you think your economic situation will...

Graph VIII-16. Perception of the economic situation of Ecuadorians in the next twelve months and their support to the political system

Usually, Ecuadorians who perceive a threat against their economic future situation support the system less with an average on a scale from 1 to 100 of: 35.6 in 2001, 40.8 in 2004

⁵⁷ In the Graph VIII-15 we have excluded the group "Very good" because this group only represents an average of 0.8% during the three years of the studies.

and 31.7 in 2006. Those people who do not perceive any threat and think that their personal economic situation will be better in the next twelve months give more support to the system, with an average of 44.6 in 2001, 45 in 2004 and 40 in 2006.

The results of the linear regression presented in Table VIII-2 reveal diverse factors that explain the decrease in support to the political system in Ecuador⁵⁸. Gender, education and age are not significant variables, demonstrating that the support of the system is independent of these demographic variables. The significant factors are: the perception of the current personal economic situation (there is more support provided to the system when the perception of the personal economic situation is good), the perception of the personal economic situation in the next year (there is more support to the system when there is no threat to the personal economic situation), the perception of the current economy of the country (there is more support to the system when the perception of the economy of the country is good) and the perception of the economy of the country in the next year (there is more support to the system when there is no threat to the economy of the country). Also, people who live on the coast tend to have the lowest average support given to the system in comparison with those who live in the mountains. Finally, as we had predicted, the fear of crime has a negative effect. For example, people who feel insecure in their neighborhood, those who have been victims of crime, as well as the presence of numerous gangs, contribute to the decrease of support to the political system.

	B	S.E.	Beta	t	Sig.
Gender	1.472	.953	.034	1.545	.123
Education	-.059	.133	-.011	-.444	.657
Age	-.006	.037	-.004	-.156	.876
Coast	-3.983	.985	-.091	-4.042	.000
East	2.519	2.490	.022	.1.012	.312
Current personal economy	.081	.028	.070	2.858	.004
Perception of personal economy in the next year	.048	.015	.080	3.133	.002
Current economy of the country	.156	.026	.140	5.997	.000
Perception of the economy in the country in the next year	.034	.016	.050	2.063	.039
Victim of crime	-.028	.012	-.052	-2.338	.019
Unsafe neighborhood	-.045	.016	-.063	-2.781	.005
Presence of gangs	-.028	.014	-.047	-2.041	.041
Authoritarian attitudes	.031	.020	.035	1.558	.119
R Square add	.068				

Table VIII-2. Factors that explain the decreases in the support to the political system: results of linear regression

⁵⁸ The variables that are significant are those that are in the last column from the chart to the .05 or smaller..

Conclusion


Ecuadorian citizens perceive several threats against their personal and economic well-being. The data from public opinion shows that while no threat is perceived, Ecuadorians have a greater degree of support for the system, higher tolerance and consequently less authoritarian attitudes. Likewise, we find the persistence of a generally unfavorable trend in 2006 and conclude by raising the hypothesis that these results are a product of the political instability that the country experienced during 2005 and beginnings of 2006.

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ANNEX A1: SPANISH LANGUAGE QUESTIONNAIRE

Versión #17D IRB Approval: 051178



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Ecuador, 2006
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Provincia: _____	PROV	
Cantón: _____	CANTON	
Parroquia: _____	PAROQ	
Zona _____	ZONA	
Sector _____	SEC	
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Manzana (o Segmento) _____	MANZANA	
Estrato: 1. Costa Urbana 2. Costa Rural 3. Sierra Urbana 4. Sierra Rural 5. Oriente Norte 6. Oriente Sur	ESTRATO	

Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Quichua	ECUIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]
Número de visitas a la casa: 1 2 3	CALLBACK

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

Q1. Gender (no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

Q1

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

A4

Agua, falta de	19
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18
Conflicto armado	30
Corrupción	13
Crédito, falta de	09
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56
Desempleo	03
Desigualdad	58
Desnutrición	23
Desplazamiento Forzado	32
Deuda Externa	26
Discriminación	25
Drogadicción	11
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21
Electricidad, falta de	24
Explosión demográfica	20
Guerra contra terrorismo	17

Inflación, altos precios	02
Los políticos	59
Mal gobierno	15
Medio ambiente	10
Migración	16
Narcotráfico	12
Pandillas	14
Pobreza	04
Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Salud, falta de servicio	22
Secuestro	31
Seguridad (falta de)	27
Terrorismo	33
Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Violencia	57
Vivienda	55
Otro _____	
No sabe	88

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe	SOCT1	
SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	SOCT2	
SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	SOCT3	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe	IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	IDIO2	
IDIO3. Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree Ud. que su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	IDIO3	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido UD. ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP1. Al Presidente de la República	1	2	8	CP1
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad, prefecto)	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4

PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunc a	(8) N S	PROT 1
---	-------------------------	----------------------	------------------	-------------------	-------------------

<i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [sigu] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado UD. dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8		CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido UD. con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8		CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo UD. a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8		CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar UD. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8		CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si UD. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [**Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado**]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
CP6. ¿ Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8	

<p>ECUNP1B [NP1B]. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión de la junta parroquial o comité barrial durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (3) No hay aquí (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	ECUNP1B	
<p>NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	NP2	
<p>ECUNP2A. [NP2A] ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a la junta parroquial durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (3) No hay aquí (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	ECUNP2A	
<p>ECUNP2B [NP2B]. ¿En su opinión la junta parroquial ayuda mucho, algo, poco o nada a solucionar los problemas de su comunidad? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (aquí no hay)</p>	ECUNP2B	
<p>SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son ...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimas) (8) No sabe</p>	SGL1	
<p>SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al municipio para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe</p>	SGL2	
<p>LGL2. En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma [NO LEER (3) No cambiar nada] [NO LEER (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	LGL2	
<p>LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>	LGL3	
<p>LGL4. ¿Cree usted que el alcalde y el concejo municipal responden a lo que el pueblo quiere siempre, la mayoría de veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca? (1) Siempre (2) La mayoría de veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) No sabe/NR</p>	LGL4	

MUNI1. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual Alcalde de este municipio? Anotar Nombre: _____ [revisar lista de alcaldes] (1) Correcto (0) Incorrecto (8) NS/NR	MUNI1	
MUNI2. En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? [No leer respuestas] [aceptar una sola respuesta] (00) Ninguno (01) Falta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (04) Falta de aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica, falta de fondos, ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR Otros: _____	MUNI2	
MUNI3. ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde de este municipio por resolver ese problema? [leer respuestas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	MUNI3	
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado Ud. en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí, ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR	MUNI5	
MUNI5A. En su opinión, ¿en que se utiliza la mayoría de los gastos de la municipalidad? [No Leer] 1. Aseo público 2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, canchas de fútbol, u otros obras públicas 3. Salud, educación 4. Corrupción 5. Sueldos 6. Nada Otro _____ 88. NS/NR	MUNI5A	
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? Leer respuestas 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6	
MUNI7. En su opinión, ¿los proyectos que ejecuta el municipio benefician o no benefician a personas como Ud. y a su familia? (1) Sí benefician (0) No benefician (8) NS/NR	MUNI7	
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado UD. algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante el último año? (1) Sí [siga] (0) No [pase a MUNI11] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11]	MUNI8	
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	MUNI9	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	MUNI10	
MUNI11. ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS/NR	MUNI11	
MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree Ud. que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo	MUNI15	

interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR		
--	--	--

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	
JC14. Frente a la incapacidad del gobierno	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC14	
ECUJC20. Frente a una expansión del conflicto armado de Colombia a Ecuador.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	ECUJC20	

JC15. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un cierre del Congreso por parte del Presidente o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para disolver la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)	JC16	
GBMIL1. Algunos dicen que los militares deberían gobernar el país, mientras otros dicen que únicamente deberían gobernar los civiles. ¿Qué piensa Ud.?	(1) Los militares deben gobernar	(2) Los civiles deben gobernar	(8) NS	GBMIL1	

VIC1. ¿Ha sido UD. víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?	(1) Sí [siga] (2) No (8) NS	VIC1	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS		AOJ8	

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde UD. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente UD. muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	AOJ11
AOJ12. Si UD. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	AOJ17.

De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho?
(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4
ST5. Defensoría del Pueblo	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST5

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a UD. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho UD. elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a UD. ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada				Mucho			No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)	B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene UD. respeto por las instituciones políticas del Ecuador?	B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político ecuatoriano?	B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente UD. orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político ecuatoriano?	B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa UD. que se debe apoyar el sistema político ecuatoriano?	B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en las Fuerza Armadas?	B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Congreso Nacional?	B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Gobierno Nacional?	B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?	B15
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	B17
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Policía Nacional?	B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Iglesia Católica?	B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en los partidos políticos?	B21
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de	B31

	Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio?	B32
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?	B33
B35. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las últimas elecciones presidenciales (2002) fueron libres, o sea que la gente pudo votar por el candidato que prefería?	B35
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37
B23 [B38]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los sindicatos?	B23
B39. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las cámaras de los empresarios privados?	B39
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	B40
ECUB41 [B41]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la junta parroquial?	ECUB41
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?	B42
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser ecuatoriano?	B43
B50 [b44]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?	B50
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión de Control Cívico Contra la Corrupción?	B46
B49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gente de su barrio?	B49
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene Ud. confianza en las elecciones?	B47
B51. ¿Hasta que punto tiene Ud. confianza en las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en el país?	B51
ECUB50 [B50]. ¿Ha oído nombrar a la ONG "Participación Ciudadana"? (Si dice "no" marcar 9 y pasar a ECUFJ2. Si dice "si" pregunta: ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en esta organización?)	ECUB50
ECUFJ2. ¿Hasta que punto estuvo Ud. de acuerdo con la forma en que se selecciono a los nuevos Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	ECUFJ2
ECUFJ3. ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que los nuevos Magistrados de la Corte Suprema son independientes de los partidos políticos?	ECUFJ3

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS
N1. Combate la pobreza.	N1
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	N3
N9. Combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	N9
N10. Protege los derechos humanos.	N10
N11. Mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	N11
N12. Combate el desempleo.	N12

[Recoja tarjeta A]

[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo							No sabe
Muy de acuerdo							

	Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
ING1. En una democracia casi siempre el sistema económico funciona mal. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	ING1
ING2. En los países democráticos hay muchos conflictos y cuesta mucho tomar decisiones. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo?	ING2
ING3. A las democracias les cuesta mucho mantener el orden en el país. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo?	ING3
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo?	ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los ecuatorianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo?	PN2
PN2A. Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo?	PN2A
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	DEM23

RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. En general, ¿Ud. diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Ecuador? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. En su opinión ¿Ecuador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que UD. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que UD. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza UD. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	E16	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32	
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	D37	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Ecuador. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Ecuador, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]	D1	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2	
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?	D5	

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está UD. más de acuerdo?		
NEWTOL3. Debido al conflicto armado que se vive en Colombia: Cree ud. que se justifica la llegada de inmigrantes colombianos o cree ud. que no se justifica? (1) Se justifica (2) No se justifica (8) NS	NEWTOL3	
NEWTOL10. Algunas personas dicen que les preocupa que en las próximas elecciones nacionales un ciudadano indígena sea electo Presidente de la Republica, mientras que otros dicen que la raza de las personas no es importante en la política. (1) Preocupa (2) No es importante (8) NS	NEWTOL10	
NEWTOL9. (1) En la vida política del país deberían participar principalmente las personas con educación o (2) todas las personas deberían poder participar en la política del país sin importar su grado de educación (8) NS	NEWTOL9	

<p>ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión:</p> <p>(1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o...</p> <p>(2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o....</p> <p>(3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	ACR1	
<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático</p> <p>(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.</p> <p>(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	DEM2	
<p>DEM9. ¿Considera UD. que en nuestro país los militares son los que mandan o son los civiles los que mandan?</p> <p>(1) Militares mandan (2) Civiles mandan (8) NS</p>	DEM9	
<p>DEM13. En pocas palabras, ¿que significa para UD. la democracia? [No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Libertad (2) Igualdad (3) Bienestar, progreso económico (4) Capitalismo (5) Gobierno no militar (6) Libre comercio, libre negocio (7) Elecciones, voto (10) Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley</p> <p>Otro (anotar) _____</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p>	DEM13	
<p>ECUDEM14. Cual es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en el país. [Leer respuestas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fortalecer la Justicia 2. Fortalecer los gobiernos locales 3. Combatir la corrupción 4. Desarrollar fuentes de empleo 5. Educar en valores 6. Mejorar la seguridad ciudadana 7. [NO LEER] Ninguna de las anteriores 8. NS/NR 	ECUDEM14	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa UD.?</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido</p> <p>(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	AUT1	

<p>AUT2. El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa UD.?</p> <p>(1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora [(0) Ninguna] (8) NS</p>	AUT2	
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<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [lea las alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	PP1
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó UD. para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002?</p> <p>(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	PP2

<p>M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría UD. que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Alfredo Palacio es: LEER RESPUESTAS</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR</p>	M1
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	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>					
EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que UD. no cometió?	0	1	8		EXC1
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC2
EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando coimas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC4
EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC5
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC6
<p>EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente]?</p> <p>Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?</p>	0	1	8	9	EXC11

	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
EXC13. ¿UD. Trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar, preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC14
EXC14A. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los fiscales? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los fiscales en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC14A
ECUEXC14B. En el último año ¿tuvo que tratar con abogados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] Ha tenido que pagar una coima a un abogado en el ultimo año?	0	1	8	9	ECUEXC14B
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna coima?	0	1	8	9	EXC15
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna coima?	0	1	8	9	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una coima para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?	0	1	8		EXC18

