

A Study of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

The Political Culture of Democracy in Costa Rica, 2004



COSTA RICA

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This publication was made possible through support provided by the USAID Missions in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Support was also provided by the Office of Regional Sustainable Development, Democracy and Human Rights Division, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Task Order Contract No. AEP-I-12-99-00041-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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Acronyms

ADEMR	Index of system support, recoded
BCCR	Banco Central de Costa Rica
BID	Interamerican Development Bank
CCP-UCR	Centro Centroamericano de Población de la Universidad de Costa Rica
CCSS	Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social
CsPRO	Census and Survey Processing System
DEF	Design effect
GAM	Gran Área Metropolitana de San José
ICE	Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad
IDESPO	Instituto de Estudios Sociales de Población de la Universidad Nacional
IDH	Index of Human Development
IDS	Index of Social development of MIDEPLAN
IIS-UCR	Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad de Costa Rica
INEC	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo
INS	Instituto Nacional de Seguros
IRB	Institutional Review Board of Human subjects (Pittsburgh University)
Km	Kilometers
MIDEPLAN	Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica
MOPT	Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes
NPE	Number of effective political parties
OPAL	Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina
PIB	Producto Interno Bruto (Gross Domestic Product)
PNUD	Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
PPS	Probability proportional to size
PRODE	Index of human rights protection
PSU	Primary sample unit
SE	Standard Error
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
URS	Unrestricted random sample design
USAID	Agency for international development of the United States

Executive Summary

This study of democratic culture in Costa Rica is part of a comparative study carried out in eight Latin American countries: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. The research not only attempts to compare the political culture in these countries, but also create a useful tool for monitoring the changes that these countries undergo over time. The Costa Rican study is based on the results of a nationwide survey on values, attitudes, and opinions that was carried out in March 2004, by interviewing 1,500 persons. The questionnaire used has a common core that was shared with all the countries included in the study, as well as specific topics developed for use in Costa Rica. Technical coordination for the research as a whole was the responsibility of Mitchell Seligson, a professor at Vanderbilt University and creator of the OPAL project. In Costa Rica, the research was managed by the Central American Population Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP-UCR).

The study confirms broad citizen support for democracy, as it exists in Costa Rica. On the one hand, support for institutions within the political system is the highest among the eight countries in the project. The country's score on a scale of 0 to 100 is 68. This result supposes a measurable recovery from the level of support registered five years ago (61). However, from a longer-term perspective, it does not reach the levels achieved 20 years ago (85), so that we could speak of a declining trend. The comparatively high support granted to institutions within the political system is part of a generic trust in public institutions in Costa Rica, which includes both those agencies that protect their rights (Judicial Branch, Ombudsman, Comptroller General of the Republic), as well as those that provide services (CCSS, INS, ICE). (Only the political parties have a clearly negative result, as was also the case in the rest of the countries.) On the other hand, among the eight countries studied, Costa Rica has the largest group of individuals that both support the political system and, at the same time, have a high political tolerance towards minority groups, which the study recognizes as an important pillar for stable democracy.

One of the factors that have the greatest influence on support for the system is the country's social capital. Costa Rica is the only country among the eight studied where the number of individuals that trust the members of their community surpasses the number that distrusts them (the contrast with Costa Rica's two neighbors, Nicaragua and Panama is especially relevant). Other dimensions of social capital were measured only in Costa Rica, so that it is not possible to make comparisons; nevertheless, the results of the analysis of neighborhood social cohesion with regards to interpersonal trust suggest that Costa Rica enjoys the highest social capital.

Furthermore, and this is another outstanding point, victimization of the individual by acts of corruption in Costa Rica is very uncommon, in fact it is among the lowest of the eight countries studied. This is an important datum, since the victims of corrupt acts demonstrate a lower level of support for the system. Nevertheless, on average, this is the country with the highest perception of corruption in public affairs. As the report indicates, this datum –although indicative of a climate of opinion- is a poor predictor of either the level of victimization by corruption or of acquiescence to it, which is also low in Costa Rica.

Notwithstanding, there are reasons for concern. First of all, there are strong streaks of political intolerance among the citizenry. In spite of living in the oldest and most stable democracy in Latin America, the Costa Rican citizenry shows levels of intolerance similar to those among the

citizens of the more recent democracies of Mexico and Central America. Around one-half of the population has predominantly intolerant attitudes. Moreover, over the last ten years there has been no progress in this area, according to comparable measurements of the topic. In contrast to its support for the system, social capital has no influence on political tolerance.

This profile of intolerance also applies to other milieus of social life. The study probed attitudes regarding the Nicaraguan immigration into the country (approximately 8% of the population). The populace is split on this point. The largest proportion of the respondents has neutral or ambivalent attitudes towards the Nicaraguan immigrants. There are similar proportions (19%) at opposed poles with very negative or very positive attitudes. Overall, the difference between positive and negative attitudes is -4%, i.e., there is a slight predominance of unfavorable attitudes towards this migration stream. In spite of the split, there is a great deal of integration between Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans, particularly from contacts due to friendship, at work, or as neighbors (“horizontal integration”).

Secondly, there are clear symptoms of citizen discontent. On being asked, a significant proportion of the citizenry expressed its agreement with a coup d’etat to resolve a series of critical national problems. However, when these attitudes are analyzed in depth, the conclusion that emerges is that these individuals are not rooting for an authoritarian solution, but rather for better leadership abilities among politicians to resolve the nation’s problems. Nevertheless, this is a clarion call regarding the complex political climate that the country is undergoing.

One of the most noteworthy results of the study is the importance of local factors on individual values and attitudes. This is especially true with regards to social capital, citizen security, and the perception of local government performance. (In other topics, such as corruption, these factors are not important.) With regards to citizen security, there is a greater perception of insecurity in the Greater Metro Area (GAM) and less in rural areas; in addition, households vary the protective measures they adopt in the face of what they perceive as threats to their security. In the realm of citizen security, it is important to highlight the gap existing between an almost unanimous perception of delinquency as a threat to the country’s welfare (Costa Rica is the country where this is highest) and a disseminated sensation of security that individuals say they feel within their communities. Furthermore, social capital –in both the interpersonal trust dimension as well as that of social cohesion- exhibits a similar territorial behavior: the levels of social capital are lower in the GAM and higher in rural areas. Finally, citizens express an assessment of the efficiency, openness, and sensitivity of their local governments that vary significantly among the municipalities. Nevertheless, there is a generalized perception that municipal corporations are less accountable to the citizenry than central government institutions. Added to this, there is a clear division into two almost equal groups of those that favor and those against a greater decentralization of the State in favor of the municipalities: in Costa Rica, an agreement has not been achieved to advance on this topic, in contrast with the rest of the countries in Latin America, where a majority favors decentralization.

The importance of local factors on the configuration of values, attitudes, and perceptions points to a little-explored question in comparative studies of democracy: that the citizenry does not live in an “average” democracy, since both their experience of it and their democratic culture has textures that vary on a sub-national level.

This study confirms findings in previous studies in the area of citizen participation. In Costa Rica, electoral participation is much more frequent, although declining, than other types of participation (those of a non-electoral character), in national and local public affairs. Furthermore, the country has one of the lowest levels of participation in municipal affairs among the eight countries studied by USAID-CAM 2004, and in spite of the country's broad democratic trajectory, the levels of community participation are no greater than those found in the rest of the countries. On the other hand, electoral participation in Costa Rica basically means voting; the proportion of individuals involved with political parties or that attempt to persuade others during an electoral process is very low. The comparatively low level of citizen participation in non-electoral affairs has an undesirable effect from the democratic point of view. According to study results, greater community participation is associated with greater support for the system.

Preface

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG”. Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing

reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups –ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

Margaret Sarles
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Prologue

Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response

The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortunately, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely goes

beyond univariate presentation of percentages.¹ As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

¹ A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, "That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new." On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, "This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong." These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be "wrong." We cannot guarantee that our results are "right," but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately $\pm 2.5\%$ sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of "design effects," i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of "non-coverage," something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles, Bruce Kay and Eric Kite in the Office of Democracy and Governance” of USAID, supported by María Barrón in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them, as well as to Todd Amani, USAID/Guatemala, who assumed the role of coordinating the project at the USAID end. ARD of Burlington, Vermont, managed the finances of the project and the formatting of the publications. Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. These include, for Mexico, Jorge Buendía and Alejandro Moreno, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM); for Guatemala, Dinorah Azpuru and Juan Pablo Pira, Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES); for El Salvador and Honduras, Ricardo Córdova, Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), José Miguel Cruz, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana, UCA, and Siddhartha Baviskar, University of Pittsburgh; for Nicaragua, Luis Serra and Pedro López Ruiz, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); for Costa Rica, Luis Rosero-Bixby, Universidad de Costa Rica and Jorge Vargas, Programa Estado de la Nación; for Panamá, Marco A. Gandásegui hijo, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA) and Orlando J. Pérez, Central Michigan University; for Colombia, Carlos Lemoine, Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of Pittsburgh. Polibio Córdova, CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, provided excellent

guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee

August, 2004

1.0 Context

1.1 Introduction

Costa Rica is one of the oldest democracies of Latin America and, certainly, the most stable one (Booth, 1995, 1998; Booth & Seligson, 1994; Chalker, 1995; Mahoney, 2001; Peeler, 1985, 1991; Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a; Yashar, 1997)(Lehouq, 2001; 1998; PEN, 2001a; Mahoney, 2001; Booth, 1998; Yashar, 1997; Chalker, 1995; Booth y Seligson, 1994; Peeler, 1991; 1985). Its democratic system was the result of a long political transition that began in the late 19th century,² which involved a conflict-ridden process of development of political institutions during the first half of the 20th century (Lehouq, 1998; Ivan Molina & Lehouq, 1999)(Lehouq, 1998; Lehouq y Molina, 1999). While the date when this transition ended is debatable, it is not controversial to state that most of the institutions and liberties associated with a democratic system were in place by the mid-1950s (Booth, 1998; Peeler, 1991) (Booth, 1998; Peeler, 1991).

During the second half of the 20th century, there was a unique convergence of economic, social, and political processes in Costa Rica. On the one hand, like in many other underdeveloped countries, Costa Rican society underwent rapid economic and demographic change, especially between 1950 and 1980. On the other hand, unlike the rest, it combined the above with a sound democratic development and important progress regarding social equity. This unprecedented convergence contributed to the country's social and political stability, despite the turbulence of its regional milieu (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002)(PEN, 2002).

Between 1980 and 1982, the country underwent a severe economic crisis –though in comparative terms, it was less intense and protracted than in most Latin American countries. Once this crisis was overcome, there were important economic and institutional changes. Costa Rica took on a new style of economic development, based on trade liberalization and fostering foreign investment, which generated a dynamic and diversified foreign trade sector. A number of constitutional and legal changes altered the structure and functioning of the Costa Rican State and strengthened the institutions upholding the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, the country did not recover the high and sustained rates of economic growth and rapid social progress that it had enjoyed before 1980.

In addition to these economic and institutional changes, there were unprecedented political events. In recent years, there has been a noticeable weakening of the traditional political parties, an erosion of the two-party system, growing mistrust of politics among the citizenry, and declining levels of electoral participation.

1.2 Historical Evolution

The development of a democratic system in Costa Rica, during the first half of the 20th century, is part of a broader process of development of the national State and of the struggle to expand recognition and protection of citizens' rights in the political, civil, and social spheres. During the roughly ninety years of the democratic transition, there were certain identifiable changes

² The concept of transition is taken from O'Donnell and Schmitter, and it refers to the passage from one political system to another of a different nature (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

regarding institutions involved in access to political power (e.g. the electoral system) as well as those entrusted with ensuring that rulers, while they exercise political power, respect the “rule of law” and respect citizens’ rights (Table I.1).

In the early 20th century, Costa Rica underwent a process of political liberalization. Elections became the main means to obtain political power. Frequency of violent outbreaks, uprisings and coups declined drastically (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a)(PEN 2001b: 205). Separation of Church and State, together with prevalence of the former over the latter, was attained, as well as supremacy of civil over military authority, with the exception of the 1917-1919 dictatorship (Campos, 2000; M. Muñoz, 1990; Soto, 1985)(Campos, 2000; Muñoz, 1990; Soto, 1985). Nevertheless, the Executive manipulated the electoral system; the vote was not secret, and a substantial part of the adult population lacked of political rights (Ivan Molina & Lehouq, 1999; O. Salazar, 1997)(Lehouq y Molina, 1999; Salazar, 1997). At the same time, institutions associated with the rule of law were inceptive. The Judiciary was subordinate to Congress, which appointed and removed court officials (M. A. Jiménez, 1974; Segura, 1990)(Segura, 1990, Jiménez, 1974). There was no institutional protection of constitutional rights and liberties, nor was there institutional control demanding accountability and transparency in public office.

By contrast, in the 1960s there was already an electoral system capable of holding free, fair and competitive elections, under the direction of an independent Electoral Board that had constitutional standing. Deep changes regarding the rule of law were effected. The Judiciary had become an independent branch of the State, with exclusive authority over the courts, not only due to the provisions of the 1949 Constitution but also because of its financial and functional autonomy, guaranteed in 1957 (Gutiérrez, 1983)(C. J. Gutiérrez, 1983). At the same time, the General Comptroller’s Office of the Republic was established in 1949, as an auxiliary body to Congress and the first horizontal accountability mechanism (O’Donnell, 1998) within the State, entrusted with oversight of legality regarding public finance.

This development of democratic institutions went hand in hand with the expansion of the recognition and protection of political, civil and social rights, in response to growing demands by the citizenry (Acuña, 1993; De la Cruz, 1977; Oliva, 1985, 1997; Pérez, 1997)(Acuña, 1993; Pérez, 1997; Oliva, 1997, 1985; De la Cruz, 1977).. Struggles for social rights intertwined with demands for expansion of political rights (such as the secret ballot and female suffrage) and for more effective political representation (for example, of banana plantation workers and urban craftsmen) (Barahona, 1994; Aguilar, 1989a; Aguilar, 1989b)(M. Aguilar, 1989a, 1989b; Barahona, 1994). Specifically, conflict-ridden recognition of social rights was one of the driving forces of inclusion of the citizenry during the first half of the 20th century. These demands contributed to the adoption of important legal and institutional changes in the State, especially during the 1940s, with the enactment of the Labor Code and establishment of the Social Security, together with the development of social policies.³ These social reforms did not encompass most of the population until the 1960s and 1970s, as their scope was at first restricted to the urban

³ While the main social reforms were enacted during the 1940s, since the early 20th century the State had undertaken certain types of social intervention. During the first decades of that century, public spending in education grew and surpassed military expenditures, which constantly declined (Quesada, 1999; Muñoz, 1990). Sustained intervention and public spending in the area of public health and sanitation can also be found as early as the 1920s (Román, 1995).

middle classes (Garnier, 1990; Rosenberg, 1980)(Garnier, 1990; Rosenberg, 1980). However, it is worth noting that greater recognition of social rights and the development of public policy in these areas went hand in hand with progressive establishment of the institutions of poliarchy, the rule of law, and recognition of political and civil rights.

The 1948 civil war and the Political Constitution enacted one year later buried the authoritarian institutional remains in the Costa Rican political system.⁴ A key reform was abolition of the army, which eliminated a factor of instability and allowed public funds to be channeled toward other spheres of action. Suffrage also became universal, and interference of the Executive in other branches of the State came to an end. However, despite the decisive thrust toward democratization that ensued, these changes did not create a full democracy overnight. The political system maintained an antidemocratic exclusion from 1949 to 1975. Paragraph two of Article 98 of the Political Constitution allowed “antidemocratic” parties to be banned, pursuant to a decision by Congress. The breadth and intensity of the exclusion diminished toward the end of this period, but it meant that a set of citizens were unable to exercise their freedom of thought, organization, and free suffrage. Repeal of this constitutional provision in 1975 completed the protracted process of creating a democratic system.

Completion of the political transition coincided with a cycle of rapid economic and demographic growth. Costa Rican population grew from slightly over 800 thousand inhabitants in 1950 to almost 2.3 million in 1980. The economy grew even more rapidly: the per capita GDP increased from roughly 850 dollars to 2032 dollars during that time. There were also important social attainments (Fallas, 1984; Garnier, 1990; Rosenberg, 1980; Rovira, 1982)(Garnier, 1990; Fallas, 1984; Rovira, 1982). In the early 1960s, approximately half the population was poor; twenty years later, this level was roughly one in four. Social conditions improved: infant mortality, malnutrition and illiteracy diminished rapidly; life expectancy at birth increased, as did Social Security’s illness and maternity coverage (REM, for its Spanish acronym), which increased from 15% to 70% of the population between 1960 and 1980 (Table I.2).

⁴ There is a vast literature on the 1948 civil war. See, among others: Acuña, 1993; Cerdas and Contreras, 1988; Lehouq, 1998; 1992; Rojas, 1986; Salazar, 1990; 1981; Shifter, 1986; Soto, 1991; Villegas and Núñez, 1997.

Table I.1 Periodification and Characteristics of the Democratic Transition Process in Costa Rica

Dimensions of democracy	Authoritarian republic	Transition			Democracy
	(Independence – end of the 19th century)	Stage 1: Liberalization (end of 19th century- 1917)	Stage 2: Political inclusion (1919 – 1948)	Stage 3: Institutional foundations (1948-1975)	Poliarchy and democratic rule of law(1975-...)
Citizen inclusion1/	Extremely restricted	Restricted	Restricted	Quasi-universal	Universal
Elections 2/	One among several paths to power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Main path to power ▪ Control of the Executive over the electoral process ▪ Selective and changing exclusion of parties and politicians ▪ Electoral fraud 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only path to political power ▪ Control of the Executive over the electoral process ▪ Selective and changing exclusion of parties ▪ Electoral fraud 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only path to political power ▪ Independent Electoral Board controls the electoral process ▪ Systematic exclusion of left-wing parties ▪ No electoral fraud 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only path to political power ▪ Independent Electoral Board controls the electoral process ▪ No exclusions ▪ No electoral fraud
Rights and liberties 3/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No institutional protection ▪ No tolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No institutional protection ▪ Variable tolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No institutional protection ▪ Variable tolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak institutional protection ▪ Selective intolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong institutional protection ▪ Broad tolerance
Judiciary 4/	Weak judiciary, controlled by other branches	Weak Judiciary, controlled by other branches	Weak Judiciary, with some independence	Independent Judiciary	Independent and strong Judiciary
Accountability regarding public acts 5/	No institutional control	No institutional control	No institutional control	Few institutional checks with selective coverage	Multiple and strong institutional checks with complete coverage
Recognition of social rights 6/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not recognized ▪ Social spending scant and sporadic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legal recognition of primary education ▪ Public spending on education, not on other social items of expenditure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Partial recognition of labor and social rights ▪ Public spending on education, not on other social items of expenditure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Universal coverage of social security ▪ High level of social spending 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Universal coverage of social security ▪ High level of social spending

1/ Extremely restricted: less than 25% of the adult population has full political rights. Restricted: 50% or less of the adult population has full political rights.

Quasi-universal: all the adult population has political rights but there are constitutional exceptions. Universal: all the adult population, with no exceptions, has political rights.

2/ Elections as one among several paths: elections alternate with coups d'état or other mechanisms to select the head of government. Elections as the main path: elections are used as the only means to select the head of government but there are recurring episodes in which the loser of the election rejects the results and stages an uprising. Elections as the only path: losers accept electoral results.

3/ No institutional protection: there are no bodies specifically responsible for protection of the constitutional rights of the population. Weak institutional protection: there are institutions responsible for protecting the constitutional rights of the population but there is little access to them by citizens. Strong institutional protection: there are institutions responsible for protecting the constitutional rights of the population and broad access to them by citizens. No tolerance: imprisonment and exile of opponents as customary practice. Variable tolerance: there are periods in which political opposition is accepted but tolerance depends on the President. Selective intolerance: only certain groups are persecuted and censored.

4/ Weak judiciary, controlled by other branches: Judiciary staff is appointed by the legislative branch; there are no provisions to ensure the Judiciary's resources, administrative and technical infrastructure is minimal, the legislative branch has the power to reverse court rulings and the Executive disregards rulings without political and legal consequences. Weak Judiciary with some independence: appointment of Judiciary staff is made by the legislative branch; there are no provisions that ensure the Judiciary's resources, administrative and technical infrastructure is minimal, but other branches obey court rulings. Independent Judiciary: constitutional and legal provisions ensure budgetary, jurisdictional and functional independence of the Judiciary. Independent and strong Judiciary: constitutional and legal provisions ensure budgetary, jurisdictional and functional independence of the Judiciary; the Judiciary exercises control of constitutionality and effective lawfulness regarding acts by the other branches of the State.

5/ No institutional control: bodies responsible for oversight of legality of the administrative acts of public officials and institutions are non-existent or they exist legally with scant operational and technical capabilities. Few checks with selective coverage: bodies are established with the authority to oversee legality of administrative and technical acts of public officials and institutions, these bodies have technical and operational capabilities; however, broad sectors of public action take place without checks. Multiple and strong institutional checks with complete coverage: various oversight bodies conduct specialized control over lawfulness of acts of public administration, with no de facto or de jure reserved areas.

6/ Social spending scant and sporadic: public expenditures in education, health, housing and social security are less than 10% of central government spending, with sharp yearly fluctuations. High level of social spending: expenditures in education, health, housing and social security are more than 25% of central government spending.

Source: developed by the authors based on (*Programa Estado de la Nación*, 2001a) PEN, 2001a and the following publications: (Víctor Acuña, 1993; Víctor Acuña, 1995; Acuña & Molina, 1991; M. Aguilar, 1989a, 1989b; O. Aguilar, 1977; Barahona, 1994; Booth, 1995, 1998; Booth & Seligson, 1994; Campos, 2000; J. M. Cerdas & Contreras, 1988; R. Cerdas, 1998, 1999; Chalker, 1995; De la Cruz, 1977; Delgado, 1997; C. González & Céspedes, 1995; C. J. Gutiérrez, 1983; Hilje, 1997; M. A. Jiménez, 1974; Jurado, 2000; Lehouq, 1992, 1995, 1998; Iván Molina & Lehouq, 1999; Iván Molina & Palmer, 1992, 1994; J. Mora, 1989; I. Muñoz, 1988; M. Muñoz, 1990; Murillo, 1995; Oliva, 1985, 1997; Paige, 1997; Peeler, 1985, 1991; Peralta, 1962; Pérez, 1997; Quesada, 1999; Rojas, 1986, 1990; Román, 1995; Rosenberg, 1980; Rovira, 1982; J. Salazar, 1981, 1990; O. Salazar, 1997; O. Salazar & Salazar, 1992; Samper, 1992, 1993; Seligson & Muller, 1990; Shifter, 1986; Silva, 1993; A. Sojo, 1984; Soto, 1985; Soto Harrison, 1991; Vargas, 1999; Villegas & Núñez, 1997; Yashar, 1997; Zeledón, 1992) citadas en la bibliografía .

Table I.2 Costa Rica. Some Social and Economic Indicators 1940-2002 at the Beginning of Each Decade

Variables	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2002
Human Development Index	N.D	N.D	0.55	0.65	0.75	0.85	0.82	0.83
Population (thousands)	656	812	1,199	1,758	2,302	3,050	3,925	4,089
Poor households (%)			50	29	26	27	21	21
Life expectancy at birth (years)	46.9	55.6	62.5	65.4	72.6	76.7	77.7	78.5
Infant mortality (per thousand born live)	123	90	68	61	19	15	10	11
Malnutrition among children under 6 (%)	N.D	N.D	14	12	4	4	3	
Social security coverage (%)		8	15	39	70	82	88	87
Illiteracy among persons over 12 (%)	27	21	16	13	10	7	5	N.D.
Phone lines in place (10.000 inhab.)	N.D	N.D	74.2	231.8	788.2	1,028.8	2,538.1	2,768.1
Per capita GDP (1990 US\$)	702	847	1,080	1,501	2,032	1,829	3,290	3,218
Persons active in agriculture (%)	66	63	59	49	35	25	20	16
Fiscal deficit / GDP ratio (%)	N.D	0.03	0.94	1.40	8.97	3.40	3.00	4.30
Domestic debt / GDP (%)	N.D	4.1	4.2	9.6	14.8	20.5	37.8	39.8
Remuneration of employees of Central Government / Total Remuneration (%)	N.D	N.D	19.7	22.7	30.6	46.5	32.4	33.5
Total government spending / GDP (%)	N.D	2.1	4.9	6.6	12.2	12.0	15.6	16.9

Source: Estado de la Nación con base en: (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002) based on: UNDP, CCP-UCR, INEC, MINAE, Ministry of Public Health, CCSS, MOPT, ICE, BCCR, Bureau of Economic Analysis

1.3 Recent Economic and Social Evolution

The period of rapid economic growth and social progress ended with the 1980-1982 economic crisis and the domestic repercussions of the military conflicts that devastated Central America. Even though this crisis lasted less and was less intense than in other Latin American countries, it brought deep consequences for Costa Rican society. Poverty among the population doubled in two years: it jumped from 26% in 1980 to 55% in 1982. After the external debt multiplied almost eightfold in only six years (1974-1980), in 1981 the country was the first in the hemisphere to declare a unilateral moratorium on payment of the foreign debt, which closed the door to external funding (González & Céspedes, 1995)(González y Céspedes, 1995). High fiscal deficit (over 8% of the GDP) restricted public spending, especially social spending, which dropped sharply. One out of every six secondary school students dropped out of the educational system (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002, 2003a) (PEN, 2002). Despite the abrupt economic and social regression, measurements by Seligson and Gómez at the time showed solid citizen support for the political system (Seligson & Gómez, 1987).(Seligson y Gómez, 1987).

The political response to the crisis was –after attaining macroeconomic stability- the establishment of a new style of development based on furthering exports and trade liberalization,

attracting foreign investment and reducing State intervention in the economy. Toward the mid 1990s, in general terms, the country had managed to recover its pre-crisis economic and social levels. In 1990, the per capita GDP was slightly less than ten years earlier, the level of poverty was just one point higher, and the fiscal deficit had been brought down to manageable proportions (circa 3% of the GDP) (Table I.2). A decade later, at the end of the 20th century, the country had substantial attainments: its trade liberalization enabled a five-fold increase of exports in ten years, and Costa Rica became the largest per capita exporter in Latin America; the per capita GDP doubled in the course of a decade, and the level of poverty among its population declined from 27% to 21% between 1990 and 2000 (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b)(PEN, varios años).

However, the recent past cannot be said to be equivalent to the period of rapid social and economic progress from 1950 to 1980. Certain social indicators no doubt continued to improve (rising life expectancy at birth, higher levels of schooling and lower infant mortality and malnutrition). Nevertheless, during the last twenty years economic growth has been uneven and on average lower than it was in previous decades. Secondly, during the nineties Costa Rican society became more unequal. In point of fact, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.37 to 0.425 between 1997 and 2002 (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003). Third, even though poverty diminished during the first half of the nineties, economic growth between 1995 and 2003 did not lead to subsequent reductions. This degree of delinkage between economic performance and social equity has become one of the most controversial issues in the country (Sojo, 2000)(Sojo, 2000).

1.4 Recent Political Evolution

Despite the social and political tensions generated by the 1980-1982 economic crisis and by the effects of conflicts in the isthmus, the democracy that emerged from the protracted transition was a stable one. From 1972 to 2003, the Freedom House Index rated Costa Rican democracy in a very similar manner to countries such as the United States and Sweden (Freedom House, 2004)(Freedom House, 2004). The situation is similar as recorded in Polity IV and in the Poliarchy dataset of Vanhanen (Gurr & Jagger, 2000; Vanhanen, 1990)(Vanharen, 2000; Gurr y Jagger, 2000). In addition to its stability, another key feature of recent democratic evolution has been the institutional reforms effected during the last decade of the 20th century.

After the transition, the Costa Rican variety of democracy can be defined as a stable presidentialist system with a highly centralized State⁵ and a two-party system. However, this variety differs from the equivalent ones in the region because of the ever stronger and more numerous political, legal and administrative checks over the Executive branch, developed during the latter decades of the 20th century. There was also a major expansion of the recognition of the rights of the population and a strengthening of mechanisms to safeguard and protect them. Currently, multiple political and institutional actors, including the citizenry as a whole, have (at least some) effective capacity to veto public policy formulation or execution (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a).

⁵ The municipal tax burden with respect to the GDP –the relative weight of taxes collected by municipal authorities within the economy- did not surpass 1% (Alfaro, 2003; Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a).

From an institutional viewpoint, the Costa Rican Executive branch is constitutionally weak (Carey, 1998)(Carey, 1998). Contrary to other Latin American political systems, the legislative powers of the Executive are subject to the laws enacted by Congress, and the Executive lacks veto power regarding approval of public budgets. The Legislative, in turn, encompasses a complex institutional framework. In addition to the Legislative Assembly, it includes two powerful institutions: the General Comptroller of the Republic, which oversees execution of public spending and approves two thirds of all State spending, and the Ombudsman's Office, established in 1993 to safeguard the rights of the inhabitants vis-à-vis the actions or omissions of public management. Both institutions exercise strong control over actions of the Executive, although they are independent with respect to the Legislative Assembly.

Nevertheless, the most important recent change in the structure of the Costa Rican State has been the displacement of power toward the Judiciary. In 1989, the Legislative Assembly amended the Political Constitution (Law 7128) and adopted the law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (7531), which added a new body to the Supreme Court of Justice: the Constitutional Court or 4th Chamber, as the only and supreme tribunal in charge of constitutional jurisdiction in the country. The 4th Chamber can find any public act unconstitutional; it decides on conflicts among branches of the State regarding their competence, and it issues mandatory or optional opinions on matters brought before it by other public institutions. It also substantially modified access of citizens to constitutional justice, as well as relations among branches of government (Jurado, 2000; Volio, 2000)(Jurado, 2000; Volio, 2000). While from 1938 to 1989 there were 155 cases questioning constitutionality, 110,000 such cases were filed between 1990 and 2003. At the same time, the Legislative Assembly has adopted the practice of submitting legislative initiatives to the Chamber before their final approval, and it generally respects its rulings (although at this stage they are not binding) (Rodríguez, 2003)(Rodríguez, 2003). Meanwhile, public spending in the system for administration of justice has increased significantly, and during 2002 this system handled roughly one million new cases (for a population of four million individuals) (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a)(PEN, 2003).

While the institutional changes in the structure of the State over the last twenty years can be seen in the clear trend toward strengthening of institutions pertaining to the rule of law and protection of citizens rights, trends in the political system are less clear. On the one hand, the provisions and institutions that regulate the electoral system have remained stable. The system has maintained its ability to ensure clean and free elections: between 1990 and 2002 there have been no legal or other public allegations of fraud or irregularities in national or municipal elections, or of threats to the safety and property of any candidate to public office.⁶ In general terms, electoral disproportionality in Costa Rica remained low throughout the period (Lijphart, 1999)(Lijphart, 1999).

However, the political parties, the party system, and electoral participation have undergone profound changes. From 1982 to 1994 there was a stable two-party system in Costa Rica, with “catch-all” parties and low electoral volatility.⁷ In fact, the number of effective parties (NEP) in the legislative elections continued to be about 2.5, and legislative volatility fluctuated between

⁶ Although such events did occur in the internal conventions of the parties.

⁷ The first research study that provides useful data on this “catch-all” nature uses information from the mid-1970s (Sánchez, 1985).

8% and 16%. Nevertheless, during this period the two-party system began to show serious fractures in the 1998 legislative and municipal elections –especially in the latter. This time, the NEP in the legislative increased to 3.4 –entailing a transition toward a multi-party system- and in most municipalities the traditional parties faced serious competition (Alfaro, 2002)(Alfaro, 2002).

This situation became more pronounced in the most recent elections. For the first time in almost eighty years there was a second electoral round, as no party attained more than 40% of the valid votes cast, which is the amount necessary to win the elections. In the presidential elections, the NEP increased from 2.4 in 1998 to 3.5 in 2002; in the legislative elections, it rose to 3.9 (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a)(PEN, 2003). Furthermore, electoral volatility skyrocketed, especially volatility among parties belonging to different ideological blocks (Sánchez, 2002) (Sánchez, 2002). Currently, the party system is in a fluid state. Contrary to other Latin American countries, the traditional parties have not disappeared, but their stability and future (as well as that of the emerging parties) is uncertain.

Table I.3 Control of the Executive and Legislative Branches, Number of Effective Parties, and Electoral Volatility, 1974, 2002

Period	Control of the Executive	Control of the Legislative branch	NEP presidential elections a/	NEP legislative elections a/	Volatility presidential elections (%) b/	Volatility legislative elections (%) c/
1974-1978	PLN	Without a majority g/	3.3	4.0	13.8	41.7
1978-2002	CU d/	Without a majority g/	2.2	2.9	3.9	19.6
1982-1986	PLN e/	PLN	2.2	2.5	13.5	16.0
1986-1990	PLN	PLN	2.1	2.5	6.7	8.1
1990-1994	PUSC f/	PUSC	2.1	2.6	5.2	10.3
1994-1998	PLN	Without a majority g/	2.1	2.7	4.1	13.0
1998-2002	PUSC	Without a majority g/	2.4	3.4	29.0	..
2002-2006	PUSC	Without a majority g/	3.2	3.7		

a/ NEP: Number of effective parties. It measures the actual weight of the parties according to their share of the votes. The formula herein applied was developed by Laakso and Taagapera.

b/ Volatility of the presidential ballot: the formula applied was developed by Pedersen. It measures the share of the votes that change from one party to another during two successive elections.

c/ To calculate electoral volatility in the legislative elections, the following rules were applied for a party to remain the same: (a) the parties change their names but their leadership and political orientation are the same and they win parliamentary representation under the new name; (b) parties join forces to set up a coalition and they obtain parliamentary recognition as a coalition.

d/ Coalición Unidad

e/ Partido Liberación Nacional

f/ Partido Unidad Social Cristiana

g/ No party has a 29 seat parliamentary majority. In all cases, the party in office is the largest minority.

Source: adapted from (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001b) and updated with information from (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002; Sánchez, 2002) PEN, 2002 y Sánchez, 2002.

Alongside erosion of the two-party system, there have been two important facts: an internal weakening of the parties' organization and a substantial decline of citizens' electoral participation. Regarding the first aspect, the structure of the parties became more democratic through adoption of open conventions and direct elections to choose candidates to public office (Fernández, 1996; Piszk & Segura, 1983; Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a)(PEN, 2001a; Piszk y Segura, 1983; Fernández, 1996). But democratization accentuated internal conflicts and strongly affected party discipline, both in the "party in congress" and in the party in the townships.⁸

Electoral participation has declined substantially. For almost 40 years, from 1966 to 1994, abstentionism was well under 20%. In the 1998 and 2002 presidential elections, it grew to 30%, a level only comparable to that of the 1953 elections, the first ones after the 1949 civil war, when two political forces had been banned (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002)(PEN, 2002). The first mayoral –non-simultaneous- elections in the country's history were held in December 2002, and non-participation rose to 70%, a level higher than countries that traditionally have had low electoral participation (Alfaro, 2002)(Alfaro, 2002).

Finally, public opinion polls show rising skepticism of citizens regarding political parties, clearly noticeable since the mid-nineties. As in other Latin American countries, trust in parties is the lowest among all public institutions and social organizations ((Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002; Seligson, 2001) Seligson, 2001; PEN, 2002 based on data from (UNIMER R.I., 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).UNIMER R.I.)

1.4 Recent Studies in Political Culture

The first empirical studies on political culture in Costa Rica date from the 1970s.⁹ A national survey on political participation was conducted in 1973 (Booth, 1998)(Booth, 1998). Establishment of the Information Office of the Presidency during the Oduber administration (1974-1978) brought with it the systematic practice of conducting public opinion polls for political decision-making. Toward the end of that decade, public opinion survey firms such as CID-GALLUP began their operations (to date, this firm has the longest public opinion trends series, with data going back to 1978).

However, academic studies on Costa Rican political culture only began in the 1980s. During this decade, the main analyses were conducted by Mitchell Seligson, often in collaboration with E. Mueller and professor Miguel Gómez Barrantes (Seligson & Caspi, 1983; Seligson & Gómez, 1987; Seligson & Muller, 1990). A public opinion project began at Universidad de Costa Rica toward the late eighties, headed by Jorge Poltronieri and Nora Garita, and it continued throughout the following decade (Garita & Poltronieri, 1989; Garita & Poltronieri, 1997)(Garita y Poltronieri, 1989; Garita y Poltronieri, 1997).

⁸ The phrase "party in congress" is taken from Coppedge's study on Venezuela (Coppedge, 1996) .

⁹ There are a number of qualitative studies on political culture, both anthropological and historical, which we do not refer to in this brief note. See, among others: (R. Cerdas, 1999; Iván Molina & Palmer, 1992, 1994; Murillo, 1995). Recently, the work by Alexander Jiménez, who analyses political culture from a philosophical standpoint, is noteworthy (A. Jiménez, 2002).

Beginning in the nineties, there has been a substantial increase in the number of empirical studies on Costa Rican political culture. In Costa Rica, new public opinion firms such as UNIMER R.I., Demoscopía, and Borge-Asociados developed public opinion time series on various topics, especially regarding performance of public institutions, political parties, and electoral preferences. UNIMER R.I. has conducted in-depth studies on values and attitudes for the daily newspaper La Nación.¹⁰ In the context of public universities, we must highlight the contributions by the Instituto de Estudios en Población at Universidad Nacional (IDESPO-UNA), of the Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas and the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales at Universidad de Costa Rica (IIP-UCR and IIS-UCR, respectively). IDESPO has a time series that begins in 1995 and, since 1997, it conducts a monthly public opinion survey on matters of interest.¹¹ IIP, in turn, has conducted various studies in the field of social psychology. More recently, the IIS-UCR began to conduct public opinion surveys (Fournier, Gutierrez, & Cruz, 2002; Fournier, Raventós, & Sandoval, 2003) (Fournier, et.al, 2002; Fournier, et. al, 2003) and it is about to publish an in-depth study on non-participants in the 2002 election, in response to a request by the Supreme Electoral Board.