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	EXC7
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<p>ECUVB8. ¿A quien cree ud. que debe obedecer el diputado: Al partido del cual es miembro, a si mismo, al electorado, al líder de su partido o a los medios de comunicación?</p> <p>1) Partido del cual es miembro 2) a si mismo 3) al electorado 4) al líder de su partido o 5) a los medios de comunicación 8) NS</p>	VCUVB8	
<p>ECUVB9. ¿Cual cree ud que es el rol del diputado: Representar a su partido, gestionar recursos para su provincia, vigilar y fiscalizar, legislar, o representar al elector?</p> <p>1) Representar a su partido 2) Gestionar recursos para su provincia 3) Vigilar y fiscalizar 4) Legislar 5) o representar al elector 8) NS</p>	ECUVB9	
<p>ECUVB10. De las siguiente afirmaciones, ¿Cuál se acerca más a su conducta en tiempo de elecciones? (ENCUESTADOR LEERÍA OPCIONES 1 y 2)</p> <p>1) Usted siempre vota por el partido. 2) Vota por la persona 3) A veces vota por el partido y otras veces vota por la persona.8) NS</p>	ECUVB10	
<p>ECUVB11. ¿Ha escuchado ud. de algún informe presentado por un diputado de su provincia ?</p> <p>1) Sí 2) No 3) NS</p>	ECUVB11	
<p>ABS5. ¿Cree UD. que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?</p> <p>(1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR</p>	ABS5	
<p>ABS6. ¿Volvería a votar por los mismos diputados por los que votó en 2002?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS</p>	ABS6	

EXPLOIT1. ¿Sabe Ud. de casos de personas, incluyendo niños/as y adolescentes, que en el último año han sido víctimas de explotación laboral, es decir, que aceptaron trabajos en que otros les quitan el dinero que ganan, y no pueden abandonar su trabajo porque están amenazados? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	EXPLOIT1	
EXPLOIT2. ¿Sabe Ud. de algún caso de mujeres, adolescentes o niñas que en el último año han sido víctimas de explotación sexual, es decir, les obligaron a trabajar como prostitutas? 1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	EXPLOIT2	
EXPLOIT5A. Sabe Ud. a qué instituciones acudir para: ¿Denunciar un caso de explotación laboral? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	EXPLOIT5A	
EXPLOIT 5B. ¿Denunciar un caso de explotación sexual? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	EXPLOIT5B	
EXPLOIT6. Cree usted que el término "Trata de Personas" se refiere a: (Leer respuestas) (1) Coyoterismo; (2) Esclavitud; [No leer] ;(3) ninguna; (4) NS/NR.	EXPLOIT6	

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) N/S	POL1	
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer respuestas) 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) N/S	POL2	

Ahora me puede decir...		
G11. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	G11	
G12. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Ecuador? [No leer, Wilfrido Lucero] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	G12	
G13. ¿Recuerda usted cuantas provincias tiene el Ecuador? [No leer, 22] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	G13	
G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Ecuador? [No leer, cuatro años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	G14	
G15. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Chile? [No leer, Ricardo Lagos] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	G15	

USAR TARJETA “A” OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde uno significa nada de acuerdo y 7 significa mucho de acuerdo , hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala					NS/ NR	
	Nada Mucho						
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA1
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA2
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA3
AA4. Cuando los niños de uno se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas.	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA4
AA5. Los niños no deben interrumpir a los adultos cuando éstos están hablando.	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA5
AA6. Muchas religiones enseñan cosas buenas; no hay ninguna que sea realmente mejor que cualquier otra.	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA6
DOG1. A pesar de que en el mundo hay muchos puntos de vista, probablemente solo uno sea el correcto. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	DOG1

ECMIG1. En su opinión, qué debería hacer el Gobierno con los colombianos que están ilegalmente en el país (LEER) 1. Deportarlos tan pronto los descubran 2. Investigarlos y dejar aquí a los que no tienen antecedentes penales 3. Facilitarles los procedimientos para darles la residencia y puedan quedarse en el país 8. NS/NR	ECMIG1
ECMIG2. En general, los colombianos que vienen a trabajar al país: 1. Hacen los trabajos que los ecuatorianos ya no quieren hacer, o 2. Le quitan el trabajo a los ecuatorianos. 8. NS/NR	ECMIG2

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que UD. aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total

[Usar tabla abajo para código]

Ninguno	0							ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12		
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18		
No sabe/no responde	88							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Q2	
Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [no leer alternativas]	Q3	
Católica.....1		
Cristiana no católica.....2		
Otra no cristiana.....3		
Evangélica 5		
Ninguna.....4		
O		
No sabe o no quiere mencionar.....8		
[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]	Q10	
Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?		
(00) Ningún ingreso		
(01) Menos de \$25		
(02) Entre \$26- \$50		
(03) \$51-\$100		
(04) \$101-\$150		
(05) \$151-\$200		
(06) \$201-\$300		
(07) \$301-\$400		
(08) \$401-500		
(09) \$501-\$750		
(10)\$751-\$1,000		
(11)\$1,001- \$1,500		
(12) \$1,501-\$2,000		
(13) \$2,000 y más		
(88) NS/NR		
RECOGER TARJETA E		
Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? (Si "no" pasar a Q11) Inap = 99.	Q10A	
¿Cuánto? (usar códigos arriba, por mes)		
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no leer alternativas]	Q11	
(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR		
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno) NS.....8	Q12	

<p>ETID. ¿ Usted considera que es una persona de raza: indígena, Afro-Ecuatoriana (negra), mestizo, mulato, blanco u otro?</p> <p>(1) Blanco (2) Mestizo (3) Indígena (4) Negro o Afro-Ecuatoriano</p> <p>(5) Mulato</p> <p>(6) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	ETID	
<p>ETIDA. Considera que su padre es o era una persona de raza blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata?</p> <p>Blanca [1] Mestiza [2] Indígena [3] Negra [4] Mulata [5] Otra _____</p> <p>NS/NR [8]</p>	ETIDA	
<p>LENG1. ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa)</p> <p>(1) Castellano (2) Quichua (3) Otro (nativo) _____</p> <p>(4) Otro (extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	LENG1	
<p>LENG1A. Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (acepte una alternativa)</p> <p>Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Ingles [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____</p> <p>Otro extranjero [5] _____ NS/NR [8] No Aplica [9]</p>	LENG1A	
<p>UNICAMENTE PARA LAS ENTREVISTAS HECHAS EN QUICHUA</p> <p>LENG3A: Habla Ud. Castellano / Español?</p> <p>Muy bien (1) Bien (2) Entiende pero no habla (3) No entiende (4) (8) NS</p>	LENG3A	
<p>PARA TODOS:</p> <p>LENG3B:</p> <p>Habla Ud. Quichua?</p> <p>Muy bien (1) Bien (2) Entiende pero no habla (3) No entiende (4)</p> <p>(8) NS</p>	LENG3B	
<p>LENG4: Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban...</p> <p>Sólo castellano (1) Castellano e idioma nativo (2) Sólo idioma nativo (3)</p> <p>NS (4) (8) NS</p>	LENG4	
<p>ETID4. En términos de clase social se identifica como: (1) clase alta (2) clase media (3) clase media baja (4) clase baja (8) NS/NR</p>	ETID4	

ENTREGAR TARJETA A:

ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano Ecuatoriano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	ETID1
ECUETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	ECUETID4

RECOGER TARJETA A

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: *(leer todos)*

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1		
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3		
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4		
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A		
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6		
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7		
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8		
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12		
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14		
R15. Computador	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15		

OCUP1. ¿En qué trabaja UD? (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración		OCUP1
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	7	Amas de Casa	13	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	8	Estudiantes	14	
Agricultores dueños, partidarios o arrendatarios de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de planta	9	Jubilados y Rentistas	15	
Ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros y trabajadores	10	Trabajadores ocasionales	16	
Profesionales independientes	5	Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	11			
Artesanos independientes	6	Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	12			

DESOC1. PARA TODOS => ¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?

(1) Sí [PASE A DESOC2]

(2) No [PASE A T1]

(3) Pensionado/rentista/ama de casa/esdutiante [PASE A DESOC2]

DESOC1

DESOC2. SI RESPONDE SÍ O ES DESOCUPADO =>¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?

_____ semanas (8) NS (9) Inap (Pensionado o rentista)

DESOC2

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____

TI

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta # 1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta "A"

Mucho	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Nada	1

Tarjeta "B"

Muy de Acuerdo	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Muy en Desacuerdo	1

Tarjeta "C"

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Tarjeta ‘D’

Muy honrados

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Muy corruptos

1

Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$25
- (02) Entre \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) \$751-\$1,000
- (11) \$1,001- \$1,500
- (12) \$1,501-\$2,000
- (13) \$ 2,000 y más

ANNEX A2: QUICHUA QUESTIONNAIRE

17 IRB Approval: 051178



AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Ecuador, 2006
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Provincia: _____	PROV	
Cantón: _____	CANTON	
Parroquia: _____	PAROQ	
Zona _____	ZONA	
Sector _____	SEC	
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Manzana (o Segmento) _____	MANZANA	
Estrato: 1. Costa Urbana 2. Costa Rural 3. Sierra Urbana 4. Sierra Rural 5. Oriente Norte 6. Oriente Sur	ESTRATO	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Quichua	ECUIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]	
Número de visitas a la casa: 1 2 3	CALLBACK	

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

Q1. Kilkakatipay (1) kari (2) warmi	Q1			
---	-----------	--	--	--

A4 [COA4]. Kallarinkapak, kanpa yuyaypika

¿maykan ashtawan jatun llakiyka

mamallaktaka charin? [AMA

KUTICHIYKUNA KILKAKATINKICHU]

Agua, falta de	19
Nancunaka mana alli kankuna	18
Conflicto armado	30
Corrupción	13
Crédito, falta de	09
Runakunaka chikipikan	05
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56
Desempleo	03
Desigualdad	58
Mikuymanta illak	23
Sinchiskankapak richina	32
Karu kullkita mañachishka	26
Discriminación	25
Mana alli jambikuna japina	11
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01
Yachachikmanta illak	21
Achikmanta illak	24

May ashtawan runakunaka	20
Terrorismomanta jatun makanakuy)	17
Rankishkamanta ashka kullita kunkuna	02
Los políticos	59
Mana alli pushay	15
Medio ambiente	10
Runakunaka shukta llaktakunaman rinkuna	16
Narcotráfico mana ailli jambikunata katunapash, rantinapash	12
Wambrakunamanta mana alli tandanakuykuna	14
Mana imatapash charinkuna (POBREZA)	04
Runamanta jatariykuna	06
Unkiuk kana / jampik illak	22
Apupa jarkashka	31
Seguridadmanta illak	27
Jatun manchay	33
Ama tarpunkapak chakrata tyan	07
Sinchi wakliy	57
wasikuna	55
Otro _____	
MY/MK	88

<i>Mashna Kutinkuna...</i>	Tukuy punchakun a	Shuklla,ishkay punchakunaka semanapimi	Rara vez	manajayka pi	NS	
<i>A1. Willaykunata radiopi uyanki</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A1
<i>A2. Willaykunapi televisiónpi rikunki</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A2
<i>A3. Willaykunata periódicopi killkakatinki</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A3
<i>A4i. Willaykunapi internetpi killkakatinkichu</i>	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Kanpa yuyaypika, ¿imashina llaktamanta SITUACION ECONOMICA Kan? ¿allipachachu, allipachachu, allichu, shina shina shinallachu, mana allichu, yapa mana allichu kan? (1) allipachami (2) allimi (3) shina shinallami (regular) (4) mana allimi (5) yapamana allimi (pésima) (8) mana yachanchu	SOCT1	
SOCT2. Kanpa yuyaypika kaypachapi, llaktapa SITUACION ECONOMICA ñaupa pachamanta ashtawan allichu, shinallachu, PEORchu, imashina kan? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu	SOCT2	
SOCT3. Kanpa yuyaypika, chunka ishikay katik killakunapi llaktapa SITUACION ECONOMICA kunanmanta, ashtawan alli kankacha? ¿shinallachu, peorchu? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu	SOCT3	
IDIO1. Kanpa yuyaypika, kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA ¿imashina kan? ¿allipachachu, allichu, shina shinallachu, mana allichu, yapa mana allichu kan? (1) allipachami (2) allimi (3) shina shinallami (regular) (4) mana allimi (5) yapamana allimi (pésima) (8) mana yachanchu	IDIO1	
IDIO2. Kanpa yuyaypika kaypachapi, kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA ñaupa pachamanta ashtawan allichu, shinallachu, PEORchu, imashina kan? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu	IDIO2	
IDIO3. Kanpa yuyaypika, chunka ishikay katik killakunapi kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA kunanmanta, ashtawan alli kankacha? ¿shinallachu, peorchu? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu	IDIO3	

Shukta jawa manta, A VECES runakunapash, ayllupash, mana paykunapa llakikunata allichina ushshapa, shukla gobiernomanta runakunaman yanapayta mañankuna.