Other research centers have conducted studies on Costa Rican political culture. In this regard, the main centers have been PROCESOS, the Costa Rican seat of Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and the Programa Estado de la Nación. PROCESOS sponsored the publication of two important works with comparative studies on political culture in Central America (Gómez & Madrigal, 2004; F. Rodríguez, Castro, & Espinoza, 1998; F. Rodríguez, Castro, & Madrigal, 2004)(Rodríguez, F, Castro, S. y R. Espinoza, 1998; Gómez, M. y J. Madrigal, 2003; Rodríguez, F, Castro, S. y J. Madrigal, 2003). FLACSO-Costa Rica, in turn, has conducted national research studies on values and attitudes (C. Sojo & Rivera, 2002), in the framework of regional studies (Rivera, 2001). Finally, the Programa Estado de la Nación sponsored a study on values and satisfactors (Gómez, 1998) (Gómez, 1997) and the Citizens Audit on the Quality of Democracy which included the issue of values and attitudes of the population (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a)(PEN, 2001).

Outside Costa Rica, the more important studies on this country's political culture continue to be those conducted by the public opinion project at Vanderbilt University, headed by M. Seligson (Seligson, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001; Seligson & Booth, 1993; Seligson & Carrión, 2002; Seligson & Caspi, 1983; Seligson & Gómez, 1987; Seligson & Muller, 1990)(Seligson, 2001). Recently, Booth has studied Costa Rican democracy and summarized, as part of his analysis, results from various empirical research studies on Costa Rican culture (Booth, 1998)(Booth, 1998).

Despite their different methodologies and results, the studies concur in certain findings: continuing citizen support for democracy, though with certain fluctuations; growing dissatisfaction with the way public institutions function; great mistrust of political parties; a rising feeling of public insecurity, and a perception of greater corruption in public office. Finally,

¹⁰ See: (UNIMER R.I., 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). An interesting case to analyze is the study on environmental values conducted in 2002.

¹¹ IDESPO conducts two types of public opinion polls: (a) a monthly phone survey with a sample of 300 persons from the Greater Metropolitan Area of San Jose. Generally, this survey focuses on a specific topic that is reiterated later on. (b) A bi-annual public opinion study based on a sample of 600 individuals in the Greater Metropolitan Area, part of whom are interviewed over the phone and part by means of fieldwork.

several studies show that values of intolerance toward minority groups persist among broad segments of the population.

2.0 Data and Methods

2.1 Introduction

This is the report for Costa Rica of the results from the survey: “An Audit of Democracy: Central America, Panama, Mexico, and Colombia”. This is a collaborative study carried out on national probabilistic samples in eight countries, coordinated by Mitchell Seligson as part of the project on Public Opinion in Latin America carried out by the Latin American Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh. The United States Agency for International Development financed the study. The Central American Population Center (CCP) at the Universidad de Costa Rica carried out the study in Costa Rica.

The study was based on standard procedures for the eight countries. These included sample design, informed consent of the participants, questionnaire, data processing, and analysis. Needless to say, there were adaptations to the particular situations in each country, as well as additions to the questionnaire and the sample, according to need. However, core comparability was maintained among the countries, as well as the common methodology.

The study methodology, in particular the topics researched and the population information obtained, follow a line of research by Professor Seligson initiated more than two decades ago (Seligson and Caspi, 1983; Seligson, 2001) on democracy in Costa Rica and in Latin America.

This chapter summarizes the methods used to draw the sample, obtain information in the field, and process, edit, and analyze the data. Emphasis is given to aspects unique to Costa Rica, since the elements in common among the eight countries will be dealt with in another report. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the results obtained with regards to sample representativeness and respondent characteristics, as well as an assessment of the precision of the results or sampling error.

2.2 Sample Design¹².

The study was carried out following probabilistic survey design. While defining the design an effort was made to make several aspects compatible, some of which were in contraposition, such as study goals, clarity to ease field work and avoid errors while underway, field personnel training and quality, availability of the sampling framework, budget, certain analysis requirements, costs, and the level of precision for the results, among others.

For the purposes of this survey, the population of interest consisted of all Costa Rican citizens, by birth or naturalization, 18 or more years of age residing in the country. Non-naturalized immigrants are excluded from the survey (approximately 10% of the adult population), as are minors and those residing in collective dwellings. The survey also excluded persons with physical or mental disabilities that would hinder their ability to respond to the questionnaire.

The sampling framework utilized the cartography by census segment prepared by the National Census and Statistics Institute (INEC) for the Population and Housing Census in June 2000. A census segment is an enumeration unit that is well defined on a map, and holds approximately 60

¹² Appendix B provides a complete description of the sample design.

dwellings. The segments selected were visited prior to data collection, to update the map when needed.

A sample size of 1,500 interviews was defined ahead of time. This size allows obtaining results with a reasonable degree of precision, even for subpopulations.

Sample selection was stratified, probabilistic and multi-staged. The strata were the San José Metropolitan Area, Rest of the Central Valley, and Outside the Central Valley, and within each *cantón* (municipality) urban or rural areas according to the census definition. Sample size within each stratum was defined using allocation proportional to size.

Within each stratum, *cantones* were selected as Primary Sampling Units (PSU). Selection was systematic with probability proportional to *canton* “size” (PPS). The indicator of the size was the number of Costa Ricans age 18 or more years enumerated in the 2000 Census. Fifty interviews was the number established ahead of time per *canton*, this was the minimum number necessary for a *cantón* level analysis. With probabilistic selection, 29 *cantones* were chosen (see map in Appendix B). One of the *cantones*, San José, had double representation (100 interviews) as dictated by the probabilistic draw

Within each *cantón*, census segments were chosen with PPS. The segments were stratified beforehand into urban and rural, with allocation proportional to size of the stratum in that *cantón*. The number of segments selected was determined by the prior condition on the number of interviews per segment: about 6 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas. These numbers are a compromise between the objective of concentrating the sample (to reduce costs and facilitate field work) and of having a sufficiently dispersed sample to reduce homogeneity within each cluster and, as a consequence, the design effect. The size of the compact areas was adjusted upwards for non-coverage (no interview, refusals, and absences, among others, according to experience in other surveys) as well as ineligibility (disability or non-Costa Rican citizenship).

After a quick actualization, the 194 census segments selected were subdivided into compact clusters to obtain 6 interviews in urban areas and 12 in rural areas. During fieldwork, one compact area per census segment was selected for interviewing.

The field teams were instructed on how to visit the dwellings in a compact segment in order, until the following assigned quotas were achieved:

Males 18-29 years of age;

Males 30 or more years of age;

Females that are neither working nor studying (housewives);

Females working or studying (at least half-time).

The quotas were set separately in each segment by Monte Carlo drawings, with probabilities in accord with the census population in each group, within each segment.

A restriction was placed on interviewing more than one person per dwelling. The interviewers received instructions on selecting one person randomly for interviewing, if there were several eligible ones in the dwelling.

2.3 Instruments for Data Collection

The most important data collection instrument was the *questionnaire* (Appendix D). A majority of the questions were defined for the international study in the eight countries, with the necessary adaptations to Costa Rican language and reality. These questions represented 71% of the questionnaire. But questions specific to Costa Rica were also included. These are identified in the questionnaire with the abbreviation CR. Some of these questions were defined jointly with researchers from other countries, but their inclusion was optional for each country. Other questions were unique to Costa Rica. The questionnaire was accompanied with a set of cards (seen Appendix D), which were used to aid the respondent in selecting his/her responses. The average duration for an interviewer to complete the questionnaire was 36 minutes; the interquartile interval was 20 to 40 minutes. The questionnaire was tested and refined in a pilot test in which 20 complete interviews were carried out.

In addition to the questionnaire, during the fieldwork a segment map, route sheet, and the informed consent form were used.

The *segment map*. The field teams received the layout for each cluster with an indication of the dwellings to visit and the route to follow. The map was originally prepared by the National Institute of Census and Statistics (INEC) and constitutes part of the cartography for the 2000 census. The map also contains useful information on locating the cluster, such as geographic north and reference points such as churches or highways. For the route, the rule was to visit every other dwelling, i.e., not to visit contiguous dwellings, but rather to skip one. The map was also useful for the supervisor to carry out his/her supervision visits to the households.

The *route sheet* (see facsimile in Appendix E). This sheet indicates the interview quotas to be met for each cluster. It also serves to write down the dwellings visited and the persons eligible for the interview, as well as checking the degree to which the quota is met. This sheet is also essential for making re-visits, whether these were for supervision or to complete a pending interview, since it also contains comments such as convenient hours.

Informed consent. The comparative country study was reviewed and approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB) from the University of Pittsburgh (see facsimile of the approval note for the project in Appendix F). As is the case in all human research, it was necessary to obtain an informed consent before proceeding to the interview. To this end, a consent sheet was read to the respondent, which then was left with him/her. The consent was verbal, since the research is anonymous¹³. Once the data had been processed, any documents that could have identified the respondents were destroyed.

¹³ A translation of the Spanish text read and handed to the respondent was the following:

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a public opinion study that is financed by USAID. I have been sent by the University of Costa Rica to request an interview with you that will last between 30 and 45 minutes.

The main objective of the study is to ascertain people's opinion regarding different aspects of the situation in Costa Rica.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may leave any question without answering it or terminate the interview at any time. The responses that you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not receive any payment for your participation, but neither will this cause you any expense.

2.4 Fieldwork

The data collection effort in the field was carried out between February 13 and March 31, under the coordination of a person with broad experience in this type of surveys. There were three field teams. Each team had three interviewers (almost all of whom were female), a supervisor and a vehicle. There were also interviewers specialized in obtaining difficult or pending interviews.

A majority of the field personnel had experience in this type of surveys; they received training for one week. The training included test interviews and simulated interviews.

The data collection process, in addition to the interviews, included field review and supervision activities, as well as critiquing in the office, in order to correct errors from the field. Supervision included re-visits to all households ascertaining that the interview had actually taken place.

2.5 Data Processing

After an initial critiquing of the questionnaires received in the office, these were codified. To wit, the codes for all of the responses were entered in the space foreseen on the right-hand margin of the questionnaire. Coding was carried out with a different color (red) than that used by the interviewers (blue). This distinction was useful later for clearing up doubts.

The coded questionnaires were then passed to data entry and verification with the package “Census and Survey Processing System (CSPro)”, public domain software, which has been designed for processing censuses and surveys by the U.S. Census Bureau. The eight countries in the study used this package for data entry.

The information was entered into the computer twice, both times using CSPro. The second data entry is known as verification. A different person from the one that entered the questionnaires was in charge of the verification. CSPro issues an alert to the verifier each time that a re-entered datum does not concur with the one entered originally. When this occurred, the data entry personnel followed certain rules to correct the information on the basis of the data, if that was the case.

The use of CSPro and the verification of 100% of the information allow the researchers to have immediate access to “clean” databases ready for analysis. This information had no out-of-range values, nor question pass or skip errors, nor data entry errors.

The database was exported to the “Statistical Package for Social Science” (SPSS), which was used to produce the tabulations, figures, and other analyses. Only two months after fieldwork was completed, a draft of the report on the survey results was available.

If you have any questions regarding the study, you may contact the Centro Centroamericano de Población, at the University of Costa Rica, Tel: 207-5693 with Dr. Luis Rosero B. Or with Éricka Méndez Ch.

Would you like to participate?

2.6 Definition of the Variables for the Analysis

As a step prior to examining the results, a set of general variables was defined that characterized the population interviewed. This set of variables, which is used in all of the chapters of the analysis, and the regressions, includes:

Central Valley Region or rest, dummy variable 0 or 1, in which the “rest of the country” is the reference group.

Type or size of locality: *Greater San José Metro Area (GAM)* which includes the capital and nearby cities (from Paraíso to Atenas, including Cartago, Heredia, and Alajuela). *Rest Urban* of the country (small and intermediate cities). *Rural*. For the regression analyses, two dummy variables were created, so that the reference group is the GAM.

Municipality: the 29 municipalities (*cantones*) in the sample. In the regressions, 28 dummy variables were used, one for each municipality except for San José, which was the reference group (San José had 100 interviews, while the other *cantones* had 50).

Gender. In the regressions, the dummy variable assumed the value of 1 for males.

Housewives. This is a variable based on Question Q10, to distinguish women who work (or study) from those dedicated to household chores. In the regressions, the results must be considered together with the gender variable. The reference group is that of women working and males and housewives are compared to it, with as many dummy variables.

In union (or married). Dummy variable that the respondent is in a marital or consensual union. Based on Question Q11.

Education. An interval variable was used in the regression analysis: number of years completed, with a range of 0 to 16, where the last value represented those individuals with 4 or more years of university studies. In Costa Rica, primary education is comprised of 6 years and secondary is completed in 5 years. However, some high schools, particularly technical ones, require 6 years. All individuals with secondary completed were codified as 11 years. When presenting some results, the following categories were used: *Primary or less* (up to 6 years of education completed). *Secondary* (from 7 to 11 years, i.e., at least one year of secondary education). *Post secondary* (12 or more years, i.e., university or para-university courses).

Age in years at last birthday. In some regressions, the variable “age squared” was introduced to capture curvilinear relationships with age.

Income of the family in thousands of *colones* per month¹⁴. These are the central values of the classes registered in Question Q10 of the questionnaire (Appendix D). The final open group of 400 thousand or more was assigned the value 500. Due to the fact that this variable had a considerable number of missing data (5%), income was imputed to these missing data based on a

¹⁴ The exchange rate at the time of the survey was approximately 400 colones per US dollar.

multiple regression analysis¹⁵. Prior to the imputed values, the average income in thousands was 166.6, after imputation it increased to 167.3.

Wealth Index. Indicates the number of “commodities” available in the home. It is calculated by summing the questions R1 through R15. It ranges from 0 to 14 with an average of 7.7. For some results the index was categorized into three groups: low (index less than 6), medium (6 to 8) and high (9 or more).

Religiosity. Based on Question Q4, three categories were created: *High*, attends church every week; *Medium*, attends every once in a while; and *Low*, rarely or never attends or professes no religion. Two dummy variables were included in the regressions, with the high religiosity group as reference group.

Indices were also defined to measure different aspects of democratic culture. The definitions are specified in the corresponding chapters of this report. It should be noted that at times it is necessary to use some of these indices before they have been defined in the report. For example, to explain attitudes in support of democracy in Chapter III, a social cohesion indicator that is explained in Chapter IX is used.

2.7 Results from the Sample and Description of the Respondents

The probabilistic character of the sample and the availability of a good sampling framework give one reason to expect that the group interviewed is representative of the population of Costa Ricans 18 or more years of age. However, due to random errors or biases that inevitably occur when a design is implemented, the characteristics of the sample finally obtained may deviate from those of the population it represents. In fact, there may even be biases that should be corrected. Table II.1 allows us to respond to the question: how representative is the study sample of the population? To this end, several characteristics from the sample have been compared with those of the corresponding population from the 2000 census. There is a good coherence between survey values and those from the census. Characteristics such as gender, age, marital status and economic activity are practically identical. The exceptions are the percentages with telephone, computer and automobile. For these three items, the survey shows values substantially higher than the census (10 percentage points or more), which cannot be due to random fluctuations. However, it is likely that these differences are real, i.e., in the 3.5 years between the census and the survey there has been a considerable increase in ownership of these three items.

¹⁵ The equation for imputing the missing income values estimated by Poisson multiple regression was: Income = EXP (3.458306 + 0.1370191 * Wealth index + 0.055558 * Education + 0.1053873 * male - 0.0840943 * housewife - 0.1128101 * rural); pseudo R-squared of 0.48 and a correlation among observed and predicted values of 0.71.

Table II.1 Characteristics of the Sample and the 2000 Census

Characteristics	2000 Census	Survey
(N)	(2,169,804)	(1,500)
Gender		
% Males	49	49
Average age (years)	39	40
% <30 years of age	33	32
Marital status		
% Single	28	26
% In union	61	63
Education		
Average years completed	8	8
% Secondary or higher	45	53
Labor force participation		
% in the labor force	52	53
Selected artifacts		
% With telephone	59	69
% With computer	16	27
% With automobile	29	39
Region		
% Central Valley	67	67
Type of locality		
% Greater San José	42	45
% Rest urban	19	18
% Rural	39	37

The sample included slightly more females (51%) than males. The average age of the males interviewed is 41 years, and 40 years for the females. Sixty-three percent are in some type of union (legal or consensual). A little more than one-half have primary studies or less, a group that includes 2% without studies and 30% with primary completed (not shown in the table). Approximately 20% of the respondents have some college education. A little more than one-half are in the labor force. Among females this percentage is 31%, and summing this group with the 8% who are students leaves 61% as “housewives”. Average monthly family income is 167,000 *colones* or about US\$ 400 dollars. Females live in families whose average income is lower than that of the males. The wealth indices identify around 20% in the “high” category. Religiosity identifies one-third of the sample with medium religiosity and one quarter with low religiosity, but these proportions are substantially higher for males, who demonstrate less religiosity than females.

Given that the sample represents the population well, there is no need to introduce adjustments by means of weighting factors, a practice that is common (and not desirable) in other surveys. The study sample is self-weighted: all interviews have the same value or weight. Table II.2 provides the general characteristics of the respondents by gender.

Table II.2 Characteristics of the Respondents by Gender

Characteristics	Total (N)	Males (729)	Females (771)
Average age	40	41	40
% In union	63	63	62
Education			
% Primary	47	48	46
% Secondary	35	34	36
% Post-Secondary	18	19	18
% In the labor force	53	77	31
Average family income			
Thousands of colones	167	177	158
Level of wealth (%)			
High (9+)	21	24	19
Medium (6-8)	39	38	40
Low (<5)	40	38	41
Religiosity (%)			
High	42	33	50
Medium	34	35	32
Low	25	32	17

The geographic characteristics of the respondents (Table II.1) are the following: two-thirds reside in the Central Valley. This group includes 45% who live in the GAM. Rural residents represent 37%. The remaining 18% correspond to the small and intermediate cities.

2.8 Statistical Analyses

Relatively simple methods of statistical analysis have been used. To establish an association between two numerical variables, Pearson's correlation coefficient was used. This provides values from 0 to 1. When there is perfect correspondence between two sets of values, the coefficient is equal to unity.

To establish whether there is a statistically significant relationship between two categorical variables, the Chi-square test is used.

In order to integrate information from several questions on the same topic, scales were constructed with simple sums. The resulting index was always standardized so that it would assume values from 0 to 100. As an indicator of internal consistency or reliability, Chronbach's "Alpha Coefficient" was used. Coefficients of 0.70 or greater were considered reliable and consistent. Factor analysis is also used to determine the number of dimensions of or factors implicit in a series of questions on the same topic.

Linear regressions models are frequently estimated by ordinary least squares in this report. Usually, the dependent variable in these models is some index constructed with several questions. The regression coefficients from these models (and their significance) allow one to make a concise evaluation of the factors that "explain" these indices. Even though at times we

refer to these co-factors as “determinants”, in reality, with the information available, it is not possible to establish causal relationships. We merely find “associations”. In the regression models there are also standardized regression coefficients “Beta”. These are useful for evaluating the relative importance of the different explanatory factors in the model, since they measure the effects in standard units. As an indicator of the goodness of fit of the model as a whole the coefficient of determination or “R squared” is used. This coefficient reports the proportion of the variance explained by the model taken as a whole, in comparison with the explanation that would be obtained with a “null” model (the dependent variable estimated solely by its mean). Appendix C presents the tables with the regressions.

2.9 Precision of the Results

Two types of errors affect every sample survey: non-sampling errors and sampling errors.

Non-sampling errors are those committed during data collection and processing, and can be controlled by building an adequate measurement instrument, training the interviewers regarding correct instrument application, supervising field work, creating an efficient data capture program, adequate questionnaire and coding review, as well as editing the file, among others. These errors can be controlled, but are unquantifiable. The comparison of the results from the sample with population data provides an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that hurt the sample representativeness.

Sampling errors are the product of chance and are the result of interviewing a sample and not the whole population.

When a sample is selected, it is one of many possible samples that could be selected from the population. The variability existing among all these possible samples is the sampling error, which could be measured if one were to have available all of these samples, a situation that is obviously unreal. In practice, what one does is estimate this error over the variance obtained from the sample itself.

To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (averages, percentages, differences, and totals), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic.

This allows you to measure the degree of precision with which this statistic approximates the result obtained if all elements in the population were interviewed under the same conditions. In order to calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design used to select the sample.

The design effect, DEF, indicates the efficiency of the design employed with regards to an unrestricted random sample (URS). A value of 1 indicates that the variance obtained by both designs (complex and URS) is equal, i.e., complex sampling is as efficient as a URS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, complex sampling produced a variance greater than that obtained with a URS, and if it is less than 1, it indicates that the variance obtained with complex sampling is less than that obtained with a URS.

Tables II.3 and II.4 present the sampling errors (standard errors, SE) and the design effects (DEF) for selected indices (Table II.3) and questions (Table II.4). The tables also provide the

value of the statistic in question (average or proportion). For Table II.4, those questions with the greatest factor loadings for each of the indices were selected. The SE's were estimated with the Stata 8 computing package.

Table II.3 Sampling Errors for Selected Indices

Indices y variables	Total				Urban zone				Rural zone			
	N	X	SE	DEF	N	X	SE	DEF	N	X	SE	DEF
Index (construct) of:												
Wealth Index	1500	7.7	0.23	10.8	941	8.6	0.15	3.58	559	6.3	0.26	6.53
Support for democracy	1493	68	0.94	3.50	940	67	0.86	1.83	553	69	1.73	4.41
Political tolerance	1469	21	0.30	1.40	929	21	0.40	1.40	540	20	0.30	0.53
Justif. for coup d'etat	1408	53	1.22	1.40	907	53	1.55	1.50	501	53	2.20	1.54
Democratic orientation	1424	63	0.81	2.54	904	64	0.52	0.70	520	62	1.76	4.50
Tolerance for corruption	1493	11	0.09	2.82	940	11	0.11	2.94	553	11	0.10	1.23
Incidence of corruption	1500	0.21	0.01	0.92	941	0.22	0.02	0.88	559	0.20	0.02	1.41
Satisf. inst. rule of law	1377	62	0.71	1.64	890	62	0.65	0.90	487	64	1.23	1.71
Protective measures	1485	2	0.06	4.43	929	2	0.06	2.50	556	2	0.08	3.80
Particip. Religious-familial	1500	42	1.41	2.51	941	41	1.20	1.20	559	45	2.20	2.06
Particip. Political-professional	1500	10	0.50	1.31	941	10	0.64	1.47	559	10	0.70	1.10
Community action	1500	20	1.24	2.47	941	19	1.66	2.80	559	21	1.30	1.00
Social cohesion	1409	74	0.83	1.35	874	71	1.12	1.40	535	81	1.03	1.10
Trust-mistrust	1500	1.2	2.61	3.61	941	-2.6	3.12	3.29	559	7.5	4.23	3.48
Models to be imitated	1500	66	1.71	4.30	941	61	2.02	3.60	559	74	2.51	4.25
Horizontal integ. migrants	1495	56	2.02	5.90	937	54	2.00	3.64	558	59	3.80	7.72
Vertical integ. migrants	1473	14	1.72	5.40	922	19	2.12	4.00	551	5	1.40	3.74
Attitude towards immigrants	1498	-3.7	2.62	2.20	940	-3.6	2.45	1.72	558	-4.0	4.17	2.02

X: Statistic estimated (mean, proportion), N: Observations; SE: Standard error; DEF: Design effect

The estimates are reasonably precise since they have small standard errors. For example, for the Support for democracy index, which is probably the most important indicator for this study, the standard error is 0.94. This means that the sample average for this index, 69, has a 95% confidence interval of 1.96 times the SE, i.e., between 66.2 and 69.8.

The design effects are worthy of consideration, since the PSU adopted was a fairly large unit, the *canton*. The convenience of having this sample for *canton*-level studies, meant that a cost had to be paid for a certain loss of efficiency. Large design effects (say greater than 2) indicate that we are dealing with variables with a strong local determinism, to wit, they vary relatively little within the community or, in this case, the *canton*, in comparison with the variation among communities.

The presence of design effects substantially greater than unity, would require the use of robust estimators (that take into account the effect of clustering) for the significance tests. Unfortunately, these robust estimators are not available in SPSS, which is a package that assumes URS. Thus, the tests of statistical significance must be interpreted conservatively.

Table II.4 Sampling Errors for Selected Questions

Variable	Total				Urban zone				Rural zone			
	N	X	SE	DEF	N	X	SE	DEF	N	X	SE	DEF
Q2. Age in years	1500	40.4	0.61	2.15	941	41.6	0.67	1.48	559	38.4	0.96	2.27
ED Education in years	1500	8.3	0.24	5.67	941	9.3	0.27	3.97	559	6.6	0.16	1.49
B4. Costa Rican pride.	1494	4	0.06	1.91	941	4	0.70	1.56	553	4	0.10	2.17
D3. Tolerant of those speaking poorly of gov't.	1471	5	0.10	1.30	931	5	0.12	1.42	540	5	0.11	0.68
CRDE04. Agree to shut down Asamblea Legislativa.	1484	4	0.08	2.40	935	4	0.07	1.05	549	4	0.13	2.37
CRDE11. Democracy for development.	1496	0.49	0.02	1.80	940	0.50	0.02	1.90	556	0.47	0.02	1.03
CRDE09. Agree to non-partisan democracy.	1471	4	0.05	0.92	931	4	0.06	0.73	540	4	0.11	1.44
JC12. Coup d'etat due to inflation.	1500	0.49	0.02	2.32	941	0.48	0.02	2.15	559	0.52	0.03	2.02
CRC3A: Pay minister to speed up highway.	1500	0.22	0.02	3.33	941	0.22	0.02	3.44	559	0.22	0.02	1.84
EXC6: Request bribe from public employee.	1500	0.03	0.005	1.43	941	0.04	0.01	1.61	559	0.02	0.01	1.62
B31: Trust Supreme Court of Justice.	1432	4	0.05	1.30	919	4	0.05	0.94	513	4	0.06	0.72
CRSE1: Measures to protect home.	1499	0.76	0.02	2.54	941	0.76	0.02	2.52	558	0.76	0.02	1.56
CP7: Meetings of parents' association.	892	0.59	0.02	1.45	537	0.58	0.03	1.73	355	0.60	0.02	0.87
CP9: Meetings of employees' association.	1500	0.10	0.008	1.20	941	0.11	0.01	1.10	559	0.10	0.01	0.97
CP5: Contributed to resolving commty. problem.	1500	0.34	0.02	2.50	941	0.33	0.03	2.88	559	0.35	0.02	0.83
CRIT4: Care for neighbor's home.	1500	0.84	0.02	1.83	941	0.81	0.02	1.73	559	0.87	0.01	1.04
IT3: Others take advantage.	1409	1	0.06	2.42	884	1	0.08	2.60	525	1	0.09	1.90
CRMI06: Friendship with Nicaraguan	1497	0.73	0.02	3.10	939	0.72	0.02	2.30	558	0.75	0.04	4.32

X: Statistic estimated (mean, proportion), N: Observations; SE: Standard error; DEF: Design effect.

3.0 Support for Democracy

3.1 Introduction

Citizen support is crucial for democratic stability. Historical experience teaches us that democracies are torn down by political forces that have the support (or at least count on the passiveness) of an important part, and sometimes a majority, of the citizenry. Democracies become vulnerable when, among other factors, the non-democratic political forces find fertile ground in citizens' attitudes for them to grow and act (Linz, 1978).¹⁶ Therefore, the issue of citizens' attitudes in support of the system has been one of the topics that comparative political science has studied most in recent decades¹⁷ and, furthermore, it has been addressed constantly in comparative studies on public opinion.¹⁸ From the academic standpoint, in recent years the methodologies that stand out were developed by Pippa Norris (Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999),¹⁹ Inglehart (Inglehart, 1988, 1990, 1997, 1999)²⁰ and Seligson (Seligson, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, forthcoming; Seligson & Azpuru, 2001; Seligson & Booth, 1993; Seligson & Carrión, 2002; Seligson & Caspi, 1983; Seligson & Córdova, 2001; Seligson & Gómez, 1987; Seligson & Muller, 1990), Putnam (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000)²¹ to measure intensity of said support, usually on the basis of public opinion polls (though not restricted to them).

¹⁶ These opening lines are taken, almost literally, from: (Vargas Cullell, Benavides, Gómez, & Kikut, 2003b).

¹⁷ In contemporary political science, these studies are set within the queries on civic culture. Almond and Verba's seminal work triggered research on political culture. It was subsequently taken up, from different theoretical standpoints, by various authors, giving rise to intense conceptual and methodological debates (Gabriel Almond, 1980; G. Almond & Verba, 1965; H. Eckstein, 1988; Harry Eckstein, 1990; Pateman, 1980; S. Verba, 1980; Wiarda, 1989).

¹⁸ The World Value Survey and the various barometers (Eurobarometer, New Democracies Barometer, Africabarometer, Asiabarometer and Latinobarómetro) stand out here. The World Values Survey questionnaire has been applied in 65 countries, though not all of them have a public opinion series. There have been three rounds of surveys: 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 1999-2001 (www.wvs.isr.umich.edu). The Eurobarometer, sponsored by the European Commission, has been applied since 1973 in the member States of the European Union (www.europa.eu.int/public/opinion/indez/en.htm). In the countries of the former Soviet block there have been several rounds of the New Democracies Barometer. There have been three rounds of Afrobarometer studies. The first one took place in 1999-2000 (12 countries) and the second one in 2003 (16 countries) (www.afrobarometer.com). There have been two rounds of the Asiabarometer, which is the most recent of them all: the first round was in 2000, covering 9 countries, and the second one in 2003 (10 countries) (www.asiabarometer.com). The Latinobarómetro began in 1995. It originally covered 10 Latin American countries, and as of 1997 it encompassed 17 countries (18 countries in 2002). Currently, seven rounds have been completed (the most recent one in 2003) (www.latinobarometro.com). In general, all these surveys ask questions on preferences for democracy over other systems, to measure support for democracy. The Democratic Indicators Monitoring Survey, sponsored by USAID and housed at the University of Pittsburgh, has in turn conducted studies in 11 Latin American countries since the mid 1990s (www.innerstory.com/newsdsd).

¹⁹ Norris suggests that support for democracy should be measured at five levels, from the more general to the more specific aspects: support for the political community, for the principles of the political system, for performance of the political system, for the institutions of the political system, and for the political actors.

²⁰ In various studies, Inglehart seeks to link citizens' preference for democracy with factors such as interpersonal trust. He is specifically interested in the linkage between what he calls post-materialist values and deterioration of authority.

²¹ Putnam studies citizen support for democracy from another angle: he suggests a relationship among civic culture, democratic culture, and democratic performance. He argues that social capital is an explanatory variable regarding said performance.

This chapter discusses citizen support for Costa Rican democracy. Study of this matter is primarily based on the methodology developed by Seligson to address the legitimacy of the system and political tolerance. We also compare results obtained with a different measurement of support for democracy, so as to examine how robust it is. We seek to analyze the information on all the points from a comparative perspective, both regarding other Latin American countries and with respect to previous studies in Costa Rica.

This chapter is divided into six parts, including this introduction. The second part addresses issues with respect to the feeling of belonging to a national political community and about trust in public institutions. The third part, which is more analytical, examines the results obtained in this study regarding the Index of support for the (democratic) system, compares them with other research studies, and analyzes the factors that might predict people's level of support for the system. The fourth part, whose structure is very similar to the previous one, addresses the issue of political tolerance. Both measurements –support and tolerance- are taken up in the fifth part, to examine support for stable democracy. The sixth part presents the results obtained regarding support for democracy based on an alternative methodology developed by Gómez, Kikut and Vargas Cullell (Benavides, Vargas Cullell, Gómez, & Kikut, 2003; Kikut, Vargas Cullell, & Gómez, 2003; Vargas Cullell, Benavides, Gómez, & Kikut, 2003a; Vargas Cullell et al., 2003b). The final section focuses on an in-depth analysis of a surprising result: the apparently extensive support in Costa Rica for a coup d'état as a measure to address difficult situations that the country might face in time.

3.2 Political Community and Trust in Institutions

In Costa Rica there is an almost unanimous pride in being Costa Rican. The reply to question B43 “to what extent are you proud of being Costa Rican” was, on average, 97 out of one hundred possible points. No variations –noteworthy ones- were found in national pride due to social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the individuals or to the region where they live. It is, therefore, an almost universal attitude among the population. While existence of a high level of pride (usually higher than 85) is a result found in other Latin American countries, the Costa Rican case stands out due to its intensity.

National pride is complemented, in the Costa Rican case, by high levels of trust in public institutions (higher than 50 points on a scale from 0 to 100). When asked about the degree of trust in institutions and organizations, only the political parties' results were frankly negative (35 points). This low score of the parties is consistent with what various public opinion polls have found, both in Costa Rica and in other Latin American countries (Achard & González, 2004).

There is a broad core of institutions that Costa Ricans trust: Trust in the system and in political institutions as a whole scores 70 points or more; key institutions of the Costa Rican social welfare State such as the social security institute (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, CCSS), the national insurance institution (Instituto Nacional de Seguros, INS) and the Costa Rican electric power institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE) score higher than this. Two bodies that oversee public affairs, one that is a public institution (the Ombudsman's Office or Defensoría de los Habitantes) and other private ones (the media) obtain high scores. The key institutions of the rule of law in Costa Rica rate a lower but still positive level of trust: the Supreme Court of Justice, the Office of the Comptroller General, and the courts. The institutions

that are rated lowest have intermediate scores: the townships, the police, and the Legislative Assembly (Table III.1).

**Table III.1 Average Trust in Values, Institutions, Organizations, and Affairs, Costa Rica
2004, Scale 0-100**


Descriptive Statistics		
	N	Media
B43RN Pride in being Costarrican	1494	97,0
B6RN Support for Political System	1493	75,4
B2RN Political Institutions	1498	75,3
B4RN Pride in Political System	1494	74,2
B17RN Defensoría de los Habitantes	1406	73,2
CRB2RN Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS)	1492	72,3
B37RN Mass Media	1481	71,5
B11RN Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones	1457	70,8
CRB3RN Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS)	1410	70,7
CRB1RN Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)	1485	70,2
B20RN Catholic Church	1472	66,6
B47RN Elections	1488	66,3
B48RN Free Trade Agreement with the USA	1364	65,6
B19RN National Comptroller	1319	64,2
B31RN Supreme Court	1429	61,9
B10ARN Judicial System	1478	61,5
B18RN Police	1492	58,4
B14RN National Government	1485	58,0
B1RN Courts	1495	57,0
B32RN Municipality	1484	56,9
B3RN Citizen Basic Rights	1493	55,9
B13RN Legislative Assembly	1456	53,5
B21RN Political Parties	1479	35,3
N válido (según lista)	1165	

Costa Ricans' trust in their institutions is high by comparison with that of other countries regarding their respective institutions.²² On a scale from 0 to 100, the simple average of Costa

²² We did the following in this analysis: (a) In question set B, those questions related to topics that are not institutions were excluded (pride in nationality, support for a free trade agreement) as well as those that were not comparable (questions CRB1-CRB3). This left a set of 12 comparable entities. (b) Due to the high level of "missings," all cases where the respondent issued an opinion on at least 8 institutions were included in the analysis. The average of opinions was attributed to those missing. (c) After attribution to the missing ones, we noted that, despite the above, there was a high level of missing replies regarding two (B17 and B19), for which

Ricans' trust in those institutions that were also studied in other countries was 63, higher than it was in the seven national cases included in this study.²³ In brief, high national pride and a relatively high trust in institutions suggest that in this country there is a strong feeling of belonging to a political community (Figure III.1).

Figure III.1 Average Trust in Comparable Institutions Per Country, 2004, Scale 0-100



3.3 System Support

Do national pride and trust in institutions translate into support for the political system? Given the replies analyzed above, a positive answer could logically be expected as political institutions are a component of the broader institutional framework in a society. However, the linkage among pride, trust in institutions, and support for the system is too important to simply assume it: there is a need to substantiate it empirically. Its importance lies in the fact that a high level of support for the system indicates that the population recognizes it as a legitimate system, that is, that people are willing to obey the authority of institutions to adopt decisions that are binding for the population as a whole. On the other hand, low support for the system would indicate that there are problems of legitimacy that, eventually, might have consequences regarding political stability.²⁴ To address this topic, professor Seligson has developed an System Support Index.

reason they were excluded from the analysis. (d) We worked with the national average for 10 institutions B1: Courts, B2: Pol. Inst., B6: Pol. Syst., B10a: Just. Syst, B11: Elect. Board, B13: Congress, B14: Nat. Gov., B18: Police, B31: Court of Justice, B32: Township. Two comparable institutions with a high level of missings were excluded: (b17: Ombudsman or Defensoría and b19: Office of the Comptroller General or Contraloría).

²³ The Costa Rican national average is somewhat affected downward by exclusion of variables B17 (Ombudsman or Defensoría de los Habitantes) and B19 (Office of the Comptroller General or Contraloría General de la República), two of the bodies that citizens trust the most.

²⁴ Under conditions of low legitimacy, individuals might refuse to accept the decisions adopted by public authorities as binding for them, and they might oppose their authority to establish and maintain public order.

In Costa Rica this index has been measured since 1978, and this allows us to study the development of citizen support for democracy as a form of government –or diffuse support for the system- over a relatively long period.²⁵ The index is based on the respondents' replies to five questions (Box III.1).²⁶ The results are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100, in which 0 is the lowest level of support and 100 is the highest. In our countries, it has been applied 9 times (including this one) and all these statistical tests suggest that it is a reliable and valid measure.²⁷

Box III.1 Questions used for Mitchell Seligson's Index of Support for Democracy

Now we are going to use a card... There is a 7-point scale on this card; each point indicates a score from 1, which means NOT AT ALL, to 7, which means VERY MUCH. For example, if I were to ask you to what extent do you like to watch television, if you do not like to at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if instead you like to watch television very much, you would say to me number 7. If your opinion is between "not at all" and "very much," choose an intermediate score. Then, how much do you like to watch television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands well.]

- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Costa Rica ensure a fair trial? If you believe that the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 2; if you believe that the courts ensure justice very much, choose number 7, or choose an intermediate score.
 - B2. To what extent do you feel respect for Costa Rica's political institutions?
 - B3. To what extent do you believe that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the Costa Rican political system?
 - B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Costa Rican political system?
 - B6. To what extent do you believe that there should be support for the Costa Rican political system?
-

Support for the system in Costa Rica increased by comparison with the measurement made in 1999, as it went from 61 to 68. This recovery, during a period of acute deterioration of the party system and declining electoral participation, is positive. As during the first half of the 1980s, support for the system increases when the country faces difficult circumstances.²⁸ However, the recovery does not reverse the long-term downward trend –pointed out by Seligson- of support for

²⁵ The concept of diffuse support was developed by Easton to refer to individuals' assessments of what an object (in this case a political system) is or represents –rather than what an object does or how it functions (Easton, 1975; Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982). This support constitutes a stock of favorable attitudes, or goodwill, that contributes to acceptance or tolerance by members of a system even in the face of results or situations to which they object, or effects that they view as detrimental (Benavides et al., 2003).


²⁶ 93.8% of the individuals (1,407) answered the five questions. A procedure to recover the cases of individuals who answered three or four questions was applied to reduce the frequency of "non-replies." In these cases, the non-replies were assigned the average score given by the individual in the items that he or she did answer. Through this procedure, the number of valid cases rose to 99.5% (1,493).

²⁷ Factor analysis reflects that the five questions group into a single factor, with loadings higher than .593. To measure reliability of the scale on which the System Support Index is based, we used Cronbach's alpha statistical test. When Cronbach's alpha is higher than .70, the measure being tested is reliable. In the case of the System Support Index, we obtained the following results: 1978= 0.77; 1980=0.75; 1983=0.79; 1985=0.75; 1987=0.70; 1990=0.74; 1995=0.73; 1999=0.75. This time, Cronbach's alpha was 0.73. However, we must note that in the factor analyses conducted, the behavior of questions b1-b6 that constitute the index was not different from that of most of the 20 questions that explore citizen trust in a broader set of public institutions (See Chapter V "Protection of citizens' rights and security" for a discussion of this matter).

²⁸ As shown in Chapter I, during this period there was a change in the party system and, despite the appearance of new parties, the level of electoral participation did not improve. Comparison with the eighties, however, must be considered carefully, as the nature of these circumstances is very different. In the eighties, support for the system grew during a period of economic crisis; currently, support for the system increases during a period in which there are problems in the political system (without an economic crisis).


the system (Seligson, 2001). The 2004 result is lower than almost ten years ago (72) and much lower than the 1985 measurement (87) (Figure III.2).

Figure III.2 Support for the Democratic System in Costa Rica, 1985, Scale 0-100, Using M. Seligson's Methodology



Compared to other countries, the 2004 measurement corroborates that support for the system is high in Costa Rica. It is 15 to 20 percentage points higher than in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama; and between 8 and 10 points higher than support for democracy in Colombia, Mexico and El Salvador, which was second (Figure III.3). The differences are greater when we compare support for the system in Costa Rica with Andean region countries. According to Vanderbilt University's Public Opinion Project (www.innerstory/nsnd.com), during the last decade support for democracy, as measured by this index, fluctuated between 35 and 45 points in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador.

**Figure III.3 National Averages Scores in the System Support Index, By Country, 2004,
Scale 0-100**



Among the components of support for the system, the items where Costa Rica scored the highest are support for the system and political institutions in general, and pride in the system. The scores for all three are very similar (close to 75). At the other end, the two issues pertaining to protection of civil and political rights –trust in the courts' ability to provide a fair trial and protection of citizens' rights by the political system- score the lowest (55 and 57, respectively). In this regard, the 2004 measurement continues the pattern of scores for the specific items of the index measured since 1978 –the novelty this time being a slight improvement of matters that traditionally got the worst scores (Table III.2).

Table III.2 National Average of the Issues That Form Part of the Index of Support for Democracy, Costa Rica 2004

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimu m	Maximum	Media	Typ. Dev.
B1RN Courts	1495	,00	100,0	57,0	27,3
B2RN Political Institutions	1498	,00	100,0	75,3	28,9
B3RN Citizens Basic Rights	1493	,00	100,0	55,9	28,0
B4RN Pride in Political System	1494	,00	100,0	74,2	27,9
B6RN Support for Political System	1493	,00	100,0	75,4	27,6
ADEMIR System Support Index	1493	,00	100,0	67,6	19,5
Valid N (according to list)	1493				

One point that must be elucidated is whether there are factors that help to predict support for the system. We explored two simple regression models (Models A and B) for this purpose. Both include the same socio-demographic characteristics as independent variables.²⁹ The difference is that Model B includes political variables to study whether they influence this support (Table III.3 in Appendix C).

In both models, the socio-demographic factors that predict support for the system are age (in years) and to a lesser extent wealth.³⁰ In both cases, the older the age and the greater the wealth, there tends to be more support. When we include political variables (Model B), the individual's religiousness ceases to be significant. Other variables that have been important in other studies (for example, education) are not so in this case. The predictive capacity of Model A is very low ($r^2=0.045$), while that of Model B is substantially higher ($r^2=0.353$). This means that, to investigate predictors of support for the system, one must pay attention to the political more than to the socio-demographic variables.³¹ Even the socio-demographic variables that are statistically

²⁹ It is the same set of socio-demographic characteristics that are applied to all the multi-variate analyses conducted, from now on, in this study. These are: A linear regression model was run with y = index of support for democracy, x1 = zone (Central Valley), x2 = size (GAM), x3 = sex(male), x4= occupation (housewife), x5 = marital status (married-common law couple), x6 = years of schooling, x7 = age, x8 = income(thousands), x9 = wealth index, x10 = religiousness (High); the categorical variables (sex, zone, size, occupation, marital status, and religiousness) were included as dummies using as reference variable the one indicated in the adjoining parenthesis.

³⁰ The wealth index was prepared on the basis of replies to questions R1-R15, which inquire on ownership of electrical appliances. It is a simple count of the number of electrical appliances that the individuals say they have, and it varies between 0 (they have none) and 14 (they have them all).


³¹ To ensure that support for democracy is not affected by the behavior of the shorter-term political variables, such as assessment of performance of the government or perception of effectiveness of the current government to address the country's problems, a co-variance analysis was conducted with respect to other items included in the questionnaire. Support for democracy –which measures diffuse support for the system- would not be expected to be “contaminated” by the more specific assessments of the performance of institutions and actors. Question M1 refers to the performance of the government: “Speaking in general terms of the current government, would you say that the job being done by President Pacheco is: (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad.” Questions N1, N3 and N9 refer to perception of effectiveness:

“Now, on this same scale (0-7), to what extent would you say that the current government, that is, the government of President Pacheco, N1 Combats poverty. N3 Promotes and protects democratic principles. N9 Combats corruption

significant only effect very small changes in the level of support (between 2 and 3 percentage points).


Costa Ricans' assessment of the performance of the President and their perception of the Government's effectiveness in successfully addressing major challenges faced by the country, such as combating poverty and corruption, and protecting democratic principles, are factors that clearly and significantly affect support for the system (in all cases: $\text{sig} < .05$). Those who rate the job done by the President as bad or very bad have scores that are below the national average; instead, support for the system by those who have a favorable or very favorable opinion of his performance is well above the average (Figure III.4) –the differences are of 20 percentage points or more. Government's effectiveness to combat corruption causes a similar effect: among those who grade it lowest (1= it is doing nothing), average support for the system is more than 20 points lower than those who rate it highest (Figure III.5). Considering effectiveness of the government to combat poverty is a predictor whose effect is very similar to perception of the government's effectiveness to combat corruption (Figure III.6).

Figure III.4 Average Support for Democracy According to Assessment of the Performance of the President of the Republic



in the government." The results indicate that the average support in the System Support Index hardly varies when these factors are considered, and that from the standpoint of statistical significance ($\text{sig} < .001$), said support is not affected by the level of popularity of President Pacheco but it is –though very slightly– by perception of the effectiveness of his government in addressing the country's grave problems (Questions N1, N3, N9). Due to these results, those questions were used as independent variables within Model B.

Figure III.5 Average Support for Democracy According to Assessment of Performance of the Government in Combating Corruption



Finally, certain factors pertaining to social capital seem to act as predictors of support for the system. The one that stands out most is the Index of social control: living in neighborhoods where there are more robust social collaboration networks among neighbors has a positive effect on average level of support for the system (Figure III.7).³² Also, interpersonal trust, another dimension associated with social capital, is a significant factor in support for the system: people who trust others more show greater average support than those who are more mistrustful (73% as opposed to 62%, sig <.05).

³² Chapter 8 addresses social capital and describes the procedure used to develop this index. For the time being, suffice it to say that it is constituted by questions CRIT3, CRIT4 and CRIT5 that ask about the existence of social collaboration networks in the neighborhoods. A higher score on this index indicates the existence of more robust networks.

Figure III.6 Average Support for the System According to Assessment of Performance of the Government in Combating Poverty





Figure III.7 Average Support for the System According to the Social Control Index



In more conceptual terms, these results seem to suggest two tentative conclusions. On the one hand, that individuals' assessments of institutions (Government) and actors (the President) –to use the terminology of Pippa Norris (Norris, 1999)- or, in other words, specific support, seem to have a strong effect on diffuse support for democracy (at least when the latter is measured as

support for its political institutions). On the other hand, certain aspects of social capital seem to be positively related to this institutional support.³³

3.4 Political Tolerance

Democracy depends to a large extent on tolerance. For this reason, having established that in Costa Rica there is broad support for the system, a second step is the analysis of political tolerance: respect for others' rights, including those less accepted among the citizenry. Tolerance is indispensable socially, economically, culturally, and politically diverse and plural societies: while in the political sphere persons belong to the same community of citizens –all with equal rights-, in the rest of their social life individuals belong to very different, unequal and even disconnected worlds. Tolerance is, to a certain extent, the adhesive that binds society to the political community.

Tolerance is based on acceptance of pluralism as a value, indispensable to ensure respect for each individual's right to humane treatment and property (Sartori, 1997; Seligman, 1995; Walzer, 1995; Young, 1995). In a democracy, this pluralism and its consequence, political tolerance, are legally codified in the constitutional and legal provisions that, in principle, apply equally to all. These provisions recognize equal rights to persons who are, otherwise, very different amongst each other.

Legal codification of pluralism is indispensable yet insufficient. Every democracy creates a set of institutions that protect pluralism and political tolerance by promoting, protecting and defending these rights. While it is indispensable, this institutional protection is insufficient. The other side of the coin are the attitudes of the population. If the population is intolerant of others, if it is willing neither to recognize nor to respect their rights, harmonious democratic relations suffer severe detriment. An intolerant population may set aside, in practice, the constitutional and legal provisions, and it may foster, carry out and cover up aggressions against population groups.³⁴

One test to measure political tolerance of the population is to examine its attitudes toward the rights of those persons toward whom, in principle, they feel less affinity. It is they who are the potential ready target of intolerance.³⁵ In the Costa Rican case, this inquiry is important because previous studies show that there are streaks of intolerance among broad population groups (Gómez, 1998). To address this issue in the study we included four questions that have been used in various countries to measure tolerance toward exercise of rights. We also included a fifth question –on the rights of homosexuals, as this group has persistently been identified as the one that is rejected most by the population (Box III.2). Based on the respondents' replies to questions D1-D4 we developed the tolerance Index.³⁶ Its results are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100,

³³ Political tolerance of the exercise of rights, while statistically significant, hardly has any impact on the level of institutional support (see the following section).

³⁴ In chapter 8 we will examine another aspect of tolerance, in this case regarding Nicaraguan immigrants, who are the majority of immigrants in Costa Rica.

³⁵ For example, acts of vandalism and criminal acts against members of certain groups may have popular acceptance.

³⁶ 96.7% of the individuals (1,450) answered the five questions. To reduce the frequency of the “non-replies” we applied a procedure to recover those cases in which individuals answered three questions. In those cases, we assigned the average score of the person's replies to the items that he or she did answer to the non-reply. By means of this procedure, we raised the number of valid cases to 97.9% (1,469).

where 0 is the lowest level of support and 100 is the highest. It is a reliable and valid measure of political tolerance.³⁷


Box III.2 Questions used for the tolerance Index

- D1. There are people who always speak ill of the form of government in Costa Rica, not just the current administration, but the form of government. How firmly do you approve or disapprove of these individuals' right to vote? Please read me the number on the scale.: [Explore: To what extent?] Write down 1-10, Does not know=88
- D2. How firmly do you approve or disapprove that these persons be able to conduct peaceful demonstrations with the aim of expressing their viewpoints? Please read me the number.
- D3. How firmly do you approve or disapprove that these persons be able to run for public office?
- D4. How firmly do you approve or disapprove that these persons appear on television to make a speech?
- D5. (NOT USED FOR THE INDEX) And now, on another topic, and with respect to homosexuals, how firmly do you approve or disapprove that these persons be able to run for public office?
-

When we examine the variables separately, we can appreciate that there are clear majorities, over 60%, who approve of the right of persons who “speak ill” of the form of government of Costa Rica to vote and express themselves. Slight majorities, just above 50%, approve of the right of these individuals to make speeches and to run for public office. Instead, more than 60% stated that they were against the right of homosexuals to run for those positions. We should note that in all cases there is an important part of the population (between 40% and 50%) who show an important level of intolerance (Figure III.8).

³⁷ Factor analysis shows that the four questions are grouped in a single factor, with loadings higher than .674. Cronbach's alpha was .799, very satisfactory. The analysis showed that question D5 (on homosexuals) could also be part of the measure of tolerance (by including it, Cronbach's alpha declined slightly, 0.75). However, to ensure comparability with other studies, we decided to exclude it from the analysis.


Figure III.8 Average Tolerance of the Exercise of Rights By the Least Liked Group, Costa Rica 2004, Scale 0-100



When the questions are analyzed by grouping them in the Tolerance Index, the average score for Costa Rica is 57.9 on a scale of 100. If we compare it with previous measurements, this result shows that with respect to political tolerance the country has hardly changed in almost a decade. In other words, ten more years of democratic experience have not produced a more tolerant citizenry (Seligson & Booth, 1993). On the other hand, from a comparative perspective, contrary to the System Support Index, regarding tolerance the Costa Rican national average is similar to those of Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico, clearly higher than that of El Salvador, and especially Guatemala, but much lower than Panama (Figure III.9). Distances with respect to the Andean countries (Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador) are less regarding tolerance than regarding support for the system (www.innerstory.com). The theoretical expectation that attitudes of political tolerance among the population are one of the cornerstones of a stable democracy is not fulfilled in the Costa Rican case. Nor is the expectation that a mature democracy will have higher levels of political tolerance than new democracies.³⁸

³⁸ This is a complex topic that goes beyond the scope of this study and that would require an investigation into the country's social and political history. Let us recall that development of the process of democratization in Costa Rica was centered in a region with relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity –which during a substantial part of the 20th century excluded ethnically distinct (black and indigenous) groups and which finally became consolidated after a Civil War (1948), one outcome of which was that certain political forces were banned.

Figure III.9 Average National Scores of the Political Tolerance Index From a Comparative Perspective 2004



In view of the fact that political tolerance is lower than would be expected in a mature democracy such as the Costa Rican one, it is especially important to explore the factors that may help predict people's level of political tolerance (Table III.5). For this, we applied the two simple regression models seen in the previous section, except that in this case the political tolerance index was the dependent variable.

Contrary to the situation regarding support for democracy, Model B did not entail important modifications to the prediction of political tolerance. The explanatory capacity of model A is low ($r^2=.071$) and taking into account the political variables hardly caused any variation at all (in Model B $r^2=.083$). Assessments of performance of institutions and actors, or specific support, has no effects on political tolerance, nor do indicators of social capital. None of them are statistically significant factors (Table III.4 in Appendix C). In more conceptual terms this has interesting implications: in Costa Rica social capital (which does positively influence support for the system) does not make people more tolerant. Nor does support for the system.³⁹


Contrary to what was seen in support of the System, in the case of political tolerance the socio-demographic variables seem to be more important. Thus, people who live in the Central Valley tend to be more tolerant than those who live elsewhere in the country. Level of schooling has a

³⁹ What would seem to happen in Costa Rica is that individuals who live in environments with higher social capital support the system more but are not more tolerant than the others –let us recall that, as we have seen, Costa Rican society does not stand out for its political tolerance even by comparison with other new Latin American democracies.

stronger influence: the greater the number of years of schooling, the greater the tolerance. Finally, people with intermediate to low levels of religiousness tend to be more tolerant.⁴⁰

We should stop to consider the variable of schooling, measured in years of schooling, which seems to influence tolerance most strongly. We observe that among people with primary education (whether complete or incomplete) and those with a college education there is a difference of more than 18 percentage points (Figure III.10). On a scale from 0 to 100, the former score 51 on average, and the latter 69. In terms of political tolerance, the educational system is a powerful means of socialization. Improvements in the level of schooling of the population (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a), which unfortunately have risen slowly in Costa Rica over the last twenty years, have political and not only economic implications –which are the ones usually discussed. Democracy would have much to gain if people had higher levels of schooling, as education makes them more tolerant.

Figure III.10 Average Tolerance According to Level of Schooling, Costa Rica 2004, Scale 0-100



3.5 Support for a Stable Democracy

Combining the System Support Index (section 3) with the Index of Tolerance for Exercise of Rights –therinafter, Political Tolerance Index- (section 4) generates a more general measure of support called “support for a stable democracy.” Why do we call this measure support for a

⁴⁰ This generates a curious outcome: those who are less religious are more tolerant of the rights of others but, as we saw in the previous section, they support the system less. One explanation is that they trust political institutions less, and these are the basis for measurement of support for the system.

stable democracy? When we analyze support for the system and tolerance jointly we can identify attitudes that are crucial for preservation of democracy: on the one hand, popular recognition of democratically elected authority to adopt decisions that are binding for society as a whole (legitimacy) and, on the other, tolerance for the rights of the groups that they like the least, without which the enjoyment of liberty may be severely threatened. When people accept democratic authority, they recognize the fundamental institutions of a democracy; and when they also accept tolerance, they are willing to live their lives under these “rules of the game” that then become predictable and stable norms over a longer period. A democracy would be in good health if the tolerant democrats were the largest group and, ideally, the majority. At the other end, those who do not support the system and do not tolerate others’ rights are not loyal to democracy and would accept its substitution by an authoritarian system in which rights and liberties were abridged. These individuals would want said authoritarian system to also be more stable –in the sense that its norms would govern social and political life for a long time. A democracy would be in serious trouble if this group encompassed a large number of citizens, if not the majority. In empirical terms, we would expect a positive relationship between tolerance and support: the greater the tolerance, the greater the support for the institutions of the democratic system.⁴¹

Currently, the situation in Costa Rica is relatively favorable for democracy. Those who support a stable democracy are the largest group (49%), almost a majority, six times more than those who would support an abridgment of democracy (8%). Those who support the institutions but are intolerant of exercise of others’ rights (33%) are a group to which we should pay more attention, as it includes one out of every three individuals. They support the per se stability provided by institutions even to the detriment of exercise of citizens’ rights (this is why we refer to them as “authoritarian stability”). However, contrary to studies in other countries, we found no significant relationship between tolerance and support for the system ($\text{sig.} > .10$). This can be explained in part by the fact that in Costa Rica the authoritarian stability group is very broad –a point that the results of the regression analysis on the issue of political tolerance had foreshadowed, since as we saw before, support for the system is not a predictor. As mentioned above, there is a strong streak of intolerance in Costa Rican political culture, even among those who say they support the democratic system.

⁴¹ These polar groups –the tolerant democrats who support a stable democracy and the intolerant non-democrats who support the authoritarian abridgment- are joined by two other groups with contradictory attitudes. Here we are referring to the polar types for didactic purposes.

Table III.5 Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Costa Rica


Table APOYO System Support Level * TOLERAN Political Tolerance Level

APOYO Level of System Support	TOLERAN Level of Political Tolerance			Total
	Low	High	Total	
Low	115 7,9%	157 10,7% ^a	272 18,6%	
High	479 32,8%	711 48,6%	1190 81,4%	
Total	594 40,6%	868 59,4%	1462 100,0%	

a. The 0-100 Scale of the System Support Index was recoded in 2 categories: (a) Low <=50; (b) High: >50. The 0-100 Scale of the Political Tolerance Index was recoded in 2 categories: (a) Low <=50; (b) High: >50.. r=.016, sig=.539

Comparison of this result with others obtained in previous studies indicates that Costa Rica's situation is the most positive one in the region and it improved slightly over the last eight years (www.innerstory.com). More precisely, support for a stable democracy in this country almost doubles that recorded in Honduras and Nicaragua, and it almost trebles that recorded in Guatemala. The distances with respect to Mexico, Colombia and El Salvador are somewhat lesser, but nevertheless clear (Figure III.11).

Figure III.11 Support for a Stable Democracy from a Comparative Perspective



An additional step in the analysis is to elucidate whether the characteristics of the group that supports a stable democracy are different from the rest. For this, we used the two models, A and B, that were applied previously. However, in this case we applied a logistic regression model because the dependent variable was recoded to make it binary (support for a stable democracy – non-support, that is, the other three groups). When we include only the socio-demographic variables, except for schooling, no other one is significant.⁴² The scant importance of these factors was expected due to the results obtained while exploring the predictors of support for the system. On the other hand, the influence of level of schooling on political tolerance, which we discussed above, also seems to apply here. In brief, from a socio-demographic standpoint the group that supports a stable democracy does not seem to differ from the rest (Table III.6 in Appendix C).

As can be seen, participation in community affairs and networks of social cooperation in the communities (both dimensions of the concept of social capital) are not significant. Nor is the assessment of the performance of the President. Other political factors do help predict support for a stable democracy (Table III.6 in Appendix C): on the one hand, assessment of the ability of the government to protect democratic principles (N3) and interpersonal trust (confi2). In Figure III.12 we can see that those who rate the government's performance highest as regards democracy tend, on average, to be more supportive of a stable democracy (a difference of more than 30 percentage points between those who rate the government well and poorly). Interpersonal trust also tends to have a positive effect, though less pronounced (Figure III.13).

⁴² The explanatory power of Model A is very low (Cox-Snell's R^2 :.025). In model B, this power increases slightly (Cox-Snell's R^2 :.065).

Figure III.12 Average Support for a Stable Democracy According to Performance of Government in Protection of Democracy, 2004, Scale 0-100





Figure III.13 Average Support for a Stable Democracy According to Index of Net Trust in the Community, 2004, Scale 0-100



3.6 Comparative Note With Respect to Another Methodology to Measure Support for Democracy

In a recent study conducted by the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP), Gómez, Kikut and Vargas Cullell developed a methodology to study diffuse support for democracy from another angle (Benavides et al., 2003; Kikut et al., 2003; Vargas Cullell et al., 2003a, 2003b). It is based on the concept of orientations toward democracy, defined as positions of support for or rejection of democracy. This concept adapts that originally formulated by Easton and it is empirically defined as a set of attitudes regarding the convenience of democracy as a system of government and acceptance of the norms and institutions on which it is based. Orientations are patterns of attitudes that derive from the replies to 11 questions that were included with modifications⁴³ in this study (Box III.3). The idea was to conduct a comparison with the results obtained through a tested measure of the system, that by M. Seligson, and to analyze whether the results obtained were similar.

Box III.3 Questions used for the index of orientations toward democracy

Now, still using card B, I want you to give me your opinion on the actions of the President when the country faces serious problems. Tell me, if the country faces serious problems, to what extent would you agree that the President (READ) (PLEASE USE THE CARD: Write down 1-7, Does not know=8)

CRDE01 Restore order by use of force. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

CRDE02 Control the media. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

CRDE03 Disregard certain laws. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

CRDE04 Disregard Congress. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

CRDE05 Not take the political parties into account. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

Using the same card, please tell me to what extent would you agree that: (Write down 1-7. Does not know=8)

CRDE08 There can be democracy without a Legislative Assembly. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

CRDE09 There can be democracy without political parties. To what extent to you agree or disagree?

DEM2. Which of the following three phrases do you agree with the most:

(1) For people like oneself, it is the same whether a regime is democratic or not.

(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.

(3) Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.

DEM6. Now I am going to read a couple of phrases on democracy. Please tell me which one you agree with the most.

(1) In general, and despite certain problems, democracy is the best form of government

(2) There are other forms of government that may be as good as or better than democracy

CRDE10 If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, you would say that (READ OPTIONS)

(1) Economic development is more important

⁴³ The original study was conducted with the Latinobarómetro 2002 questionnaire (www.latinobarometro.com). Modifications in this investigation with respect to that study were: (a) the same measurement scale was applied to 6 of the questions, to obtain a more sensitive and homogeneous measurement –in the Latinobarómetros, questions CRDE08 and CRDE09 were binary (yes/no). (b) Questions CRDE04 and CRDE05 were originally a single one. In this study they were divided so that each one would denote a different actor or institution. (c) The categories of reply for question CRDE11 were reformulated, without changing the meaning of the question, to make them more sensitive to the original ordinal scale. (d) Finally, the questions regarding the dimension of preference for democracy –see below- were modified most. Three of the four original questions remained, but two were eliminated after the statistical analysis, and another one was included. As we will see, measurement of the dimension of preference for democracy is the least reliable one. We should note that these four measures allowed an improvement of reliability of the measurements and made it possible to identify the three dimensions of support for a democracy found in the original study. This time, since reliable measurements were not obtained, the questions used to analyze orientations were subjected independently to a cluster analysis.

- (2) Democracy is more important
(DO NOT READ) (3) Both are equally important

HAND OVER CARD D

CRDE11 On this card there are four statements. We are going to read them and I want you to tell me the name of the option that best reflects what you think.

(READ THE OPTIONS SLOWLY. WAIT FOR THE RESPONDENT'S REPLY AND THEN WRITE DOWN THE APPROPRIATE CODE, IF DOUBTFUL READ AGAIN)

1. Democracy is indispensable to become a developed country
 2. It is not indispensable but it is the best means to become a developed country,
 3. Actually, there may be better means than democracy to become a developed country
 4. I believe that a non-democratic system of government is indispensable to become a developed country
-

The 11 questions are grouped into three dimensions. The first dimension explains to what extent the individuals are willing for a President, within democratic formality, to conduct actions that in practice are contrary to the effectiveness of democracy. This dimension is called “non-delegative attitudes,” as it derives from the concept of delegative democracy proposed by O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 1994).⁴⁴ As can be seen in Table III.7, the five questions used to measure non-delegational attitudes constitute a reliable measure (Cronbach's alpha: 0.78).

The second dimension indicates the importance attached by people to two key institutions of a representative democracy: political parties and Congress. Non-democratic leaders have used the argument that to “save” democracy it is necessary to (temporarily or totally) close down the parties or Congress. The measurement is also reliable regarding this dimension (Cronbach's alpha: 0.78).

Finally, the third dimension is that of preference for democracy vis-à-vis other systems of government and another value that is important in Latin American societies: attainment of economic and social development. Thus, we analyze whether, having to choose, people prefer democracy over other economic and political alternatives. Unfortunately, the measurement for this dimension is not entirely reliable (Cronbach's alpha: 0.56). However, for purposes of illustration to compare results with Seligson's System Support Index, which has already been tested, we calculated the Index of individuals' democratic orientation, which averages the results on the three dimensions and expresses them on a scale from 0 to 100.

In this index of orientation toward democracy,⁴⁵ a person who chose the most democratic replies to all these questions would score 100. These individuals prefer democracy over other socially significant values; they totally support the key institutions of representative democracy (even those that they trust the least, such as Congress and the parties), and under no circumstances do they endorse abridgment of democratic legality by an elected President. At the other end of the scale, an individual who always chose the most anti-democratic options when replying to the 11 questions would score 0. These individuals prefer an authoritarian system over a democratic one;

⁴⁴ According to O'Donnell, a type of democracy arose in Latin America in which, once in power, democratically elected presidents behave in an authoritarian manner, although without completely breaching the constitutional order.

⁴⁵ This time we did not carry out an additional step applied in the methodology proposed by Gómez, Kikut and Vargas Cullell: cluster analysis to identify groups according to their pattern of attitudes toward democracy (democratic, ambivalent, non-democratic). This operation is the basis for development of indicators of magnitude, distance and activism of the orientations.

they are willing to sacrifice democracy to attain other ends such as development; they do not support the institutions of representative democracy and, especially, they would endorse a delegational President: they would agree with the President invoking special powers and acting heavy-handedly to solve the country's problems.⁴⁶

Table III.7 Summary of the Results of Factor Analysis Applied to the Index of Orientation Toward Democracy (Scale 0-100)

Average Score in a 0-100 Scale in Questions used for the Orientation Toward Democracy Index (Kikut, Gómez and Vargas Cullell)

	N	Media	Components			Alpha Cronbach
			1	2	3	
Dimensión: Non Delegative Dimension	1479	56,2				0,78
CRDE01RN Opposes President imposing order by force	1493	36,5	0,68			
CRDE02RN Opposes President controlling mass media	1491	46,5	0,68			
CRDE03RN Opposes President putting himself above the Law	1494	68,3	0,78			
CRDE04RN Opposes President closing Legislative Assembly	1484	65,3	0,72			
CRDE05RN Opposes President brushing political parties aside	1487	64,6	0,70			
Dimension: Support for Representative Institutions	1443	64,1				0,77
CRDE09RN Democracy with political parties	1471	66,8		0,87		
CRDE08RN Democracy with Legislative Assembly	1448	61,5		0,86		
Dimension: Preference for Democracy	1480	72,1				0.56*
DEM2RN Preference for democracy	1484	82,3				0,60
DEM6RN Democracy best system	1481	77,3				0,68
CRDE11RN Democracy indispensable development	1497	73,8				0,62
CRDE10RN Democracy or development	1492	55,1				0,74
Orientation Toward Democracy Index (three dimensions)	1424	63,4				

Notes:

Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis.

Rotation Method: Normalization Varimax Kaiser

* Reliability of the Preference for democracy scale is not satisfactory (alpha < .7)

The average result obtained for Costa Rica using the methodology of orientations toward democracy is 63.4 out of 100 points, a result that is similar though slightly lower than the System Support Index (67.9). The dimension with the highest score is preference for democracy (72.1) and the lowest one is that regarding non-delegative attitudes (56.2); support for the institutions of

⁴⁶ Thus, the closer an individual scores to 100, the closer this person is to a democratic orientation. The closer to 0, the closer the individual is to an anti-democratic orientation.

representative democracy (64.1) is, in turn, similar to the overall average index. This means that preference for democracy is greater than the rejection that might be expected for a President with a delegational profile.⁴⁷

When we analyze the relationship between both indexes (orientations and support for the system), the correlation is very low ($r^2=.061$), although statistically significant (at the .05 level). Nevertheless, we should underline that most cases fall into the same categories (high-high, low-low): in all, two thirds of the individuals fall into the expected groups (61% in high-high, 6% in low-low) (Table III.8).

Table III.8 Relationship Between the System Support Index (Seligson) and the Index of Democratic Orientation (Kikut, Gómez And Vargas Cullell)

Table APOYO Level of System Support * ORIENT Level of Orientation Toward Democracy

APOYO Level of System Suppot	ORIENT Level of Orientation Toward Democracy			Total
	Low	High		
Low	81	180	261	
	5,7%	12,7%	18,4%	
High	294	865	1159	
	20,7%	60,9%	81,6%	
Total	375	1045	1420	
	26,4%	73,6%	100,0%	

a. Sig <.01, Spearman Correlation=.05

The low correlation between both indexes raises an inevitable question: why do two measurements of diffuse support for democracy produce different results? One explanation might be that one of the two is not really measuring support for the system. However, this is an unsatisfactory answer, as the topics addressed by each measurement deal with highly significant aspects of citizen support for democracy. Seligson's Index of support measures key concepts for a democracy such as tolerance and legitimacy of political institutions; the Index of Democratic Orientation, in turn, measures preference for the democratic system, support for representative institutions, and rejection of the delegational temptation. A second explanation might be that one of the two measures simply measures poorly what it intends to measure. In view of protracted experience with the System Support Index, in this case the Index of Democratic Orientation would be suspect. The System Support Index is certainly a more firmly established and

⁴⁷ As we did regarding the System Support Index, we conducted a covariance analysis to examine whether the level of democratic orientation –which in theory is another way to measure diffuse support for the system- is affected by specific assessments of actors and institutions, or specific support. For this, we used variables M1, N1, N3 and N9 , which were also used to analyze support for the system (see note 29). The results were very similar: assessment of the performance of President Pacheco has no influence, although from the standpoint of statistical significance (N1: sig <.001, N9: sig <.010) perceptions of effectiveness of the government to solve national challenges such as combating poverty and corruption do. However, the effects of these variables on the average level of democratic orientation were very slight.

statistically more reliable one to explore support for democracy –and it has an additional advantage: with less variables it approximates the concept of diffuse support. This, however, does not mean that the Index of Democratic Orientation is wrong. We should note that both methodologies show a key fact: in Costa Rica there is broad support for democracy.

A third explanation of the low correlation between both indexes is as follows: both measure different aspects of citizen support for democracy. We are inclined to believe that this is the case. The System Support Index does, in fact, refer primarily to institutional variables –the political system and the Rule of Law. The Index of Orientation toward Democracy addresses the issue of diffuse support through different themes: preference for democracy over other values⁴⁸ and support for an elementary democratic norm, that is, that in a democracy the elected authorities are subject to the law (non-delegational attitudes). The variables of institutional support are one component, but not the main one. Thus, in light of the theme discussed in the upcoming section, the Index of Orientation toward Democracy may be studying certain areas of support for the system that have not been explored to date and which are highly significant under the current political conditions prevailing in several Latin American countries: emergence of authoritarian behaviors within the democratic formality of elected governments, behaviors that at a given time have popular acceptance.

In brief, both methodologies obtain a similar result on the 0-100 scale and corroborate that there is broad support for democracy in Costa Rica. While on average their results are similar, the individual cases do not show a correlation. Although it is necessary to further explore the reasons for this result, an important reason seems to be that they measure different dimensions of citizen support for democracy.

3.7 A Surprising Result: Attitudes That Justify A Coup D'état

This time we included, for the first time in Costa Rica, a measurement of citizen support for a possible coup d'état in face of possibly difficult conditions suffered by the population. The measurement is based on replies of the respondents to five questions (Box III.4).⁴⁹ Its results are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is the highest level of support or justification of a coup as a solution to difficult problems, the most anti-democratic attitude; and 100 is the score that reflects the attitude of greatest rejection of a coup d'état, the most democratic attitude.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁸ To avoid Seligson et al.'s valid criticism regarding the question on preference for democracy (Canache et al., 2001), in the Index of orientation toward democracy this preference is not measured by a single question but rather results from four questions. Furthermore, within the index, preference for democracy is not only with respect to an authoritarian regime but also with respect to a set of socially important values such as good governance and development.

⁴⁹ To lower the frequency of “non-replies” we carried out a procedure to recover the cases where individuals answered three or four questions. In these cases, non-replies were assigned the average scores given by the person in those items that he or she did answer. By means of this procedure, the number of valid cases was 1408 () .

⁵⁰ A score of 0 would indicate that the person answered that “it would be justifiable” in questions JC1, JC4, JC10 and JC12; and in question JC1A he or she answered that “there could be”. A score of 100 would indicate that the person answered that “it would not be justifiable” in questions JC1, JC4, JC10 and JC12; and in question JC1A he or she answered that “there would never be a reason.”

statistical tests indicate that the six questions measure the same dimension, and that it is a reliable and valid measurement.⁵¹

Box III.4 Questions used to measure support for a coup d'état

Now let us talk about other topics. Some people say that under certain circumstances a coup d'état would be justifiable. In your opinion, in what situations would a coup d'état be justifiable?

JC1. In face of very high unemployment (1) It would be justifiable (2) It would not be justifiable (8) Does not know

JC4. In face of much social protest (1) It would be justifiable (2) It would not be justifiable (8) Does not know

JC10. In face of much crime (1) It would be justifiable (2) It would not be justifiable (8) Does not know


JC12. In face of high inflation, with excessive price hikes (1) It would be justifiable (2) It would not be justifiable (8) Does not know

JC13. In face of much corruption (1) It would be justifiable (2) It would not be justifiable (8) Does not know

JC1A. Do you believe that there can ever be sufficient reason for a coup d'état or do you believe that there can never be enough reason for one? (1) Yes, there could be (2) There never would be (8) Does not know

The results were surprising. They show that, when asked about the concrete conditions that could be alleged for a coup d'état, at best 40 out of every 100 individuals would agree with this measure (in face of much corruption); at worst, 65 out of every 100 would agree with a coup when there is much social protest (Figure III.14).

Figure III.14 Average Justification of a Coup D'État as a Response to Political Problems, 2004, Scale 0-100



⁵¹ The factor analysis showed that the five questions group into a single factor, with loadings higher than... To measure the reliability of the scale on which the System Support Index is based, we conducted a statistical test using Cronbach's alpha. When Cronbach's alpha is higher than .70, the measurement is reliable.

When the questions are analyzed as a whole, an important part of the Costa Rican citizenry would agree that a coup would be justifiable under all or almost all these conditions. 45.2% of those who expressed their opinion accept that a coup would always or almost always be justifiable (in at least four of the five questions they answered that a coup would be justifiable). Instead, only 29.3% emphatically reject said action every time: those who are in the “never” category (Table III.9).

Table III.9 Level of Justification of a Coup D'État in a Joint Analysis of the Five Situations


JGOLPE2 Level of Justification of a Coup D'Etat

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Accumulative Percentage
Valid	Always/Almost always	636	42,4	45,2	45,2
	Sometimes	248	16,5	17,6	62,8
	Seldom	111	7,4	7,9	70,7
	Never	413	27,5	29,3	100,0
	Total	1408	93,9	100,0	
Lost	System	92	6,1		
	Total	1500	100,0 ^a		

a. 1. Always/Almost Always: respondents answering that a coup d'état can be justified in at least 4 out of 5 situations. 2. Sometimes: respondents answering that a coup d'état can be justified in 2 or 3 out of 5 situations. 3. Seldom: respondents answering that a coup d'état is justified in 1 out of 5 issues. 4. Never: respondents that do not justify a coup d'état under any circumstance..