<i>¿Lakikunanta allichinkapak man yanapayta ushshapachu ?</i>	Ari	Mana	Mana yachanchu/mana kutinchi	
CP1. Mama llaktapa pushak	1	2	8	CP1
CP2. Congresopa apuk	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. Gobiernomanta ministerio	1	2	8	CP3
CP4. CONAIE, shukta runakunapa tandanakuy	1	2	8	CP4

PROT1. Kanka shuk manifestación pulicamanta rirkankichu?	(1) wakin punlla	(2) Manajayk apini	(3) man ajay capi	(8)) N S	PROT 1
---	------------------	--------------------	-------------------	-----------	---------------

<i>Una, kanpa ayllumanta, chaypa llakikunamantapash shukta tarpuykunaka</i>	Ari	Mana	Mana yachanc
---	------------	-------------	---------------------

<i>rurakrini.....</i>			hu	
CP5. ¿Kipa ishkey watakunapi, ¿kanpa ayllupash, kanpa mashikunapach maykan llakita allinchinkapak yanapashka? (1) Ari [katipay] (2) Mana [CP6man ripay] (8) Mana yachanchu	1	2	8	CP5
CP5A. ¿Kullkita, imatapash kanpa ayllupa llakikunata allichinkapak kushpa?	1	2	8	CP5 A
CP5B. ¿Kanpa llamkayta kushpa?	1	2	8	CP5 B
CP5C. ¿Ayllumanta llakikuna allichinkapak tantanakuymán rishpa?	1	2	8	CP5 C
CP5D. ¿Barriota allichinkapak, muchuk tantanakuymanta ruranata yuyashpa?	1	2	8	CP5 D

Organizacionesmanta shutikuna kikakatikrini, paykunapa tantanakuymán (1) shuklla kutin semanapi, (2) shuk, ishkey kutinkuna killapimi, (3) shuk, ishkey kutinkuna watapimi rishpa, (4) manajaycapi, niwapay

	Shuklla kutin semanapi	Shuk, ishkey kutinkuna killapimi	Shuk, ishkey kutinkuna watapimi rishpa	Manaj a ycapi, niwap ay	Ma na yac han chu	
CP6. ¿Apunkchik wasimanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 6
CP7. ¿Yachanawasimanta jatun yachanawasimanta yayamamamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 7
CP8. ¿Ayllu allichinkapak tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 8
CP9. ¿PROFESIONALES, randikkuna, productores manta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 9
CP10. ¿Llamkunamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 10
CP11. ¿Coperativamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu ?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 11
CP12. ¿Mama llaktamanta tanta nakuymán rinkichu? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP 12
CP13. ¿Partido politicamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	CP 13

allimi (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu		
LGL2. Kanpa yuyaypika, municipioka ashtawan ruraykunatapash, kulikitapash charina kanchu, mama llaktapa pushayka ashtawan municipiopa ruraykunata charina kanchu ¿imashina kana kan? (1) Municipiopak ashtawan ruraykuna (2) Mama llaktapa pushaypak ashtawan ruraykuna charina kan [AMA KILLKAKATIPAY (3) nimatapash chikanyana kan] [AMA KILLKAKATIPAY (4) municipio alli ruraykuna rurakpi, ashtawan ruraykunata kuna kan] (8) Mana yachanchu/ mana yuyanchu	LGL2	
LGL3. ¿Ruraykunata ashtawan alli ruranata ushankapak, ashtawan kullkita municipioman kuyman? ¿Kanpa yuyaypika chayta mana FUNCIONA? (1) ashtawan kullkita kuyman (2) Chayta mana FUNCIONA (8) Mana yachanchu	LGL3	
LGL4. Kanpa yuyaypika, alcaldeka, consejo provincialka runakunaka shuyan rurankunachu? ¿tukuy pachachu, ashtawan pachakunachu, asalla pachakunachu, manajaykapichu? (1) tukuy pachami (2) ashtawan pachakunami (3) ashalla pachakunami (4) manajaykapimi (5) Manajaycapi (8) Manayachanchu	LGL4	
MUNI1. ¿Ima shuti kay alcaldeka kan, yuyankichu? Shutita Killkapay: _____ [Alcalde kuna shutikunata rikupay] (1) Allimi (0) Mana allichu (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu	MUNI1	
MUNI2. Kanpa yuyapika ¿maykan ashtawan jatun llakiyta kay pachapi, municipioka tyan? [Ama kutichiykunata killkakatipay] [shuklla kutichiy mañapay] (00) nimatapash (01) yakuta mana charinkunachu (02) ñankunaka mana alli kankuna (03) runakunaka chikipi kan (04) llaktaka mapami kan (05) mana SERVICIOS charinkuna (06) situación económica (10) mana alli pushakkuna charinchu (11) Pachamama lakikuna charin (88) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu Shuktakuna (killkapay): _____	MUNI2	
MUNI3. ¿Mashna ta alcaldeka kay llakikunata allichinkapak rurashka? [Kuitichiykunata killkakatipay] (1) Ashka (2) Imallla (3) ashalla (4) Manaimatapash (8) Mana yachanchu	MUNI3	
MUNI5. ¿Imashina municipioka paypa kullkita kun yuyaypi ¿Kanka chaypi kashka? (1) Ari, kashkani (0) Mana kashkanichu (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu	MUNI5	
MUNI5A. ¿Maypitak municipioka ashtawan paypa kullkita kun? [Ama killkakatipay] 1. Tukuy runamanta llaktata pichaypi 2. Ñankunapi, jatun ñankunapi, chakakunapi, pukllankapak Kanchakunapi, shuktakunapi 3. Unkushka kamankapak, wawakunata yachachinkapak 4. CORRUPCION 5. Runakunaman,	MUNI5A	

paykunapa lammkaymanta, kullkita kunkapak 6. Manaimatapash Shuktakuna _____ 88. Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu		
MUNI6. ¿Kanka, municipioka alli ruraykunachu kullkiwan ruray iñinkichu? 3) Ashka iñin (2) Shina shinalla iñin (1) Ashalla iñin (0) Nimatapash iñin (8) Mana yachanchu	MUNI6	
MUNI7. Kanpa yuyaypika ¿municipiomanta ruraykunaka kanpa aylluman, kanka shinalla runakunaman, allichin? (1) Ari (0) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu	MUNI7	
MUNI8. ¿Kanka, kipa watapi, yanapayta, pankakunata municipiopi mañashkachu? (1) Ari [Katipay] (0) Mana [MUNI11man katipay] (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu [MUNI11man katipay]	MUNI8	
MUNI9. ¿Paykunaka imashina kanta chaskinkuna ? (1) Allipachami (2) Allimi (3) Shina shinallamil (4) Mana allimi (5) Yapa mana allimi (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu (9) Inap.	MUNI9	
MUNI10. ¿kanta llakika, mañayka allichiy charirka? (1) Ari (0) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu (9) Inap	MUNI10	
MUNI11. ¿kanpa yuyaypika ¿mashnatak kanka municipiopi ruranata ushanki? ¿ashtakachu, imallachu, ashallachu, manaimatapashchu? 1. Ashka 2. Imalla 3. Ashalla 4. Manaimatapash 8. Mana yachanchu	MUN11	
MUNI15. ¿kanpa yuyaypika,¿ municipiopi alcaldeka, tukuy runakunamanta yanapayta munanchu? (3) Ashtawan munan (2) Shina shinallami munan (1) Ashtakalami munan (0) Mana munanchu (8) Mana yachanchu	MUNI15	

Kanpa municipiomanta rimakrinkichik, Shukta runakunaka, shukkuna kuntinkunapi aukakunaka pushayta japiyman, alli kayman, nin, kanpa yuyaypika, Ima kutikunapi aukakunaka pusahayta japichun alli kayman				
JC1. Ashka runakunaka mana llamkayta charikpi	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli Kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC1
JC4. Ashka runamanta jatariykuna tyakpi	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli Kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC4
JC10. Ashka juchak tyakpi.	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC10
JC12. Ashka kullkita rantinkapak kuna kakpi.	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC12
JC13. CORRUPCION tyakpi	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC13
JC14. Incapacidad gobiernomanta tyakpi	(1) Alli kayman	(2) Mana alli Kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	JC14
ECUJC20. Colombiamanta jatun makanakuyta jatun yachina tiyakpi.	(1) Alli kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	ECUJC20

JC15. Kanpa yuyaypika, Pushakka Congressomanta wichikana ruray tukunchu?	(1) Ari	(2) Mana	(8)	JC15
JC16. Kanpa yuyaypika, Corte Supremamanta wichikana ruray tukunchu?	(1) Ari	(2) Mana	(8)	JC16
GBMIL1. Shukkunaka nin: aukakunaka pushayta japinshkan. Chikan runakunaka nin: Aukakunaka manachu pushayta japishkan. Imatak yuyapanki?	(1) Aukakunaka akachanchu	(2) Shukta runakunaka kanchanchu	(8) MAY/MK	GBMIL1

VIC1. ¿kipa chunka ish kay killakunapi maykan runakunaka kanta makashkapash, shuwashkapashchu? Ari [katipay] (2) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu	(1)			VIC1
AOJ8. Juchakkunata japinkapak, chapakkunaka LEYshina nikpi rurana kanchu, shukla kutikunapash ruranata ushanchu? (1) LEYshina nikpi ruranata kan (2) Shukla kutikunapashruranata ushan (8)Mana yachanchu				AOJ8
AOJ11. Kanpa llaktapi, shuwaymanta, wañuchiymanta, kanka ¿SEGURO Kankichu? (1) Seguro kanimi (2) Shina Shinallami (3) Mana SEGURO kanichu (4) Yapa mana SEGURO kanichu (8) Mana yachanchu				AOJ11
AOJ12. Kanpa yuyaypika, kanta shuakpi, leyta rurakkuna juchakta tiksinmankunachu? (1) Ashka (2) Imalla (3) Ashalla (4) Manaimatapash (8) Manayachanchu				AOJ12
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Ashka (2) Imalla (3) Ashalla (4) Manimatapash (8) Mana yachanchu				AOJ17

De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho?
(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)

	Kutentomarikan shi	Ayshana go marikanchi	Ayshinag o nagustatany	Ashysa inagustany	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR		
ST1. Mamallaktamanta chapakkunal	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1	
ST2. Jusedospipash, tribunales de justicia pipash	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2	

	Kutento marikan shi	Ayshana go marikanchi	Ayshinago nagustata ny	Ashysa inagustany	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST3. Fiscaliapichu	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST 3
ST4. Alcaldiapichu	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST 4
ST5. Defensoría del Pueblo	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST 5

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Shukta pankapi kilakrishun. Kay pankapi yupaykunata shukmanta kanshismantyan. Shukka manaimashina kan, kutin kanshiska ashka shina kan. Imashina, ñukaka mashnatak televisiónta rikunata munanki tarpukpika, kanka manaima munashpashuklla japinkiman, shinapash manaima munashpa shukllata japinkiman. Shina shinalla munashpa, hukta yupayta japinkiman. Shina kashpaka. ¿Mashnatak televisiónla rikunata munanki? Yupayta japipay **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
manimatapash				ashka			manayachanchu

Chay pankapi kutichipay

	Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
B1. ¿Kanpa yuyaypika ¿Ecuadormanta taripankapak tantanakuykunpi juchakman alli taripay rurankunachu? (Sondee: <i>S i UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)	B1
B2. ¿Mashnatak mamallaktamanta pushaykunapi iñinki?	B2
B3. ¿Mashnatak runakunapa allikunata Ecuadormanta pushakkunaka rikun?	B3
B4. ¿Mashnatak mama llakta pushayta munanki?	B4
B6. ¿Kanpa yuyaypika, ¿Mashnatak Ecuadormanta pushayta quimina kan?	B6
B10A. ¿Sistema de Justicia ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B10A
B11. ¿Shitay rikukpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B11
B12. ¿Aukakunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B12
B13. ¿Pushakmanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B13

	Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
B14. ¿Mama llaktamanta pushaypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B14
B15. ¿Fiscalía General de la Naciónpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B15
B17. ¿Runakunamanta Defensorpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B17
B18. ¿Chapakkunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B18
B20. ¿Kuchipatakunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B20
B21. ¿Partido politicokunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B21
B31. ¿Corte Suprema de Justiciapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B31
B32. ¿Ciudadmanta pushaypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B32
B33. ¿Jatun llaktamanta pushaypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B33
B35. ¿Kanpa yuyaypika kipa mama llakta pushakta akllaykunapi runakunaka, paykunapa yuyaywan shitana usharkachu?	B35
B37. ¿Willak runakunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki'?	B37
B23 [B38]. ¿Llamkasmanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B23
B39. ¿EMPRESARIO PRIVADOpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B39
B40. ¿Kichwa runakunamanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B40
ECUB41 [B41]. ¿Parroquiamanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	ECUB41
B42. ¿Servicio de Rentas internaspí ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B42
B43. ¿kanka ecuadormanta kashpa alli kanchu?	B43
B50. ¿Tribunal Constitucionalpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B50
B46 [b45]. ¿kanpa ayllupi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B46
B49. ¿Kanpa llaktapa runakunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B49
B47. ¿Kanpa mashikunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	B47
B51. ¿ONG's mamallktapi llamkashpan. Imatak iñinki?	B51
ECUB50 [B50]. ¿kanka ONG participación Ciudadnata riksinkichu? Kanka imatak kanta ininki?	ECUB50
ECUFJ2. ¿kanpa yuyaypika, Magistrados de la Corte supremaka akllaymanta imatak iñinki?	ECUFJ2
ECUFJ3. ¿kanpa yuyaypika, Magistrados de la corte Supremaka payta partido político uyanchu?	ECUFJ3

Kay pankapipash killkapay. Mama llakta paushayka tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Ano tar 1-7, 8 = NS
N1. Wakchakta yanapana munanchu	N

<p>Kay pankapipash killkapay. Mama llakta paushayka tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)</p>	<p>Ano tar 1-7, 8 = NS</p>		
	1		
<p>N3. Democraciamanta riman</p>	3	N	
<p>N9. Mama llakta pushaypa CORRUPCIONta mana alli kan, nin.</p>	9	N	
<p>N10. Derechos Humanosman yanapay</p>	10	N	
<p>N11. Seguridad ciudadanaman allichiy</p>	11	N	
<p>N12. Llamkana rurachin</p>	12	N	

[Recoja tarjeta A]

[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nayuyaypikan gushtany						tukuyta	Mana yachanchu

	Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe
ING1. Democraciapimi. Sistema económico mana alli kan. Kanka imatak yuyankichu?	ING1
ING2. Paisas democráticospimi, ashka llakikunaka kan, ashka yuyay mutsurin. Imatak yuyanki?	ING2
ING3. <i>Democraciamipi, ashka llakita allichina mutsrin. Imatak yuyanki?</i>	ING3
ING4. Democraciaka aska llakita charin. Kanka kay forma de goiernoka may allimi kan?	ING4
PN2. Ecuador runakunaka mana paktachu kankuna. Shipapash tukuykuna alliyuyay charinkuna Imatak iñinki?	PN2
PN2A. Politicokunaka paypa alli llamkay, chaymanta mana mamallakta runakunaka yuyan. Imatak iñinki?	PN2A
DEM23. Democraciankapak rurachina, partidos políticasmanta mutsurinkuna?	DEM23

RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. Kanpa yuyaypika, Ecuador democraciamanta, kanka cushillami kanki? (1) Ashka (2) Imalla (3) Manaimapash (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. <i>Kanpa yuyaypika, Ecuador, ashka democracia, imalla democracia asha democracia, mana democracia tiyan?</i> (1) ashjka democracia (2) imalla democracia (3) asha democracia (4) mana democracia (8) Mana yachanchu	PN5

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Shukta pankapi killkarkinki. Kay mushuk pankaka shukmanta, chunkakaman yupaykunaka charin. Shukka, kanka mana shina yuyankishina kan, chunkaka, kanka shinami yuyanki shina kan. Runakinaka, politico imakinata, yuyakunapash charinkapak, kay imakunapash ruranata ushan. Kanka shina yuyankichu, mana shina yuyankichu

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyankichu					Kanka shina yuyankichu					Mana yachanchu

	1-10, 88	
E5. Jatariykunapi kachun		E5
E8. Llakikunata allichinkapak tantanakuykunaman richun		E8
E11. Partido politicomanpash, pushakkunamanpash llamkachun		E11
E15. Ñankunata wishikachun		E15
E14. Shuk runamanta llaktaman, wasimanpash, shinapash payka mana ari nikpi yaykuchun		E14
E2. Llamkay ukuman, shukta jatun wasimanpash mana charikkuna ari nikpi yaykuchun		E2
E3. Pushayta mana munashpa, makanakuyta rurachun		E3
E16. Estadoka mana justicia ruranchu, chaymanta runakunaka, paypa justiciaka ruran		E16

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Mama llakta ruaymanta rimakrinchik. Shuk manta, chunka kaman japishun.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyankichu					Kanka shina yuyankichu					Mana yachanchu

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿ Kanpa yuyaypika runakunaka mana jatariykunata rurana ushankapak leyta rurachun alli kanchu, mana alli kanchu?		D3 2
D37. ¿ Mana ñukanchik mamallaktapi yuyanchik munanchu, pushayta kay runakunata mana rimana sakinman?		D3 7

Tay tapuykunaka Ecuadormanta runakunapa yuyaykunata yachankapak kan. Shuk manta, chunka kaman japishun [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyakinchu						Kanka shina yuyankinchu				Mana yachanchu

	1-10, 88	
D1. Shukkunaka tukuy Ecuadormanta pushaykunaka mana alli kan, nin. ¿Kay runakunaka shitana kanman?		D1
D2. ¿Kay runakunaka alli jatariykunaka rurana kanmanchu? Yupayta nipay		D2
D3. ¿Kay runakunaka pushaypi llamkana usan?		D3
D4. ¿Kay runakunaka rimankapak televisiónpi yaykuna kanman?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?		D5

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

¿Imashina kanka yuyankichu?		
NEWTOL3. Colombiapimi shuk conflicto armado tiyan. Chaymanta inmigrantes colombianos shamun. Kanka yuyaypika, kayka allimi kan? (1) Se justifica (2) No se justifica (8) NS	NEWTOL3	
NEWTOL10. Shukkunaka nin: katik akllaypimi shuk runa puhak akllay, chaymanta paykunaka shuk preocupación kan. Otros nin: razaka mana llakita kan. Kaymanta imatak ninki? (1) Preocupa (2) No es importante (8) NS	NEWTOL10	
NEWTOL9. Ecuadorpa vida politicapimi yachakkunalla rurayta tukunchu? Tukuykuna rurayta tukunchu?	NEWTOL9	

<p>ACR1. Kay quimsa rimaykunamanta, maykan ashtawan munanki: (1) Ñukanchik mama llaktaka chikanyana kan (2) Ñukanchik mama llaktaka allichina kan (3) Ñukanchik mama llaktaka mana chikanyana kan (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	ACR 1	
<p>DEM2. Kay quimsa rimaykunamanta, maykan ashtawan munanki: (1) Democraciapimi Kausashka, mana democraciapimi kausashkachu shinalla (2) Democraciaka shuklaq pushaymanta ashtawam alli kan (3) kutin kitikunapimi shuk kamak pushayka ashtawan alli kan (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu</p>	DEM2	
<p>DEM9. ¿kampa yuyaypika, aukakunaka shukta runakuna uraypi kana kanchu? Shukta runakuna kachanchu? (1) aukakunaka kachanchu (2) shukta runakuna kachanchu (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	DEM9	
<p>DEM13. Asha shimikunawan. Imatak Democraciaka kan? [mana kutiykuna killka katipanki] [shuklla killkapanki] (1) kishpi (2) tukuy runakuna shinallatak kana kanmi (3) Achka kullkita charin (4) Capitalismo (5) Mana aukakuna pushak (6) kishpi katuy rantiypashmi (7) Akllaykuna, shitay (10) Ñukanchik apukkunata akllanata ushan (11) Corrupción (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley Otro _____ (88) Mana yachanchu/mana kutinchi</p>	DEM15	
<p>ECUDEM14. Imamantatak democraciamanta allichinchu? [Leer respuestas] 8. Fortalecer la Justicia 9. Fortalecer los gobiernos locales 10. Combatir la corrupción 11. Llamkay rurachin 12. Valores yachay 13. Seguridad ciudadana allichin 14. [NO LEER] Ninguna de las anteriores 8. Mana kaypichu tiyan</p>	ECUDEM 14	
<p>AUT1. Shuk runakunaka nin: Ñukanchikka sinchi apukta mutzurinchik shinapash ñukanchikka payta mana shitawan akllana kana kanchu. Shukta runakunaka nin: Mana shina kashpaka shitayka ashtawan alli kan. Kanka imatak yuyanki? (1) Ñukanchikka sinchi apukta mutzurinchik shinapash ñukanchikka payta mana shitawan akllana kana kanchu (2) Shitayka ahtawan allikan (8) Mana yachanchu/ mana kutinchi</p>	AUT1	
<p>AUT2. Ñukanchik mamallaktata ashtaka apukkunata charishka. Shinapash wakin runakunaka yuyan: Aukapuhakwan ashtawan alli kachikman nin Shukta runakunaka yuyan: Kunanshinakana kanchik nin kikinka imatatak yuyanki? (1) Aukakuna tikramuna kan (2) Kunanshina katina kan [(0) Mana ima] (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	AUT2	

PP1. Akllaykunapika, shuk runakunaka shukta runakinata nin: Kay apuk tukunaka akllan. Kaypika kanta ninchu? [Yupak killka katinki] (1) Tukuy akllay (2) Achnka akllay (3) Asha akllay (4) Manarak (8) MY/MK	PP1
PP2. Runakunaka pushak tukunata llamkay. Kanka 1998 akllaykunapika shuk pushak tukunawan llamkarkanki? (1) Ari llamkarkanki (2) Mana llamkarkanki (8) MY/MK	PP2

M1. Kay mamallakta pushakpi Alfredo Palacio imatak llamkan: (1) mayalli (2) ashtawan alli (3) shina shinallla (4) mana alli (5) Ashtawan millay (8) MY/MK	M1
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	Man a	Ari	MY	INA P	
<i>Kunanka ñukanchikka kanpa yachay kaysaymanta rimana munan...</i>					
EXC1. ¿Kanka shuk Chapakkunaka nin: Kanka shuwak, llullak, killkash kan, shinapash kikinka mana kaypi kan?	0	1	8		EXC1
EXC2. ¿Shuk chapakkunaka coimata kanta mañashka?	0	1	8		EXC2
EXC4. ¿Kay watapika, kanka, shuk runakunaka, shuk mama llakta llamkakta coimata kina rikushkanki?	0	1	8		EXC4
EXC5. ¿Kay watapika, kanka shuk runakunaka, shuk mama llakta llamkakta coimat kuna rikushkanki?	0	1	8		EXC5
EXC6. ¿Kay watapika shuk mamallakta llamkkka kanta coimata mañaschka?	0	1	8		EXC6
EXC11. ¿Kay watapika mnicipiopimi kanka shuk pankata mutzurikpi llakta llamkak kullkita mañashka (Ashtawan kullkita kamachita nin)? Kanka mana shuk pankata mutzurishka (iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki)	0	1	8	9	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Kanpa llamkaypika, shuk mana alli kullkita mañashka? Kanka mana llamkankichu? (iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki)	0	1	8	9	EXC13
EXC14. ¿Kay watapika Juzgadoman rishkanki? (mana nikpi iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki) ¿Juzgadopika coimat kina kanki?	0	1	8	9	EXC14
EXC14A. ¿Kay watapika fiscalkunawan rishkani? Kaypika shuk mana alli kullkita mañashka?	0	1	8	9	EXC14A
ECUEXC14B. Kay watapika abogado kunawan rishkani?	0	1	8	9	ECUEXC14B

	Man a	Ari	MY	INA P	
EXC15. ¿Kay watapika kanka shuk mamallakta jampiwasiyan rishkanki? (mana nikpi iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki) Kay yachana washipika kullkita mañashka? (ashtawan kulki ima kamachita nin)	0	1	8	9	EXC15
EXC16. ¿Tkanka wawaka yachana wasimanchu jatun yachana wasiman kan? [mana nikpi iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki] Kay yachana wasipika kullkita mañashka? (ashtawan kulki ima kamachita nin)	0	1	8	9	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Mana luz eléctrica kun, shuk runaka kanta coimata mañashka?	0	1	8		EXC17
EXC18. ¿kanka yuyaypika kunanka coimata kun allichu kan?	0	1	8		EXC18

EXC7. Kanka yachayka mamallakta llamkak waklishka imatak kan? (1) Mayachka (2) Achka (3) Asha (4) Nanay (8) MY/MK		EXC7
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VB1. ¿kanka cédula de idenidadta charinki? (1) Ari (2) Mana (3) Manarak kunki (8) MY/MK	VB1
VB2. ¿2002pika kanka akllanki? (1) Ari [katinkij] (2) Mana [VB4katinkij] (8) MY/MK	
ECUVB3 [VB3]. ¿Ima Partido Politico akllarkanki? 1. Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero / Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País) 2. Alvaro Noboa Pontón (PRIAN) 3. León Roldós Aguilera (Partido Socialista Ecuatoriana) 4. Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (Izquierda Democrática) 5. Antonio Xavier Neira Menendez (Partido Social Cristiano) 6. Jacobo Bucaram Ortiz (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana) 7. Jacinto Velásquez Herrera (Movimiento Transformación Social Independiente) 8. Ivonne Leyla Juez Abuchakra (Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriana) 9. Cesar Augusto Alarcón Costa (Partido Libertad) 10. Oswaldo Hurtado Larrea (Movimiento Patria Solidaria) 11. Carlos Antonio Vargas Guatatuca (Movimiento Indígena Amauta Jatari) 12. Nulo akllak/ yurak akllak Shukta _____ 88. MY/MK 99. Inap (Mana akllak)	ECUVB3
[SI VOTO, PASAR A LA PROXIMA] VB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] 1 Mana jatun antawata tiyan 2 Unkuy 3 Mana munan 4 Mana runakunata akllak munan 5 Mana apukkunata munan 6 Mana Cédula de idenidadta charin 7 Mana paadrónpimi kanchu 10 No tener edad 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad shukta _____ (88) MY/MK	VB4
ECUVB7 [VB7]. ¿Pimantatak partido político Diputadokunapk (Congreso Nacional) 2002akllaykuna shitarkanki? 1. Partido Conservador 2. Democracia Popular 3. Partido Social Cristiano 4. Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano 5. Izquierda Democrática 6. Frente Radical Alfarista 7. Movimiento Popular Democrático 8. Partido Socialista Frente Amplio 9. Pachakutic 10. Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de enero 11. PRIAN 12. Varios _____ 13. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco Otro _____ (88) MY/MK (99) Inap (Mana akllak)	ECUVB7