From a comparative perspective, the Costa Rican results are not unusual in Latin America (Seligson & Carrión, 2002). When we examine the average score of the Index for justification of a coup, all countries’ average score, with the noteworthy exception of Nicaragua, is 50 or more on the 100 scale –the scores for Mexico, Guatemala, Panama and Colombia are greater than 60. Costa Rica’s level is similar to that of El Salvador and Honduras (Figure III.15)

Figure III.15 Average Score on the Index for Justification of a Coup D'État From a Comparative Perspective



Nevertheless, from a national perspective, this situation is surprising from various standpoints, as recent Costa Rican political history shows that support for democracy rose when the country suffered a severe economic crisis in the early eighties (Seligson & Gómez, 1987). Unfortunately, there is no measurement of the issue of justification of a coup for those years. Furthermore, Costa Ricans' support for democracy, documented in this same chapter, is high –the highest in the region- and it also rose in recent years. A second, independent measurement of support for democracy, also explained in this chapter, corroborates the high level of support for democracy by Costa Ricans. Finally, while recent studies on the country's political culture had showed that many supported a "*mano dura*" to lead the country, evidence suggests that for that reason people favored, rather than an authoritarian solution, decisive leadership that was nevertheless respectful of liberties.

The surprising breadth of support for a possible coup must be analyzed more carefully. In principle, two reactions would seem inappropriate: on the one hand, to take the results at "face value" without subsequent tests and to literally conclude that Costa Ricans want a coup; or, on the other hand, to question the results by arguing that the respondents were confused or did not know what they were talking about. As regards the first reaction, we should note that no open question asked what they mean by a coup d'état. With respect to the latter reaction, it would allow room for the prejudice that, since Costa Rica is a mature and stable democracy, the result is "wrong."⁵²

⁵² Analysis of the replies does not indicate any problems when the questionnaire was applied or in the individuals' interpretation of the questions.

Fortunately, we have the means to conduct a more detailed analysis of these results. First, another part of the questionnaire included question AUT1 that explicitly asks about the strong leader who might rule in difficult times even if he or she was not elected. The question is as follows:

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not need to be elected by a ballot. Others say that even though things do not function well, electoral democracy, that is, the popular vote, is always the best. What do you think? (1) We need a strong leader who does not need to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (8) Does not know/Does not answer

92.8% of the persons who replied said that electoral democracy is always the best. Only 7.2% agree with the idea of a strong leader who is not elected.⁵³ Thus, it would seem that when people state that they would support a coup they do not mean abridging the democratic system. However, this preliminary conclusion requires further substantiation, as it could be argued that question AUT1 places people before a petition of principle: to abridge or not to abridge democracy. In a society in which, in principle, we know that there is diffuse support for democracy, people may feel uncomfortable recognizing that they agree with ending it. Furthermore, inquiring about possible justifications of a coup refers us to reactions in face of concrete conditions.

The five questions that measure non-delegative attitudes in the Index of Democratic Orientation are very significant here. As we have seen, they ask to what extent people agree that, in face of difficult problems, the President adopt authoritarian measures such as, among others, restoring order through force, controlling the media and setting the parties aside. In other words, for the President to act abusively in a manner similar to what would occur if there were a coup. As stated above, these questions measure the same dimension and they are reliable.

Crossing the variable “justification of a coup” with that of “non-delegative attitudes” allows us to examine the degree of solidity of the attitudes that justify a coup d'état. We would expect those who always or almost always support a coup to have delegative attitudes, that is, to support abuse being committed by the President. However, the results are very different. A third of those who always or almost always justify a coup do not agree with the President taking authoritarian measures. Even though, as expected, the majority of those who would never justify a coup would not agree with a delegational President, it is interesting that some of them would. In brief, there are good reasons not to take the coup d'etat questions at face value (Table III.10).

⁵³ N= 1468

Table III.10 Level of Justification of a Coup and Non-Delegational Attitudes**Table JGOLPE2 Level of Justification of a Coup D'Etat * OD1 Non Delegative Attitudes Dimension**

JGOLPE2 Level of justification of a Coup D'Etat	Always/Almost Always	OD1 Non Delegative Attitudes			Total
		High	Medium	Low	
	Always/Almost Always	198	284	149	631
		14,2%	20,4%	10,7%	45,3%
	Sometimes	101	98	46	245
		7,3%	7,0%	3,3%	17,6%
	Seldom	45	50	14	109
		3,2%	3,6% ^a	1,0%	7,8%
	Never	211	128	68	407
		15,2%	9,2%	4,9%	29,2%
Total		555	560	277	1392
		39,9%	40,2%	19,9%	100,0%

^a. The Non Delegative Dimension of the Orientation Toward Democracy Index was recoded in three categories as follows : (a) High: 0-33, (b) Medium: 34-67 (c) Low Delegative: 67-100. The a 0-100 scale of the Justification of a Coup D'Etat Index was recoded in four categories: (a) Always/Almost Always: <50 points; (b) Sometimes: 50 < 83,3; (c) Seldom: 83,3 < 99,9; (d) Never: 100 points. Sig < .001

A first important result is that individuals who consistently support anti-democratic measures are a minority group. We should note that people who always, almost always and sometimes would support a coup and who also have low non-delegative attitudes are 10.7% of the total. On the negative side, an important result is that those who consistently reject these authoritarian measures are also a minority. The third result is that the majority, close to 7 out of every 10 individuals, show various shades of ambivalence.

In brief, we can identify at least five types that it would be interesting to examine in greater depth and that bring together 94.1% of the respondents who answered the questions we are discussing (1,392):

Group 1: Those who always, almost always and sometimes justify a coup and who also have strongly delegative attitudes (or low level of non-delegative attitudes). They justify both the coup in general and the measures typically adopted under those circumstances. They are 149 individuals, 10.7% of all those who answered.

Group 2: Those who never or hardly ever would justify a coup and who also object strongly to a President adopting authoritarian measures. They are the opposite of the previous group, and somewhat larger, including 256 individuals, 18.4% of those who answered.

Group 3: The individuals who always, almost always or sometimes would justify a coup and who show an intermediate level of support/rejection of authoritarian measures. While in general they

would justify a coup, they are not fully convinced by concrete authoritarian policies. They are 382 individuals, 27.4% of the total number.

Group 4: Those who would never or hardly ever support a coup and whose level of support/rejection of authoritarian measures is intermediate. They are 178 individuals, 12.8% of the total number.

Group 5: The individuals who would seem to embody a contradiction between a strong justification of a possible coup (always, almost always, and sometimes) and a strong rejection of authoritarian measures. They are a substantial group that includes 299 persons, 21.4% of the total number.

We studied the basic socio-economic profile of these groups and their attitudes regarding support for democracy and tolerance of exercise of rights by the groups that they like the least. The results are as expected. If we compare the opposite groups, those who would justify neither a coup nor authoritarian measures score higher, on average, on the System Support Index (71.0) and the Index of Political Tolerance (65.2) than the group of delegative individuals who support a coup (69.0 and 57.0, respectively on the aforementioned indexes). In socio-demographic terms, the group that supports a coup and authoritarian measures is, on average, younger; they have less years of schooling and there is a predominance of women and unmarried persons in this group. This pattern is found, with nuances, in the groups adjacent to the extremes: group 5 who does not justify the coup but have an average level of delegative attitudes are similar to the more democratic ones (group 1); and group 3 who justifies the coup but are not completely delegational are similar to group 2 (who consistently endorse authoritarian measures). And group 4, whose attitudes toward a coup are contradictory, also have contradictory attitudes regarding other variables: in terms of support for the system they have the lowest score, but in terms of tolerance of exercise of rights they tend to score high (Table III.11).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ The purpose of the profile of the groups is purely descriptive –factual- and the variables selected cannot be used to establish associations or inferences.

Table III.11 Socio-Demographic and Political Profile of the Groups According to Their Justification of a Coup and Non-Delegational Attitudes

Social, Demographic, And Political Profiling of Groups According to Justification of a Coup D'Etat

Variables	Range	Group 1*	Group 5**	Group 3***	Group 2****	Group 4*****
		Not Justifies Coup Non Delegative	Not Justifies Coup Medium Delegative	Justifies Coup Medium Delegative	Justifies Coup Delegative	Justifies Coup Non Delegative
Social and Demographic Variables						
% Females		46,1	47,8	51,8	53,8	51,2
% Married		61,3	55,6	44,8	41,5	44,8
Age (in years)	18-92	44,1	44,7	38,6	36,7	36,6
Average Schooling Years	0-16	9,5	8,9	7,8	8,2	8,9
Average Wealth Level	0-14	8,4	7,9	7,6	8,4	7,9
% GAM		49,6	43,3	46,1	48,7	46,8
Political Variables						
System Support Index	0-100	71,8	69,6	66,2	69,0	63,8
Political Tolerance Index	0-100	65,2	56,5	54,9	57,0	58,5
Corruption Acquiescence Index	0-100	91,5	91,1	88,7	86,6	91,6

Notas:

* Group encompasses 256 persons. N varies slightly between 253 y 256 cases.

** Group encompasses 178 persons. N varies slightly between 174 y 178 cases

*** Group encompasses 382 persons. N varies slightly between 379 y 382 cases

**** Group encompasses 195 persons. N varies slightly between 191 y 195 cases

***** Group encompasses 299 persons. N varies slightly between 233 y 298 cases

These results strengthen the reasons to interpret the questions on the coup cautiously. From a comparative perspective, even those who most strongly justify a coup and authoritarian measures by a President score relatively high on the System Support Index. In point of fact, the group that scores worst on this index (Group 4), on average, scores 63.6 out of 100. This value is higher than the national average in the rest of the countries studied. This suggests that in a subsequent inquiry into this matter it would be useful to complement the questions with one asking what people mean by a coup d'état and to apply a qualitative methodology for an in-depth exploration.

In brief, when people are asked in general on abridgment of a democratic regime, as well as when concrete non-delegational attitudes are examined, most of those who said that they would support a coup do not seem to be thinking of an authoritarian solution to economic and political problems.

4.0 Corruption in Public Affairs

4.1 Context

Article 11 of Costa Rica's Political Constitution provides that public officials –and therefore also elected officials- are “mere depositaries of authority” (República de Costa Rica, 2004). This means that their authority derives from popular sovereignty. As depositaries of authority, in exercising their functions public officials and representatives cannot go beyond constitutional and legal provisions. In other words, those who exercise power are subject to the law.

Constitutional and legal provisions set forth the aims, procedures and spheres for use of the resources entrusted to public officials and representatives. They define as crimes committed during public service the misappropriation of funds, their use for purposes not set forth in the law or its regulations, or their use by means of procedures that have not been authorized legally or administratively. This is so because in matters of public law, the authorities cannot do what the law does not explicitly authorize.⁵⁵ Therefore, from a democratic perspective, corruption in the exercise of public office is a breach of democratic legality.⁵⁶ It is an illegitimate use of authority, by means of which a public official or an elected representative takes on unauthorized powers. In this regard, the motivations or aims alleged by the violator for breaching legality are irrelevant.⁵⁷ In brief, corruption is an antithesis of democracy because it abridges one of its basic tenets: that in a democracy, power is subject to law. For this reason, mechanisms of “horizontal accountability” are a structural component of the democratic rule of law to oversee, or to punish as required, improper use of authority (O'Donnell, 2003; O'Donnell, 1997, 1998)(O'Donnell, 2003; 1999).

Widespread corruption can have very injurious instrumental effects on the legitimacy of a political system. If citizens see that public authorities abridge the laws and use public resources for their own benefit or that of their circle, and do so with impunity, their trust in them and in the institutions that allow such abuse may be seriously affected. This unfortunate situation can worsen if the population feel that they are often and repeatedly the victims of acts of corruption. Seligson argues that, for this reason, corruption can erode political legitimacy (Seligson & Córdova, 2001). This is a valid argument although, being an empirical one, its nature is different from the one outlined in previous paragraphs (resulting from a petition of principle).

In any case, the issue of corruption has been addressed in numerous empirical studies.⁵⁸ At the international level, the yearly international measurements made by Transparency International

⁵⁵ This principle is the opposite of the one that prevails in private law: here individuals may do whatever is not explicitly forbidden by law.

⁵⁶ By corruption we mean the use of public resources or authority for private ends, whether one's own or those of third parties, by means of practices that are punished by domestic legislation or international treaties that the country has signed and ratified.

⁵⁷ An excuse often given in various countries of the region (including Costa Rica) for the unauthorized use of public funds is “necessity”. Thus, it is said that since the legal and administrative framework in force is cumbersome and it is necessary to address urgent needs of the citizenry, breaching provisions is a lesser evil (and even necessary) to attain a greater good (social welfare).

⁵⁸ In this chapter we will not review the literature. The reader can find a summary of the various theories on democracy in chapter VI of the Audit of democracy in Ecuador (Seligson & Córdova, 2001). As explained in that chapter, there is a debate on the degree to which corruption “lubricates” the political system: some authors argue

stand out.⁵⁹ According to these measures of perception, after Chile (though quite far behind), Costa Rica is one of the countries of Latin America where businessmen and experts believe that corruption is least widespread. Nevertheless, at the national level, public opinion series show that, since the mid-1990s, the perception of strong penetration of corruption in management of public affairs has spread to the majority of the population (Camp, Coleman, & Davis, 2000; Nora Garita & Poltronieri, 1989; N. Garita & Poltronieri, 1997)(Nora y Poltronieri, 1989; 1997).

4.2 Perception of Prevalence of Corruption

This study corroborates the existence of a widespread perception amongst the population regarding prevalence of corruption in public affairs. In response to question EXC 7 “Taking into account your experience, corruption among public officials is... (1) Very widespread (2) Somewhat widespread (3) Not very widespread (4) Not widespread at all,” almost half the sample (41.4%) said that it is very widespread. When we add the replies stating that it is very or somewhat widespread, this proportion increases to 74.6%. This corroborates other measurements of perception of corruption made in Costa Rica and Latin America.⁶⁰ From a comparative perspective, Costa Ricans’ perception of how widespread corruption is among public officials is not very different from that prevailing in the rest of the countries included in the study, although it is interesting to point out that Costa Ricans seem to be the most critical ones (Figure IV.1).


The small differences in intensity of perception regarding how widespread corruption is among public officials in most countries, and the difficulty of interpreting those differences when they do exist, make perception a poor tool to analyze the issue of corruption. In point of fact, we know that the development of horizontal accountability mechanisms within the State is a key factor to combat corruption: the stronger these mechanisms, the greater the capacity to detect and punish these improper practices (O'Donnell, 2003; O'Donnell, 1998; Seligson & Córdova, 2001; World Bank, 1997). In principle, a greater capacity to control and punish entails greater success in the struggle against corruption, due to its deterrent effect on officials who intend to break the law; and we would also expect that greater success would also have a positive effect on public perceptions of corruption. However, the opposite may be the case: the greater the exposure of episodes of corruption, the fresher they are in the memory of the population, and therefore they may have the unexpected consequence of strengthening perceptions of how extended corrupt practices are, while inability to detect those cases may have the effect of rendering them invisible. Due to these arguments, it is extremely difficult to understand the reason why countries with very different institutional development, such as Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, have similar levels of perception regarding corruption of public officials; or the reasons why perceptions of Mexico and most of the countries included in the study are similar when, as we will see later on, Mexicans report levels of victimization due to corrupt acts that double those of the other countries.

that corruption contributes to social cohesion and to the effectiveness of a system to address the needs of the population; others deny said beneficial effects. In recent years, the World Bank has argued that corruption in public affairs is negatively associated with economic development, as it hinders the establishment of strong institutions (Kaufman, 1998; Kaufman, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; World Bank, 1997).

⁵⁹ For a critique of the TI methodology, see: (Philps, 2002; Seligson & Córdova, 2001)

⁶⁰ In various years, the Latinobarómetro survey has included a question on the degree of corruption of public officials (on a scale from 0 to 100). With the exception of Chile, in the other countries covered by that study, the national averages are above 80. See: www.latinobarometro.com

Figure IV.1 Perception of How Widespread Corruption of Public Officials is, From a Comparative Perspective, Scale 0-100, 2004



Within Costa Rica, this perception does not show important differences according to the region of the country where the population lives. However, it tends to be more intense among persons with a higher educational level (Spearman R= -.091, sig < .001). Thus, among those who have some level of post-secondary education and who answered this question, 87.9% believed that corruption of public officials was somewhat or very widespread, as compared to 76.7% of those with a grade school education or less.

4.3 Acquiescence to Corruption

A broadly disseminated perception that corruption is widespread among public officials does not mean that people are upset by it. Some may accept acts of public corruption as being inevitable, or even, more explicitly, justify them as an acceptable (though not legal) means to attain individual or collective objectives. In other words, what people believe about how widespread corruption is in management of public affairs is one thing, and their reaction to that perceived state of affairs is another. To clarify the latter topic it is necessary to inquire about people's level of tolerance of corruption. In this study, we inquired about tolerance by means of six questions that placed the individuals before three hypothetical situations and asked them for their opinion on them (Box IV.1). The three situations have different implications: one is a "mild" act of corruption, another is intermediate, and the last one is "grave;"⁶¹ likewise, in each situation we

⁶¹ The distinction between mild and grave corruption was taken from the rounds of focus groups in Honduras and Costa Rica conducted in 2003 by the firm UNIMER RI for the Programa Estado de la Nación. These focus groups were part of the preparatory process for the 2d Report on Human Development in Central America and Panama

asked about the two parties involved in the relationship: the one who pays and the one who receives the payment. Analyses conducted show that the six questions measure the same dimension and that they are a reliable and valid measurement.⁶²

Box IV.1 Questions asked regarding tolerance of corruption

In everyday life, many things happen. I would like you to give me your opinion on the following cases:

CRC1 Let us suppose that there are many delays and too many steps to expedite a matter at a public office and an individual gives a tip or a gift to an official for the matter he or she needs to be completed quickly.

CRC1A With regard to the person who gives the tip. Would you say that this person (READ THE OPTIONS) 1. Is not acting improperly, merely solving his or her problem. 2. Is acting improperly, but it is justifiable. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

CRC1B. With regard to the official who received the tip. Would you say that the official: 1. Is not acting improperly, helps to solve a problem 2. Is acting improperly, but it is not a gross misconduct 3. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

CRC2 A person pays a bit less taxes than she or he should, but is caught by an IRS official. To avoid strong punishment, he or she gives the official a tip.

CRC2A With regard to the person who pays the tip. Would you say that this person (READ THE OPTIONS) 1. Is not acting improperly, merely solving his or her problem. 2. Is acting improperly, but it is justifiable. 3. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

CRC2B. And now with regard to the official who received the tip. Would you say that the official (READ THE OPTIONS). 1. Is not acting improperly, merely avoiding excessive punishment. Is acting improperly, but it is not gross misconduct 3. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

CRC3 The firm that built a highway that the country needed urgently did so well and on time, but inflated the cost to pay a minister because otherwise they would not get the contract.

CRC3A With regard to the firm that paid the minister. Would you say that this firm (READ OPTIONS) 1. Is not acting improperly, merely solving a national problem 2. Is acting improperly, but it is justifiable 3. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

CRC3B. And now with regard to the minister who received the money. Would you say that the official (READ OPTIONS) 1. Is not acting improperly, but helping to solve a national problem. 2. Is acting improperly, but it is not gross misconduct. 3. Is acting improperly and should be punished.

Most people's attitude is to object to concrete acts of corruption in public management: in face of a situation of bribery to accelerate steps to expedite a personal matter, 67.8% state that both –the person who pays as well as the person who receives- act improperly and should be punished. This attitude increases to 85.1% in the case of bribery to avoid payment of taxes and to 77.7% in the case of a firm that bribes a minister (Table IV.1).

A more detailed look at these replies shows interesting nuances with respect to the issue that, as the sonnet by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz goes, may be summarized as follows: "who sins more: he who pays to sin or he who sins for pay?" On the one hand, note that in all three cases there is an important group of individuals who are more complacent regarding he who pays. This group

(Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003b). In all the groups, the participants established a distinction between mild corruption –acts that do not have perceptible consequences for third parties and that are carried out to solve a necessity- and grave corruption –corrupt acts in which the collectivity loses and that involve immoderate ambition of public officials. These focus groups showed that there is greater tolerance by people of acts that they deem mild.

⁶² The factor analysis showed that questions CRB1A, CRB1B, CRB2A, CRB2B, CRB3A and CRB3B measure the same dimension: with high loadings, above .628, they grouped into the same factor. Cronbach's alpha was very satisfactory (.7801).

is several times larger than that of those who are harshest with he who receives the payment. In other words, there is greater permissiveness with he who “pays to sin”. On the other hand, we must take note of the fact that there is greater tolerance when the concrete act of corruption is closer to the everyday life of the individuals: in face of excessive and slow steps to expedite a matter, one out of every three individuals is willing to justify one or the other party (or both) involved in a corrupt act (32.8%). This tolerance declines sharply when the act has a more tangible public significance: when it is a matter of evading taxes, only 14.9% of the individuals show any tolerance for either of the parties (or both); the proportion increases slightly to 22.2% when a minister is bribed to “build a highway that the country needs”. In other words, there is a higher threshold of tolerance for acts of mild and minor corruption than for grave acts of corruption, in the sense that they cause collective damage (Table IV.1).

Table IV.1 Attitudes in Face of Situations of Corruption

Attitudes in the Face of Corruption

¿Tougher with one who pays the bribe or with the one who receives it?	CRC1	Bribe to accelerate personal permits	CRC2	Bribe to avoid paying taxes	CRC3	Bribe to Minister to obtain a contract
		%		%		%
Tough with both	1.013	67,8	1.276	85,1	1.164	77,7
Softer with one who pays	288	19,3	125	8,3	159	10,6
Soft with both	170	11,4	80	5,3	167	11,1
Softer with one who receives	24	1,6	19	1,3	8	0,5
Total	1.495	100,0	1.500	100,0	1.498	100,0

Note:

CRC1 N= 1495; CRC2 N= 1500; CRC3= 1498

The six questions regarding corruption can be grouped together on an index with a scale of 0-100, where 0 indicates an attitude of total tolerance and justification of a corrupt act in the three situations analyzed (in all cases, the person says that the actors are not acting improperly) and 100 indicates radical intolerance (in all cases, the person says that the actors are acting improperly and should be punished). This index is called the index of Intolerance of corruption, and the national average is 89.9, which indicates a high level of intolerance of public corruption. There are, nevertheless, differences regarding the intensity of that intolerance. The factors that help predict intolerance of corruption are basically three: the individuals' age, their civil status, and their years of schooling (Table IV.2 in Appendix C). People who are married or have common-law spouses, who have more schooling, and who are older, are slightly less tolerant of corruption. Support for democracy is also statistically significant, although it does not make a substantial difference regarding intolerance of corruption. Political tolerance is not a factor that helps predict intolerance of corruption.⁶³ A low to medium level of religiousness (sig < .10) is another variable, in addition to the ones mentioned above that remain as predictors.

An important point to investigate is whether acquiescence with corruption in concrete acts of public management is associated with greater generic acquiescence with corruption of public

⁶³ The explanatory capacity of the model is low ($r^2=0.05$). When the districts or *cantones* are included as “dummy” variables, this capacity nearly doubles ($r^2=0.0903$).

authorities as long as they are effective in solving social and economic problems. In various Latin American countries, the population tends to excuse certain corrupt leaders and governments in the belief that “they steal but they do things” –these corrupt leaders and governments, in turn, hide behind public works, progress, to dismiss charges of corruption. To investigate this matter, we included the following question in this study:

CRCO1 Finally, and with respect to another topic, tell me to what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would not mind if a President takes advantage of his post as long as he solves the country’s problems.⁶⁴

In a context of intolerance by the majority regarding concrete acts of corruption in public management, those who are most intolerant are those who are least willing for the President to take advantage of his post as long as he solves the country’s problems ($r=.182$; $\text{sig} < .01$). Therefore, the argument of effectiveness to promote progress is not viewed favorably by most of the population (Table IV.3). However, there is a group that would tolerate this argument somewhat more: those who score lowest on the index of intolerance regarding corruption accept more often that the President take advantage of his post. Intolerance of concrete acts of corruption is positively related to support for the system ($r=.084$, $\text{sig} < .01$), although the association is weaker than the previous one, the same as regarding non-justification of a coup d’État (.064, $\text{sig} < .05$).

Table IV.3 Average Score on the Indexes of Support for the System, Political Tolerance, and Intolerance of Corruption, According to the Degree of Acceptance of Abuse of His Post by the President as Long as He is Effective

Average Score on the Indexes of System Support, Political Tolerance, and Acquiescence of Corruption, According to the Acceptance of the President Abusing His Post as Long as He is Effective

	High Agreement Level*		Low Agreement Level**	
	N	Media	N	Media
TOLICORR Acquiescence of Corruption Index	223	84,34	1253	90,85
ADEMIR System Support Index	225	66,44	1250	67,78
TOLER Political Tolerance Index	223	58,62	1232	57,76

Question CRCO1: " To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would not mind if a President takes advantage of his post as long as he solves the country’s problems (Recoded: 0=total agreement; 6=total disagreement)

* High Agreement Level: people who scored 0-2

* Low Agreement Level: people who scored 5-6

4.4 Victimization by Corrupt Acts

Are most Costa Ricans trapped in a world in which they are victims of daily acts of corruption? To study this issue, we asked a number of questions about whether during the last year they had

⁶⁴ The question was recoded on a 0-6 scale as follows: 0 is the person who most strongly agrees with this statement; 6 is the person who disagrees most with this statement.

suffered concrete experiences as victims of corrupt acts in a series of spheres of social life (Box IV.2).⁶⁵

Box IV.2 Questions asked in the study on victimization by corruption

Now we would like to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...

EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?

EXC2. Has any police agent asked you for a bribe during the last year?

EXC6. Has any public official asked you for a bribe during the last year?

EXC11. Have you taken steps to further a matter in the local government during the last year? [If the reply is no, check 9; if it is “yes”, ask the following]

To further a matter in the local government (such as a permit) during the last year. Have you had to pay any amount in addition to that required by law?

EXC13. Do you work? [If the reply is no, check 9; if it is “yes”, ask the following]

In your work, has anyone asked you for an improper payment during the last year?

EXC14. During the last year, did you take steps to further a matter before the courts, including traffic violation hearings? [If the reply is “no”, check 9; if it is “yes”, ask the following]

Did you have to pay a bribe in the courts during the last year?

EXC15. Did you use public medical services during the last year [If the reply is “no”, check 9; if it is “yes”, ask the following]

To receive medical attention at a hospital or health center during the last year. Have you had to pay any bribes or ‘biombos’?


EXC16. Did you have any child in primary or secondary school during the last year? [If the reply is “no”, check 9; if it is “yes”, ask the following]

At the primary or secondary school during the last year. Did you have to pay any bribes?

Despite the perception that there is widespread corruption in management of matters of public interest, most of the respondent population reports that, in their personal experience, they have not been the victims of an act of corruption. In point of fact, 85 out of every 100 individuals who answered the questions on this topic stated that they had no concrete experience during the last year; few people (4 out of 100) suffered them more than once.

These results should not be interpreted lightly: the proportion of victims of corruption (in all, 15% suffered one or more corrupt acts) is five times higher than what has been reported for countries of Western Europe –and for a five year period, not just one year as in this study (Seligson, 2004). When the proportion of individuals who have suffered at least one act of corruption in the last year is compared with the situation in other countries, we conclude that in Costa Rica victimization by corruption is, together with Colombia, the lowest in the region. However, it is not very different from the level found in most Central American countries, where the proportion of victims of corrupt acts is approximately 18%. The only important difference –of Costa Rica and the others- is by comparison with Mexico, where one out of every three individuals suffered at least one corrupt act during the last year (Figure IV.2).

Figure IV.2 Average Proportion of Individuals Who Have Suffered at Least One Act of Corruption, by Country



In Costa Rica, the victims of concrete acts of corruption do not, generally speaking, have a very different profile from that of the rest of the population. We reach this conclusion after analyzing the results of a logistic regression model (the dependent variable is a dichotomy: victim – non-victim).⁶⁶ They tend to have higher income (Q10R) and, in general, housewives are less the victims of corruption than the rest of the population (OCUP1R2) ($\text{sig} < .1$). We also examined whether local differences help predict victimization or frequency of corruption (Model B that introduces the 30 districts or *cantones* as “dummy” variables). The results were negative, as including these variables modifies the predictive capacity of model A very slightly (Table IV.4 in Appendix C). Of the set of variables we examined, only two: housewives and income level were statistically significant ($\text{sig} < .1$). In general, model A has a very low predictive capacity (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .016$).

Victimization by corrupt acts of public officials is greater the higher the income of the population: among those with the highest level of income, frequency is 19%, compared to 12% of the population with the lowest level of income (Figure IV.3). Housewives who, in principle,

⁶⁶ Due to the low frequency of corruption (only 4% had experienced two or more acts of corruption), this variable was dichotomized: victims of at least one act of corruption and non-victims.

⁶⁷ Due to the low frequency of corruption (only 4% had experienced two or more acts of corruption), this variable was dichotomized: victims of at least one act of corruption and non-victims.

⁶⁸ Podría haberse esperado que quienes han sido víctimas de un acto de corrupción tendieran a ser más intolerantes con ella. La inexistencia de una relación entre ambas cosas refuerza el punto que es insuficiente colegir de la percepción de una alta corrupción, e incluso, de la victimización por ella, la actitud de las personas en contra de la corrupción.

spend more time within the home than population with an occupation, have a lower rate of victimization (Figure IV.4). On the other hand, victimization by corruption is not associated with greater or lesser acquiescence to corruption ($\text{sig}=.30$). Both victims and non-victims of corruption have similar levels of intolerance of corruption.

Figure IV.3 Victimization by Acts of Corruption According to Level of Income





Figure IV.4 Victimization by Acts of Corruption Against Housewives and the Rest of the Population




4.5 Corruption and Support for Democracy

This study corroborates a finding of other research studies of the Public Opinion project of Vanderbilt University: victims of corrupt acts have a lower level of support for the system. In Seligson's index of support for the system, the victims of at least one act of corruption score an average of 63.1 on a scale of 100, below the national average (67.9). Instead, persons who have not been victims have a higher level of support for the system (69.2 on average). In other words, being a victim of corruption is associated with lower support for the system, although the effect is not pronounced.⁶⁹

This finding is not only valid for Costa Rica: in all the other countries included in the 2004 study, the victims of corrupt acts show less support for the democratic system than non-victims. The differences are statistically significant ($\text{sig} < .001$) and in countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Panama and Colombia they are also relatively pronounced (Figure IV.5).

Figure IV.5 Average National Differences in Support for the Democratic System According to Victimization by Corruption, by Country, 2004



⁶⁹ We found no important differences between the victims and non-victims of corrupt acts when we examined their level of tolerance of the political rights of others nor with respect to their acquiescence to corruption. Regarding these matters, both groups' patterns were very similar to the national average.

5.0 Protection of Citizens' Rights and Security

5.1 Introduction

Protection of the rights of individuals is one of the pillars of democracy.⁷⁰ Without this protection, one of the premises of the democratic system is undermined: political and civil equality of the person, an equality, moreover, that is acknowledged and guaranteed in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. Absence of protection for citizens' rights creates uncertainty, and thus, insecurity: if individuals are unprotected, they then fear for their physical and patrimonial integrity, as well as their dignity, since they are vulnerable to threats (real or imagined) from other persons, organizations, or institutions. This situation is an attack on their freedom, since it limits the range of vital options that they can desire for themselves. Furthermore, it makes individual freedom dependent on the economic and political resources available to each person to mobilize those means needed to protect their rights.

Protection of rights requires a network of institutions with due legal competencies and financial, technical, and administrative capacity that enables them to reasonably carry out this function. In the Costa Rican case, there has been vigorous institutional development in this area during the last few decades, centering on strengthening the Judicial Branch and agencies such as the Ombudsman (*Defensoría de los Habitantes*). This institutional development has substantially extended individuals' access to protection of their rights (see Chapter 1). From an international point of view, Costa Rica has constantly been recognized as a leader in human rights promotion and protection.

Thus, we could expect that a society that recognizes, promotes, and protects an individual's rights would be one in which these individuals live in a secure milieu, with few threats to the integrity or property of the inhabitants. Although it is irrefragable that the country has lower levels of criminality than found in the immediately surrounding region (Cruz, 2003; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2004; United Nations, 1999), a critical view of the criminological statistics shows a gradual but sustained climb in delinquency, especially in violent crime (Carranza & Solana, 2004). This growth has contributed to generate a significant increase in the sensation of citizen insecurity (N. Garita & Poltronieri, 1989; N. Garita & Poltronieri, 1997; Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a; UNIMER R.I., 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).

This chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the protection of citizens' rights and security from the viewpoint of personal perceptions and experiences. It also attempts to identify possible implications for life under democracy. It is divided into five sections. In addition to this introduction, the second section deals with the trust of the citizenry with regard to the institutions

⁷⁰ In recent years, a debate has arisen in comparative studies on democracy regarding the relationship between democracy and the democratic Rule of Law. In procedural theories of democracy, the existence of a democratic Rule of Law is assumed implicitly or explicitly as a necessary condition, albeit external to the regime (Robert Dahl, 1971, 1989; Robert. Dahl, 1999). More recently, O'Donnell has postulated a broader concept for democracy –democracy beyond the regime– according to which the democratic Rule of Law is a constituent dimension of democracy. He argues that the recognition of political equality of citizens implies a set of institutions capable of recognizing and protecting these rights (O'Donnell, 2003; O'Donnell, 1997, 1998). Other authors have proposed the crucial nature of the consolidation of a Rule of Law for democracy, an aspect that has scarcely been dealt with by the procedural theories of democracy (Becker, 1999)

that protect their rights. The third section analyzes perceptions of civil security. We then proceed to look at measures that households have taken in the face of these perceptions. The fifth and final section explores the prevalence of criminal acts and provides a basic profile of the victims of these acts.

5.2 Protection of Rights

Costa Ricans tend to trust the major State institutions dedicated to protecting their rights: the system for administering justice, the Ombudsman, and the police. On a scale of 0 (no trust) to 100 (fullest trust), they all receive around 60 points, with the Ombudsman earning the highest score. Thus the courts of justice earned 56.8 points, the justice system (in general), 61.6, the Ombudsman 73.0 points, the police 58.6, and the Supreme Court of Justice 62.0. As we saw in Chapter III, these are not particularly high scores when compared with other public institutions, but they do excel when compared with similar agencies in other countries within the region (Figure V.1 through Figure V.4).

The trust placed by Costa Ricans on the institutions that protect their rights is both the highest and most consistent in the region. When we compare the institutions that exist in all of the countries included in the study (courts, system of justice, police, and Supreme Court), Costa Rica is the only case where all four receive a level of trust above 50 points on a scale of 100. In Guatemala, none of these entities achieved 50 points; in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, only the police surpass this level. On the other hand, Colombia and El Salvador are somewhat similar to the Costa Rican situation (in these two countries, 3 institutions surpass the 50 point mark), but with exceptions, for example, the Supreme Court of Justice in El Salvador earns a slightly lower level of trust. In all cases, except the Costa Rican one, there are large gaps in the level of trust according to the institution being analyzed (at times, the differences are 10 or more percentage points on a 100 point scale). In most cases, the police constitute the agency receiving the best scores, while in Costa Rica the institutions within the Judicial Branch come out the best.⁷¹

⁷¹ The Ombudsman (*Defensoría de los Habitantes*, or *Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos*) was studied in only 4 countries (Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, and Panama). In these cases, the pattern of confidence noted for the other entities is repeated: the Ombudsman in Costa Rica received 73 points out of 100, compared to 65 points in Colombia and El Salvador and 64 points in Panama.

Figure V.1 Average Trust in the Legal System by Country, 2004, Scale 0-100




Figure V.2 Average Trust in Supreme Courts by Country, 2004, Scale 0-100




Figure V.3 Average Trust in the Legal System by Country, 2004, Scale 0-100





Figure V.4 Average Trust in the Legal System by Country, 2004, Scale 0-100



In order to explore the predictors of trust in institutions that protect the rights of the citizenry, two procedures were carried out. First of all the following questions were analyzed B1 (Trust in the courts of justice), B10 (Trust in the system of justice), B17 (Trust in the Ombudsman), B18 (Trust in the police) and B31 (Trust in the Supreme Court of Justice) to determine whether taken

as a whole, and not individually, they served to measure the general level of trust in institutional protection of citizens' rights. A factorial analysis was applied and the results were satisfactory.⁷² As a consequence, a index called PRODE was created, which runs from 0 to 100, where 0 is a situation of complete distrust of all five institutions and 100 is a situation of full trust in these entities. The national average level of trust in these institutions that protect citizens' rights, according to the PRODE Index, is relatively high: 62.4 on a 100-point scale.

In second place, three linear regression models were run taking the PRODE Index as the dependent variable. Model A includes as its independent variables the socio-demographic variables that have been used throughout this study, as well as some political attitudes and experiences, but without considering Seligson's democratic support index. Model B includes the foregoing variables and the support index. Model X includes, in addition, the *cantones* as "dummy variables". Model A1 has a weak predictive capacity ($R^2 = 0.064$). After including the democratic support index (ADEMR). The predictive ability of the model increases substantially ($R^2 = 0.503$). The inclusion of the 30 *cantones* as dummy variables has almost no further impact ($R^2 = 0.511$). This means that with regards to matters of trust in institutions that protect citizens' rights, local peculiarities do not matter when predicting the level of this trust. Thus, Model B was selected for the analysis (Table V.1). As can be seen, there are four statistically significant variables: gender – males are slightly less trusting-, age – older persons have slightly more trust-, victimization by a crime (Question VIC1),⁷³ and especially, support for democracy (Sig. < 0.100).

As could be expected, having been a victim of a criminal act depresses the level of trust in these institutions (Figure V.5). The factor that most differentiates the score, in terms of trust in institutions that protect rights, is support for democracy. Individuals with higher levels of support for democracy show a markedly higher level of trust in the institutions that protect citizens' rights than do those with low levels of support. This would seem to suggest a close and robust association between support for democracy and support for the core institutions in a democratic rule of law, a finding that is important at the outset (Figure V.6).

⁷² The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sample adequacy was .833. The factor loadings were high in all cases: B1=0.742, B10=0.795, B17=0.667, B18=0.739, B31=0.799. Cronbach's alpha was very satisfactory=0.804.

⁷³ Question VIC1 asks: "Were you a victim of an act of delinquency in the last 12 months?" 1. Yes 2. No 8. NS/NR

Figure V.5 Average Score in the Index of Protection of Rights by Criminal Victimization





Figure V.6 Average Score in the Index of Protection of Rights by Support for the Democratic System (Recoded)



However, this empirical relationship must be accepted with care. When a factor analysis is carried out with the variables in the B set, which refer to public institutions, both the agencies that protect citizens' rights and those of the political regime load on the same factor. This means that there is a suspicion of collinearity between the Protection of Rights Index (PRODE) and the democratic support index, insofar as when their elements are analyzed together, both seem to

form part of a broader dimension that could be called: regime + rule of law (Table V.2 in Appendix C). But more important than this methodological question is the result: in the Costa Rican perspective, regime and rule of law seem to be closely related.⁷⁴

On the other hand, the factor analysis reveals the existence of a second factor consisting of the trust of individuals in their municipalities and the autonomous institutions (Costa Rican Social Security Fund – CCSS -, Costa Rican Electricity Institute – ICE -, National Insurance Institute – INS). These agencies provide services to the population and at least in the case of ICE, INS, and CCSS, are the flagship institutions of the welfare State that has developed in this country after the civil war in 1948.

Table V.1 Results of the Factor Analysis on Average Trust in Public Institutions in Costa Rica, 2004

	Rotated Components Matrix ^a	
	1	2
B1R Courts	,618	,111
B2R Political Institutions	,468	,186
B6R Political System Support	,572	,081
B10AR Legal System	,715	,203
B11R Electoral Tribunal	,739	,067
B13R Legislative Assembly	,626	,297
B14R Nstional Government	,708	,239
B17R Defensoría Habitantes (Ombudsman)	,534	,295
B18R Police	,560	,363
B19R National Comptroller	,658	,281
B31R Supreme Court	,720	,287
B32R Municipality	,384	,524
CRB1R Costa Rican Electricity Institute	,241	,751
CRB2R Costa Rican Social Security Institute	,170	,808
CRB3R National Insurance Institute	,126	,803

Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax Kaiser Normalization.

a. Convergence in 3 iterations.

⁷⁴ This empirical result provides an interesting light to the discussion regarding the concept of democracy. O'Donnell has proposed, as was previously mentioned, that democracy is more than a political regime, a thesis that has been adopted in Costa Rica by the Citizens Audit on Democracy Quality and the reports on the State of the Nation (O'Donnell, 2003; Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a, 2003a, 2003b). The results that are commented seem to indicate that, beyond the meanings that individuals grant of the concept of democracy, generally circumscribed to notions such as freedom and the liberty to vote, in practice seem to have a broader notion of it. Other evidences in the same regard seem to appear in the recent study by Miguel Gómez and Johnny Madrigal on the vision of cultural democracy among youths (Gómez & Madrigal, 2004).

5.3 Perception of Security

In spite of the high degree of trust in institutions that protect citizen's rights, several public opinion studies indicate an extended perception with regard to the lack of citizen security (Poltronieri and Garita, 1997; UNIMER R.I). This study identified citizen insecurity as the most important problem cited by respondents and one of the severest local problems (See Chapter VI for an analysis of this topic), although as was stated at the outset, the country has comparatively low crime rates.⁷⁵ So that it may be worthwhile examining this topic in greater detail, since an extended perception of insecurity could be associated with a loss of personal freedoms (people stop doing things because they are afraid to) and eventually to a demand for drastic measures on the part of the authorities in order to resolve the problem, even if it means overstepping the laws and the rights of the rest of the citizens.

In order to study the perception of citizen security, this study included a battery of questions (Sidebar V.1). Generally, these questions probe the threat that delinquency represents both for the country and especially for the communities. It also explores whether individuals have trust in the punitive capacity of the institutions.

Sidebar V.1. Questions used to study perceptions of citizen security.

AOJ11. With regards to the place or neighborhood where you live, and considering the possibility of being a victim of an attack or a robbery, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

(1) Very secure (2) Somewhat secure (3) Somewhat insecure (4) Very insecure (8) DK

AOJ11A. And with regards to the country in general, how much do you think the level of delinquency that we have now represents a threat for our future welfare?

(1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/NR

AOJ12. If you were the victim of a robbery or an attack, how sure are you that the system would punish the culprit?

(1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) DK/NR

AOJ17. To what extent would you say that gangs affect your neighborhood? Would you say a great deal, somewhat a little, or not at all?

(1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (8) DK

CRAOJ20 How often do you avoid going through some zones of the neighborhood, because you consider them dangerous? Always, sometimes, rarely, or never?

(DO NOT READ) 0. There are no dangerous zones in the neighborhood.

(1) Always (2) Sometimes (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/NR

Crime is perceived with greater intensity for the country than for the individuals in the communities: 94.5% believe that the current level of delinquency threatens "a great deal" or "somewhat" the nation's welfare. Contrast this situation with the one reported in the communities: here the majority perceives greater security, since between 60% and 70% of the interviewees that responded did so indicating that they feel very or somewhat secure in their localities (Figures V.7 and V.8). In summary, there is an important gap between the perception of insecurity at the national level and at the local level.

⁷⁵ The homicide rate is slightly above 6 per 100,000 inhabitants. In Latin America, only the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) have lower rates. (Cruz, 2003). However, compared to the situation prevalent in Costa Rican society in the mid-80's, the current homicide and property crime rates are much higher (Carranza & Solana, 2004).

Figure V.7 Perception of the Threat of Crime to the Country's Welfare





Figure V.8 Perception of Security in the Neighborhood or Community Where One Lives



In order to study more deeply the finding of the extended perception of security in the neighborhoods and communities, questions AOJ17 and CRAOJ20 were included in the study. The first probes whether gangs have had a significant affect on life in the neighborhood and the second explores whether the respondents avoid passing through certain zones in the community since they are considered dangerous. The results confirm the majority sensation of security at the local level: 70% say that gangs do not affect their neighborhood or do so only a little, and about

two-thirds never or rarely avoid going through dangerous zones of the neighborhood and a few say that there are no dangerous zones in their community (Figures V.9 and V.10). However, the insecure minorities are not negligible (between 30% and 40% of those interviewed).

Figure V.9 Frequency With Which Persons Avoid Going Through Dangerous Zones in Their Communities






Figure V.10 Perception of Effect on Neighborhood from Presence of Gangs



Finding a gap in the perception of local security but national insecurity is not exclusive to Costa Rica (Figure V.11). In all of the countries included in the study, ample majorities (above 85 of every 100, except Mexico) believe that delinquency is a threat to the country's welfare and, at the same time, a majority of the individuals say that they live in neighborhoods that are very or somewhat secure (generally above 55 of every 100). Costa Rica stands out for the intensity with which the respondents believe that delinquency threatens the country: is it almost a unanimous perception, significantly above the countries with levels of criminal violence clearly superior to those in Costa Rica (Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala). This perception is in contrast to the extended trust of the Costa Rican populace in the institutions that protect their rights – the highest in the region, as we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

Figure V.11 Contrasting Perceptions of Neighborhood Security and the Threat of Delinquency to the Country's Welfare, 2004



Thus, the foregoing results suggest two provisional conclusions. On the one hand, the sensation of citizen insecurity has at least both national and local dimensions, each with a different intensity. On the other hand, this sensation is not homogeneously distributed among the populace: some persons feel secure and others do not, for various reasons. To probe further into this topic, profiles of the perceptions of citizen security were prepared and they were examined to see whether there were any factors associated with these perceptions (Sidebar V.3). Once the data had been studied, three profiles representing 94.7% of the respondents were selected:

The persons who feel there is national insecurity (delinquency threatens the country) but local security (they feel secure in their communities). We could say that they have a feeling of indirect citizen insecurity (they do not face the criminal threat directly). This group includes 859 individuals, 57.3% of the sample.

The persons who feel that there is citizen security at both the local and national levels. This is a small group of 42 persons (2.8% of the total).

The persons who feel there is citizen insecurity both locally and nationally. These are the respondents who feel most intensely the threat from delinquency. This group includes 519 persons (34.6%), one of every three in the whole group.

Sidebar V.2 Procedure to define citizen security profiles

Citizen security profiles were built on the basis of the responses to the following questions: AOJ11A (Level of delinquency as a threat to the country's welfare) and AOJ11 (Feeling of security in the community).

The first profile combined the following responses: (a) Question AOJ11A: Do you think that the country is (1) very or (2) somewhat threatened; (b) Question AOJ11: do you feel (1) very or (2) somewhat secure in your neighborhood.

The second profile combined the following responses: (a) Question AOJ11A: Do you think that the country is (3) slightly or (4) not threatened at all; (b) Question AOJ11: do you feel (1) very or (2) somewhat secure in your community.

The third profile combined the following responses: (a) Question AOJ11A: (1) greatly or (2) somewhat threatened; (b) Question AOJ11: do you feel (3) very or (4) somewhat insecure in your neighborhood.

The two largest groups are: first, those individuals who, in spite of perceiving the country as threatened by delinquency, feel secure in their communities; and secondly, those who feel insecure both locally and nationally. Different tests were made to determine if there were socio-demographic or political attitude differentials between these two groups, but the results were negative; any differences that exist are not statistically significant. The only factor that was important was the geographic factor ($\text{Sig.} < 0.001$): in both groups, insecurity was always more extensive among the inhabitants of the Greater San José Metro Area (GAM) than in rural areas (Figures V.12 and V.13). Note that 43% of the residents of the GAM feel threatened at both levels (national and local), in contrast to 25% of the inhabitants of rural areas.

Figure V.12 Proportion of Individuals That Feel the Country Threatened but Their Communities Secure





Figure V.13 Proportion of Individuals That Feel the Country Threatened and Their Communities Insecure



5.4 Protective Measures Adopted by Households

Just as not all of the populace feel the same sense of citizen insecurity, they also react differently in the face of this threat. Some adopt different precautions, others, to the contrary, do not do so, in spite of feeling threatened; furthermore, as we have seen above, there are those who do not feel that they are affected at all. In the face of the extended but differentiated perception of threats (national or local) to citizen security, this study included five questions on protective

measures that households might have taken in recent years to increase their security (Sidebar V.4). It is important to point out that in view of the almost universal use of window grills on homes, no question was included on whether there were grills or not, the response would have been overwhelmingly positive, but whether the householders have reinforced this security (Question CRSE3 ‘Improve home security, such as purchasing alarms, razor wire, etc.’).

Sidebar V.3 Questions used for the analysis of the protective measures adopted by households.

CRSE1 In recent years, which of the following protective measures have you taken in your home? Not leaving the house alone: 1. Yes 2. No

CRSE2 Reduce social activities due to fears: 1. Yes 2. No

CRSE3 Improve home security, for example, by buying an alarm or razor wire: 1. Yes 2. No


CRSE4 Acquire, purchase or borrow a firearm: 1. Yes 2. No

CRSE5 Pay for permanent private security for the house, block or neighborhood (guard or company): 1. Yes 2. No

The protective measure most disseminated among households interviewed was to not leave the house alone (75.5% responded that they have adopted this decision in recent years).⁷⁶ At some distance, it is followed by two decisions that imply an investment of resources or lifestyle changes: improving household security (38.3%) and affecting social life (ceasing to attend social activities, 34.4%). Approximately one of every three households has adopted these measures. Finally, 16.5% of households pay for a private security service and 7.6% have recently acquired a firearm. The proportions change in some cases when the geographic factor is introduced (Figure V.14). In fact, measures such as not leaving the house alone and ceasing to go to social activities have been adopted by residents in different areas of the country (GAM, rest urban, and rural) in a similar fashion. On the other hand, improvements in home security, by purchasing an alarm or reinforcing existing security devices, and payment for private security services are measures adopted more frequently by residents of the GAM.

⁷⁶ Putnam has argued that this type of behavior affects social capital – the networks of collaboration and interpersonal trust (Putnam, 2000). For an analysis of social capital, see Chapter VIII.

Figure V.14 Protective Measures Adopted by Households in Recent Years by Region



What makes a household adopt one or several protective measures, or not adopt any? To study this topic the foregoing questions were analyzed to create a simple accounting of the measures, where 0 indicates a household in which none of the five protective measures have been taken and 5 indicates a household that has taken all five of the measures studied.⁷⁷ On average, Costa Rican households scored 1.72 on a scale of 0-5 (almost 2 protective measures per household). Later, two linear regression models were applied. The first included the usual battery of social factors plus the experience of having been a victim or not of a crime (Model A).⁷⁸ The second added to the foregoing variables, using the *cantones* as “dummies” (Model B). This second model obeys the following observation: if an important proportion of individuals feels that the threat to security is of a local nature, it is appropriate to probe local specificities in order to see whether they introduce differences.

The results mentioned below refer to Model B, since the inclusion of the *cantones* as “dummies” increased the predictive capacity of Model A (R^2 increased from 0.076 to 0.116) and also introduced an important change in the predictive factors. According to Model A, the variable

⁷⁷ A factor analysis was carried out to determine the possibility of creating an Index of Protective Measures. The analysis provided two factors: CRSE1 (not leaving home alone) and CRSE2 (cease going to social activities) were grouped in one factor; CRSE3 (enhance household security), CRSE4 (acquire a firearm), and CRSE5 (pay for private security) were grouped in the other, in both cases with relatively high loadings (over 0.500). However, the reliability of these measures was not satisfactory (Chronbach's alpha = 0.3930 and 0.3049, respectively). Tjus we gave up on creating a index and opted for a simple count of protective measures.

⁷⁸ x1 = Zone (Central Valley), x2 = Size (GAM), x3 = Gender (male), x4 = Occupation (housewife), x5 = Marital status (married-in union), x6 = Years of schooling, x7 = Age, x8 = Income (thousands), x9 = Wealth index, x10 = Religiosity (High), x11 = Victim of a crime; the categorical variables are included as dummies*.

TAMAÑO was significant: the persons living in intermediate-sized cities (rest urban) and rural areas adopt less protective measures than those living in the Greater Metro Area (GAM). On average, these latter scored 1.92 on the 0-5 scale, in comparison to 1.58 for households in the rest urban and 1.54 in rural areas ($\text{Sig.} < 0.10$) (Table V.3 in Appendix C).

To a certain point, we could expect this result. However, when *cantones* are introduced into the model, the variable TAMAÑO loses its significance. In other words, local specificities are key to examining this relationship even within the same region. According to both models, age, wealth, low religiosity, and, in particular, having been the victim of a crime are factors that help to predict that households will adopt more protective measures ($\text{Sig.} < 0.10$). In model B, four of the 30 *cantones* are significant and become predictive factors ($\text{Sig.} < 0.10$): persons living in *cantones* within the GAM, such as Heredia, and particularly, Desamparados have adopted more protective measures in their homes than the Central Municipality of San José (Capital); in contrast, those living in Puriscal or Turrialba have adopted less.

Upon examining household behavior, most of the statistically significant factors introduce small differences regarding the number of protective measures taken in the home. The two factors that make the greatest difference in protective behavior are income level and, particularly, if the person had been the victim of a crime (Figures V.15 and V.16). Both behaviors are to be expected. On the one hand, certain measures require a financial outlay (additional protection for the home, pay for private guard services); on the other, undoubtedly the experience of having been a victim of a crime seems to affect individual behavior, making these persons more cautious.

Figure V.15 Average Protective Measures Adopted by Households According to Experience of Criminal Victimization by the Respondent





Figure V.16 Average Protective Measures Adopted by Households According to Level of Wealth




5.5 Victimization by Criminal Acts

In Costa Rica, the perception of citizen insecurity is greater than the victimization rate – those that have in fact suffered a crime- a frequent result in different opinion studies carried out both in the country and the rest of Latin America (www.latinobarometro.com), as well as research within the framework of the Vanderbilt University Public Opinion Project (www.innerstory/nsnd.com). See in particular: (Seligson, forthcoming; Seligson & Azpuru, 2001).

This finding is repeated in this study: in Costa Rica, 84.8% of the sample (1272 persons) have not been the victims of a crime – in other words, one of every six persons has been the victim of a criminal act (Figure V.17). This incidence is very similar to that found in the rest of the countries included in the survey.


Figure V.17 Average National Proportion of Persons Victim of a Criminal Act by Country



Of the 228 victims, almost half (112 persons, 49.1%) reported the act to a public institution. The main reason for not making an official report is ineffective institutional response. Of the 115 persons that declared a reason for not denouncing the crime, over half (61, 53%) said that they had not made a claim because “it is a waste of time”; the second reason given was that the crime itself was not serious (30 persons, 26.1% of those not reporting). A lack of knowledge or fears of making a claim were not motives for non-reporting. Most of the crimes reported by respondents were not violent. Of 228 victims, 154 (67.5%) indicated that the robbery occurred without aggression or threat or that the home was broken into but without indicating violence.

Under a comparative perspective, the level of denunciations of criminal acts presented to an institution in Costa Rica is, together with Panama, the highest within the eight countries studied. In five of the countries in the region, the level of denunciation varies between 32 and 40%, a particularly low level, which denotes a scant use of the institutional means for sanction and eventual reparation of the damages caused by criminal acts (Figure V.18).

Figure V.18 Average Proportion of Victims that Denounce Criminal Acts to their Country's Institutions by Country



In order to examine the characteristics of the persons that have been victims of a criminal act, a logistic regression model was applied with VIC1 as the dependent variable (dichotomous: was victim – not victim). The socio-demographic factors usually used throughout the report were analyzed. The strongest predictors were level of income and level of education. In general terms, the greater the income and educational level, the greater the rate of victimization, to the point that the persons with post-secondary education and those in the highest income levels reported a three-fold higher rate of having been the victims of a criminal act than those with primary education or less and those with a low income level (Figures V.19 and V.20).

Figure V.19 Rate of Victimization by Delinquency by Level of Education





Figure V.20 Rate of Victimization by Delinquency by Income Level



6.0 Local Governments

6.1 Context

Costa Rica has a highly centralized political system. Very early in its republican history, the quasi-autonomous colonial municipalities lost attributions to the central government.⁷⁹ However, in the first decades after Independence in 1821, the municipalities retained functions such as provision of public health and educational services as well as care for the indigent. Institutions within the central government slowly took over these functions. With the educational reform carried out after 1880, the municipalities lost their last area of control over the country's social life (I. Muñoz, 1988). Thus, during the 20th Century, municipal functions have been gradually reduced to the provision of some local services that central institutions, for various reasons, do not provide, such as refuse collection and local road maintenance. The creation of the decentralized institutional sector in the 1949 Constitution –autonomous agencies under the Executive Branch in charge of service provision- and subsequent laws that created the frameworks for new institutions, or established public control over existing private firms, in areas such as potable water supply (Costa Rican Electricity Institute [ICE], 1951; National Aqueduct and Sewer Service [SNA] in 1961) reduced even further municipal intervention in the provision of goods and services to the population. Currently, central government institutions provide these services for a majority of the population. Thus, there is a well-founded reason for a majority of citizen channeling toward the Central Government ([Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a] on the basis of [S. Mora, 2004]).

In recent years, certain measures have been adopted favoring a transfer of competencies to the municipalities. In the mid-90's, the collection of property taxes was ceded to the municipalities. The figure of specific allocations (*partidas específicas*) – transfers of funds to finance local works under the control of the deputies from the governing party – was substituted for direct transfers from the Ministry of the Treasury, which, in principle, would be assigned with more technical criteria, referring to the relative development of their territories. With the approval of the reform to Article 171 of the Constitution in 2001, a norm was established that municipalities should receive 10% of the central government's budget; in addition, a law approved in the same year mandated one-quarter of the tax collections ear-marked for highway maintenance to be allocated to the municipalities. Simultaneously, local democratic institutions have been strengthened in the past few years. The approval of the new Municipal Code (1998) created new mechanisms for direct democracy or strengthened existing ones (impeachment, plebiscite, town meetings). At the same time, the Code created the figure of the Municipal Mayor and established his/her selection by means of direct, non-concurrent elections – Costa Rica was the last country in Central America to adopt this mechanism. The first election was held in December 2002.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ In the first two decades after Independence from the Spanish Empire, there were two conflicts, with changing alliances, among the four municipal seat/urban centers (1823 and 1838). San José won these conflicts, taking the title of Capital City from Cartago and turning it into the seat of the national government through to the present. One of the first studies on the municipal regime in Costa Rica can be found in (Baker, Fernández, & Stone, 1972)

⁸⁰ Through 1998, the Costa Rican municipal regime could be characterized as a parliamentary regime. The legislative organ of the corporation – the Municipal Council- was elected by the citizens and had, among its powers, the appointment and removal of the Municipal Executive.

In practice, the progress in decentralization is markedly less than what could be expected from the reforms in norms and institutions mentioned above. First of all, the transfer of 10% of the central government's budget depends on a law on municipal competencies that has yet to be promulgated. Secondly, the economic base of the local governments continues to be extremely weak. During the period 1995-2002, the municipal tax load⁸¹ did not exceed 0.7% of GDP (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003a). Third, the central government does not meet the transfers that by law it is obligated to make. In 2002, the municipalities received around 5% of the budget that corresponds to them from the vehicle use tax for highway infrastructure (Laboratorio Nacional de Materiales y Modelos Estructurales de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2003). Finally, in the first direct election for mayors, abstentionism was exceptionally high: at the national level, an average of 70% of the electors did not vote. In contrast, abstentionism in the first round of the presidential and legislative elections in February 2002 was 30.7%.

To summarize, the Costa Rican political system has demonstrated a timid, piecemeal, and gradual process of decentralizing competencies and democratizing local governments.⁸² The evolutionary course of this decentralization will depend decisively on municipal performance at handling the new political and economic attributions that they have been granted, and, overall, on the capacity to respond to community problems that are not actually being confronted by central government institutions.

6.2 Specificity of Local Problems

Local governments are responsible for attending the requirements of the population in their *cantones* that go beyond other institutions of central government. Although they share the nation's territory and other social and economic conditions with other communities, in principle, it could be proposed that each local government faces particular problems that define an appropriate range of action for municipalities as regards other institutions of the central government. To test the validity of this affirmation, this study requested that the respondents identify the most serious community problem.⁸³

No dominant local topic was found, since in general the respondents identified a plurality of problems without one clearly prevailing. Drug addiction was identified as the serious local problem most frequently by the population responding to this question (21.5%), followed by a deteriorated road system (16.4%), citizen insecurity (14.3%) and unemployment and poverty (11.7%) (Table VI.1).

Important regional differences can be seen. For rural inhabitants, the two major problems, mentioned in almost the same proportion, are a deteriorated highway infrastructure and poverty and unemployment (20.2% and 19.3%, respectively). On the other hand, the concerns of the inhabitants of the Greater Metropolitan Area (GAM) are quite different: drug addiction and

⁸¹ Proportion represented by the tax income of local governments within the Gross Domestic Product.

⁸² In other dimensions, there have been significant changes in the municipalities: a marked fragmentation of the local party system and a strong increase in female representation in the Municipal Councils, to the point that they represent more than 40% of the councilmembers elected in 2002 (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2002).

⁸³ Question CRMU1 In your opinion, What is the most serious problem that this community currently faces? (DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS) (ACCEPT ONLY ONE ANSWER; PROBE), IF MORE THAN ONE MENTIONED, "THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE".

citizen insecurity (25.5% and 22.3%, respectively) constitute the main problems. The residents of intermediate urban centers combine the characteristics of the foregoing two groups. On the one hand, similar to the inhabitants of the GAM, they indicated drug addiction as the most serious local problem with greater concentration than the other two areas. On the other hand, similar to the rural populace, they identified with certain frequency the poor highway infrastructure and poverty and unemployment as serious local problems.

Table VI.1 Most Important Local Problem by Region (Percent)

Most important local problem	Region			Total
	GAM*	Other Urban	Rural	
CRMU1RP1 None	11,0%	8,1%	9,1%	9,8%
CRMU1RP2 Water and Sanitation	2,5%	2,3%	7,4%	4,3%
CRMU1RP3 Poor transportation infrastructure	13,4%	16,3%	20,2%	16,4%
CRMU1RP4 Unemployment, poverty	3,6%	15,9%	19,3%	11,7%
CRMU1RP5 Citizen unsafety	22,3%	11,6%	5,9%	14,3%
CRMU1RP6 Drugs	25,5%	28,7%	13,2%	21,5%
CRMU1RP7 Lack of cooperation, participation	5,8%	3,9%	4,5%	5,0%
CRMU1RP8 Others	15,9%	13,2%	20,4%	17,1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

n= 1423

* Gran Area Metropolitana

1/ Water and sanitation: lack of water (3.7%), water pollution (0.6%), sewers, spilled dirty waters

2/ Mala infraestructura vial: huecos en las callas, mal estado de caminos (13.7%)

3/ Unemployment, poverty: lack of jobs, unemployment (8.9%), widespread poverty (2.7%)

4/ Citizen unsafety: lack of safety, crime rates, robberies (14.3%)

5/ Drugs: drugs, drogadiction (21.5%)

6/ Lack of cooperation, participation: lack of union and cooperation (1.4%), Indifference (1.0%), lack

7/ Others: fallas en recolección de basura (2.2%), falta de aseo público (0.8%), immigrants (0.8%),

How different are local problems from national problems? In other words, is there a specificity of problems over which the municipalities have an appropriate field of action, different from other public institutions with national coverage? To respond to this question, we will look first at the most serious national problem that the respondents have indicated the country faces (Question CRA4);⁸⁴ then we will see whether the national problem identified is similar to or contrasts with the most serious local problem.

At the national level, insecurity is the most significant problem that the country faces, almost one of every three individuals has so indicated (31.1%) (Table VI.2). It is followed by unemployment and poverty (21.5%) and the country's macro economy – price stability and fiscal deficit – (21.5%). As can be seen, two of the three national problems (insecurity, unemployment and poverty) were identified at both national and local levels. Once again there are important regional variants: for the inhabitants of the GAM, insecurity is a greater concern than it is for the

⁸⁴ CRA4. To begin, in your opinion, What is the most serious problem that the country faces? [DO NOT READ THE ALTERNATIVES]

inhabitants of rural areas; for the residents of intermediate urban centers, the main problem is unemployment and poverty (28.7%).

Table VI.2 Most Important National Problem According to Respondents by Region

Most Important National Problem	Region			Total
	GAM*	Other Urban	Rural	
CRA4P1 Macroeconomy	19,9	20,5	23,9	21,5
CRA4P2 Unemployment, poverty	20,1	28,7	23,4	22,9
CRA4P3 Citizen Unsafety	36,2	24,6	28,2	31,1
CRA4P4 Drugs	4,7	10,1	10,8	7,9
CRA4P5 Others	19,0	16,0	13,7	16,5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

n=1464

* Gran Area Metropolitana

1/ Macroeconomy: Inflation and high cost of life (5.7%), economic problems (14.9%), domestic debt and fiscal deficit (.5%), economy (.5%) and other issues less than 0.5%

2/ Unemployment and poverty: unemployment (16.7%), poverty (6.2%) and other issues less than 0.5%

3/ Citizen unsafety: crime, violence (28.7%), citizen unsafety (1%) and other issues less than 0.5%

4/ Drogadicción: drogadicción (7.9%)

5/ Others: Free Trade Agreement (1.2%), domestic violence (1.5%), immigration (3.0%), bad government (2.6%), corruption (2.0%), poor education (1.0%), lack of values (0.5%) and other issues less than 0.5%

In spite of the similarity in the pattern of certain national and local problems identified by the respondents, there is a range of specificity for local problems. When questions CRA4 (national problem) and CRMU1 (local problem) are analyzed together, we can see that close to 9 of every 10 individuals mention different national and local problems. Only 11.4% of the sample named the same topic in both questions (Table VI.3). In other words, the local problem that a person identifies as the most serious, and which would be within the competency of local government response, is different from the national problem that s/he mentions, which would be a competency of the national government to face. Thus, it would seem that the requirements bearing on municipalities have contents differing from the requirements bearing on the institutions of the central government.

Table VI.3 Proportion of Respondents that Identify the Same Local and National Problem

Region	% Respondents that identify the same local and national problem
GAM	11,9%
Other Urban	13,1%
Rural	9,6%
Total	11,3%

N=149
 * Persons who chose the same category of local problems in questions CRA4 y

6.3 Performance of the Municipal Government

One of the arguments wielded in favor of decentralizing competencies towards local governments is that these are “closer” to the populace. Therefore, it is assumed that the municipalities are more sensitive to local problems, and as a consequence, have greater incentives to respond more effectively to demands of the citizenry. However, it is one thing to expect local governments to perform better than the central government’s institutions; it is something else whether they do so effectively. This question is especially important in a country as centralized as Costa Rica. Citizen support for the transfer of competencies to local governments – an innovative state of affairs in the institutional history of the country – depends not only on that expectation, but also on the current performance that they perceive from the municipalities. If the performance is evaluated as deficient, citizen resistance may emerge against local governments assuming responsibilities that are currently being carried out by other agencies.

In order to study the performance of local governments, the present study analyzed four topics, which were, in order: perception of the respondents regarding municipal efficacy; municipal government responsiveness in the face of local problems; satisfaction with the services offered by local governments; and, perception of the accountability shown by local governments.

6.3.1 Effectiveness and Responsiveness

An immense majority of the respondents considers that their municipality has done little or nothing to resolve the most serious problem in the community. In general, almost 7 of every ten say that it has done “nothing” (68.7%), as a response to Question CRMU2 “How much has the municipality done to resolve this problem [the most serious in the community]? The evaluation is more critical in the areas of drug addiction and unemployment and poverty – more than 73% state “nothing” – and slightly more benign with regards to the road infrastructure, where the proportion of the most critical is about 52%. Taking together those that opine that the municipality has done something or a lot to resolve the most serious local problem, this group represents a mere 12.2% (Table VI.4). There are no significant differences in the perception of

the effectiveness of the municipalities among the inhabitants of the GAM, intermediate cities, and rural zones (Spearman's $r = 0.739$).

Table VI.4 Effectiveness of the Municipality in Resolving the Most Serious Problem Affecting the Community

Contingency Table

CRMU1R Most Important Local Problem	CRMU2R None	Effectiveness of Municipality			Total
		Little	Some	High	
Water and Sanitation	39 67,2	9 15,5	8 13,8	2 3,4	58 100,0
Poor Transportation Infrastructure	120 51,9	72 31,2	27 11,7	12 5,2	231 100,0
Unemployment, Poverty	111 72,1	25 16,2	16 10,4	2 1,3	154 100,0
Citizen Unsafety	137 68,8	37 18,6	24 12,1	1 0,5	199 100,0
Drugs	223 76,6	37 12,7	24 8,2	7 2,4	291 100,0
Lack of cooperation, participation	48 73,8	13 20,0	1 1,5	3 4,6	65 100,0
Others	167 72,0	42 18,1	18 7,8	5 2,2	232 100,0
Total	845 68,7	235 19,1	118 9,6	32 2,6	1230 100,0

Sig <.001


One point to clear up is whether reduced municipal effectiveness for resolving local problems can be laid on this corporate body or, more probably, on the nature of the problem itself. In other words, an important group of the respondents may feel that the municipality has not done anything because, in fact, local problems have no solution. One way to clear up this uncertainty is to analyze the question on municipal efficacy CRMU2 together with question EFF6, which probes the probability of solving the community's problem through community participation. If a majority of the respondents were to consider that the municipality is doing nothing to resolve this problem and that it is not possible to resolve the problem with community participation either, then we would be facing a critical evaluation of municipal effectiveness, but rather an attitude of resignation – the belief that it is impossible to modify the state of affairs. Question EFF6 says:

Question EFF6 How probable do you think it would be that a popular effort would serve to resolve this community's problems? Would you say it was very probable and they could resolve it, somewhat probable, slightly probable, or it is essentially not probable?

Between these two questions – municipal efficacy and the probability of resolving community problems with popular participation – there is a slight positive association (Spearman's $r = 0.116$, Sig. < 0.001). In general terms, the individuals with the best concept of municipal efficacy tend to believe in the effectiveness of citizen participation as well. However, even among those that believe that the municipality has done nothing, only a minority also considers citizen

participation ineffective for resolving local problems (Figure VI.1). Thus, the perception that the municipality does nothing would seem to respond to a critical perception of its efficacy and not to an attitude of resignation in the face of supposedly unsolvable problems.


Figure VI.1 Perception of Average Municipal Efficacy in Solving the Main Local Problem by Belief in Popular Participation for Resolving this Problem



An additional probe of municipal effectiveness was made to ascertain whether there is any association of this with the level of social development of the municipality as a geographic entity (*cantón*). The hypothesis was that in *cantones* with greater social development, on the average, the populace would have a better concept of municipal effectiveness at problem solving, since the municipality would have been one of the players promoting that development. In order to deal with this topic, we used the Social Development Index (IDS) developed by MIDEPLAN, disaggregated at the *cantón* level. The IDS is composed of 9 variables, with the most recent estimates from 2001, based on the 2000 census data.⁸⁵ In addition, variable CRMU2 was standardized to express responses on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is a response that the municipality “has done nothing” to resolve the local problem and 100, a response that it has done “a lot” (CRMU2RN). We estimated *cantón*-level averages for this variable and we found response dispersion similar in all of them. Finally we ran a simple linear regression with IDS as the independent variable and CRMU4RN as the dependent variable. The results were not statistically significant ($r^2 = 0.069$; $\text{Sig.} = 0.170$). Average perception of municipal efficacy does not seem to be a function of a *cantón*’s social development (Figure VI.2).

⁸⁵ In 1987, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy (MIDEPLAN) prepared the Social Development Index (IDS, in Spanish), using information from the VIII Population Census of 1984. Its objective is to identify the most depressed geographic areas. It includes 8 variables in three different areas: education, housing, and health. It was actualized in 1998 on the basis of administrative records, and once again in 2001 with information from the IX Population Census of 2000 (M. E. González, 2004).

Figure VI.2 Relationship Between the Average *Cantón*-Level Perception of Municipal Effectiveness and MIDEPLAN's Social Development Index



The extensive perception of a lack of municipal efficacy is combined with a similarly extensive opinion regarding the lack of “responsiveness” of authorities and officials to the needs of the populace. In this regard, we asked respondents two questions that probed how responsive municipal authorities were (Sidebar VI.1). The two questions resulted closely related ($r = 0.561$; $\text{Sig.} < 0.001$).

Sidebar VI.1 Questions used to measure municipal responsiveness

NP1B. To what point do you think municipal officers pay attention to what people request in these meetings? *

They pay (1) a lot (2) some (3) little or (4) no attention (8) DK


NP1C. If you had a complaint about some local problem, and were to take it to a member of the Municipal Council, how much interest do you think s/he would pay?

(1) A lot (2) some (3) little or (4) none? (8) DK

* This refers to meetings called by the Mayor.

In general, respondents considered that both the Municipal Council, the legislative body within local government, as well as municipal public officials had low sensitivity to the petitions that were presented to them by the citizenry. Thus, 55.8% of the respondents felt that way, more than twice those that felt that both players, Council and officials, paid some or a lot of attention to citizen petitions (Figure VI.3). These proportions hold true for the different regions, although the perception is slightly better among those living in the Greater Metropolitan Area.


Figure VI.3 Perception of the Sensitivity or Responsiveness of Local Government to Peoples' Petitions



This critical evaluation by the populace regarding the lack of municipal responsiveness does not imply that they discount their municipalities as a means to resolve the problems in their communities. When the respondents were asked to identify the entity that best responds when the time comes to help resolve local problems, most of the respondents identified the municipality (around 60%), independent of the problem that they identified (Figure VI.4).⁸⁶ In general, with proportions that varied from three to one (water, sanitation, and road infrastructure) to five or more to one (drug addiction, scant cooperation, and participation), the municipalities lead the national government and Congress. The advantage is slightly lower regarding the topic of citizen insecurity. In synthesis, the respondents are not content with the efficacy of their municipalities, but believe that these may be the best vehicles for attending local problems.

⁸⁶ Question CRMU3: "Speaking more generally, in your opinion, among the government, the congressional deputies, or the municipality, who responds best when it comes to helping resolve the problems of your community or neighborhood? The National Government? The Deputies? Or the Municipality? (1) national government, (2) deputies, (3) municipality (4) [DO NOT READ] None (5) [DO NOT READ] All the same (8) DK/NR.

Figure VI.4 Entity that Best Responds to Resolve Community Problems Satisfaction with Municipal Services




6.3.2 Satisfaction with Municipal Services

Almost one-half of the respondents consider that the services provided by the municipality are “neither good nor bad” (46% for the total sample). When the positive opinions (good and very good) are contrasted with the negative ones (bad and very bad), the former are clearly superior (33% versus 19%, respectively) (Figure VI.5).⁸⁷


⁸⁷ Question SGL1 says: “Would you say that the services that the municipality provides for people are...? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad, (8) Don’t know.”

Figure VI.5 Perception of the Quality of Services Provided by Their Municipality



For the purposes of an international comparison, this question may be transformed into a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is “very bad”, 50 is “neither good nor bad”, and 100 “very good”. Similar to the survey carried out in Costa Rica four years ago, on the average, individuals consider that the services are tolerable, with a slightly lower score on that occasion. When this result is compared to those from the rest of the countries in Latin America included in the study, we see that the evaluation given by the Costa Rican populace is very similar to those from the other countries (Figure VI.6).

Figure VI.6 Satisfaction of Respondents with Municipal Services in Comparative Perspective, 2004, Scale 0-100



To probe the factors that influence citizen perception of the quality of municipal services, three simple regression models were proposed: Models A, B, and C.⁸⁸ Model A included only the socio-demographic variables employed throughout the study. Model B included, in addition to the foregoing, a set of political attitudes. Finally, Model C proposed an examination of local differences in municipal service quality and controlled the socio-demographic and political variables included in the previous models with the *cantones* where the respondents lived, introducing *cantones* as dummy variables.

The explanatory capacity of the different models is very uneven. Model A, the most restricted model has a very low explanatory capacity, $R^2 = 0.025$ (Model A). None of the socio-demographic variables acts as a predictor of the evaluation of municipal service quality (with the exception of housewives and residence in the Central Valley), even after controlling for other types of factors. The introduction of political variables in Model B substantially increases the explanatory ability ($R^2 = 0.244$), and when the *cantones* are introduced, R^2 increases once again: 0.303 (Model C).