<p>ECUVB8. ¿Kanka yuyaypika, Diputadokunaka pikunaman uyanchu? Kanpa partidopolíticomán, paykaman, akllakkunaman, partido polítido pushakman, medios de comunicaciónman? 1) Kanpa partidopolíticomán, 2) paykaman 3) akllakkunaman, 4) partido político pushakman, 5) medios de comunicaciónman 8) MY/MK</p>	VCUVB8
<p>ECUVB9. ¿kanpa yuyaypika, imallapitak diputado llamkashkanki? Partidomanta llmkan, Paypa markaman kullkita kun, chapay, gestionar, akllakman yanapaypash? 1) Partidomanka representar 2) Payka markaman kullkita kun, 3) Chapay, gestionar 4) akllakman yanapay 5) o representar al elector 8) MY/MK</p>	ECUVB9
<p>ECUVB10. Kanka akllaykunapi, imatak ruran? (ENCUESTADOR LEERÍA OPCIONES 1 y 2) 1) Partidoka akllanki 2) Runakunaka akllanki 3) Partidokapash, runakunapash akllanki. 8) MY/MK</p>	ECUVB10
<p>ECUVB11. ¿Kanka kanpa markapa diputadoka paypa informe kurkaska? 1) Ari 2) mana 3) MY/MK</p>	ECUVB11

<p>ABS5. ¿Kanpa yuyaypika, Shuk akllayka, Ecuadormanta allichinchu? (1) shyashpa cambiani (2) kushaykuna (8) MY/MK</p>	ABS 5
<p>ABS6. ¿Kanka kay diputadonkapak chikan akllinkichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) MY/MK</p>	ABS 6

EXPLOIT1. ¿Runakunaka, wawakunaka, wanrakunapash, llamkay llakita charin, kanka kayka uyanki? Kanka kayka yachakunki? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) MY/MK	EXPLOIT1
EXPLOIT2. ¿Warmikunaka, kuytzakunaka, warmi wawapash explotación sexualta llakinkuna. Paykunaka prostitutas llamkankuna. Kanka kayka uyanki? Kanka kayka yachakunki? 1) Ari (2) Mana (8) MY/MK	EXPLOIT2
EXPLOIT5A. Maymantatak kanka shuk llamkay llakita allichin? Kanka yachankichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) MY/MK	EXPLOIT5A
EXPLOIT 5B. ¿Maymantatak explotación sexual allichin? Kanka yachanichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) MY/MK	EXPLOIT5B
EXPLOIT6. Imatak “Trata de personas” kan? (1) Coyoterismo; (2) Esclavitud; [No leer] ;(3) ninguna; (4) MY/mn.	EXPLOIT6

POL1. ¿Kanpa yuyaypika, politicaka kankapak valik kan? 1) Ashka 2) imalla 3) ashallamana 4) Nada 8) my/mj	POL1
POL2. ¿Mashna politicamanta rimay? Ashka, algo, asha, mana kaypimanta rimay1) Ashka 2) Imalla 3) ashalla 4) mana kaypimanta 5) rimay 8) MY/MK	POL2

Kunanka, kanka nina ushanki.....	
GI1. ¿kanka yachanki ima shutilak Estados Unidos pushakmi kan? [Mana , George Bush killka katinki] (1) Alli (2) Mana alli (mana yachanchu)	GI 1
GI2. ¿kanka yachanki ima shutilak Congreso pushakmi kan? [Mana , Wilfrido Lucero] (1) Alli (2) Mana alli (mana yachanchu)	GI 2
GI3. ¿Kanka yachanki Mashna markatak Ecuadorta charin? [Mana ish kaychunka ish kay killka katinki] (1) Alli (2) Mana alli (mana yachanchu)	GI 3
GI4. ¿Mashna watatak Ecuador mamallakta pushakka, pushakpimi kan? [mana chusku watakunaka killka katinki] (1) Alli (2) Mana alli (mana yachanchu)	GI 4
GI5. ¿kanka yachanki ima shutilak Chile Apukka kan? [Mana Ricardo Lagos killka katinki] (1) Alli (2) Mana alli (mana yachanchu)	GI 5

USAR TARJETA “A” OTRA VEZ.

Kunanka rimashun wakinpura jintikunaguan shaymandu 1 a 7 shaypi 1 yuyarishpa y 7 mana yuyarishpa rimaghay?	Escala		NS/ NR	
	Nada	Mucho		
AA1. Empleadoka mana alli llamkakpi, pushakka tukuykunawan, regañar, chaymanta empleadoska tukuykuna allimi ruran	1	2 3 4 5 6	8	AA1
AA2. Shuk runakunaka may kullkita kanpa wasiman kun,	1	2 3 4 5 6	8	AA2

chaymanta tukuykuna kamashka ruranchu?	7								
AA3. Yachana wasipika yachachiklla rimay, chaymanta wawakunaka paypa permiso rimanakapak mutzurinkuna	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA3	
AA4. Wawakunaka mana alli rurankuna, chaymanta jatun runakunaka makachinkuna	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA4	
AA5. Jatun runakunakalla rimankpi, wawakunaka mana rimankuna	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA5	
AA6. Tukuy religionkunaka yachachin, chaymanta tukuy religiokuna allimi kan	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA6	
DOG1. Mundoman achka yuyayta tiyan, shinapash shuklla yuyayta allimi kan. Kayka allimi kan?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	DOG	1

ECMIG1. Kanpa yuyaypika. Mama llakta pushak, imatak ilegales colombianoswan mutzurina kan? 1. Deportarlos tan pronto los descubran 2. Investigarlos y dejar aquí a los que no tienen antecedentes penales 3. Mamallaktapimi recibirlos 8. MY/MK								ECMIG1	
ECMIG2. Colombia llamkarka Ecuadorpimi imatak kan? 1. Trabajos que los ecuatorianos no quieren hacer 2. Ecuador runakunaman llamkay kichun 8. MY/MR								ECMIG2	

Kunanka ñukaka asha taripaykunaka yupankapak ruranki.....

ED. ¿Ima tikuri yachana wasika wtatak kutirkanki?

_____ Wataka _____ (Yachana wasika, jatunyachana wasika, sumakyachana wasika) _____ años total [**Yupak pankata japinki**]

Mana yachana wasika rirka	0						ED
Yachana wasika	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Jatun yachana wasika	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Sumak yacha wasika	13	14	15	16	17	18	
MY/MK	88						

Q2. ¿Mashna wattatak charinki? _____ Watakunami?		Q2
---	--	-----------

<p>Q3. ¿Ima Apunchik yuyaytak kanki? [no leer alternativas] Católica (Kay Apunchik rimayta ruran).....1 Cristiana no católica.....2 Otra no cristiana.....3 Evangélica 5 Ninguna.....4 O No sabe o no quiere mencionar.....8</p>	Q3	
<p>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E] Q10. ¿Tukuy killapika mashna kullkitak kanpa ayllujuna charinki? (Shukta mamallaktaka kulkita churanki) (00) Nipapash (01) Asahgu \$25 (02) Yaycui \$26- \$50 (03) \$51-\$100 (04) \$101-\$150 (05) \$151-\$200 (06) \$201-\$300 (07) \$301-\$400 (08) \$401-500 (09) \$501-\$750 (10) \$751-\$1,000 (11) \$1,001- \$1,500 (12) \$1,501-\$2,000 (13) \$2,000 imallapas (88) NS/NR RECOGER TARJETA E</p>	Q10	
<p>Q10A. ¿Kanpa familia, shuk remesas japinkichikchu? (Si “no” pasar a Q11) ¿Cuanto? (usar códigos arriba, por mes)</p>	Q10A	
<p>Q11. ¿Kanka imatak kan? [no leer alternativas] (1) Manarak kusayuk (2) Kusayuk-warmiyuk (3) Kusa tukunawan Kawsan (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Sapalla (8) MY/MK</p>	Q11	
<p>Q12. ¿Mashna wawakunatak charinki? _____ (0 = mana wawakuna sharin) MY/MK.....8</p>	Q12	

<p>ETID. ¿ Imatak kanki? (1) Wirakucha (2) Mishu (3) Runa (4) Negro o Afro-Ecuatoriano (5) Sukta (6) Otro _____ (8) MY/MK</p>	ETID	
<p>ETIDA. Kanpa yaymamaka imatak kanchu? virakucha [1] mishu [2] runa [3] Negro [4] Mulato [5] Otra _____ MY/MK [8]</p>	ETIDA	
<p>LENG1. ¿ Imatak shimikunata wawapi rimarkanki? (Ashka rimayta ushana kunki) (1) Mishu shimi (2) Kichwa shimi (3) Shukta (Runa shimi) _____ (4) Shukta (Gringolla) _____ (8) MY/MK</p>	LENG1	
<p>LENG1A. Ima shimita kanpa wasipi rimarkankuna? (acepte una alternativa) Mishu shimi [1] Kichwa shimi [2] Ingles shimi [3] Shikan (Ecuador mamallaktamanta) [4] _____ Chikan extranjero [5] _____ MY/MK [8] No Aplica [9]</p>	LENG1 A	
<p>UNICAMENTE PARA LAS ENTREVISTAS HECHAS EN QUICHUA LENG3A: kanka mishushimita rimanki? Ashtawan alli (1) alli kanka japinki (2) mana arimankicu (3) mana japinkichu (4) (8) Mana yachanichu</p>	LENG3 A	
<p>PARA TODOS: LENG3B: Kanka kichwata rimanki? Ashtawan alli (1) alli kanka japinki (2) mana rimankicu (3) Mana japinkichu (4) (8) Mana yachanichu</p>	LENG3 B	
<p>LENG4: Kanpa yaymamamakamanta rimashka. Kankunaka imatak, nin/nirka? Mishu shimilla (1) mishu shimi (2) runa shimi (3) NS (4) (8) Mana yachinichu</p>	LENG4	
<p>ETID4. Kanka imatak kan? (1) Clase alta (2) Clase media (3) clase media baja (4) clase baja (8) NS/NR</p>	ETID4	

ENTREGAR TARJETA A:

ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿Kanka mashna ecuatoriana kan?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	ETID1
	7							
ECUETID4 [BETID4]. ¿Kanka mashna cultura Kichwamanta kan?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	ECUETID4
	7							

RECOGER TARJETA AKanha wasika imatatak charinki (*Tukuyta killka katinkij*)

R1. Televisor	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R1		
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R3		
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R4		
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R4A		
R5. Vehículo	(0) Mana	(1) shuk	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R6		
R7. Microondas	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R7		
R8. Motocicleta	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R8		
R12. Agua potable (washu ukupi)	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R12		
R14. Armana uku	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R14		
R15. Computador	(0) Mana	(1) Ari	R15		

OCUP1. ¿kanka imatak llamkanki? (kaspita churankapak urapi rikuy, Kanka mana llamkanki, imallamkatak ashtawan ruranki?)

1.- Kanpak llamkanki		2- tukuy punchapika llamkan:		3.- Chawpi punchaka llamkan		OCU P1
Sumak jatunpash randiyuk	1	Rantina apukka	7	Wasi llamkak warmika	13	
Uchilla rantinayuk	2	Rantina katik apukka	8	Yachakukkuna	14	
Tarpuk allpayuk, partidariokuna, kullkita kuk allpaka	3	Llamkak runakuna	9	Llamkay tukuk runaka	15	
Wakrayuk	4	Llamkak runakuna	10	Kutiy llamkak	16	
Profesionales independientes	5	Tarpuk runakuna	11			
Maki rurakyuk	6	Rantik runa, maki rurakka	12			

DESOC1. Kay watapimi, => ¿kanka mana shuk llamkay charirka?(1)Ari [**PASE A DESOC2**](2) Mana [**PASE A T1**](3) Pensionado/rentista [**PASE A DESOC2**]**DESOC1**

DESOC2. Kipa watakunapi, mashna punchada shuk llamkay charirka =>¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ Punchakuna (8) m/n (9) Inap (Pensionado o rentista)	DESOC2	
--	---------------	--

Ima pachatak tapuyjunata tukuchin _____ : _____ TI. Mashna pachatak tapuykunatak karka? [chinillakuna, shuk pankaka rikunki) _____	TI	
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Chaykuna tikuy tapuykunami karka. Yupaychanihari

Ñukaka apunchikpak shutipik rimani, kay tapuykunaka alli runakunawanmi rurani.

Tapuychik shutikkaz _____ Puncheda, killa, wata ____ / ____ / ____

Tapuychik apuka shutikka _____

Tapuychik chutika:

Killkay kutik shutika _____

Kutik rikuk shutika _____

Tarjeta # 1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Illukijawamantapash					Allijawamantapash				

Tarjeta "A"

Ashka	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Mani matapash	1

Tarjeta "B"

Tukuyta	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Nayuyapikan gushtany	1

Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"

ASHIKAIÑAN	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
NIMATAPASH IÑIN	1

Tarjeta E

- (00) Nipapash
- (01) Asahgu \$25
- (02) yaycui \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) \$751-\$1,000
- (11) (11) \$1,001- \$1,500
- (12) \$1,501-\$2,000

- (13) \$ 2,000 imallapas

ANNEX B: Sample Design and Fieldwork

By: A. Polibio Córdova C.
Executive President of CEDATOS / GALLUP International

Mitchell A. Seligson conducted an exhaustive evaluation of the Ecuadorian institutions dedicated to the investigation of markets and public opinion. The objective of this evaluation was to contract one of these institutions to conduct the "Democracy Audit". The institution had to be capable to design a sample, conduct field work, to validate of the information, to enter and process the data received, the revision and final edition of the study, and lastly the diffusion through academic seminars and presentations to leaders, mass media and the public in general. Following this evaluation, CEDATOS / GALLUP International was selected as the most capable firm in terms of professionalism, experience, and infrastructure in the country.