Respondent residence in five of the thirty *cantones* in the sample is statistically significant. In other words, political attitudes and place of residence make an effective difference when evaluating the quality of municipal services (Table VI.5 in Appendix C).⁸⁹ Thus, individuals living in Montes de Oca, Tibás, Heredia, and Puriscal (*cantones* belonging to the GAM or in the case of Puriscal, bordering it) have a worse evaluation of municipal services. On the other hand, those living in Belén have a better evaluation. In consequence, it would seem indispensable to take into consideration specific local government performance when evaluating municipal service quality. In 1999, the Citizen Audit of Democratic Quality (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a) carried out an in-depth study of several of the country's municipalities, using sentinel site methodology.⁹⁰ Two of them, Belén and Montes de Oca, are also in this study, and the results were significant. It is interesting to note that the results from the survey coincide with those from the audit. In both studies, the municipality of Belén received the highest rating of all those studied. In this municipality, the citizens participate more in municipal meetings, have greater trust in the honesty and efficacy of local authorities, and believe that their local government is capable of taking over the services presently in the hands of the central government. In contrast, Montes de Oca, a municipality with serious problems of political stability, having had 9 mayors in four years, with accusations of corruption among the officials, scored poorly on the different topics studied.

However, political variables are the ones that have the greatest bearing on the evaluation of municipal service quality. These variables can be divided into two groups: those referring to national aspects, such as support for democracy (ADEMR), evaluation of government performance (M1) and its effectiveness in fighting poverty (N1); and those referring to local affairs, such as the perception of the responsiveness of the Municipal Council and municipal officials to petitions from the citizenry (NP1B y NP1C).


⁸⁸ See note 12 in Chapter 3.

⁸⁹ For reasons of space, the table presents results from Model B, even though the text comments those obtained from Model C.

⁹⁰ This methodology combines quantitative techniques (questionnaire) with qualitative techniques (interviews, focus groups, and weighted grouped groups) for an in-depth study of local topics.

With regards to the national variables, those persons that most support democracy tend, on average, to proffer a better evaluation of municipal service quality: among those with a low support for the system (less than 50 points on the Index of System Support), the average score for the quality of these services is 10 points below that of those with a high level of support (Figure VI.7).

Figure VI.7 Evaluation of Municipal Service Quality by Level of Support for Democracy



Evaluation of the president's performance and the effectiveness of his government to deal with national challenges are factors that have a powerful influence on the perception of public service quality. It would seem that, for this topic, municipal destiny rides the coattails of a factor that is alien to the municipalities, the performance and efficacy of the national government. In fact, for those that give the worst rating to the government in the fight against poverty (a score of 1 or 2 on a scale of 7), the evaluation of municipal service quality is 10 or more points below the score from those that judge the government more favorably (Figure VI.8). The differences by evaluation of the job done by the current president are even clearer (Figure VI.9).

Figure VI.8 Evaluation of Municipal Service Quality by Perception of Efficacy of the National Government's Fight Against Poverty





Figure VI.9 Evaluation of Municipal Service Quality by Rating of President Pacheco's Performance



At the local level, perception of the responsiveness of local governments to citizen petitions plays a preponderant role in the evaluation of municipal services. The lower the popular perception of municipal responsiveness, the worse the evaluation. In fact, among those that feel that the officials (NP1C) and Municipal Council (NP1B) have little or no openness, the evaluation of municipal services is almost 30 points below that of the respondents who feel that these two municipal factors have some or a great deal of openness: the former score around 40 on the scale of 0 to 100, while the later score with an average above 70 (Figures VI.10 y VI.11).

Figure VI.10 Evaluation of Municipal Service Quality by Responsiveness of Local Government to Citizen Petitions





Figure VI.11 Evaluation of Municipal Service Quality by the Perception of Interest of the Municipal Council Towards Citizen Complaints



6.3.2 Accountability

Another argument in favor of decentralization is that, insofar as local governments are closer to the populace, accountability is facilitated. On the one hand, municipal authorities live in the

communities that they govern and can be approached more easily by their neighbors; on the other hand, since the municipality deals with matters that affect individuals more directly, and on which they have specific knowledge, they are in a better position to demand from these municipal authorities explanations for their actions or omissions. But do these persons feel that the municipal authorities are actually accountable for their local management? And, if they are, do local authorities are more accountable than those managing Central Government institutions?

To study the topic of local accountability, this study introduced three questions. The first was open, and asked the respondents about the meaning that the concept of accountability had for them. Then, according to this meaning, there was a question on the frequency with which the municipality provided an accounting, and if it did so more frequently than other institutions (Sidebar VI.2)

Sidebar VI.2 Questions used to study municipal accountability

CRMURC1 Nowadays, we frequently hear in different media individuals talking about the accountability of public officials. What does accountability mean for you? WRITE DOWN RESPONSE 88. DK (Go to JC1)

CRMURC2 And, according to the meaning it has for you, would you say that the municipality is accountable to the populace, always, almost always, almost never, or never?

1. Always 2. Almost always 3. Almost never 4. Never 8. DK/NR

CRMURC3 And compared to government institutions and the Legislative Assembly, would you say that your municipality is accustomed to provide an accounting to the populace more than these other institutions?

1. Municipality more 2. Government institutions more (DON'T READ) 3. The two provide an accounting more or less equally 4. Neither of them is accountable 8. DK/NR

Accountability means to provide true, timely, complete, and responsible explanations – in the sense that the person providing them assumes the consequences of his/her actions or omissions. Thus, not every explanation or communication by an authority meets with the stipulations of an act of being held accountable, since the information for the citizenry may be incomplete, delayed, untrue, and even, although meeting several of the requirements, they may not be responsible (M. Gutiérrez & Román, 2002).

However, it is reasonable to consider that the degree to which individuals will demand accountability from their municipal authorities, in the aforementioned sense, is influenced by the concept they have about what this practice is. If they do not have a clear idea, it would be difficult for them to demand that their authorities be accountable; if they believe that it merely means the publication of information, but not the assumption of responsibilities, they may be satisfied when the authorities provide certain data on their tenure. However, if they consider that accountability implies assuming responsibility, it is reasonable to think that they will demand much more from their authorities.

When the respondents were asked for their conceptualization of accountability, more than 70 different answers were received, which can be classified into larger categories. Several aspects are noteworthy: a large proportion is unable to articulate any meaning: one of every four respondents does not know what accountability means (26.0% of the total). Almost one-half believe that it is a merely informative act: that the authorities provide information, without establishing the conditions of veracity, timeliness, and extension (42.7% of the total); finally, a minority provides a meaning that is closer to the concept mentioned above for accountability: that it is an act of transparency and assumption of responsibilities (22.3% of the total). One of

every eleven persons believes that being held accountable is meeting the managerial objectives; they seem to confuse efficiency with accountability. Finally, a small proportion grants other meanings to the concept of accountability (Table VI.6).

Table VI.6 Meanings Given for the Concept of Accountability According to the Respondents

Meanings of Accountability According to		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Accumulative Percentage
Válidos	Give information 1/	641	42,7	57,7	57,7
	Transparency / assume responsibility for acts 2/	334	22,3	30,1	87,8
	Fulfilling goals 3/	88	5,9	7,9	95,8
	Others	47	3,1	4,2	100,0
	Total	1110	74,0	100,0	
Perdidos		88	390	26,0	
	Total	1500	100,0		

1/ Includes: to inform what has been done (5.7%), to inform how resources are used (18.0%), to inform about what is being accomplished (10.6%), to issue an economic report (0.9%), check (0.5%), "clear reports on revenues and expenditures (4.3%), and other responses less than

2/ Includes: to present invoices of all expenditures (1.0%), to inform with evidence of what has been done (3.9%), to give explanations of what is being accomplished (1.9%), being transparent and to inform people (2.1%), informed citizenry (0.5%), back with evidence claims of what has been done (1.9%), give explanations of the goals fulfilled in a given period of time (1.9%) and other responses less than


3/ Includes: being responsible, honor promises (1.5%), to fulfill the people's needs (0.4%) and responses less than 0.3% related to social and economic

4/ Includes: negative meanings ("does not mean anything", "a hoax") and other unrelated ("widespread poverty", "something like a vengeance"), with less than 0.3%

The lack of awareness of the topic of accountability becomes clear when the respondents are questioned with regards to the frequency that the municipality provides an accountability (CRMURC2) and with regards to the entities that do so the most, central government or municipalities (CRMURC3). In the first case, more than one-third of the persons (36.9% of the total) gave no answer; a similar proportion (35.9%) did not answer the second question. It is worth noting that, in spite of what we expected, no statistically significant association was found between the meanings that people gave for the concept of accountability and their evaluations of the actual accountability of municipal authorities.

The respondents with opinions about accountability practices in municipalities are severe critics of these corporations: 93.5% of them considered that the municipality never or almost never gives an accounting. On the other hand, most considered that government institutions were more accustomed to giving an accounting than the municipalities. The proportion here is 2:1 (Figure VI.12). No personal or geographic variables were found to help predict these evaluations.

Figure VI.12 Perceptions of Accountability by the Municipalities



In this context critical of the municipalities, due to their lack of accountability, or rather, of ignorance of a large segment of the population about what accountability means, we should not be surprised that there is a marked distrust on how municipalities manage their financial resources. In fact, two of every three (67.1%) that answered this question (1314 persons) indicated that they have little or no trust in this management. When we take into consideration only that part of the population that has an opinion about municipal accountability (question CRMURC2) we find that within a generalized framework of distrust, those individuals that think the municipality always or almost always is accountable, show a slightly greater trust in their handling of these funds (Spearman's $r = 0.119$, $\text{Sig.} = 0.000$).

As was the case with the perception of municipal service quality, trust in municipal fund management is influenced by local factors. When the *cantones* are introduced as dummy variables into a simple regression model (Model B), explanatory power increased ($r^2 = 0.105$, $\text{Sig.} < 0.001$). In this case, 12 of the 30 *cantones* in the sample are significant ($\text{Sig.} < 0.1$) and once again the municipality of Belén appears positively associated with trust. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in all of the locations, there is mistrust of the municipality to a greater or lesser extent.

6.4 Citizen Participation in Municipal Affairs

The counterpart of citizen evaluation of different aspects of municipal government (effectiveness, service quality, and accountability) is the degree to which they participate in this government. It could be the case that these critical Costa Rican citizens are, nonetheless, citizens that do not participate in local government, i.e., inactive critics.

Participation in local affairs may be studied from two different perspectives: involvement in activities convoked by the municipality (NP1) and petitions presented to municipal authorities

(NP2) (Sidebar VI.3). In both cases, although by different means, the citizenry resorts to the municipal officials and authorities as part of their rightful entitlement

Sidebar VI.3 Questions used to measure participation in municipal affairs

NP1. Have you attended any meeting convoked by the mayor in the last 12 months?


(1) Yes (2) No (8) Don't know/ Don't remember

NP2. Have you requested help or presented a petition to some office, officer, council member or representative of the municipality during the last 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (8) Don't know/ Don't remember

Only 7 of every 100 persons have attended a meeting called by the mayor during the last 12 months (7.2% of the total). Thus, the present study confirms the scant participation that was detected four years ago, in 1999, when only about 5% of the respondents indicated that they had attended municipal meetings. When we compare this situation with the other countries in Latin America, the conclusion is that, together with Nicaragua, Costa Ricans have the lowest participation in municipal affairs (Figure VI.13).

Figure VI.13 Average Proportion of Persons Attending Meetings and Presenting Petitions to Their Municipality by Country



In order to analyze the social characteristics of the population that attends municipal meetings as compared to those that do not attend, we used logistic regression (the dependent variable is dichotomous: attends – does not attend municipal meetings) in order to identify predictors of their participation. In general, of all the conditions analyzed, only age and educational level are

significant (Table VI.7 in Appendix C). With greater age there is a slight increase in attendance of municipal meetings.⁹¹

Educational level of the respondents is the variable that has the most impact on attendance at municipal meetings. Those with more than secondary education (incomplete or completed higher education) have a proportion of meeting attendees three-fold higher than those persons with primary education or less; thus, the higher the education, the greater the participation. There were no local or regional differences in this pattern.⁹² The persons most attending municipal meetings believe, with greater intensity than the rest, in the value of citizen participation as a vehicle for resolving community problems. In fact, eight of every ten persons that participate believe in the effectiveness of their participation. The proportion is lower among those that do not attend municipal meetings (Spearman's $r = 0.066$, $\text{Sig.} < 0.05$).

Table VI.8 Probability of Resolving the Local Problem by Popular Participation, According to Attendance of Persons at Municipal Meetings

Tabla de contingencia NP1R Assistance to Meeting Called By Mayor * EFF6R1
Probability of Solving Local Problem Through Participation

		EFF6R1 Probability of Solving Local Problem Through Participation		
		Little or none	Some or a lot	Total
NP1R Assistance to meeting called by mayor	No	342	789	1131
	Yes	18	77	95
Total		360	866	1226
		29,4%	70,6%	100,0%

The second dimension of participation in municipal affairs is the petition that the citizenry can bring before an office, official, council member or representative from the municipality. This is another way to become involved in the management of public affairs. In this aspect, there is greater citizen activity: in Costa Rica, almost one of every five respondents has exercised their right to petition the municipality during the last year (19.7%). This level of petition is similar to that reported in the rest of the countries throughout the region (Figure VI.13).


As with the foregoing topic, we analyzed the factors that might aid in predicting the exercise of the right to citizen petition. We applied a logistic regression, whose dichotomous dependent variable was the exercise of the right to petition in the last year (made a petition – did not petition). The results show that there were no significant local or regional variations in

⁹¹ This chapter does not include a deeper analysis of the topic of participation, since this topic will be dealt with in Chapter 8.

⁹² A logistic regression was run including the municipalities as “dummy” variables. The model did not include them. On the other hand, note that the variables regionvc (Central Valley – Outside Central valley) and size (GAM, Rest urban, Rural) are not significant.

petitioning; income and wealth were not important either. On the other hand, gender, age, marital status, and level of education are important factors. In general terms, petitions are presented to the municipalities by males, persons over 30 years of age, those married or in consensual unions (and less by single persons), and particularly, those with post-secondary education ($\text{Sig. } < .1$) (Figure VI.14).⁹³

Figure VI.14 Municipal Petitions and Social Characteristics of the Respondents



When attendance at municipal meetings and petitions to local authorities are analyzed together, we find that both these variables are related (Spearman's $r = 0.222$; $\text{Sig.} = 0.000$). Those who attend also exercise their right to petition more. Based on this information we can identify three groups: those that neither attend nor make petitions (76.9%), more than three-quarters of those responding ($n = 1,413$); those that did one or the other, but not both things, an intermediate level of participation (18.4%), and finally, the small core of those that participate the most, who attended meetings and exercised their right to petition the municipality (3.7%).

6.4 Final Note: Transferal of Obligations to the Municipalities

The study has shown that a majority of the populace is critical of municipal performance in two key areas: effectiveness in resolving local problems and in their democratic governance (accountability). Furthermore, there is little trust in the way they handle their funds. The evaluation of municipal service quality is somewhat more tempered, since, as we have seen, it is strongly influenced by local aspects. In spite of these critical appraisals, it was also noted that the

⁹³ In contrast to the variable on attendance at municipal meetings, exercise of citizen petitions is not associated with a greater or lesser belief in citizen participation as a means for resolving community problems.

respondents feel that the municipalities respond better than central government institutions to local problems.

This tension between the negative appraisal of municipal performance and positive opinion about the municipality as a more adequate entity for solving local problems, become more patent when people are asked about the transfer of competencies to the municipalities. The opinion of the Costa Ricans on this topic is clearly divided: among those responding, 50.7% feel that greater obligations should be given to the municipalities, while 49.3% feel that more obligations should be given to the national government, without change to the current situation (high concentration of competencies in the central government), or at best, transfer services conditioned on municipal performance.

Table VI.9 Transferal of Obligations and Services to the Municipalities

CRMU4R Transferal of Obligations and Services

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Accumulative Percentage
Valid	Central Government should take on more responsibilities	573	38,2	41,9	41,9
	Don't change anything	52	3,5	3,8	45,8
	More to the Municipality if provides better services	49	3,3	3,6	49,3
	More to the Municipality	692	46,1	50,7	100,0
	Total	1366	91,1	100,0	
Lost	System	134	8,9		
Total		1500	100,0		

7.0 Electoral Behavior

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the electoral behavior of Costa Ricans, based on the results of the USAID-CAM 2004⁹⁴ survey. It probes attitudes and behaviors among the populace and, at the end, presents some results regarding citizen support for electoral reforms that have been proposed in recent years. It is organized into five sections, starting with this introduction. The second section deals with voting attitudes. It looks more closely at freedom to vote and vote efficacy. The third section studies electoral behaviors or electoral participation. Two dimensions are distinguished here: the exercise of the vote (or not voting) and electoral activities going beyond voting. In both dimensions factors that aid in predicting participation are analyzed. On the basis of the preceding dimensions, the fourth section presents an analysis of three types of electoral participation: those who are inactive, those who limit their activity to voting, and the electoral activists. Finally, we look at citizen support for three political reforms that have been amply discussed in recent years.⁹⁵

It is worth mentioning that for the present study, it would have been very useful to have available the findings from a large-scale study on abstentionism underway at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Costa Rica (IIS-UCR) at request of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. At the time this report was written (June 2004), these findings were not yet available.

7.2 Attitudes Towards the Vote

Freedom to choose those who will govern us through vote is the basis of democracy. By freedom is meant that the vote responds, with no limitation whatsoever, to an exercise of moral autonomy by each individual (Robert Dahl, 1989). In other words, individuals vote taking into account solely their beliefs regarding what is best for them and, also, this decision will have no consequence whatsoever on their physical or patrimonial integrity or that of persons related to her. In summary, there are no pressures or threats limiting the range of options that the elector faces at the moment she emits her vote.

On the other hand, the right to vote is complemented by the free exercise of the right to run as a candidate for public office. Just as in the foregoing case, this means that the elector that decides

⁹⁴ This Chapter is modest in scope: based on the results of the CAM survey, individual perceptions of the vote, factors that help to predict the decision to participate, the reasons given for not voting, and finally the modes of citizen participation in the electoral arena. It is not intended to provide an historical study of electoral behavior (Chapter I introduced some information in this regard), for more information on this topic, the interested reader may refer to the bibliographic references listed in section D of Chapter I, for a sampling.

⁹⁵ The literature on electoral behavior is one of the richest, especially in the United States. The first studies were carried out during the first half of the 20th Century, but the research went deeper during the decades between 1950 and 1970 (Fiorina, 1981; Lyons, 1981; Niemi, 1993). Important works from this period are those by Downs and Rae, which introduced a microeconomic perspective into voting studies (Downs, 1957; Rae, 1967). From a more sociological point of view, Lipset and Rokkan attempted to unravel the link between individual voters and the social structure (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). More recently, studies have attempted to determine, using a more institutionalist viewpoint, the impact of norms and institutions on the vote (Lijphart, 1999; Nohlen, 1993; Norris, 2004). In Costa Rica, one of the first empirical studies on the topic was carried out in the 70's by Carvajal (Carvajal, 1978).

to run as a candidate will not face pressures or threats to his or her physical and patrimonial integrity.

In Costa Rica, between 1990 and 2002, a period where 4 national elections happened, there were no denunciations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) of threats to the physical and patrimonial integrity of the electors and candidates for public office. Neither did any claims of this type appear in the communications media (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a, 2002). Thus, we would expect that there would be few persons who felt any infringement of their rights to elect or be elected. However, this conclusion is insufficient. It may be that there are no reports in the TSE or the mass media because these individuals were afraid of denouncing their situation. For this reason, it is important to complement the foregoing with a direct probe of the respondents about whether they have undergone fear, pressure, or threats when voting. A prior study, carried out in 1999, indicated that a very small proportion of the populace reported the existence of threats or pressure, or of incentives to “purchase their vote” (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a).⁹⁶ However, it is important to update this information. To study this topic, three questions were drafted in this study (Sidebar VII.1).

Sidebar VII.1 Questions used to study voter freedom

If you were to decide to participate in some of the activities that I am going to mention, would you do so fearlessly, with a little bit of fear, or with a great deal of fear? [READ THE LIST, REPEATING THE QUESTION IF NECESSARY]: FEARLESSLY, A LITTLE BIT OF FEAR, A GREAT DEAL OF FEAR, DK

DER2. Vote in a national election?

DER4. Run for a popularly elected office?

CRVB1 Can you tell me if in any of these elections that we have spoken about, someone pressured you, or you received something in exchange for voting in a certain manner or not voting?


1. Yes 2. No 8. DK/NR

A majority of the respondents (85 of every 100) say that they have not been afraid when voting in a national election; only three of every 100 express that they have had “a great deal of fear”, and almost 12 of every 100 confess to “a little bit of fear”. Under a comparative lens, Costa Rica falls among those countries where the smallest proportion of individuals confess to having been fearful of voting – even though there are two countries that report a slightly lower incidence of fear (Mexico and Panama) (Figure VII.1). Nevertheless, since an individual may be frightened for different reasons, not necessarily related to threats, it is important to analyze these results with the findings from question CRVB1, which refers openly to pressures or intents to “buy” their vote. Almost no one (1.9%) admits having been pressured in one way or another. From this, we can infer that, in fact, the vote in Costa Rica is a free vote.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Question CRVB1, included in this study was originally prepared for the survey carried out in 1999 as a part of the Citizen Audit of Democratic Quality (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001a).

⁹⁷ The finding from question DER4 is, at first lights, interesting. More than one-half of the respondents indicate that they are somewhat or very frightened of running for public office (54.1%). These figures, however, must be accepted with care. This question has two problems. The first lies in the fact that this “fright” of being a candidate could be more related –we do not know for certain– to other factors such as “stage fright” or of not being prepared to be the object of intense public scrutiny – factors little related with what we are interested in analyzing here. Secondly, it places these individuals in an improbable scenario running as candidate. It is not at all surprising that there are numerous missing responses (249). As Figure VII.1 indicates, in all of the countries, important

Figure VII.1 Proportion of Respondents Afraid to Vote or Run for Public Office in a Comparative Perspective




Notwithstanding the fact that an individual may consider that s/he enjoys freedom to vote, does s/he consider his/her vote useful as an instrument for influencing the governance of society? This is an important topic, since democracy suffers if an important part of the citizenry, if not the majority, feels that the vote is an inefficient or futile instrument. In this case, rather than being a tool for empowering the citizenry, the vote could be seen as a ritual act, and if this perception were to endure, it could eventually discourage electoral participation. To probe perception of the efficacy of the vote, the following question was included in the study:

ABS5. Do you think that voting can improve things in the future or do you feel that no matter how you vote, things won't improve? (1) Voting can change things. (2) Things will not improve. (8) DK/NR

The results are worrisome: almost one-half of the respondents consider that no matter how they vote, things will not improve (48% of the total) – due to the margin of error of the survey, we could say that there is a tie with those that say that the vote is an effective tool (Figure VII.2). This suggests the existence of extensive doubts about the efficacy of the central act of democracy: suffrage. Taken together, we could say that an absolute majority of Costa Ricans feels that the vote is free in their country, but they are profoundly divided in their beliefs regarding the efficacy of the vote.

proportions, which are similar to those in Costa Rica, indicate that they are frightened by running for public office; this seems to reinforce the argument proposed above.

Figure VII.2 Perception of the Efficacy of the Vote as a Means for Change



7.3 Electoral Participation

Freedom to vote is a necessary condition for democracy, but is not a sufficient one. In fact, freedom does not guarantee that citizens will want to participate in selecting their leaders and, in the final instance, if they will do so. For this to happen, an individual must want to exercise his/her rights.

Without citizen participation, electoral democracy is not viable. The citizenry, as a source of the sovereignty of power, are the ones that elect their leaders. If they decide to abstain massively from doing so, the legitimacy and validity of the regime are affected and it cannot be perpetuated, since it is renewed by these very same elections (Benavides et al., 2003).⁹⁸ Thus, it is critical to examine the level and ways that the electors participate in the electoral arena.

However, electoral participation is not synonymous with voting. In an electoral process, the citizenry must carry out an ample variety of activities that go beyond the vote: persuade their fellow citizens, make public manifestations, or work for a candidate. Therefore, this section will analyze two dimensions of electoral participation: exercising the vote and individual involvement in activities within the electoral process that go beyond suffrage.

⁹⁸ To the contrary, the argument that states: for electoral democracy to function, high levels of participation are required, is not necessarily true. To date there is no theory capable of establishing an ideal and optimal level of citizen participation (*Ibid, loc. cit.*).

7.3.1 Exercising the Vote

In Costa Rica, voting is a civic obligation, but, contrary to other Latin American democracies, abstaining does not imply specific sanctions (República de Costa Rica, 2004). During the first round of the presidential elections of 2002, 69.3% of the citizens voted. This level of participation was similar to that of 1998, it is below the average of the nine presidential elections held during the period 1962-1994 (approximately 80%) and only comparable to that recorded for the first presidential elections after the Civil War of 1948.⁹⁹ Viewed within a Central American perspective, the decline in participation is part of a regional trend (excepting Nicaragua and Panama, the level of participation declined in four of the six countries during the 1990-2002 period), even though the country maintains levels that are similar or higher than those of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2003b; Seligson, 2001).¹⁰⁰


The level of electoral participation during the first round of the presidential elections of 2002 recorded in this study (Question VB4: 74.3% said they had voted) is somewhat higher than what really occurred (69.3%). The voting order by parties agrees with what actually happened (PUSC, PLN, and PAC), not however the magnitudes – there is a severe underestimation of the voting in favor of the PAC and an over estimation of the vote for the traditional parties (Question CRVB3). Since the level of the vote is similar to what actually occurred, but not the vote by party, the following analysis uses question VB1 (“Did you vote in the first round of the last presidential elections, in February 2002?”) and discards question CRVB3 (“Still talking about the first round, for which party did you vote for president?”). In a comparative perspective, the level of the declining vote in Costa Rica is similar to that reported in a majority of the countries included in the study, with the exception of Guatemala and Colombia, which show levels that are clearly lower (Figure VII.3).¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ In the 1953 election, however, the political forces defeated in 1948 were proscribed.

¹⁰⁰ This does not include the results from the national elections held in 2004 in three countries in the region: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama.

¹⁰¹ In a majority of the countries, the level of voting in the last presidential election reported by the survey was different from the actual level of the vote. However, these differences were relatively small (less than 7 percentage points), as was the case in Costa Rica.

Figure VII.3 Proportion of Respondents that Say they Voted in the Last Presidential Election in a Comparative Perspective



Are there factors that help predict electoral participation through voting? To respond to this question, we used a logistic regression where the dependent variable was the citizen's exercise of the right to vote (VB2: Voted / did not vote). The results are shown in Table VII.1 in Appendix C. In general, at least for the 2002 elections, the region of residence, degree of urbanization, occupation, and level of community participation of the respondents do not help predict voting behavior. On the other hand, personal characteristics such as gender, marital status, age, and level of schooling are predictors. However, variables related to social capital, such as interpersonal trust, social collaboration networks, and level of community activity, did not have an effect on the decision to vote. The same can be said of the political tolerance of the respondents, which did not influence the vote. However, the level of support for democracy and the perception of the effectiveness of their vote did help predict the decision to vote in the 2002 presidential elections.

In the 2002 elections, women participated more than men, 78% to 70% (Sig. < 0.01); those over age 30 did so notably more than the respondents younger than 30, 80% to 62% (Sig. < 0.001) (Figures VII.4 and VII.5). It is worth noting that those with post-secondary education were the ones participating the most of all the groups (83%) (Sig. < 0.1).

Figure VII.4 Percent Voting in the First Round of the Presidential Elections of February 2002 by Marital Status





Figure VII.5 Percent Voting in the First Round of the Presidential Elections of February 2002 by Age Group



Those political variables that resulted significant denote an individual's "investment" in the system. On the one hand, the level of support for democracy helps to predict the exercise of voting, since those with the highest level of support voted with the highest frequency. Among those that exhibit high support for democracy¹⁰², the level of participation in the last elections

¹⁰² They score 51 or more on the 0-100 scale in Mitchell Seligson's Index of Support – see Chapter 3.

reached 78%; on the other hand, among those that manifested a low level of support for democracy, participation is noticeably lower (63%, Sig. <0.01). Individuals that believe in the effectiveness of their vote (Question ABS5) tended to vote in a higher proportion (Figures VII.6 and VII.7).

Figure VII.6 Percent Voting in the First Round of the Presidential Elections of February 2002 by Perception of the Efficacy of the Vote





Figure VII.7 Percent Voting in the First Round of the Presidential Elections of February 2002 by Level of Support for the Democratic System



Now we should look at those citizens that did not vote, the abstentionists. We know, from what was said above, that among them there are more males, young persons, single persons, with lower levels of education, less support for democracy, and less belief in the effectiveness of the vote. But, what were their reasons for not voting? Was fear an important variable for not doing so? Or to the contrary, was their abstention the result of a free choice? To study these topics, the questionnaire included question VB4, which probed 12 reasons for abstaining from voting, which were later recoded to simplify the analysis of this topic (Sidebar VII.2).

Sidebar VII.2 Question and recoding used to analyze abstentionism

VB4. If you did not vote, why didn't you vote in these elections? [Record only one answer AND GO TO CRVB5]

(01) No transportation (02) Illness (03) Lack of interest (04) Didn't like any of the candidates/parties (05) Don't believe in the system (06) Don't have a *cédula* (ID card) (07) Couldn't find self on polling lists (10) Wasn't old enough (11) Arrived too late to vote / polls were closed (12) Had to work Other _____
(88) DK/NR (99) Does not apply

Together with other low frequency responses, the foregoing alternative responses were reclassified into four groups:

1. Force majeure: (02) Illness (10) Not old enough (11) Having to work;
 2. Lack of interest: (01) Lack of transportation (03) Lack of interest (06) Lack of a *cédula* (07) Could not find self on polling lists (11) Arrived too late to vote / polls closed;¹⁰³
 3. Protest: (04) Did not like any of the candidates / parties (05) Does not believe in the system.
-

A total of 358 respondents said that they had not voted in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections (24% of the sample). Thus, the survey reports a lower level of abstentionism than actually occurred (31%).¹⁰⁴ The most frequently given reason was a lack of interest (38% of those abstaining). This is followed by protest (30%) and reasons of force *majeure* (27%). In general, two of every three abstainers did not exercise their right to vote due to a lack of interest or as a protest (Table VII.2).

Not voting has little to do with a fear of exercising this right (Question DER2). Supposing that the reasons for not voting are an ordinal scale (protest is a stronger reason for abstaining than the lack of interest, which in turn is stronger than a reason involving force *majeure*), the correlation between the reasons for not voting and the degree of fear is low (Spearman correlation = 0.09, Sig. < 0.10). In any case, an immense majority of those who are disinterested and those that

¹⁰³ In Costa Rica, more than 99% of the populace have a *cédula* (identity card), the sole requirement for being able to vote; finding oneself in the polling lists is simple, since the citizenry has access to telephone or Internet services for immediate response; the polls are accessible throughout the country, are close to the residence of the population, and are open 12 hours.

¹⁰⁴ For this reason, the results should be accepted with some caution. The difference between 100 and the sum of those that say they voted or not voted (74.3% + 23.9% = 98.2%) are the persons that did not vote because they were not of age.

protest felt no fear about going to vote. In summary, abstention seems to be the result of a free decision by each citizen.¹⁰⁵

Table VII.2 Comparison of the Reasons for Abstaining from Voting by Level of Fear of Voting

Contingency Table DER2R Afraid of voting * VB4R

		VB4R				Total
		Force majeure	Lack of Interest	Protest	Others	
DER2R Afraid of Voting	A lot	1	7	7	4	19
		5,3%	36,8%	36,8%	21,1%	100,0%
	Some	14	22	20	0	56
		25,0% ^a	39,3%	35,7%	,0%	100,0%
	None	81	107	79	16	283
		28,6%	37,8%	27,9%	5,7%	100,0%
	Total	96	136	106	20	358
		26,8%	38,0%	29,6%	5,6%	100,0%

a. Spearman Correlation = -.092, sig <.1

7.3.2 Electoral Participation Beyond Voting

Beyond voting, there is a world of activities that a citizen can carry out during an electoral process. To analyze this topic in the study, two questions were included that seek to identify these other electoral participation activities (Sidebar VII.3).

Sidebar VII.3 Questions employed to study participation beyond voting

PP1. Now, changing the topic... During the elections, some people try to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate. How frequently have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the alternatives] (1) Frequently (2) Sometimes (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/NR

PP2. There are individuals that work for a particular party or candidate during the electoral campaign. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections in 2002? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/NR

In general terms, around 70 of every 100 persons never tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate. The figure climbs to 84% when asked if they worked for a party or candidate (Figures VII.8 and VII.9).

¹⁰⁵ Remember, that as a minimum, in an election a citizen may freely opt for one of six options: (1) Vote for candidate A; (b) Vote for candidate B; (3) Vote for both of them; (4) Not vote for either of them; (5) Not go to the polls (O'Donnell, 2003).

Figure VII.8 Electoral Participation Beyond the Vote: Proportion of Respondents that Sought to Convince Others During the Last Election





Figure VII.9 Electoral Participation Beyond the Vote: Proportion of Respondents that Worked for a Candidate or Party During the Last Election




To advance in our comprehension of electoral participation beyond the vote, we selected question PP1 – try to convince others-, which refers to the most frequent activity (although always in the minority) of the two that were recorded in this study. A linear regression was

applied to ascertain the factors that predict citizen involvement beyond voting (Table VII.3 in Appendix C), after standardizing question PP1.¹⁰⁶ On the standardized scale, the national average was 18.5 on a scale of 100 (i.e., low involvement). Several factors were statistically significant: region, age, income level, occupation, perception of voting efficacy, and community participation.


Of the socio-demographic factors that were significant, the two with the most marked differences were age and income levels. As with the decision to vote, electoral participation beyond the vote is greater among those over 30 years of age, as compared to those less than 30 years of age (20% to 15%, respectively) (Figure VII.9). Individuals with high income levels also exhibit greater electoral participation than those of low or medium income levels.

Figure VII.10 Proportion of Persons that Sought to Convince Others During the Last Election in 2002 by Age Group



¹⁰⁶ The variable PP1 was standardized (PP1RN) on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = never; 33.3 = rarely; 66.7 = sometimes; 100 = frequently.

Figure VII.11 Proportion of Persons that Sought to Convince Others During the Last Election in 2002 by Income Level



Electoral participation beyond the vote is strongly influenced by the level of community participation of the respondents (of all the variables analyzed in this regression, it was the one that introduced the biggest difference):¹⁰⁷ those with high community participation almost double the frequency with which they exert political persuasion in relation to those with low levels of community participation (29% versus 16%) (Figure VII.12). In other words, two dimensions of citizen participation –social and electoral beyond the vote- are related. Furthermore, perception of voting efficacy is also an important predictor. Those who think that a vote can change things double the level of political persuasion over those who believe that the vote is not effective (Figure VII.13).

¹⁰⁷ Individual community participation is measured with an index composed of questions CP5A- CP5E, which probe contributions to resolve community problems. See Chapter 8 for an explanation of this index. For the purpose of this figure, the results from this index were recoded into two categories: low participation (50 or less points on the 0-100 scale) and high participation (51 to 100 points on the 0-100 scale).

Figure VII.12 Proportion of Persons that Sought to Convince Others During the Last Election in 2002 by Level of Community Action





Figure VII.13 Proportion of Persons that Sought to Convince Others During the Last Election in 2002 by Perception of the Efficacy of the Vote



7.4 Types of Electoral Participation

The types of electoral participation are the modes of intervention that the citizenry effect within the electoral process. This can be reconstructed by examining those things that persons do within the electoral milieu (Benavides et al., 2003). This study typifies three types of electoral participation that together represent 77% of the sample:

Non-voting individuals, who exercise no political persuasion, do not work for a candidate or a party (inactive). A total of 319 persons can be classified as completely inactive: 21.2% of the whole sample.

Those persons that limit their participation to voting, but neither persuade nor work for a candidate or party. This is the great majority of the citizens interviewed: 765 persons, 51% of the total sample.

The respondents that vote, exercise political persuasion, and work for a candidate or party (the activists). These are a small group: 87 individuals, 5.8% of the whole sample (Sidebar VII.4).

Sidebar VII.4 Procedure for rebuilding three types of electoral participation

The types of participation are constructed from the responses to questions VB4 (Did you vote in the last presidential election), PP1 (employ persuasion), and PP2 (work for a candidate or party).

The inactive respondents are those combining the following responses: (a) VB4R: 0. Did not vote in the first round of the last presidential election. (b) PP1R: 0. Never; or 1. Rarely tried to convince other persons to vote for a candidate. (c) PP2R: 0. Did not work for a candidate or party in the last presidential election.


Those that only voted combine the following responses: (a) VB4R: 1. Voted in the first round of the last presidential election. (b) PP1R: 0. Never; or 1. Rarely tried to convince others to vote for a candidate. (c) PP2R: 0. Did not work for a candidate or party in the last presidential election.

The activists combine the following responses: (a) VB4R: 1. Voted in the first round of the presidential election. (b) PP1R: 3. Sometimes; or 4. Frequently tried to convince others to vote for a candidate. (c) PP2R: 1. Worked for a candidate or party during the last presidential election.¹⁰⁸

In a comparative perspective, the proportions that the different modes of electoral participation have among the citizenry are not very different from those found in the rest of the countries included in the survey (Figure VII.14). In all of them, those that only vote constitute the most frequent type of participation (around 50% or more); the activists are a very small group, approximately one of every 20 individuals, and the inactive group represents a fifth, excepting Guatemala and Colombia, where they represent 27%.

¹⁰⁸ A factor analysis was carried out to determine if PP1 and PP2 measure the same dimension. The results were negative (the measure did not achieve reliability, since Cronbach's alpha was 0.443).

Figure VII.14 Relative Importance of the Types of Electoral Participation among the Citizenry by Country



In terms of personal characteristics, there are not many differences among the three types of electoral participation.¹⁰⁹ The largest difference occurs in age: electoral activists are, on the average, 8.1 years older than the inactive ones. There are, however, notable differences with regards to political attitudes: on the average, activists exhibit greater support for democracy (71.2 on the scale from 0 to 100, versus 63.1 for those who are inactive), and they are politically more tolerant (61.7 versus 57.9 for those who are inactive), although the groups are not distinguished by their intolerance of corruption. Finally, electoral activists are also more active within the community milieu: on the Community Action Index, they receive an average that is double that received by those who are inactive (Table VII.4).