The experience of this first study conducted was highly satisfactory. For that reason the University of Pittsburgh trusted CEDATOS/GALLUP International to conduct a second and third edition of the survey series "Democracy Audit" which were realized in the first half of 2004 and 2006, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the sampling procedures used in Ecuador in 2001 and 2004 served as a reference for the studies on Political Culture conducted in Central America, Mexico and Colombia during the first half of 2004 and the upcoming 2006 studies in Chile, Peru and several Carribean countries. The studies were directed by Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson (Vanderbilt University).

I. SAMPLE DESIGN

1. UNIVERSE

The survey provided national coverage, focusing on the three principal regions: sierra, costa and amazonía (with the exception of the insular region of Galápagos) and on urban and rural areas. In 2001 the survey was extended by special areas in the border provinces, while this survey was independent from the national survey, similar instruments were used in both cases.

2. POPULATION

This study includes members of the civil population that are not institutionalized. We excluded residents of hospitals, orphanages schools, military barracks etc. Nevertheless, the particular households located in these places are included in the population of the sample.

3. UNIT OF OBSERVATION – FINAL UNIT OF SELECTION

This study contains topics referring not only to the individual (adults of at least 18 years of age, eligible to vote, who speak Spanish or Quechua but no other monolingual language), but also to the head of the household and its other members. Thus, **the statistical unit of observation is the household**, due to the fact that all these people belong to only one household.

At the same time, all households live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. The dwelling is a unit that is easily identified in geographical terms. In addition, dwellings display more permanence over time. These two elements make the

dwelling particularly well-suited as the **final unit of selection**, identified on a block in urban areas or a “parceled out” segment in rural areas).

4. SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

The sampling method is the means by which one determines the size of the sample, the construction of the domains of the study, the definition of selection stages of sample units, the population estimations from the sample data and the calculation of errors implicit in these estimations.⁵⁹

To select the appropriate sample methodology, we considered the following factors:

- a) Obtaining a representative sample for the following levels, strata and domains of study
 - The entire country
 - Strata of the first stage:
 1. Sierra
 2. Costa
 3. Oriente
 - Strata of the second stage:
 1. Urban areas
 2. Rural areas
 - Domains of study:
 1. Quito
 2. Guayaquil
 3. Cities with 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion
 4. Cities with 25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants
 5. Cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants
 6. Rural parishes⁶⁰
- b) The calculation of the sampling errors that correspond to these estimations.
- c) Facilitating the execution of the survey.
- d) Optimal assignment to permit a reasonable equilibrium between the budget, sample size and the precision of the results.
- e) Utilizing the best and most accurate sampling frame available for each city (census, maps, and recent lists of dwellings).

Based upon these considerations, the method utilized in this study is a probabilistic sampling at all stages. It is stratified, multistaged, and clustered, with a random selection of units in each stage, including the final selection of adults to be interviewed within each household.

⁵⁹CORDOVA, P.: "Introducción a la Investigación por Muestreo". Edit. DGEA/México, 1972./a edition, presentation by Leslie Kish and M. Seligson, 2006.

⁶⁰ In our treatment of rural areas, we relied upon parish centers (populated centers) with “parceled out” dwellings or upon “segments” similar to blocks, when the dwelling of the population center was not structured according to standard physical units.

This sample is stratified by region (Costa, Sierra and Oriente) and by area (urban and rural), and is multistaged. First, Primary Sampling Units (PSU, cantons) were selected. Following the identification of these Primary Sampling Units, Secondary Units were selected from each PSU, conforming to census sectors. Then, Units of the Third Stage (blocks or segments) were selected, followed by the selection of Final Sampling Units (FSU). The Final Sampling Units were clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas, and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each dwelling unit of these clusters, we selected one single household as a Unit of Observation. Finally, we selected and interviewed one adult of voting age, according to a random process (Kish / Córdova System).⁶¹ In 2004 and 2006 studies a system of quotas (three age groups and gender) was used; in each selected household, an adult was selected employing a probabilistic selection process.

Following a norm of probabilistic selection, we did not allow for a substitution or a replacement of the selected units (see pertinent procedures discussed further in the text).

To ensure the consistency, sufficiency, and efficiency of the sample, we assigned particular sample sizes to each strata and total aggregation level. The interior of the sampling stratum is auto-weighted, but requires weighting for the aggregation of strata (Sierra, Costa and Oriente) due to the smaller size of the Oriental region. In each stratum, the selection of the sample is determined by proportional probability for the size of each domain.

This design allows for the ready calculation of results by strata, domain, and total population. Using versatile and simple procedures, one can readily engage in calculations of the principle variables and socio-demographic characteristics considered in this study.^{62 63}

5. SAMPLING FRAME

The sampling frame was constructed through maps and lists of city and parish dwellings, obtained through the information provided by the Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda of 2001. To update this information, we relied upon the cartographic updates and new counts of constructions and dwellings conducted by CEDATOS in the year 2006.

To ensure that the sampling frame was appropriate for each city, we used the following sources of information:

1. Updated maps with information obtained by public and private institutions involved in housing programs. This information provided the means by which to verify the cartographic limits of cities, and to create maps in areas with new developments, with the aim of registering the creation or elimination of blocks and rural segments.

⁶¹ CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

⁶² KISH, L.: "Survey Sampling": John Wiley & Sons. 1965.

⁶³ RAJ, D.: "Sampling Theory". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Chapters 4-5 provide an extensive example of these methods of selection.

2. Counts of constructions, dwellings, and residential populations by age, processing these lists with the directions and identification of the dwellings by blocks, for all the cartographic sections of the sample in each selected city and parish. This is a job in which CEDATOS has engaged for more than 30 years in its direct study of cities and rural areas.

6. SAMPLE SIZE

To determine the size of the sample we rely upon the following criteria: we utilize a sampling procedure of final clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. This last factor is the explanatory variable of the design and the function of its variance.⁶⁴ The resulting design effect of the sample of clusters (DEF) is estimated on average at 1.022, in the case of three strata, with cluster sizes of 6 to 12.

The adjustment of the sample size from a simple random sample to a clustered sample is derived from the following formula:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ(DEF)}{n}}$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ (DEF)}{E^2}$$

Where:

E = Band of probable error (+ /- 0.05)

P = Percentage of population with a given attribute of 50%.

Q = (1-P) Percentage of population without the attribute considered in P. Q= 50%.

DEF = Design effect. Relation of variances between the clustered sample we utilize to that of a simple random sample. This value fluctuates between 1.0 and 2.0. The clustered sample and the simple random sample tend to conform less when the size of the cluster is smaller and there is real variance from the stratified sample.⁶⁵ There is a direct trade-off between the rise of real variance due to clustered sample effects and the diminishing of the real variance by stratification with the assignment of proportional sizes to the size of the stratum. With this base and according to the tables of DEF, we estimate that in the present design DEF= 1.022.⁶⁶ for the regions of Costa and Sierra and DEF= 1.011 for the region Oriente.

⁶⁴ Ver: KISH, L.: "Statistical Design For Research".- John Wiley. 1987. For a discussion of design effects, see Chapters 2 and 7 and "Survey Sampling" Chapters 2 y 11.

⁶⁵ FRANKEL, M. "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". ISR; The University of Michigan. 1971.

⁶⁶ FRANKEL, M: Op. Cit. Tablas de DEF y discusión.

Z = Value of the normal distribution. For a confidence level of 95%, this value is 1.965.

n = Sample size

7. CALCULATION OF SIZE BY STRATA, DOMAIN, PSU, AND SAMPLING UNITS

The sample design considered assigning selection units for the 21 provinces of the country, while the sample is not sufficient to represent the respective provinces, it is sufficient for the regions of Costa, Sierra and Oriente. In the first stage, in which we select Primary Sampling Units (PSU), the PSUs are characterized by the urban and rural populations, to assign sample sizes with proportional probability to their actual size. In the region of Oriente we used the divisions of Oriente Norte and Oriente Sur.

In its totality, the sample consists of 439 sampling units: 301 urban and 138 rural, distributed in 64 cantons of the 21 continental provinces.

The aggregations of the sizes (nh), produce sizes (nd) by domain (1. Quito, 2. Guayaquil, 3. cities of 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion, probability 1; 4. cities of 25,000 to 100,000 inhabitants; 5. cities of less than 25,000 inhabitants, and 6. rural parishes). This is sufficient for estimations of total results and for results disaggregated by age groups and other socio-demographic variables.⁶⁷

$$nd = \sum_h n_{hd}$$

8. SAMPLE SIZE, CONFIDENCE LEVES, AND MARGINS OF ERROR

The anticipated confidence level for this national sample was 95% ($Z_{.95} = 1.965$) with a margin of error of $\pm 2\%$, assuming a proportion of 50/50 ($P = 0.50$; $Q = 1 - P$); for dichotomous variables, in the worst case scenario. We assume a DEF of 1.022 through the system of cluster sampling for the regions Sierra and Costa and the whole country and of 1.011 for the region Oriente, which was stratified into northern and southern zones.

With this backdrop, the probable margins of error by stratum for a simple random sample and the clustered sample we utilized are as follows:

SAMPLE SIZE AND MARGINS OF ERROR

⁶⁷ GUENTHER, W.: "Introducción a la Inferencia Estadística". McGraw-Hill. 1968. See Chapters 3-5, for exercises on these applications.

Strata	Sample Size	95% Confidence Level	
		S.R.S.	C.S.
REGIONS			
Sierra	1.154	2.89	2.92
Costa	1.293	2.73	2.76
Oriente	478	4.49	4.52
BY AREA			
Urbana	1.772	2.33	2.36
Rural	1.153	2.90	2.93
COUNTRY TOTAL	2.925	1.82	1.84

9. ADJUSTMENTS FOR NONCOVERAGE

To ensure efficiency, sufficiency and precision of the sample, we adopted a sampling system with “Adjustment for noncoverage.” This guarantees the execution of the sample with the estimated size as minimums within the confidence level and maximum permissible error⁶⁸. Additionally, the system assured the elimination of bias resulting from the substitution or replacement of units that could not be objects of an interview. This system estimates an important cost for CEDATOS, but also guarantees the quality of the information. The method is based upon CEDATOS’s knowledge of “noncoverage” it observed in similar studies of the nation as a whole, urban and rural.

The system consists of applying the sample size (n) estimated for each stratum, domain, and PSU a factor of noncoverage (t), with which we calculate the operative size of final selection (n*), expressed as:

$$n^* = (1 + t) n$$

t = Rate of no interview. This rate considers situations of noncoverage (no interview, refusal, unoccupied dwellings, absence of adults, or impossibility of interviewing after 3rd visit, among other possible events). According to the experience of CEDATOS and the information available from its studies, the rate (t) varies by province, region, size of city, socio-economic level of the household, urbanization, etc.

n* = Final sample size to be selected: $n^* = (1 + t) n$

The average rate of t for the national sample was 0.18, in which:

$$n^* = (1 + 0.18) 2.925 = 3.452 \text{ adults to be interviewed.}$$

⁶⁸ CORDOVA, P. Op.cit. The value of “t” changes from country to country, from region to region, from strata to strata; the value registered in previous surveys must be used to obtain the greater efficiency in terms of cost, time and precision.

The actual size obtained at the end of the survey was 2.925 adults; the number envisaged for the national sample. By strata and by rural and urban areas, the sample was optimal.

10. SURVEY PERSONNEL

CEDATOS invested all of its energy to ensure that this study would be successful. CEDATOS fulfilled the requirements set by the anticipated size of the sample, without having to resort to posterior weighting due to incomplete sample sizes. This posterior weighting introduces considerable non-sampling errors. The confidence levels and margins of error are more or less as anticipated, and have the additional guarantee of sample sufficiency in terms of size and quality of the survey.

CEDATOS assigned 254 people to work on this study. These workers can be classified as follows:

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED BY CEDATOS FOR THE STUDY "DEMOCRACY AUDIT"

FUNCTIONS	Total People
1. Field Coordinators	20
2. Field Supervisors	40
3. Spanish-speaking Interviewers	120
4. Bilingual Interviewers (Quechua/Spanish)	3
5. Bilingual Supervisors (Quechua/Spanish)	1
6. Quality control in the field	15
7. Critics / codifiers	20
8. Data Entry	15
9. Quality control of data entry	4
TOTAL IN FIELD AND DATA ENTRY	238
10. DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL	12
11. Administrative Personnel	4
TOTAL PERSONNEL	254

11. UNIVERSE, POPULATION TOTALS, REGIONS (COSTA, SIERRA AND ORIENTE), URBANIZATION, AND DOMAINS OF THE STUDY.

ECUADOR: TOTAL POPULATION, CENSUS FOR 2001 Thousands of Inhabitants

	Country Total	Sierra	Costa	Oriente
Total	12,065	5,460	6,056	549
Urban	7,415	3,013	4,207	195
Rural	4,650	2,447	1,849	354

Percentage Distribution (%)

	Country Total	Sierra	Costa	Oriente
Total	100.0%	45.2%	50.2%	4.6%
Urban	100.0%	40.7%	56.7%	2.6%
	61.5%	55.2%	69.5%	35.5%
Rural	100.0%	52.6%	39.8%	7.6%
	38.5%	44.8%	30.5%	64.5%

SIERRA AND COSTA DIVISIONS Thousands of inhabitants

	Sierra and Costa Total	SIERRA	COSTA
Total	11,516	5,460	6,056
Urban	7,220	3,013	4,207
Rural	4,296	2,447	1,849

Percentage Distribution (%)

	Total	SIERRA	COSTA
Total	100.0%	47.4%	52.6%
Urban	100.0%	41.7%	58.3%
	62.7%	55.2%	69.5%
Rural	100.0%	57.0%	43.0%
	37.3%	44.8%	30.5%

Source: INEC. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos.