¹⁰⁹ The socio-demographic and political profile carried out below is made with the average characteristics of the persons with different types of participation, and it is purely descriptive, with no predictive purpose.

Table VII.4 Average Social and Political Profile of the Respondents by Their Types of Electoral Participation

	Mode of Electoral Participation					
	Not vote, nor persuade, nor work for candidate 1/		Just Votes 2/		Votes, persuades and works for candidate 3/	
	N	Average	N	Average	N	Average
REGIONVC Central Valley Region	319	63.9	765	68.5	87	65.5
Q2 Age (in years)	319	35.5	765	41.3	87	43.6
EDR Schooling (years)	319	7.9	765	8.3	87	8.3
RIQDX Wealth Index	319	7.5	765	7.8	87	8.1
TOLICORR Acquiescence of Corruption	316	89.5	764	90.4	87	91.6
ADEMIR System Support Index	317	63.1	763	68.5	86	71.2
TOLERPR Political Tolerance	311	57.9	750	57.8	85	61.7
PSOLP Community Action Index	319	15.8	765	18.0	87	32.0
N=1500						
1/ Did not vote in the first round of the last presidential election (Question VB4); seldom or never tries to persuade other people to vote for a candidate (Question PP1); did not work for a candidate or political party in the last presidential election (Question PP2).						
2/ Voted in the last presidential election (Question VB4); seldom or never tries to persuade other people to vote for a candidate (Question PP1); did not work for a candidate or political party in the last presidential election (Question PP2).						
3/ Voted in the last presidential election (Question VB4); frequently or sometimes tries to convince other people to vote for a candidate (question PP1) and worked for a candidate or political party in the last presidential election (Question PP2).						

7.5 Final Note: Support for Political Reforms

In spite of the stability of the norms upon which the Costa Rican electoral system is based, in recent years, proposals have been presented to reform this system. The most ambitious proposal was designed by the Presidential Commission for Political Reform in 2001, at the request of then President Rodríguez Echeverría, posing the possibility of evolving towards a semi-presidential system (Urcuyo, 2003). Previously, in 1999, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal presented a set of electoral reforms to the Legislative Assembly, which the latter rejected (Programa Estado de la Nación, 2001b).

An important part of the political reforms are technically very complex, not well known or understood by the citizenry. For this reason, in this study, based on a public opinion survey, we selected three reforms that meet two requirements: they have been the object of a broad-based debate and are simple to understand by individuals who are not specialists on the topic. These reforms are: the alternative between open or closed lists for congress; breaking the party monopoly on public offices; and, expanding the number of deputies for the Legislative Assembly (Sidebar VII.5).¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Currently there are 57 (since 1949). Costa Rica has one of the highest elector/deputy ratios in Latin America (Artiga, 2003).

Sidebar VII.5. Questions used to study support for electoral reform


CREREF1. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that when voting, an elector could choose deputies from different parties and not by party lists as is done now? [Read me a number from 0-10]

CREREF2. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that associations or other groups could register candidates for deputy and not just parties as it is now?

CREREF3. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that the number of deputies in the Legislative Assembly should be expanded? To what point would you approve or disapprove?

There is ample citizen support for two of the electoral reforms: establishing open lists in the voting for deputies, so that the electors can select among candidates from different parties and breaking the monopoly over proposing candidates for public office, allowing associations and other groups to do so as well. Only around 10% of the respondents were in disagreement (scores equal to or less than 3), while between 45% (CREREF2) and 60% (CREREF1) were in agreement with these changes (scores equal to or greater than 8 on a scale from 1 to 10). This situation changes radically for the proposal to expand the number of deputies. There is overwhelming rejection: two of every three are opposed to it (66.0% with a score of 3 or less). This means that the average score for increasing the number of deputies is less than half of that of the other two reforms (Figure VII.15).

Figure VII.15 Average Levels of Agreement with Three Electoral Reforms on a Scale of 0-10



The analyses discarded the possibility of using the variables CREREF1, CREREF2, and CREREF3 to build an index of electoral reform.¹¹¹ In its place, we selected question CREREF1- the alternative of open versus closed lists for deputies- to study the existence of predictors of support for electoral reform. We used a linear regression with the same independent variables used in the voting analysis (see Section 3). None of the personal or political variables were statistically significant. The exception was the Democracy Support Index (Sig. = 0.001), but the coefficient was low (0.012) and, in general, the model had a very low predictive capacity ($R^2 = 0.022$). In general terms, there are no social or political differences between those that support or are against electoral reform.

¹¹¹ A factor analysis was applied to questions CREREF1, CREREF2, and CREREF3, to see whether they measure the same dimension and whether this measure is reliable for preparing an index of support for electoral reform. Questions CREREF1 and CREREF2 loaded with high coefficients on a single factor, but their reliability was insufficient (Cronbach's alpha = 0.607). Question CREREF3 loaded singly on another factor. We decided not to create the index and selected question CREREF1 for analysis.

8.0 Citizen Participation and Social Capital

8.1 Introduction

Citizen participation is a concept that goes beyond purely electoral aspects. Citizens, in addition to manifesting their desires at the polls, also participate in decisions by getting involved in different types of organizations and contributing with resources and time to the solution of community problems. One might consider that a democracy where citizens actively participate in its political life and decisions is more stable than one where participation is limited to voting. But also, it could be considered that a stable democracy, without turbulence, where the elected representatives and institutions behave in accord with the expectations of the electors can result in an apparently apathetic civil society.

In any case, democracy requires some degree of citizen participation. This is necessary to at least maintain some degree of control over public administration (Burns, 2001; Conway, 1985; Crotty, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Schlozman, 1999; Sydney Verba, 1995).

For different reasons, the last decades have experienced a global phenomenon of increasing participation by civil society and the proliferation of non-governmental organizations. The impact of civil society on politics seems to have increased. The role of Solidarity in Eastern Europe or the “Vote for No” in Chile are examples of the influence of civil society in promoting democracy. Activism in civil society can also influence important government decisions, as occurred in Costa Rica, with the protests against the “combo”, which made the government change its direction with respect to privatizing public entities and opening up state monopolies.

The concept of social capital is related to participation in civil society. It has been proposed that the key to democracy-building is to increase social capital (Edwards & Foley, 1997; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000). Communities and countries with high social capital are the ones where the citizens trust each other and their governments and this confidence arises from an active participation in organizations within civil society (Edwards & Foley, 1997). Although the opposite may also be debated, that where citizens trust each other and their leaders, activism becomes unnecessary and there is satisfaction with the delegation of power to elected representatives. Some of the components of social capital can be distinguished as the following: interpersonal trust and the existence of role models worthy of imitation at the community level.


A third element of social capital is cohesion or social control, which is linked to the concept of “collective efficacy”. Sampson (Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999) and other authors propose that social cohesion is what really counts in social capital for community progress and, especially, to reduce crime and other social pathologies. Individuals within a community do not have to have full trust in each other or in their institutions in order for the community to gain control over its milieu and to embark on collective actions for the common good. It is enough to have a certain degree of cohesion. In modern societies, strong ties of friendship between neighbors and the support networks are species in extinction. Less intimate connections, or “weak ties” according to Granovetter (Granovetter, 1973) are what really matter to establish social capital and integrate communities. These connections lay the groundwork so that there is a minimum of trust to work together (“working trust”) and a shared predisposition to exercise social control.

The data analyzed in Chapter III showed the connection between social capital and support for democracy. Those who perceive that their neighbors are trustworthy or who live in communities with a certain degree of social cohesion, also express greater support for democracy. The same relationship also seems to exist when country averages are compared. This chapter describes the measures used to quantify the degree of participation in civil society and the social capital available to each country. It also explores some relationships between these measures and certain characteristics of individuals and communities.

8.2 Levels of Participation

Respondents were asked how frequently they attended five different types of meetings: (1) religious, (2) parents' associations, (3) community improvement committees, (4) professional, trade, or growers' associations, and (5) political parties (questions CP6 through CP13 on pages 2 and 3 of the attached questionnaire). The possible responses were: once a week, once or twice a month, one or twice a year, and never (the individuals without children in primary or secondary school were imputed the response "never participate" in parents' meetings). The respondent was also asked if s/he has participated in a public manifestation or protest: several times, almost never, or never (page 3 of the questionnaire). The responses are presented in Figure VIII.1.

Figure VIII.1 Participation in Meetings of Organizations from Civil Society



There is considerable participation in religious organizations: 53% do so at least once a month. It is possible, however that many of the responses refer to "religious services" and not to "meetings of some religious organization". The participation in meetings of parents' associations is also considerable; 27% do so at least once a month and two thirds of the group that "never

participates” is made up of individuals without school-age children. Participation in the rest of the organizations or in manifestations is modest; 80 to 95% responded that they had “never” participated.

A factor analysis identifies two components or factors implicit in the information obtained from these six questions. These two factors explain 41% of the variance in the six questions. The factor loadings for the rotated components (Table VIII.1), suggest that the first component is given by participation in community committees, professional organizations, political parties, and protest manifestations. These four questions identify a participatory dimension that we have called “political-professional”. The second component is given by participation in religious organizations or in parents’ associations at school. This dimension of participation we have called “religious-familial”.

Based on these results from the factor analysis, we calculated the related indicators for these two dimensions of participation. The indicators are the simple sum of the corresponding variables. The variables were recoded beforehand, so that the higher codes meant greater participation. The sum was standardized so that the index runs from 0 to 100. These indicators measure the frequency of participation in organizations from civil society.¹¹²

Table VIII.1 Matrix of the Rotated Components

Type of participation	Component	
	1	2
Church	-.016	.697
Parents	-.002	.702
Community Committee	.531	.363
Professionals, Growers	.656	-.003
Political Party	.532	.051
Protest Demonstration	.578	-.215

Extraction Method: Principal component analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax Normalization with Kaiser.

8.3 Correlates of Participation in Civil Society

In order to identify individual or collective characteristics associated to the two dimensions of participation, we estimated the related models by multiple linear regression, with the two indices as dependent variables. The estimated models are presented in Table VIII.2 in Appendix C.

The Beta coefficients suggest that a person’s age is the most important predictor in the two dimensions of participation. The effect is curvilinear: participation increases up to a certain age and then drops at advanced ages. This is shown by the variable “age squared” which resulted negative and significant. Religiosity is the second most important determinant in religious and familial organizations. This diminishes substantially in individuals that are only slightly or not at

¹¹² Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the two indices were modest: 0.19 for religious-familial participation and 0.32 for political-professional participation. This is due to the fact that each question measures different dimensions of participation and, generally, different individuals participate in different organizations. Thus, these are not scales of sums, but rather counts of the frequency of participation. The modest value for Alpha is irrelevant in this case, since we are dealing with counts of the number of organizations in which the individuals participate and not the frequency of the participation in them.

all religious. (This strong association confirms the suspicion that some respondents indicated attendance at religious services and not religious organizations.) Education is also an important factor for both dimensions of participation, especially for the one in professional and political milieus. The more educated persons participate more. Males, unmarried persons, and those with higher income, especially the former, participate less in church or family organizations. In rural zones there is greater political-professional participation.


The models explain religious-familial participation much more ($R^2 = 0.29$) than political-professional ($R^2 = 0.09$). It is worth noting that the second is more difficult to understand. The degree of explanation improves very little when the 29 indicator variables for the *cantones* are included (the coefficients of determination (R^2) increase by only 0.03). This result, and the non-existence of significant effects from other geographic variables, indicates that participation in civil society depends less on the community characteristics than on the characteristics of the individuals, such as age, gender, or education.

The religious-familial participation indicator is, perhaps, not a good measure of participation in civil society, since it is based on two questions whose responses are problematic. The responses on participation in church activities possibly measure attendance at religious services, as we indicated above. The responses on parents' organizations are heavily determined by the fact that more than 40% of the respondents do not have school-age children and, would be hard-put to attend.

8.4 Community Action

Does participation in meetings result in actions to resolve community problems, or are these merely social events? To respond to this question, we measured the respondent's proactive participation to resolve community problems. In this regard, the survey included six questions (CP5, on page 2 of the attached questionnaire), which begin with one probing whether in the last year the respondent has contributed to the solution of any community problem. Those responding affirmatively (34%) were then asked for five types of specific contribution: (1) money, (2) work, (3) participation in meetings, (4) organize new groups, and (5) groups to combat delinquency. Figure VIII.2 shows the percentage saying that they have made the different types of contributions.

Figure VIII.2 Participation in Community Problem Solving During the Last Year



The factor analysis identified a single component that explained 61% of the variance of these six questions. Cronbach's alpha coefficient was 0.88, indicating that the six questions have good internal consistency and that a simple-sum scale can be derived from them. We called this scale "Community Action".

8.5 Correlates of Community Action

Attendance at meetings and similar activities does seem to translate into actions to resolve problems. For example, among those attending weekly or monthly community improvement meetings, 82% said that they had contributed to resolve some problem; this percentage was only 24% among those that never attended the committee meetings. However, it must be kept in mind that the first group only includes 13% of the respondents, while the second group includes 81%. The correlation coefficient between the political-professional participation index and that of community action is a respectable 0.46.

The multiple regression models to explain the community action index (Table VIII.3 in Appendix C) identify age and attendance at political-professional meetings as its most important determinants (highest Betas). The age effect is curvilinear: community action first increases, then decreases among the elderly. Lesser religiosity and residence in intermediate cities (as compared to GAM or rural areas) reduces community participation. Education has an indirect effect on community participation, which is almost wholly mediated by attendance at political-professional meetings. When the indicator for attendance at these meetings enters the equation, the educational effect disappears. Neither gender, condition as housewife, marital status, nor wealth play a significant role in community action.

Entering the two indices of participation into the model increased the goodness-of-fit noticeably, from an $R^2 = 0.07$ to an $R^2 = 0.25$. Residence in a specific canton does little to explain community participation. The R^2 increased only 0.02. In spite of that, the model identified some *cantones* in which the participation index is significantly different from the rest, to wit:

Alajuela, Goicoechea, Aserrí, Turrialba, Escazú, and San Ramón, with community participation significantly greater, in that order; and

Desamparados, San Carlos, Limón, La Cruz, Guácimo, and San José, with significantly lower participation.

Figures VIII.3 and VIII.4 show the effects of age, education and religiosity on the three participation and action indices in civil society.

Figure VIII.3 Three Community Participation Indices by Age





Figure VIII.4 Participation Indices by Education and Religiosity



An individual achieves his/her maximum religious-familial participation between 35 and 44 years of age. This pattern is influenced in part by the presence of school-age children. The age of maximum proactive participation in resolving problems is later: between 45 and 54 years of age. There is no clear effect of age on participation in political-professional meetings.


Education increases participation in political-professional meetings and in the solution of community problems, but it does not show an effect on attendance of religious-familial meetings. On the other hand, religiosity has a strong effect on raising attendance at this type of meetings, a result that, as we indicated above, is somewhat tautological. It also increases, to a lesser extent, political-professional participation, but does not affect community action.

8.6 How Does Participation in Costa Rica Compare with Other Countries?

Figure VIII.5 compares the indices of political-professional and community action participation¹¹³ of the countries studied. Costa Rica, together with El Salvador, has the lowest degree of participation in political-professional activities or protest demonstrations. The corresponding index is about one-half of that from Colombia. However, the index measuring concrete actions to solve problems places Costa Rica at mid-point in the group. An interesting situation is found in Nicaragua (and to a lesser degree in Colombia), where it seems as though many individuals do not go beyond the talking stage, and do not act to resolve problems.

¹¹³ Since some countries did not include the question on organization of groups against crime, the index of community action was recalculated without that question, to make comparison possible.

Figure VIII.5 Average Indices of Participation and Community Action by Country



8.7 Social Capital

The introduction to this chapter proposed three dimensions of social capital. To measure them the survey has three sets of three questions each (IT1 to CRIT8 on page 3 of the questionnaire). The first set seeks to measure interpersonal trust and asks whether: (1) the people in the community are very, somewhat, slightly, or not trustworthy; (2) worry only about themselves or try to help their neighbors; and (3) if offered the opportunity they would try to take advantage or would not take advantage of them. The second set seeks to measure social cohesion and asks if in the neighborhood it is customary for (1) adults to make sure the children are safe; (2) when a house is left alone, others take care of it; and (3) the neighbors ask and provide favors, such as lending tools. The four possible responses were: it is always, sometimes, rarely, or never the custom. The third set tries to determine the existence in the community of role models worthy of imitation, so that the respondents are asked whether there are persons that children and adolescents can admire in the neighborhood because they are: (1) outstanding athletes; (2) very hard-working persons; or (3) very cooperative in resolving community problems. Table VIII.4 presents the responses given.

Table VIII.4 Responses to Questions on Social Capital (percent)

Community characteristics	Percent of responses				(N)				
Interpersonal trust:									
The neighbors are:									
Very reliable	42								
Somewhat reliable	35								
Slightly reliable	17								
Not reliable	6								
Total	100				(1,454)				
Help their neighbors	33				(1,468)				
Do not take advantage of others	35				(1,409)				
Social cohesion:									
	Always	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Total				
Watch children	54	16	10	20	100 (1,444)				
Watch houses left alone	60	16	7	17	100 (1,454)				
Do favors	68	17	6	10	100 (1,474)				
Role models:									
Athletes	51				(1,370)				
Hard working persons	87				(1,424)				
Cooperative persons	75				(1,395)				

A great majority of respondents indicated that neighbors are either very reliable (42%) or somewhat reliable (35%). Very few (6%) felt that they are “not reliable”. However, when faced by more specific questions, a minority of respondents indicated that their neighbors try to help out their neighbors (33%) or avoid taking advantage of one another (35%). Thus we have a situation that we could characterize as one of cautious trust.

The responses on social cohesion (Table VIII.4) indicate that a significant majority of Costa Ricans perceives that there is social control and cooperation within their community. For example, 85% state that the neighbors do favors always (68%) or sometimes (17%). The percentage corresponding to control over children is 70%.

A majority also reports the existence in the community of role models worth imitating, especially hard-workers (87%) or cooperative persons (75%), and to a lesser degree athletes (51%). It should be noted that in this last series of questions, a considerable number (between 5% and 9%) did not respond.

Factor analyses of the three sets of questions show that each one is associated with a single component, but this explains about 50% of the variance. Consequently, the Cronbach alphas for summed scales are not very high (48, 57, and 51 for the three sets respectively), which suggests that each set of questions does not measure a single concept; i.e., they lack high internal consistency. For this reason, no summed scales were built with these questions, and in their place, we created indices or typologies that integrate the information from the questions as indicated below.

Interpersonal Confidence. The aforementioned responses on whether community members were trustworthy are somewhat deceptive. This perception arises when contrasting these responses with the perception of whether the residents try to aid their neighbors and whether they try to take advantage of one another (Table VIII.5). At one end, among those that perceive their

neighbors as “not trustworthy”, only 13% feel that the neighbors do not worry only about themselves and try to aid their neighbor and a similar proportion states, “they do not try to take advantage”. This group of respondents is quite coherent in their responses. However, at the other extreme, among those that perceive that their neighbors are “very trustworthy”, attitudes of “aiding their neighbor” (44%) or that “would not take advantage” (48%) continue to be minority perceptions. Remembering that a majority of respondents (77%) said that the people in their community were somewhat or very trustworthy, we find a considerable group of approximately 50% of the respondents that express that they trust the members of their community, but at the same time believe that their neighbors only worry about themselves or that they would take advantage of others if they could. This is the most prevalent attitude in the sample.

Table VIII.5 Coherence Among the Three Reponses on Interpersonal Trust

People in your community are:	Aid their neighbor		Would not take advantage	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
Not reliable	13	(89)	14	(86)
Slightly reliable	22	(241)	26	(234)
Somewhat reliable	29	(504)	29	(477)
Very reliable	44	(593)	48	(575)
Total	33	(1,427)	35	(1,372)

Since there are insufficient elements to classify the respondents that showed ambivalence in their responses on a trust-distrust scale, we opted to identify solely the two extreme attitudes. (1) Those who “distrust” fully, since they responded that their neighbors are only slightly or not at all reliable, they only are concerned for themselves, and they would try to take advantage. These represent 14% of the respondents. (2) Those who are “trusting” in every sense, since they responded that their neighbors are somewhat or very reliable, try to aid their neighbors, and do not take advantage of others. These represent 15% of the respondents. For analytical purposes, we created the variable “interpersonal trust” with a value of -100 for the first group and +100 for the second group and zero for the rest. The average of this variable is the difference between the percent that trusts minus the percent that distrusts.

Social Cohesion. We created an indicator of perceptions of the frequency with which neighbors “watch the children so that they don’t get into trouble”, “watch the empty houses”, and “do favors such as loaning tools”. This indicator was computed by summing the responses and the result was standardized on a scale from zero to one hundred (average 74).

Role Models to Imitate. This is a very simple indicator that counts the responses on the presence of the three types of models (athletes, hard-workers, and cooperative individuals) in the community. The result of the count was also standardized on a scale from zero to one hundred (average 66).

8.8 Correlates of Social Capital

We estimated multiple regression models to identify the correlates of the three indicators of social capital (Table VIII.6 in Appendix C). The regression results suggest that social capital is more a community characteristic than an individual one, since geographic factors predominate over personal characteristics. Thus, the most important factor for explaining the three indicators,

according to the Beta values, is rural residence. Figures VIII.6 and VIII.7 illustrate this point. The three social capital indices are higher in the communities of the “rest urban” than they are in the GAM, and are even higher in rural areas.

Note that the indicators of participation in civil society, which we examined previously, depended on individual attributes more than community ones. Here, the opposite situation has occurred for indicators of social capital, which depend more on where one lives than whom one is.

Figure VIII.6 Difference in Percentages Trusting and Distrusting





Figure VIII.7 Indicators of Social Cohesion and Role Models by Type of Place



Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are individual characteristics, such as age or religiosity demonstrating a significant association with the indicators of social capital. It is possible, however, that this responds more to perceptions than to realities. To wit, persons with certain characteristics, such as being older or only slightly religious, may be more skeptical than their neighbors and indicate that in their communities the inhabitants are not trustworthy or uncollaborative.


Community preponderance in the formation of social capital is corroborated by an important increase in the models' goodness-of-fit (the R^2). When the *canton* indicator variables are introduced into the equation the models' explanatory power increases by 50% or more.

The regressions identify the following *cantones* in a statistically significant manner as having greater or lesser social capital, after controlling the other *cantón* characteristics in the regression. The *cantón* of Desamparados stands out as having the three indicators that show the lowest social capital.

	Interpersonal trust	Social cohesion	Role models
Highest social capital	San Ramón	San Carlos	Guácimo
	Poás	Carrillo	San Carlos
Lowest social capital	Desamparados	Desamparados	Desamparados
	Alajuela	Montes de Oca	Aserrí
	San José		San José

Is there a relationship between indicators of social capital and those of participation in civil society studied above? Figure VIII.8 shows the coefficients of correlation among the selected indicators. The relationship between participation in civil society (measured by the community action scale) and social capital is weak, with correlations of 0.10 or less. In contrast, there is an important correlation (0.32) between the indicator of interpersonal confidence and that of social cohesion.


Figure VIII.8 Correlations Among Indicators of Social Capital and Community Action



8.9 Costa Rican Social Capital in a Comparative Perspective

Costa Rica is the only country of the 8 studied in which the number of individuals that trust the persons in the community surpasses the number that distrust them, although the difference is by only a few percentage points (Figure VIII.9). In other countries, mistrust predominates over trust. The most dramatic situation can be seen in Costa Rica's two neighbors, Nicaragua and Panama. In these countries, the proportion distrusting their neighbors exceeds by 15 or more percentage points those that trust. Although the other aspects of social capital were only measured in Costa Rica, and for that reason it is not possible to make comparisons, the results with regard to interpersonal trust suggest that the social capital in Costa Rica is higher. If we add to this finding the fact that social capital has a favorable effect on individual attitudes in support of democracy (Chapter III), this could be one of the keys for understanding adhesion or not to the democratic system in certain societies.

Figure VIII.9. Difference Between Percent Trusting Less Percent Distrusting



9.0 The Nicaraguan Immigration

9.1 Introduction

The Nicaraguan immigration is one of the most important social phenomena occurred in Costa Rica during the last two decades. At least, that's how public opinion perceives it. Many of the country's most important occurrences, especially the negative ones, are almost reflexively related or attributed to the Nicaraguan migration. If poverty or infant mortality rates do not improve, the blame is placed on the immigrants, according to many. The same is true if crime, domestic violence, or unemployment rise. The collective imagination also tends to exaggerate the importance of this migration stream. Declarations by the press and public officials frequently mention embellished figures, such as the fact that there are a million immigrants. The reality, shown by the 2000 Census, is that they number less than 300,000, even after correcting for a 12% undercount (INEC & CCP, 2002). These perceptions are, in part, due to greater migrant visibility in certain environments where they tend to concentrate, such as the San José Metropolitan Area, and certain neighborhoods, such as La Carpio, Los Guido, and La Merced Park, among the young adult population, or in occupational groups dedicated to domestic service, construction, and private security services.

This exaggerated perception, that the number of migrants is very large and that they have a tremendous impact on the nation's life-style, may have an impact on Costa Rican democracy. When an important minority, such as the case of the Nicaraguans, does not have citizens' rights, the democracy must, of necessity, guarantee their civil rights. If it does not, it would be a perversion of the concept of democracy. Disregard for the civil rights of these non-citizens could arise from the attitudes and values of those holding citizenship rights, so that it is important to determine the climate of acceptance or tolerance towards these immigrants.

The possibility also exists that some politician may attempt (and achieve) access to power on the basis of a xenophobic and, by definition, anti-democratic platform. Although none of this has occurred in Costa Rica, the experience from other countries shows us that it is very possible. The existence of more than 10% of Nicaraguans in the adult population of Costa Rica is, certainly, a situation to be taken into consideration in this study of the country's democracy.

The survey only interviewed Costa Ricans. Those immigrants that have maintained their citizenship of origin are not included in the sample and, for that reason, their opinions, values, and norms towards democracy are not included, at least not directly. However, for the Costa Ricans interviewed, the survey probed a series of questions related to the immigration, in order to measure their acceptance of the immigrants and their degree of integration (questions CRMI on page 13 of the questionnaire).

9.2 Attitudes Towards Immigrants

The respondents were asked whether:

The government should act in one of the following ways towards illegal immigrants: (1) deport them, (2) investigate them and allow those with no criminal background to stay, (3) provide opportunities for them to stay legally;

The Nicaraguans do jobs that the Costa Ricans don't want to do, or do they take jobs away from the Costa Ricans;

The Nicaraguans receive fewer benefits, receive what they deserve, or receive too many benefits; and

The Nicaraguans have bad habits or simply have customs and ways of doing things that are different, but not worse or better than the “ticos”.

The responses to these questions show that, while not in a majority, the negative opinions of the immigrants are very widespread (Table IX.1). For example, 33% responded that they take jobs away from locals, 28% that they receive too many benefits, and 39% that they have worse customs. Fifty-one percent opined that they should be deported immediately. Although the country still holds an important reservoir of good will towards the immigrants, it is worrisome that around one-third of the population proffered manifestations of intolerance. Very few (7%) are in favor of facilitating the stay of the illegal migrants, as was carried out in the 1999 amnesty.

Table IX.1 Attitudes Towards Nicaraguan Immigrants

Unfavorable	%	Neutral	%	Favorable	%
What should be done with illegal migrants? (N=1,484)					
Deport them as soon as they are found	51%	Investigate them and allow those without antecedents to stay	42%	Provide facilities for them to stay	7%
Nicaraguan workers: (N=1,460)					
Take jobs away from Costa Ricans	33%			Do what Costa Ricans don't want to do	67%
Nicaraguans, as compared to Costa Ricans: (N=1,442)					
Receive too many benefits	28%	Receive what they deserve	23%	Receive too few benefits	49%
Nicaraguan customs are: (N=1,472)					
Worse than the ticos'	39%	Different but not worse	50%		
		Some worse and others not	11%		

Table XI.1 classifies the responses by unfavorable, neutral, or favorable attitudes expressed by the respondents regarding the immigrants. Of the 54 possible combinations of responses, we constructed the following typology of 5 attitudes towards the immigration (in parenthesis the scores or codes assigned, so that the average expresses a net percentage of favorable less unfavorable attitudes):

Very negative: without favorable responses and at least two unfavorable (-100);

Very positive: without unfavorable responses and at least two favorable (100);


Somewhat negative: one favorable response and at least two unfavorable (-50);

Somewhat positive: one unfavorable response and at least two favorable (50);

Neutral: the rest of the valid responses (0).

The largest number of respondents (29%) has neutral or ambivalent attitudes (Figure IX.1) towards the Nicaraguan immigrants. Similar percentages (19%) are polarized with very negative or very positive attitudes. Those with somewhat negative attitudes (20%) surpass those who are somewhat positive (13%). Overall, the average index indicates that the difference between positive and negative attitudes is -4%, to wit, there is a slight predominance of unfavorable attitudes towards the immigration¹¹⁴.

Figure IX.1 Attitudes Towards Nicaraguan Immigrants



9.3 Integration with the Immigrants

Degree of integration with the immigrants was measured with the following five questions as to whether in the last five years the respondent has or had a Nicaraguan as: (1) a close neighbor, (2) a friend, (3) a colleague at work, (4) an employee or other domestic worker, and (5) a security guard in the home or neighborhood. The alternatives were yes or no.

¹¹⁴ In fact, a confirmatory factor analysis showed that the four questions are aligned on a single factor, which explains 41% of the variance. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale would be 0.50. Due to this relatively modest value, we opted for the typology described above, instead of building a scale.

Almost three-quarters of the respondents indicated friendship with a Nicaraguan (Table IX.2); this is an indicator that the integration is relatively high. Fifty-nine percent indicated that they had a Nicaraguan as a close neighbor and 36% as a colleague at work. If we exclude those who do not work, this percentage climbs to 49%. It is important to note that between one-half and three-quarters of Costa Ricans have contact with immigrants, which in turn is an indicator of the importance and ubiquity of the immigration phenomenon. The proportions of contact are substantially lower through domestic service and security services provided by immigrants: 15% and 13%.

Table IX.2 Have Interaction with Nicaraguans

Type of interaction	%	(N)
As neighbor	59	(1,496)
By friendship	73	(1,497)
At work	36	(1,494)
Domestic service	15	(1,491)
Guard service	13	(1,476)

A factor analysis showed that there are two implicit dimensions in the foregoing five questions (Table IX.3). The first dimension, which we call “horizontal integration”, results from contacts through friendship, at work, or as neighbors. The second, which we call “vertical integration”, groups contacts as domestic employees or neighborhood security guards. The two components explain 55% of the variance of the five questions.

Table IX.3 Rotated Component Matrix

Type of interaction	Component	
	1	2
As neighbor	.663	-.006
By friendship	.758	.037
At work	.611	.095
Domestic service	.078	.811
Guard service	.025	.819

Extraction Method: Principal component analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax Normalization with Kaiser.

Taking into account the factor analysis results, two indices were defined using counts of the positive responses. The horizontal integration index, with a range from 0 to 3, indicates how many types of contacts the respondent has had with Nicaraguans on a plane of equality. The vertical integration index, with a range of 0 to 2, indicates how many contacts in a subaltern relationship¹¹⁵. Both were normalized to values of 0 to 100. The horizontal integration index average was 56 and the vertical integration index was 14.

Who are more or less integrated with the Nicaraguan immigrants? A response to this question can be extracted from the multiple regression results in Table IX.4 in Appendix C. With regard to horizontal integration, residents outside the Central Valley and in the GAM are significantly more integrated with the immigrants. This is also true of males, women who are not housewives,

¹¹⁵ Cronbach Alpha coefficients for these two scales are not high: 0.42 and 0.50, respectively. However, this is not important, since we are dealing with an enumeration of relationships with different types of immigrants.

those married or in union, those who are older, and with greater income levels, although the association with income and marital status is, according to the Beta coefficient, quite weak. Education, accumulated wealth, and religiosity are not factors of integration with the migrants.

In some respects, the results are similar for vertical integration. The exceptions are the following: males show less integration of this type, while education and wealth present a positive and statistically significant association. Thus, vertical integration occurs at higher income levels, and among the better educated, and involves women in greater measure. Horizontal integration, on the other hand, is not associated with socio-economic condition; however, it is with where one lives. The fact that goodness-of-fit almost doubles when the *cantones* are introduced into the equation is further proof of this (the R² climbs from 0.12 to 0.20).

9.4 Correlates of Acceptance or Tolerance of Immigrants

With the foregoing data, we can now clear up the doubt on which factors or characteristics among Costa Ricans are associated with greater or lesser tolerance of immigrants, as well as the more specific question of to what point the acquaintance or integration with migrants reduces intolerance.

The results of the multiple regression analysis suggest that it is not easy to explain what makes a person more or less tolerant towards immigration (Table IX.5 in Appendix C). Goodness-of-fit for the overall model (the R²) is a mere 0.05. Sex, age, marital status, income, wealth, and religiosity do not have a significant influence. The only individual characteristic that is significantly related is education. Individuals with post-secondary education are more favorably disposed to the immigrants. However, this is not the case with those having only a secondary education, who are not significantly different from those with primary schooling or less. Figure IX.2 shows that among those respondents with post-secondary education, favorable attitudes surpass unfavorable ones by 12 percentage points. On the other hand, in the other two educational groups, negative attitudes toward the immigrants exceed positive ones by 6% to 9%.


Persons living in communities with greater social cohesion and with a higher degree of horizontal integration with the immigrants also show a significantly more positive attitude towards the immigration. In particular, having a Nicaraguan friend, neighbor, or colleague may lead a person to be more accepting of the immigrants. And, the more immigrants that one is acquainted with, the better (Figure IX.2). There is, however, the possibility that causality runs in the other direction, that more tolerant individuals integrate more with the immigrants.

The specific locality of residence, represented by *cantón*, also seems to be of some importance. Model goodness-of-fit increased by 40% when the *cantón* indicator variables were included in the equation (Table IX.5). This effect occurs after having controlled interaction with the migrants, which to a certain point measures the importance of immigration in each locality. Although the number of interviews is small (50 per *cantón*), the regression allows us to identify some extreme *cantones*, where acceptance of migrants is significantly higher or lower than the rest, to wit:

Pérez Zeledón San Carlos, Guácimo, and La Cruz with favorable attitudes towards immigration.

Limón, with a low tolerance for immigration.

Figure IX.2 Difference in Percentage of Acceptance Minus Rejection of Immigrants



These results that refer to the impact that the *cantón* has on tolerance towards immigrants suggest that the corresponding attitudes and values are to a great extent shaped by the locality, town, or neighborhood. This probably occurs in a process of interpersonal diffusion or imitation. Processes of this type, which are not seriously rooted in socio-economic aspects, may frequently be influenced in one direction or another through education, information, and propaganda, as is well-known by marketers and publicists.

Appendices

Appendix A: Bibliography

Appendix B: Sample Design

Appendix C: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Appendix D: Questionnaire

Appendix E: Road Map

Appendix F: IRB Approval

Appendix A: Bibliography

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Appendix B: Sample Design

Universe

The survey universe included all of continental Costa Rica.

Population

The unit of study is the non-institutional population with Costa Rican citizenship, 18 or more years of age. This definition excludes non-naturalized immigrants (approximately 10% of the population), minors, and residents of collective dwellings. It also excludes individuals with physical or mental disabilities unable to respond to the questionnaire. The population of interest was 2,169,000 in the Census in June 2000. The population excluded for disability or residence in collective dwellings is estimated to be 80,000 or 4% of those with the right to vote. On the other hand, given the growth rate of 2% per year, at the time of the survey, February 2004, the population of interest was estimated to be 2,250,000 persons.

Unit of Observation

The statistical unit of observation is the household. Every individual must belong to a single household. This study did not distinguish between households and dwellings. Every household inhabits a dwelling. Although it may be shared with other households, this situation is uncommon in Costa Rica. According to the 2000 Census, only 0.1% of the households shared a dwelling. The dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the unit of final selection, identified in the cartography from a census “compact segment”.

Sampling Considerations

In order to select the sampling methods, the following considerations were kept in mind:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

The country as a whole

Strata for the first stage:

1. San José Metropolitan Area (AMsj)
2. Rest of the Central Valley (VC)
3. Outside the Central Valley (FVC)

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban area
2. Rural area

(b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.

(c) Facilitate survey operations.

(d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable equilibrium between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.

(e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.

(f) Make the sample self-weighted.

(g) Sample size of 1,500 interviews.

- (h) Cluster sample in *cantones* (municipalities) with a similar number of interviews for each *cantón*.
- (i) Expectation of 50 interviews by *cantón*, allowing a multi-level analysis.
- (j) Clusters of 12 interviews in rural areas and 6 in urban areas.
- (k) Quota sampling within each cluster.

On the basis of these requirements, the method used corresponded to a probabilistic sampling system in all of its stages, which was stratified, multi-stage, clustered, with random selection of units at each stage, including the final selection of the adult to be interviewed within the sample household.

The sampling was stratified by region (AMsj, VC, and FVC) and areas (urban and rural), and was multi-stage since it initiated with the selection of the Primary Sampling Units (PSU, *cantones*); followed by the Secondary Sampling Units in each PSU, consisting of census segments stratified into urban or rural areas; and Final Sampling Units consisting of clusters (compact segments) of 6 dwellings in urban areas or 12 dwellings in rural areas. In each housing unit of these clusters, one and only one voting-age Costa Rican was selected and interviewed, by means of a random process (birthday closest to the interview). As a norm to protect randomness, no substitutions or replacements were allowed for the units selected.

The sample considered the assignment of sizes that insured sample consistency, sufficiency, and efficiency for each stratum and at the aggregate total level. The sample is self-weighted at the national level and within each stratum. In each stratum, sample selection was carried out with probability proportional to size

Sampling Frame

The sampling framework consists of the June 2000 Population and Housing Census cartography. This cartography identifies the census segments (groups of about 60 dwellings defined for enumeration purposes) and within them the constituent dwellings. In a preliminary visit to the selected segments, the cartography was actualized when important changes were identified with regards to the map used in the Census.