Processed by: CEDATOS. Departamento de Operaciones

SIERRA**Urban****Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample
1. Pichincha	Quito	1,399,378	58.7%	336	12	50
2. Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	199,827	8.4%	42	2	7
3. Imbabura	Ibarra	108,535	4.6%	27	1	5
4. Tungurahua	Ambato	154,095	6.5%	34	1	5
5. Chimborazo	Riobamba	128,807	5.3%	26	1	4
6. Azuay	Cuenca	277,374	11.6%	56	2	9
7. Loja	Loja	118,532	4.9%	27	1	4
		100.0%				
TOTAL 100,000+ INHABITANTS		2,382,548	79.1%	548	20	84
		188,056	6.2%	48	5	11
REMAINDER OF URBAN SIERRA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		442,535	14.7%	83	12	24
REMAINDER OF URBAN SIERRA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)		3,013,139	100.0%	679	37	119
TOTAL URBAN SIERRA						
RURAL						
CANTONS WITH 100,000+ INHABITANTS		837,698	34.2%	154	20	16
REMAINDER OF RURAL SIERRA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		258,546	10.6%	111	5	11
REMAINDER OF RURAL SIERRA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)		1,351,355	55.2%	210	12	26
TOTAL RURAL SIERRA		2,447,599	100.0%	475	37	53
TOTAL SIERRA SAMPLE				1,195	37	
172						

COSTA**Urban****Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample
1. Guayas	Guayaquil	1,985,379	65.1%	432	15	64
2. Guayas	Milagro	113,440	3.7%	24	1	4
3. Guayas	Durán	174,531	5.7%	32	1	5
4. Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	95,124	3.1%	24	1	4
5. Manabí	Portoviejo	171,847	5.7%	32	1	5
6. Manabí	Manta	183,105	6.0%	40	1	6
7. Los Ríos	Quevedo	120,379	4.0%	32	1	5
8. El Oro	Machala	204,578	6.7%	48	2	8
		100.0%				
TOTAL 100,000+ INHABITANTS		3,048,383	72.4%	664	23	101
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		335,343	8.0%	161	10	30
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)		823,814	19.6%	96	8	20
TOTAL URBAN COSTA		4,207,540	100.0%	921	41	151
RURAL						
CANTONS WITH 100,000+ INHABITANTS		256,253	13.8%	80	23	9
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		417,211	22.6%	196	10	27
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)		1,175,219	63.6%	96	8	15
TOTAL RURAL COSTA		1,848,683	100.0%	372	41	51
TOTAL COSTA SAMPLE				1,293	41	202
TOTAL SIERRA AND COSTA						
URBAN		1,600	78	270		
RURAL		847	78	104		
TOTAL		2,447	78	374		

12. SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA.**SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA**

	URBAN Total	RURAL Total	TOTAL Total
SIERRA			
100,000+	548	154	702
25,000 – 100,000	48	111	159
Less than 25,000	83	210	293
Total Sierra	679	475	1,154
COSTA			
100,000+	664	80	744
25,000 – 100,000	161	196	357
Less than 25,000	96	96	192
Total Costa	921	372	1,293
Total Sierra and Costa	1,600	847	2,447
ORIENTE			
North Zone	80	158	238
South Zone	92	148	240
Total Oriente	172	306	478
TOTAL	1,772	1,153	2,925

GENERAL SUMMARY

COUNTRY TOTAL	SAMPLE	PSU	Points of Sample
<u>BY REGION</u>			
SIERRA	1,154	37	172
COSTA	1,293	41	202
ORIENTE	478	10	60
TOTAL	2,925	88	434
<u>BY AREA</u>			
URBAN	1,772	88	296
RURAL	1,153	88	138
TOTAL	2,925	88	434

13. SAMPLE SELECTION BY STRATA AND AREA, CITIES AND PARISHES

NATIONAL SURVEY: SAMPLE SELECTION

1. BY STRATA (REGIONS COSTA, SIERRA, AND ORIENTE)
2. BY AREA (URBAN AND RURAL)
3. BY PSU'S
4. BY CANTON, PROBABILITY OF SELECTION PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)
5. POINTS OF SAMPLE AND FINAL SIZE, PROBABILITY PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)

SIERRA													
SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
1	Imbabura	Ibarra	La Esperanza	1	1	5	2	27	20	47	32	24	56
2	Pichincha	Quito	Puembo	12	1	50	4	336	41	377	396	48	444
3	Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	Alluriquin	2	1	7	2	42	23	65	50	26	76
4	Tungurahua	Ambato	Quizapincha	1	1	5	2	34	20	54	40	24	64
5	Chimborazo	Riobamba	Cubijiles	1	1	4	2	26	16	42	31	19	50
6	Azuay	Cuenca	San Joaquín	2	1	9	2	56	22	78	66	24	90
7	Loja	Loja	Taquil	1	1	4	2	27	12	39	32	14	46
TOTAL						84	16	548	154	702	647	179	826
REMAINDER OF SIERRA													
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)													
8	Imbabura	Otavalo	San Pablo	1	73.4/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
9	Pichincha	Rumiñahui	Cotogchoa	1	74.4/125.4	2	2	8	23	31	9	26	35
10	Cotopaxi	Latacunga	Belisario Quevedo	1	116.7/125.4	3	2	16	20	36	19	23	42
11	Bolívar	Cuaranda	Guanujo	1	73.1/125.4	2	2	8	22	30	9	26	35
12	Cañar	Azogues	Cojitambo	1	67.8/125.4	2	3	8	26	34	9	31	40
TOTAL						11	11	48	111	159	57	130	185
REMAINDER OF SIERRA													
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
13	Carchi	Montúfar	La Paz	1	32.6/125.4	2	2	7	20	27	8	24	32
14	Imbabura	Cotacachi	Imantag	1	36.2/125.4	2	2	7	12	19	8	14	22
15	Pichincha	Mejía	Tandapi	1	60.6/125.4	2	3	7	29	36	8	34	42
16	Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	Canchagua	1	15.8/125.4	2	2	7	12	19	8	14	22
17	Tungurahua	Baños	Lligua	1	17.2/125.4	2	2	7	20	27	8	24	32
18	Chimborazo	Guano	San Gerardo	1	40.5/125.4	2	2	7	20	27	8	24	32
19	Chimborazo	Guamote	Palmira	1	33.9/125.4	2	2	7	20	27	8	24	32
20	Cañar	Biblián	Turupamba	1	23.8/125.4	2	2	7	14	21	8	16	24
21	Azuay	Santa Isabel	Abdón Calderón	1	21.3/125.4	2	3	7	26	33	8	31	39
22	Azuay	Chordeleg	San Martín de Puzhi	1	9.9/125.4	2	2	6	13	19	7	15	22
23	Loja	Calvas	El Lucero	1	31.0/125.4	2	2	7	12	19	8	14	22
24	Loja	Catamayo	San Pedro de la Ben	1	24.5/125.4	2	2	7	12	19	8	14	22
TOTAL						24	26	83	210	293	96	248	343

COSTA													
SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
25	Guayas	Guayaquil	Chongón	15	1	64	1	432	10	442	510	12	522
26	Guayas	Milagro	Chobo	1	1	4	1	24	10	34	28	12	40
27	Guayas	Durán		1		5		32		32	38		38
28	Guayas	Samborondón	Tarifa		1		1		9	9		11	11
29	Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	Tabiazo	1	1	4	1	24	9	33	28	11	39
30	Manabí	Portoviejo	Río Chico	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	11	49
31	Manabí	Manta	Santa Marianita	1	1	6	1	40	9	49	47	11	58
32	Los Ríos	Quevedo	San Carlos	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	11	49
33	El Oro	Machala	El Cambio	2	1	8	2	48	15	33	57	17	74
TOTAL						101	9	664	80	714	784	96	880
REMAINDER OF COSTA													
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)													
34	Esmeraldas	Quinindé	La Unión	1	93.4/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
35	Manabí	Jipijapa	América	1	98.1/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
36	Manabí	Sucre	Charapoto	1	100.5/152.6	3	3	16	23	40	19	27	46
37	Manabí	Chone	Canuto	1	126.2/152.6	3	3	17	22	39	20	26	46
38	Guayas	Daute	Limonal	1	88.4/152.6	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
39	Guayas	Santa Elena	Atahualpa	1	104.8/152.6	3	3	16	22	38	19	26	45
40	Guayas	El Empalme	El Rosário	1	65.9/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
41	Los Ríos	Ventanas	Zapotal	1	72.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
42	El Oro	Huaquillas	Hualtaco	1	41.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
43	El Oro	Santa Rosa	La Avanzada	1	65.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
TOTAL						30	27	161	196	357	191	230	421
REMAINDER OF COSTA													
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
44	Esmeraldas	Atacames	Tonchigue	1	22.8/152.6	3	2	16	14	30	19	17	36
45	Manabí	Bolívar	Quiroga	1	43.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
46	Manabí	Rocafuerte	Resbalón	1	29.2/152.6	3		16		16	19	12	19
47	Manabí	Tosagua	Bachillero	1	29.2/152.6		1		10	10		14	12
48	Guayas	Colimes	General Vernaza	1	21.6/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	23
49	Guayas	Yaguachi	Virgen de Fátima	1	56.0/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	23
50	Los Ríos	Urdaneta	Ricaurte	1	28.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	23
51	Los Ríos	Buena Fe	Patricia Pilar	1	34.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	23
52	El Oro	El Guabo	Borbones	1	41.4/328.3	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
TOTAL						20	15	96	96	192	112	127	225

ORIENTE (ZONA NORTE)													
SELECTION (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
53	Sucumbíos	Lago Agrio	El Eno	1	65.5/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	47	66
54	Scumbíos	Cascales	Sevilla	1	16.3/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
55	Napo	Tena	Puerto Misahuallí	1	56.9/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	47	66
56	Napo	Quijos	Cosanga	1	6.7/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
57	Orellana	Orellana	San Luis	1	32.7/60.9	3	3	16	30	46	19	35	54
TOTAL						15	17	80	158	238	95	185	280

TOTAL													
ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)													
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)													
58	Pastaza	Pastaza	10 de Agosto	1	49.6/60.9	4	5	24	48	72	28	57	85
59	Morona	Morona	Río Blanco	1	67.6/60.9	3	4	20	32	52	24	38	62
TOTAL						7	9	44	80	124	52	95	147
REMAINDER OF ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)													
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
60	Morona	Sucúa	Huambí	1	19.6/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
61	Zamora	Zamora	Timbara	1	41.9/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
62	Zamora	Zumbí		1	6.6/60.9	3		16		16	19		19
63	Zamora	Yacuambi	La Paz	1	6.6/60.9		2		20	20		24	24
TOTAL						9	8	48	68	116	57	80	137

By Region	Number of Cantons	Points of Sample				Sample Size		Size Selected	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
GENERAL SUMMARY									
SIERRA	24	119	53	679	475	1,154	797	557	1,354
COSTA	28	151	51	921	372	1,293	1,087	439	1,526
ORIENTE	11	26	34	172	306	478	204	360	564
TOTAL	63	296	138	1,772	1,153	2,925	2,088	1,356	3,444
BY REGION	63	296	138	1,772	1,153	2,925	2,088	1,356	3,444

14. MAP OF ECUADOR . GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF THE SAMPLE ECUADOR

DEMOCRACY AUDIT 2006
Geographical Distribution of the Sample



Produced by: CEDATOS - Gallup International Ecuador

17. DETAILS OF THE DESIGN: SAMPLE FRACTIONS

To determine the fractions for the sample (f) one should consider the distinct stages of selection:⁶⁹

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

⁶⁹ CORDOVA, P.: Op. Cit. Also "Metodología de la Encuesta Nacional de hogares". Edit. DANE, Colombia, 1972-1984.

- f_i = Fraction of the sample in stage i.
- n_i = Sample size of stage i
- N_i = Total dwellings in stage i

For each stage of selection the fraction is:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (stages 1, 2, 3 and 4)}$$

Where:

- f_1 = Probability of selection in stage 1: PSU
- f_2 = Probability of selection in stage 2: sectors
- f_3 = Probability of selection in stage 3: (blocks or segments)
- f_4 = Probability of selection of the cluster within each block or segment

Given that we take clusters of dwellings by blocks of the sample, the fraction converts into:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h/TVM}$$

Where:

TVM = is the total number of dwellings in the block or segment

The global fraction of the sample (probability of selection within each PSU) should satisfy the following condition:

$$PU = \frac{TVS}{TVU} \times \frac{TVM}{TVS} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVM}$$

- TVU = total dwellings in the PSU
- TVS = number of dwellings in each sector
- TVM = number of dwellings in each block
- NH = number of households in each dwelling of the selected cluster
- h = h households to be selected in each cluster and 1 person in each one of these households

Probability of final selection

The final probability of selection of the cluster (g) is expressed as:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_s}{T_T} \times \frac{T_m}{T_s} \times \frac{T_g}{T_m} = \frac{T_g}{T_T} = \frac{1}{T_T}$$

Where:

- T_T = Total number of dwellings in the city (PSU)
- T_s = Total number of dwellings in the sector
- T_m = Total number of dwellings in the selected block
- T_g = Total number of clusters of h dwellings by block

In general, the probability of selection of a cluster in a given city is expressed as:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{n_c}{N_c} = f_c$$

Where:

- P_c = Probability of selection of a cluster of h dwellings in city c.
- T_{Mc} = Number of blocks to be selected in the city and in these h final dwellings
- T_{Tc} = Total number of dwellings in the city
- n_c = Size of the sample in city c
- N_c = Size of the population in area c
- f_c = Global fraction of the sample for city c (PSU)

18. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES FROM THE SAMPLE

The results of the sample should be treated at the level of each PSU to produce the total population estimates.^{70/71} The restitution factor to be applied to each selected PSU is defined as the product of:

- a) Basic weight (F). The basic weight is equal to the “interval of selection” of the PSU.
- b) Adjustment of coverage for nonresponse: (R_{hj}). The adjustment for nonresponse is calculated for each block (cluster) and is applied to each interviewed household (with completed interviews) within each cluster.
- c) This results in dividing the number of selected and interviewed households (with complete interviews) on the block. The final restitution factor (W_{hj}) to be applied to each block is the product of the two previous factors.^{72/ 73} The estimation of the total

for characteristic X of the population is expressed as: $X' = \sum_{h=1}^d$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{nh} X_{hj} W_{hj} = (F) \cdot (R_{hj})$$

Where:

⁷⁰ KAJ, D.: Op. Cit. See Chapter 9 for methods of calculating errors for various types of samples.
⁷¹ CORDOVA, P,: Op. Cit.
⁷² DANE: Op. Cit.
⁷³ CORDOVA, P,: Op. Cit.

- h = 1,2, domain units h
 j = 1, 2,..... selected blocks for the sample in city h .
 n_h = Total number of blocks in the sample of city h .
 W_{hj} = Restitution factor of block j in city h
 X = Statistic X for block j of city h .

$$X = \sum_{k=j}^{T_{hj}} X_{hjk}$$

- X_{hjk} = Statistic X for the household, block j , of city h .
 k = 1,2,..... households with completed interviews on block j of city h
 T_{hj} = Total households with interviews completed on block j of city h

- F = Basic weight
 R_{hj} = Factor adjustment for nonresponse of block j in city h .

The above formula compares the sample information with that of its appropriate sampling frame. As this frame can have deficiencies or imperfections, it is convenient to take the sample results with an estimator independent of the population, as a projection of the population. The corresponding factor is:

$$L = \frac{\text{Projected population at the date of the survey}}{\text{Restitution of the population in the sampling frame}}$$

Finally, the estimation of the population is expressed as:

$$X = X' \cdot L$$

19. PRECISION OF RESULTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

The population characteristics are estimations that are calculated from the elements included through the sample. This estimation depends upon the design of the sample and the particular combination of elements that are selected.

While these estimations are based upon a probabilistic sample, the statistics can still contain two types of errors.

- a) Errors outside of the sample that result due to procedures of observation, interview, field work, processing, data entry. Thus, the data cannot be perfect. These errors are common in all types of statistical analysis.
- b) Errors due to sampling, that can occur when the procedure is probabilistic and results because one studies only a fraction of the total population. In this way, the selected sample is one of the combinations of N elements, taken in groups of n , that could have been selected through the random process. The variation in the results

due to chance that could have been obtained through these NCn samples, ⁷⁴ forms the sampling error.

Our primary interest is in the calculation of sampling errors due to its theoretical and practical importance. This importance resides in the fact that by acknowledging the sample error, one can estimate the real value of a statistic between the limits of a confidence interval.

The standard deviation of the sample distribution of a given estimation is known as the standard error, and is the root of the variance of this distribution.

To calculate the variance of a rate, ratio, or proportion (r) in sampling clusters, we utilize the following formula: ^{75/76}

$$\text{Var} (r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[\text{var} (y) + r \text{vr}(x) - 2 \text{cov} (x,y) \right]$$

Where:

$$r_x = \frac{y}{x} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^a y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^a x_i}, i = 1,2,\dots,a$$

- a = Total of segments or clusters in the sample
- y_i = Sum of the values of variable x in the ith cluster
- x_i = Sum of the values of variable x in the ith cluster
- y = Total sum of the values of variable y, in the sample
- x = Total sum of the values of variable x, in the sample

To facilitate the calculation, one can abbreviate the formula as follows:

$$\text{Var} (r) = \left[\frac{1}{x^2} \cdot \frac{a}{a^1} \right] Z_i^2$$

Where:

$$Z_i = (y_i - rx_i)$$

The Standard Error (SE) of r is:

$$\text{SE} (r) = \sqrt{\text{var}(r)}$$

⁷⁴ Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.

⁷⁵ Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.

The variance of an estimator can be obtained with the product of X var (r).

⁷⁶ KISH, L.: Op. cit. 1965. Chapter. 6. Op. cit. 1987. Chapter. 4

And the coefficient of variation in percentage terms is:

$$\text{C.V. (r)} = \frac{\text{SE (r)}}{r} \times 100$$

According to the design of the sample, as we noted in a previous section, it is useful to calculate DEF as a means of determining the efficiency of the sample design utilized.⁷⁷ DEF is the reason for the variance of a sample of clusters, with respect to the variance of an unrestricted random sample of the same number of elements. That is:

$$\text{DEF} = \frac{S^2 \text{ cluster.}}{S^2 \text{ msa}}$$

A design effect equal to one indicates that the sample is as efficient as a simple random sample, and a value greater than one indicates that there are losses in efficiency due to clustering. In this case, we found that DEF= 1.022 for the regions of Costa and Sierra, and DEF = 1.011 for the region Oriente.

The confidence intervals calculated after completion of the survey, according to the sizes of the sample effectively observed and observing the design effect indicated an error of error of + / - 1.84% for a 95% confidence level for the national sample, and a confidence interval of + / - 2.92% for the Sierra, + / - 2.76 % for the Costa, and + / - 4.52% for Oriente. For these areas, the margins of error are: + / - 2.36% for urban areas and + / - 2.93% for rural areas.

20. WEIGHTS FOR AGGREGATION OF DOMAINS AND STRATA

The sampling method utilized in this study considered a distribution of sample sizes self-weighted at the internal level for the strata of Sierra and Costa; however not in the oriental region, due to the notable difference in population when compared to the other two regions. In addition, as a consequence of the random selection at the level of each household, the sample in its totality does not project the population by gender, which necessitates the introduction of weights to ensure that the sample corresponds to the census distribution by gender. Finally, while the PSU selection resulted from a probabilistic proportion of set size for urban and rural areas, this introduces variance that needs adjustment. This adjustment relies upon weights, which are derived from the urban/rural distribution as well as the sample proportion by PSU in light of the real proportion of the population, also by PSU.

With these above considerations in mind, we calculated weight values by sample point, including urban and rural areas, which results in a chain of components, as follows:

⁷⁷ FRANKEL, M.: "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". Edit. ISR, U. Of Michigan. 1971. In particular, see Appendix E.

W_{pi} = Weight for each sample point i according to its population in light of the population of its region.

W_{mi} = Weight of each sample point of sample i according to the sample size assigned to it, according to the size of the sample of the whole region.

W_{gi} = Ratio of men/women observed in the sample at sample point i .

W_{Gi} = Ratio of men/women observed in sample unit i according to the last population census (2001) and CEDATOS projections for 2006.

W_{ai} = Urban/rural distribution observed by the survey in sample point i .

W_{Ai} = Urban/rural distribution observed in sample point i , according to the population census of 2001 and CEDATOS projections for 2006.

With the previous values from these calculations, we proceed to calculate the following values:

$$F_{1i} = W_{pi} / W_{mi} ;$$

$$F_{2i} = W_{gi} / W_{Gi} ; y$$

$$F_{3i} = W_{ai} / W_{Ai}$$

With these partial factors (F_{ji} ; $j = 1, 2, 3$; $i = 1, \dots, 434$ sampling points), we estimated a final factor to weight by locality:

$$F_{fi} = F_{1i} \cdot F_{2i} \cdot F_{3i}$$

This F_{fi} is incorporated into the dataset for each point of sample i .

II. COMMENTS ON THE WORK ASSIGNED TO CEDATOS / GALLUP International.

1. PLANNING OF THE THIRD STUDY

The third edition of the Ecuadorian “Democracy Audit”, again produced very good results. This is due to the positive experiences gained during the previous studies in 2001 and 2004 conducted by the same personnel: As in the former studies the appropriate methodology for this type of investigation was defined jointly with Prof. Mitchell Seligson, the scientific director of the study, with whom a very valuable and positive professional relation existed throughout the project. Besides the general design also the sample design and the questionnaires were agreed upon, as well as the procedures for data gathering and processing, the layout of the final data files and the final report. All in all, the reports from 2001 and the 2004 have been very useful as a basis for a comparative analysis. Additionally, many parts of the study were used as a

reference guide for similar studies in Central America, Mexico and Colombia (2004) and Peru, Chile and a number of countries of the Caribbean in 2006.

2. QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was basically the same that was used in 2001 and 2004, with some adjustments of names, political parties, dates and other issues specific to the year 2006. While the questionnaire is fairly large, it did not present any serious difficulties; it is dynamic, clear, fluid, and awakens an interest in the respondent. With these adjustments and given the experiences from 2001 and 2004, the interviewers (who were mostly the same as in the former two studies), were able to reduce the average time of the interviews from 50 to 45 minutes. This could be an objective of future endeavors. The use of auxiliary cards was appropriate; however we observed some difficulties that were overcome with the necessary instruction of the interviewer in rural areas that are less developed than the national average.

The questionnaire passed through some revisions before being finalized, but less than in the first two studies. Like in 2001 and 2004 an in-depth training was given to the national, regional and local supervisors, who themselves in turn trained the interviewers in the field. The field tests were conducted both rural and urban areas. The discussion, revision, analysis and final suggestions regarding the questionnaire were made in Ecuador with the support of Juan Carlos Donoso, who was sent by Vanderbilt University's LAPOP.

We found various questions that should be restructured and adapted to the language and common expressions of Ecuador.

Like in the years before, a translated version of the questionnaire in Quetchua was employed for use with respondents in households, who do not or only rudimentary know Spanish. This questionnaire can be found in the annex.

3. THE SAMPLE

Neither the design nor the sampling presented significant problems for CEDATOS, given that CEDATOS possesses the information, cartography, knowledge and experience necessary for this type of work. The sizes appeared to be appropriate for the survey. Using data from the last population census (2001) provided the project with essential information not only for the design phase, but also for data processing and the calculation of weights (gender and age group/ geographic location: urban and rural).

The census cartography utilized in this survey was recent, and was updated for various new urban and rural sectors. This material proved to be highly important to be able to make the design by panels to keep the clusters similar to those of 2001 and 2004, in which the households and adults for the interview were selected.

4. QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

The training of the interviewers and supervisors was a key element for the success of the project. The system to train supervisors, who in turn trained the interviewers again proved to be highly successful. The participation of Juan Carlos Donoso was also very valuable; he worked directly with the interviewers and supervisors and could therefore observe the training and the quality of the project personnel.

As mentioned before, CEDATOS was able to use mostly the same personnel (interviewers, supervisors and project executives) for this third edition of the study, which also took part in the first two studies. Using this kind of experienced staff cannot be underestimated as the interviewers and supervisors had sufficient practice in identifying sampling units, the final selection of households, and the adults in the households of the sample. They handled with skill the random tables at the level of the household.

5. FIELD WORK, INTERVIEWS; REACTIONS

The interviews were conducted according to the previously established schedule, without any problems during the field work.

The majority of the population received the survey very well and collaborated with the project. In urban areas, as has occurred on other occasions, we observed a certain resistance and lack of interest on the part of individuals of high socio-economic status, especially due to the extent of the questionnaire. The supervisors were very effective throughout all the work of field.

As in the first two surveys, a quite a few respondents were interested in learning of the results of the survey; others demonstrated a lack of interest in political matters, even if they commented on the distrust in various institutions and the fight against corruption. For that reason it is recommended to communicate the results to the whole public in the urban and rural areas, and not only to academic groups or political leaders.

6. VALIDATION OF INFORMATION

The supervision of 100% of the places of the survey (confirming that the interview was conducted in the proper household with the person that was randomly selected) contributed substantially to the quality of the information. The selection of the survey with previous setting of the rate of noncoverage is a procedure that makes it possible to complete the anticipated sample; 18% of noncoverage was fulfilled. The majority of non-responses occurred in large cities, and in middle and upper middle socio-economic levels.

The validation of information, with second interviews and corroboration, was conducted for up to 40% of the sample. The requirement of 1 supervisor for every 3 interviewers was fulfilled.

7. CRITIQUES, CODIFICATION, AND DATA ENTRY

In the second week of field work, critiques of the questionnaire arose (in terms of evaluations and revision), prior to the data entry. The work parties were satisfied to take three daily turns (8 am to 1 pm; 1 pm to 6pm and from 6pm to 11pm). All of the questionnaires were processed and the quality control functioned completely. Like in

the two previous studies the number of errors made during the data entry did not surpass 1/1,000.

8. PROCESSING OF ARCHIVES, QUALITY CONTROL, AND THE AUDIT FROM PITTSBURGH

As the survey progressed, the technical team of the Centro de Cómputo of CEDATOS worked in parallel to input the data and file preparation in SPSS format. This work complied with the requirements of LAPOP and all information was sent as soon as it was available

As indicated by the contract, the questionnaires were sent to the University of Pittsburgh to be audited. Profesor Seligson's answer was completely satisfactory. The key to this satisfactory result was the quality control applied to each and every stage of the study.

9. COMUNICACIONES

Regular communication was maintained between LAPOP and CEDATOS to coordinate the ongoing study. Like in the previous studies, Profesor Seligson's responses were very positive, and he was always collaborating with CEDATOS. At the same time, he fulfilled all of his requirements and observations from the United States. Email was the system of communication that was utilized extensively and intensively.