Micro-data from the 2000 Census are available at the Central American Population Center (CCP) for on-line tabulation on Internet (<http://censos ccp ucr ac cr>). The availability of the Census micro-data allowed us to establish specific quotas for each cluster. The census cartography for the 194 census segments selected was provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). The dwellings that were to be visited by the interviewers were identified on the actualized census map (in Costa Rica there is no manageable system for addresses, so it is not possible to give the interviewers a list of addresses, instead, they received a map that identified the dwellings to be visited).

The population of interest and the number of dwellings have increased by approximately 7% between the date of the census and that of the survey. This increase did not affect the probability of selection of the *cantones*, but it may have had a slight impact on the probability of census segment selection. A substantial part of the increase probably was centered in new urbanizations, which house young families. These new urbanizations would, therefore, be under-represented in

the survey. Actualizing the sampling frame with this type of information is, however, beyond the economic possibilities of this survey. But the bias for not doing so is probably negligible.

Sample Size

In order to determine the sample size, we started with the following criteria: a cluster sampling procedure with a final size of 6 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas. This latter is the explanatory variable for the design and the variability function (Kish, 1987). The average design effect resulting from cluster sampling (DEF) was estimated initially at 1.1. (Once the survey was completed, this effect was estimated (together with sampling errors) for a set of variables, as was indicated in Chapter II.) DEF measures the ratio of variances for the sample design used, by clusters, with regard to a simple random sample. *A posteriori*, this value turned out to be between 1 and 2.5 for a selection of 16 questions. DEF tends to be lower as the size of the cluster and the true stratified sample variance decreases.

Sample Selection

At first, Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were selected within each of the three strata at the first level, with assignment proportional to stratum size. The PSU are the country's 81 *cantones*. *Cantones* were selected in each stratum, with probability proportional to size (PPS) of the *cantón* (Costa Rican population 18 or more years of age), on a systematic basis, with a random starting point. Table A.1 shows the *cantones* selected in the three large regions. San José, which has an exceptionally large population, fell into the sample twice. Thus, the sample includes 29 municipalities with 50 interviews each, except for San José, which includes 100 interviews.

In a second stage, segments were selected in each *cantón*, after stratification by urban and rural, with allocation proportional to size. Selection was also PPS on a systematic basis with a random starting point within each *cantón*-stratum. According to the 2000 Census, each segment has an average of 125 individuals of interest. The country is divided into 17,200 segments of approximately 60 dwellings each. The number of segments to be selected in each *cantón*-stratum was set taking into account the requirement of establishing clusters of size 6 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas.

Table A.1. *Cantones* Selected by Stratum

San José Metro Area		Rest Central Valley		Outside Central Valley	
Cantón	Pop.*	Cantón	Pop.*	Cantón	Pop.*
San José&	177,832	Puriscal	17,787	Pérez Zeledón	67,296
San José&	177,832	Santa Ana	19,832	San Carlos	63,194
Escazú	28,842	Alajuela	131,247	Sarapiquí	20,043
Aserrí	112,695	San Ramón	39,761	Carrillo	14,928
Desamparados	28,830	Grecia	38,024	La Cruz	6,715
Goicoechea	71,469	Poás	14,118	Puntarenas	59,226
Alajuelita	36,460	Cartago	80,742	Garabito	5,328
Tibás	45,357	Turrialba	41,098	Limón	47,620
Montes de Oca	32,101	Oreamuno	23,397	Pococí	54,199
		Heredia	62,412	Guácimo	17,999
		Belén	11,837		

* Population of Costa Ricans 18 or more years of age residing in private dwellings, data from the 2000 Census.

& San José, which has a substantially larger population than the rest, was selected twice in the randomly initiated systematic and Probability Proportional to Size selection.

In a *third stage*, each segment was divided into compact segments, each with the desired number of dwellings (6 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas). A compact segment was randomly selected in each segment.

Overall. There were 194 sampling points: 71 in the AMSJ, 78 in other urban areas and 45 rural ones, distributed in 29 *cantones*. Table A.2 shows the number of segments selected by stratum and compares the distribution of interviews by census strata. The sample reproduces very well the population distribution by strata. Map 1 shows the localization of the sampling points selected for the survey.

Table A.2. Distribution of the Population and Sample by Stratum

Stratum	Voters Census		Sample		
	Number.	%	Segments	Interviews	%
San Jose Metro Area	594,464	27	71	450	30
Rest urban Central Valley	493,171	23	50	314	21
Rural Central Valley	360,153	17	19	236	16
Urban not Central	266,688	12	28	178	12
Rural not Central	455,327	21	26	322	21
Total	2,169,803	100	194	1,500	100

Selection of Individuals by Quota

For each one of the 194 census segments selected in the sample, individual interview quotas were set. The quotas were established for four groups or strata within each segment, to wit:

males 18-29 years of age;

males 30 or more years of age;

female housewives (including retirees and unemployed); and

females that work or study at least half-time.

These four strata identify groups that experience has shown have a different probability of being available for the interview (Sudman, 1966).

The quotas for each segment were determined by a Monte Carlo type random draw, with probabilities proportional to the number of individuals in each stratum in the segment. For example, in a segment in the rural area outside the Central Valley, where 12 interviews were required, the distribution of the 145 voters from the census was 22%, 33%, 41%, and 4% for the four groups; the quotas drawn were: 2, 3, 7, and 0. This manner of assigning the quotas ensures that the interviewer will not be asked to do the impossible, for example, interview a large number of workingwomen where this type of population is scarce. Although by chance the quotas do not exactly reproduce the population distribution for a specific segment, overall, for the whole sample of 194 segments, the quotas reflect well the true population distribution. (Table A.3).

Table A.3. Population and Sample Distribution by Quota Groups

Quotagroups	2000 Census		Sample	
	Number.	%	Number	%
Males				
18-29 years of age	352,243	16%	225	15%
30 or more years of age	709,000	33%	538	36%
Females age 18 or more				
Housewives	716,462	33%	446	30%
Work / study	382,903	18%	291	19%
Total	2,160,608	100%	1,500	100%

The geographic location of the selected segments is shown in Map 1.

To avoid biases in the integration of the quotas in the field, and to reduce cluster homogeneity, the following three measures were adopted:

The interviewer received a list of the dwellings to visit in each segment.

Dwelling visits in urban areas were scheduled from 3 P.M. through 8 P.M. and on weekends.

Dwellings visited were not contiguous.

Levels of Confidence and Margins of Error

Since the survey is of complex design, it was not possible to determine the sampling error *a priori*. This was determined for selected variables *a posteriori* with the sample results (Chapter II). The sample was prepared taking into consideration demographic surveys with similar designs. The design effect (DEF) is on the order of 1.1. Assuming a DEF of this magnitude and with the known formulas for unrestricted random sampling, Table A.4 presents the sampling error for proportions of 0.50 (in any other proportion, the sampling error is lower). The maximum assumed error for percentages in the national sample is 2.8 percentage points, with a 95% confidence level. When the sample is disaggregated by stratum, this error can reach 8 percentage points in the smallest stratum (urban non-Central).

Table A.4. *A priori* estimate of sampling errors

Stratum	N	MSA	MPC
San José Metro Area	450	0.046	0.051
Rest urban Central Valley	314	0.055	0.061
Central Valley rural	236	0.064	0.070
Urban not Central	178	0.073	0.081
Rural not Central	322	0.055	0.060
Total	1500	0.025	0.028

Adjusted for non-Coverage and non-Eligibility

In order to ensure sample efficiency, sufficiency, and accuracy, we adopted a sampling system with “Non-coverage adjustment”, which guaranteed sample implementation with estimated sizes as the minimums within the levels of confidence and maximum permissible error. The system ensures the elimination of biases arising from the substitution by units that cannot be subjected to an interview. This system guarantees information quality. The method requires some knowledge of “non-coverage” experienced by similar studies and the probable proportion of eligible units in each conglomerate. This system consists of applying a non-coverage factor (*t*) and another factor

for non-eligibility (e) to the estimated sample size (n) for each FSU, to calculate a final operational size to the selection (n^*), which is given by:


$$n^* = (1 + t)(1 + e)n$$

Where:

t = non-interview ratio. This rate considers non-coverage situations (no interview, rejections, absence of adults, or impossibility of interview after three tries (visits), among other possible events). According to the experiences from other surveys, the (t) rate varies by stratum and socio-economic level of the household. The average (t) rate for the national sample was estimated at 0.20, which means that on average interviewers received listings with a 20% larger number of dwellings.

e = Ratio of non-eligibility for interview due to disability or non-citizenship. Disability was assumed to be proportional to the number of adults over 75 years of age in the census segment, with a national average of 3%. The proportion of foreigners varies enormously among segments, from 0% to 49% in the 194 segments selected, for a national average of 8%. In a segment where around half of the population are foreigners, it was necessary to select twice as many dwellings.

Figure A.1. Map of Conglomerates in the Sample, Regions of Costa Rica



Appendix C: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Technical Note

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the database itself www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/.

**Table III.3 Predictors of Support for the Democratic System With Political Variables
(Model B)**

Model		Coefficients ^a				
		B	Non Standardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
1	(Constante)	30,165	4,246		7,105	,000
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	-1,667	1,242	-,040	-1,342	,180
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	-3,866	1,471	-,078	-2,629	,009
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	-,055	1,326	-,001	-,041	,967
	Q1R Male	-3,525	1,201	-,091	-2,935	,003
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	-2,148	1,329	-,051	-1,616	,106
	Q11R2 Married or free union	1,786	,952	,045	1,877	,061
	EDR Schooling years	-,100	,153	-,020	-,651	,515
	Q2 Age (in years)	,154	,030	,129	5,127	,000
	Q10R Income -in thousands-	-,005	,004	-,035	-1,109	,268
	RIQDX Wealth Index	,522	,236	,072	2,216	,027
	Q4RR1C1 Medium Religiousness	-1,384	1,044	-,034	-1,326	,185
	Q4RR1C2 Low Religiousness	-,568	1,188	-,013	-,478	,633
	PSOLP Community Action Index	-,005	,015	-,008	-,362	,717
	CONFI2 Percentage of Net Trust in Community	,021	,009	,059	2,439	,015
	CONSOCR Social Control Index	,038	,018	,053	2,136	,033
	TOLERPR Political Tolerance Index	,054	,017	,075	3,211	,001
	M1 Government Performance	-1,046	,617	-,045	-1,694	,090
	N1 Performance Government in Combating Poverty	1,208	,373	,108	3,237	,001
	N3 Performance Government Protecting Democracy	3,458	,355	,297	9,733	,000
	N9 Performance Government Public Corruption	1,952	,331	,189	5,891	,000

a. Dependent Variable: ADEMIR System Support Index

Table III.4 Predictors of Political Tolerance (Model B)

Coefficients^a

Model		Non Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	Typ. Error	Beta	t
1	(Constant)	23,645	7,203		3,283 ,001
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	3,686	2,074	,064	1,777 ,076
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	3,512	2,462	,051	1,427 ,154
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	5,001	2,212	,089	2,261 ,024
	Q1R Male	1,755	2,013	,032	,872 ,383
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	,206	2,223	,003	,093 ,926
	Q11R2 Married or free union	-1,901	1,591	-,034	-1,194 ,233
	EDR Schooling years	1,468	,253	,213	5,807 ,000
	Q2 Age (in years)	-,010	,051	-,006	-,205 ,837
	Q10R Income -in thousands	,007	,007	,037	,998 ,318
	RIQDX Wealth Index	,394	,395	,039	,999 ,318
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	4,167	1,742	,073	2,393 ,017
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	5,554	1,980	,088	2,805 ,005
	PSOLP Community Action Index	,016	,024	,018	,653 ,514
	CONFI2 Percentage of Net Trust in Community	,010	,015	,021	,715 ,475
	CONSOCR Social Control Index	-,035	,030	-,034	-1,175 ,240
	ADEMR System Support Index	,150	,047	,107	3,211 ,001
	M1 Overall Government's Performance	1,882	1,031	,057	1,825 ,068
	N1 Performance in Combating Poverty	-,260	,626	-,017	-,415 ,678
	N3 Performance in Promoting and Protecting Democracy	-,517	,615	-,032	-,841 ,401
	N9 Performance in Combating Public Corruption	,156	,561	,011	,278 ,781

a. Dependent Variable: TOLERPR Political Tolerance Index

Table III.6 Predictors of Support for a Stable Democracy (Model B)

Variables In the Equation

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	REGIONVC(1)	,144	,164	,779	1	,378 1,155
	TAMAÑO			2,378	2	,305
	TAMAÑO(1)	,155	,194	,636	1	,425 1,168
	TAMAÑO(2)	,269	,175	2,368	1	,124 1,309
	Q1R(1)	-,009	,158	,003	1	,954 ,991
	OCUP1R2(1)	-,204	,175	1,353	1	,245 ,816
	Q11R2(1)	-,129	,126	1,061	1	,303 ,879
	EDR	,060	,020	8,993	1	,003 1,062
	Q2	,003	,004	,430	1	,512 1,003
	Q10R	,000	,001	,148	1	,700 1,000
	RIQDX	,036	,031	1,357	1	,244 1,037
	Q4RR			1,536	2	,464
	Q4RR(1)	,133	,138	,939	1	,333 1,143
	Q4RR(2)	,177	,157	1,262	1	,261 1,193
	PSOLP	,002	,002	,862	1	,353 1,002
	CONFI2	,002	,001	4,189	1	,041 1,002
	CONSOCR	,000	,002	,002	1	,969 1,000
	M1	,007	,082	,008	1	,931 1,007
	N1	,025	,049	,257	1	,612 1,025
	N3	,185	,048	15,084	1	,000 1,203
	N9	,050	,044	1,291	1	,256 1,051
	Constante	-2,415	,565	18,288	1	,000 ,089

a. Variable(s) included in Step 1: REGIONVC, TAMAÑO, Q1R, OCUP1R2, Q11R2, EDR, Q2, Q10R, RIQDX, Q4RR, PSOLP, CONFI2, CONSOCR, M1, N1, N3, N9.

Table IV.2 Predictors of Intolerance of Corruption

Coefficients ^a						
Modelo		Non Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
		B	Error típ.	Beta	t	
1	(Constante)	75,760	3,299		22,968	,000
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	,359	1,224	,010	,293	,769
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	,359	1,451	,008	,248	,805
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	1,616	1,293	,046	1,249	,212
	Q1R Male	-,405	1,186	-,012	-,341	,733
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	-1,353	1,298	-,037	-1,042	,298
	Q11R2 Married or free union	3,815	,934	,110	4,084	,000
	EDR Schooling years	,423	,151	,099	2,806	,005
	Q2 Age (in years)	,156	,029	,149	5,278	,000
	Q10R Income -in thousands-	,002	,004	,014	,394	,693
	RIQDX Wealth Index	-,066	,233	-,011	-,283	,777
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	-2,102	1,031	-,059	-2,039	,042
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	-1,506	1,160	-,039	-1,298	,195
	ADEMR System Support Index	,049	,023	,056	2,147	,032
	TOLERP	-,029	,046	-,017	-,645	,519

a. Dependent Variable: TOLICORR

Table IV.4 Predictors of Victimization by Corrupt Acts

Variables in the Equation						
	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Paso 1 ^a REGIONVC(1)	,172	,211	,665	1	,415	1,187
TAMAÑO			,136	2	,934	
TAMAÑO(1)	-,031	,245	,016	1	,900	,970
TAMAÑO(2)	-,078	,219	,129	1	,720	,925
Q1R(1)	,017	,191	,008	1	,931	1,017
OCUP1R2(1)	-,456	,225	4,099	1	,043	,634
Q11R2(1)	,253	,162	2,434	1	,119	1,287
EDR	-,006	,025	,056	1	,813	,994
Q2	-,005	,005	,958	1	,328	,995
Q10R	,001	,001	3,151	1	,076	1,001
RIQDX	-,006	,039	,028	1	,868	,994
Q4RR			2,606	2	,272	
Q4RR(1)	,072	,177	,164	1	,685	1,074
Q4RR(2)	,295	,188	2,462	1	,117	1,344
TOLICORR	-,005	,004	1,570	1	,210	,995
Constante	-1,382	,590	5,484	1	,019	,251

a. Variable(s) included in Step 1: REGIONVC, TAMAÑO, Q1R, OCUP1R2, Q11R2, EDR, Q2, Q10R, RIQDX, Q4RR, TOLICORR.

Table V.2 Predictors of Trust in Institutions That Protect Citizen's Rights

Coefficients ^a						
Modelo		Non Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
		B	Error típ.	Beta	t	
1	(Constante)	51,716	4,569		11,318	,000
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	-1,928	1,549	-,044	-1,245	,213
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	-1,369	1,813	-,026	-,755	,450
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	2,706	1,636	,063	1,654	,098
	Q1R Male	-2,767	1,474	-,068	-1,877	,061
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	-,321	1,634	-,007	-,197	,844
	Q11R2 Married or free union	1,191	1,182	,028	1,007	,314
	EDR Schooling years	-,159	,188	-,031	-,845	,398
	Q2 Age (in years)	,193	,038	,151	5,149	,000
	Q10R Income -in thousands-	-,009	,006	-,058	-1,559	,119
	RIQDX Wealth Index	,791	,296	,103	2,673	,008
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	-,631	1,298	-,015	-,486	,627
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	-4,959	1,442	-,106	-3,439	,001
	VIC1R Crime Victimization	-3,373	1,521	-,061	-2,218	,027
	AOJ8R Authorities must abide by the Law	-,005	,004	-,029	-1,087	,277
	TOLERPR Political Tolerance Index	,046	,021	,062	2,256	,024
	TOLICORR Acquiescence of Corruption Index	,006	,032	,005	,171	,864

a. Dependent Variable: PRODER Trust in Rights Protection Index

Table V.3 Predictors of the Level of Protective Measures Adopted by Individuals in Their Households

Model		Coefficients ^a				
		Non Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Error t íp.	Beta		
1	(Constante)	,252	1,064		,237	,813
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	,799	1,035	,354	,772	,440
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	,012	,166	,004	,071	,943
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	,007	,153	,003	,048	,962
	Q1R Male	-,110	,075	-,052	-1,474	,141
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	-,068	,081	-,029	-,832	,406
	Q11R2 Married or free union	,057	,058	,026	,990	,322
	EDR Schooling years	,000	,009	-,001	-,031	,975
	Q2 Age (in years)	,005	,002	,069	2,487	,013
	Q10R Income -in thousands-	,000	,000	-,009	-,241	,810
	RIQDX Wealth Index	,060	,015	,151	4,083	,000
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	,096	,064	,042	1,491	,136
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	,274	,072	,111	3,806	,000
	VIC1R Crime Victimization	,379	,077	,128	4,888	,000
	CANTC1 Escazú	,143	,172	,024	,835	,404
	CANTC2 Desamparados	,946	,672	,158	1,407	,160
	CANTC3 Puriscal	-,355	,228	-,186	-1,560	,119
	CANTC4 Aserrí	-,043	,171	-,007	-,254	,800
	CANTC5 Goicoechea	,278	,173	,047	1,604	,109
	CANTC6 Santa Ana	-,119	,192	-,020	-,620	,535
	CANTC7 Alajuelita	,204	,189	,035	1,083	,279
	CANTC8 Tibás	,310	,196	,052	1,579	,115
	CANTC9 Montes de Oca	-,017	,020	-,140	-,869	,385
	CANTC10 Pérez Zeledón	,608	1,070	,103	,568	,570
	CANTC11 Alajuela	,104	,244	,017	,424	,672
	CANTC12 San Ramón	,015	,289	,003	,052	,958
	CANTC13 Grecia	,456	,300	,077	1,519	,129
	CANTC14 Poás	,308	,316	,052	,977	,329
	CANTC15 San Carlos	,711	1,089	,120	,653	,514
	CANTC16 Cartago	,321	,314	,054	1,023	,306
	CANTC17 Turrialba	-,208	,363	-,035	-,572	,567
	CANTC18 Oreamuno	,376	,353	,064	1,067	,286
	CANTC19 Heredia	,806	,363	,134	2,221	,027
	CANTC20 Belén	,476	,381	,078	1,248	,212
	CANTC21 Sarapiquí	,883	1,123	,149	,786	,432
	CANTC22 Carrillo	1,221	1,129	,207	1,081	,280
	CANTC23 La Cruz	1,105	1,138	,187	,972	,331
	CANTC24 Puntarenas	,929	1,148	,157	,809	,418
	CANTC25 Garabito	1,066	1,152	,180	,926	,355
	CANTC26 Limón	,684	1,163	,116	,588	,557
	CANTC27 Pococí	1,373	1,168	,232	1,175	,240
	CANTC28 Guácimo	1,564	1,160	,265	1,349	,178

a. Dependent Variable: MEPROM Count of Protection Measures

Table VI.5 Predictors of Municipal Service Quality Evaluation

Modelo		Coefficients ^a				
		B	Non Standardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
1	(Constante)	34,255	5,381		6,366	,000
	REGIONVC Region Central Valley	5,467	1,617	,114	3,382	,001
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	2,834	1,917	,049	1,478	,140
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	,232	1,664	,005	,140	,889
	Q1R Male	1,104	1,539	,025	,717	,473
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	3,251	1,700	,066	1,912	,056
	Q11R2 Married and free union	-1,378	1,224	-,030	-1,126	,260
	EDR Years of Schooling	-,037	,194	-,006	-,190	,849
	Q2 Age (in years)	-,054	,039	-,038	-1,394	,164
	Q10R Income -in thousands	,000	,006	,002	,061	,951
	RIQDX Wealth Index	-,195	,305	-,023	-,638	,523
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	-1,398	1,344	-,030	-1,040	,299
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	-2,314	1,524	-,045	-1,519	,129
	N1 Government combats poverty	,884	,486	,067	1,818	,069
	N3 Government promotes and protects democracy	,550	,482	,041	1,140	,254
	N9 Government combats public corruption	-,666	,429	-,055	-1,552	,121
	M1 Government performance	-1,369	,800	-,051	-1,711	,087
	NP1BRN Responsiveness of municipal officials	,214	,023	,286	9,333	,000
	NP1CRN Responsiveness of municipal council	,129	,023	,172	5,564	,000
	ADEMR System Support Index	,086	,036	,074	2,368	,018

a. Dependent Variable: SGL1RN Quality of Municipal Services

Table VI.7 Predictors of Participation in Municipal Affairs

Variables in the Equation						
	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Paso 1 ^a						
REGIONVC(1)	-,339	,314	1,170	1	,279	,712
TAMAÑO			1,879	2	,391	
TAMAÑO(1)	-,474	,379	1,564	1	,211	,622
TAMAÑO(2)	-,083	,329	,063	1	,802	,921
Q1R(1)	,261	,281	,860	1	,354	1,298
OCUP1R2(1)	-,124	,325	,146	1	,703	,883
Q11R2(1)	,320	,236	1,845	1	,174	1,378
EDR	,134	,034	15,561	1	,000	1,143
Q2	,014	,007	4,216	1	,040	1,014
Q10R	-,001	,001	,530	1	,467	,999
RIQDX	-,011	,056	,041	1	,839	,989
Q4RR			3,717	2	,156	
Q4RR(1)	-,217	,243	,801	1	,371	,805
Q4RR(2)	-,568	,296	3,664	1	,056	,567
Constante	-3,922	,719	29,715	1	,000	,020

a. Variables included in Step 1: REGIONVC, TAMAÑO, Q1R, OCUP1R2, Q11R2, EDR, Q2, Q10R, RIQDX, Q4RR.

Table VII.1 Logistic Regression to Identify the Predictors for Voting in the First Round of the 2002 Presidential Elections

Variables in the Equation						
	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Paso 1 ^a						
REGIONVC(1)	-,069	,183	,142	1	,707	,934
TAMAÑOC1	-,270	,223	1,466	1	,226	,763
TAMAÑOC2	-,127	,199	,408	1	,523	,880
Q1R(1)	-,631	,189	11,162	1	,001	,532
OCUP1R2	-,247	,211	1,370	1	,242	,781
Q11R2(1)	,476	,141	11,384	1	,001	1,609
EDR	,042	,024	3,018	1	,082	1,043
Q2	,032	,005	43,447	1	,000	1,033
Q10R	,001	,001	2,529	1	,112	1,001
RIQDX	-,012	,035	,106	1	,744	,989
Q4RRC1	,009	,163	,003	1	,957	1,009
Q4RRC2	-,392	,172	5,183	1	,023	,676
PSOLP	,000	,002	,002	1	,964	1,000
CONFI2	,001	,001	,806	1	,369	1,001
CONSOCR	,002	,003	,473	1	,492	1,002
ADEMR	,007	,004	3,616	1	,057	1,007
ABS5R(1)	,382	,140	7,487	1	,006	1,466
TOLERPR	,001	,003	,059	1	,808	1,001
Constante	-1,008	,544	3,439	1	,064	,365

a. Variables included) in Step 1: REGIONVC, TAMAÑOC1, TAMAÑOC2, Q1R, OCUP1R2, Q11R2, EDR, Q2, Q10R, RIQDX, Q4RRC1, Q4RRC2, PSOLP, CONFI2, CONSOCR, ADEMR, ABS5R, TOLERPR.

Table VII.3 Predictors of Electoral Political Participation Beyond the Vote

Coefficients ^a						
Model		Non Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
		B	Error típ.	Beta	t	
1	(Constante)	5,649	6,889		,820	,412
	REGIONVC Central Valley Region	-4,691	2,378	-,069	-1,973	,049
	TAMAÑOC1 Other Urban	1,824	2,843	,022	,642	,521
	TAMAÑOC2 Rural	-,365	2,558	-,006	-,143	,887
	Q1R Male	-4,790	2,330	-,075	-2,056	,040
	OCUP1R2 Housewives	-5,994	2,549	-,087	-2,351	,019
	Q11R2 Married or free union	-,418	1,823	-,006	-,230	,818
	EDR Schooling years	,104	,296	,013	,353	,724
	Q2 Age (in years)	,205	,058	,104	3,533	,000
	Q10R Income -in thousands	,015	,009	,066	1,791	,074
	R1QDX Wealth Index	-,382	,455	-,032	-,839	,401
	Q4RRC1 Medium Religiousness	-2,333	2,014	-,035	-1,158	,247
	Q4RRC2 Low Religiousness	1,482	2,275	,020	,652	,515
	PSOLP Community Action Index	,122	,028	,120	4,374	,000
	CONFI2 Percentage of Net Trust in Community	-,025	,017	-,043	-1,506	,132
	CONSOOCR Social Control Index	,035	,034	,030	1,035	,301
	ADEMR System Support Index	,025	,046	,015	,533	,594
	ABS5R Vote Efficacy	9,915	1,766	,156	5,616	,000
	TOLEPR Political Tolerance Index	,003	,032	,003	,093	,926

a. Dependent Variable: PP1RN Convince others

Table VIII.2 Explanatory Multiple Regression of the Two Indices of Participation

Explanatory variables	Religious-familial participation			Political-professional participation		
	B	Beta	Sig.	B	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	23.147		.001	-8.238		.019
Central Valley	-.795	-.011	.707	-.018	-.001	.987
Rest Urban	-2.976	-.033	.239	-.577	-.014	.665
Rural	3.299	.046	.143	2.809	.085	.018
Males	-10.159	-.148	.000	1.680	.052	.128
Housewives	.042	.001	.985	-1.660	-.048	.166
In union	10.594	.149	.000	-1.655	-.050	.065
Education (years)	.593	.069	.022	1.130	.281	.000
Age in years	1.552	.733	.000	.353	.358	.007
Age squared	-.018	-.804	.000	-.003	-.257	.054
Income ('000 ¢)	-.016	-.065	.035	.001	.008	.810
Wealth index	.137	.011	.735	.029	.005	.892
Median religiosity	-15.103	-.207	.000	-.678	-.020	.472
Low religiosity	-34.539	-.433	.000	-1.446	-.039	.172
R ²	0.29			0.09		
R ² with cantones	0.32			0.12		

Table VIII.3 Multiple Regressions Explaining the Community Action Index

Variables Explanatory	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	Beta	Sig.	B	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	-17.41		0.011	-11.89		0.053
Central Valley	-0.765	-0.012	0.723	-0.704	-0.011	0.716
Rest Urban	-5.833	-0.074	0.024	-5.176	-0.066	0.026
Rural	3.399	0.054	0.139	0.860	0.014	0.677
Males	2.982	0.049	0.161	2.177	0.036	0.259
Housewives	-2.396	-0.037	0.300	-1.013	-0.015	0.626
In union	1.208	0.019	0.485	1.967	0.031	0.213
Education (years)	1.154	0.151	0.000	0.177	0.023	0.466
Age in years	1.142	0.608	0.000	0.755	0.402	0.001
Age squared	-0.010	-0.499	0.000	-0.007	-0.333	0.007
Income ('000 ¢)	-0.005	-0.023	0.521	-0.005	-0.022	0.488
Wealth Index	0.454	0.040	0.269	0.422	0.037	0.254
Medium religiosity	-3.943	-0.061	0.030	-2.490	-0.039	0.137
Low religiosity	-7.066	-0.100	0.001	-3.829	-0.054	0.057
Religious-familial participation				0.059	0.066	0.014
Political-professional participation				0.835	0.438	0.000
R ²	0.07			0.25		
R ² with cantones	0.10			0.27		

Table VIII.6 Multiple Regressions for the Three Indicators of Social Capital

Variables Explanatory	Interpersonal trust			Social cohesion			Role models		
	B	Beta	Sig.	B	Beta	Sig.	B	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	-37.828		. 0.000	65.733		. 0.000	58.225		. 0.000
Central Valley	13.018	0.115	0.001	6.579	0.116	0.001	5.729	0.084	0.011
Rest Urban	11.686	0.085	0.010	8.013	0.116	0.001	5.554	0.067	0.040
Rural	22.720	0.206	0.000	15.235	0.276	0.000	15.133	0.229	0.000
Male	2.297	0.022	0.540	-0.798	-0.015	0.683	3.246	0.051	0.144
Housewives	0.050	0.000	0.990	0.203	0.004	0.924	-1.571	-0.023	0.517
In union	0.896	0.008	0.759	-1.718	-0.031	0.256	-0.168	-0.003	0.923
Education (years)	-0.313	-0.023	0.500	-0.046	-0.007	0.850	-0.623	-0.078	0.024
Age in years	0.295	0.090	0.001	-0.013	-0.008	0.779	0.013	0.007	0.813
Income ('000 ¢)	0.002	0.005	0.896	0.001	0.004	0.921	-0.007	-0.028	0.430
Wealth index	1.674	0.085	0.022	0.035	0.003	0.927	0.447	0.038	0.301
Medium religiosity	-6.272	-0.056	0.052	-0.560	-0.010	0.737	0.856	0.013	0.654
Low religiosity	-9.943	-0.080	0.006	-3.187	-0.051	0.089	-6.752	-0.091	0.002
R ²	0.06			0.05			0.06		
R ² with cantones	0.09			0.08			0.13		

Table IX.4 Explanatory Multiple Regression of the Two Indices of Interaction with Nicaraguans (Simple and Standardized Regression Coefficients)

Explanatory variables	Horizontal interaction			Vertical interaction		
	B	Beta	Sig.	B	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	64.224			-8.813		
Central Valley	-6.559	-.096	.000	-1.242	-.021	.125
Rest urban	-7.614	-.092	.003	-8.435	-.115	.494
Rural	-4.647	-.070	.004	-6.380	-.109	.000
Male	10.357	.161	.048	-6.113	-.108	.001
Housewives	-7.861	-.114	.000	-3.096	-.051	.001
In union	.692	.010	.001	-3.340	-.057	.114
Education (years)	-.533	-.066	.696	.999	.140	.022
Age in years	.591	.298	.048	.265	.152	.000
Age squared	-.011	-.491	.024	-.001	-.043	.222
Income ('000 ₡)	.006	.026	.000	.059	.282	.725
Wealth index	-.760	-.064	.444	.584	.056	.000
Medium religiosity	1.084	.016	.072	1.212	.020	.093
Low religiosity	4.959	.067	.560	5.754	.087	.430
R ²	0.12			0.24		
R ² con cantones	0.20			0.28		

**Table IX.5 Multiple Regression of the Index of Acceptance of Nicaraguan Migrants
(Simple and Standardized Regression Coefficients)**

Explanatory variables	B	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	-36.153	.	0.006
Central Valley	-7.593	-0.053	0.131
Rest urban	10.457	0.060	0.086
Rural	4.572	0.033	0.403
Hombre	4.611	0.034	0.361
Housewives	3.648	0.025	0.506
In union	-3.334	-0.024	0.391
Secondary education	-2.815	-0.020	0.535
Post-secondary education	13.261	0.075	0.040
Age in years	-0.192	-0.046	0.124
Income ('000 ₡)	0.030	0.060	0.109
Wealth index	1.494	0.059	0.120
Medium religiosity	-3.359	-0.023	0.431
Low religiosity	-5.969	-0.038	0.216
Social cohesion	0.136	0.054	0.048
Horizontal interaction	0.243	0.115	0.000
Vertical interaction	0.009	0.004	0.908
R ²	0.045		
R ² with cantones	0.063		

Appendix D: Questionnaire

Anexo 2. Cuestionario

Versión # 9 ; IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH



UNIVERSIDAD DE COSTA RICA

**AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA:
Centroamérica y México, 2004**

Entrevistador: Lea y entregue la nota de consentimiento informado

Pais: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	PAIS	
Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]	CRIDNUM	
Provincia:	CRPROV	
Cantón:	CRCANT	
Distrito:	CRDIST	
Segmento:	CRSEG	
Compacto:	CRCOM	
Estrato:	CRESTR	
1. AMSJ 2. Urbano - Bajura 3. Urbano - Central	4. Rural - Bajura 5. Rural - Central	
Zona:	CRUR	
1. Urbano	2. Rural	

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	
CRA4. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	CRA4	
(01) Problemas económicos (03) Desempleo (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (10) Problemas del medio ambiente (12) Narcotráfico (14) Pandillas (16) Migración (02) Inflación, altos precios (04) Pobreza (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre carreteras, paro, etc.) (09) Falta de crédito (11) Drogadicción (13) Corrupción (15) Mal gobierno (17) La guerra contra terrorismo (88) No sabe Anotar si no existe código:		

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A3

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	SOCT1	
SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	SOCT3	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...				CP5	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?	(1) Sí [Seguir con CP5A]	(2) No [Pasar a CP6]	(8) NS [Pasar a CP6]		
CP5A. ¿Ha donado dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5A	
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5B	
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5C	
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5D	
CP5E. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo para combatir la delincuencia en su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5E	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	INAP	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)		CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)		CP8

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	INAP	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)		CP9
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)		CP13

PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	PROT1	
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Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP2
CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4A

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..?	(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	LS3	
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..?	(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1	
IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?	(1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	IT2	
IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, tratarían de aprovecharse de Usted, o cree que no se aprovecharían de Usted?	(1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	IT3	

CRIT3 Y, hablando de las costumbres de su barrio, dígame por favor si en este barrio se acostumbra que los adultos vigilen que los niños estén seguros y no se estén metiendo en problemas (LEER OPCIONES):	(1) Siempre se acostumbra (2) a veces (3) rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	CRIT3	
CRIT4 ¿Se acostumbra en este barrio que cuando un vecino deja la casa sola, otros la cuidan? (LEER OPCIONES)	(1) Siempre se acostumbra (2) a veces (3) rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	CRIT4	
CRIT5 ¿Se acostumbra que entre los vecinos se hagan favores: por ejemplo, se regalan comida, se prestan herramientas? (LEER OPCIONES)	(1) Siempre se acostumbra (2) a veces (3) rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	CRIT5	
CRIT6 ¿Podría decirme si en este barrio hay o no personas que niños y jóvenes pueden admirar por destacar en el deporte? ¿Sí o no?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	CRIT6	
CRIT7 ¿Y por ser gente muy trabajadora?	(1) Sí o no? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	CRIT7	
CRIT8 ¿Y hay personas que puedan admirar por ser muy cooperadoras a la hora de resolver los problemas del barrio?	(1) Sí o no? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	CRIT8	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su comunidad...

CRMU1 En su opinión, ¿cuál es el problema más grave que tiene esta comunidad en la actualidad? (NO LEER LAS RESPUESTAS) (ACEPTAR UNA SOLA RESPUESTA; SONDEAR, SI MENCIONA MÁS DE UNA: "LO MÁS IMPORTANTE") (00) Ninguna (PASE A CRMU3) (01) Falta de agua (03) Falta de trabajo, desempleo (05) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia, robos, asaltos (07) Fallas en la recolección de basura (09) Falta de aseo público (11) Drogas, drogadicción (13) Mal servicio, problemas con el servicio de buses (88) NS/NR (PASE A CRMU3) Otros (ESPECIFIQUE)	CRMU1
(02) Huecos, mal estado calles o caminos (04) Mucha pobreza (06) Contaminación del agua (08) Falta de vivienda (10) Seguridad ambiental (12) Narcotráfico (14) Alcantarillado, aguas sucias derramadas	
CRMU2 ¿Cuánto ha hecho la municipalidad por resolver ese problema? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	CRMU2
EFF3. ¿Cree que Ud. pueda ayudar a solucionar este problema? (1) Si [sigue con EFF5] (2) No [pasar a EFF6] (8) No sabe [pasar a EFF6] (9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)	EFF3
EFF5. ¿Ha hecho algún esfuerzo alguna vez solo o en grupo para resolver este problema? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS (9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)	EFF5
EFF6. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Qué tan probable cree Ud. que el esfuerzo del pueblo pueda servir para resolver los problemas de esta comunidad? ¿Diría que hay mucha probabilidad de resolverlo, alguna probabilidad, poca probabilidad o casi ninguna probabilidad? (1) Mucha (2) alguna (3) poca (4) casi ninguna (8) NS	EFF6
CRMU3. Hablando más en general, en su opinión, ¿Entre el gobierno, los diputados, o la municipalidad quién responde mejor a la hora de ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? O ¿La municipalidad? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) La municipalidad (4) [NO LEER] Ninguno (5) [NO LEER] Todos igual (8) No sabe / no contesta	CRMU3
CRMU4. En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a esta municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más a la municipalidad (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (3) [NO LEER] No cambiar nada (4) [NO LEER] Más a la municipalidad si da mejores servicios (8) NS / NR	CRMU4
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los funcionarios de la municipalidad le hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	NP1B
NP1C. Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro del concejo municipal, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso? (1) Mucho (2) algo (3) poco o (4) nada? (8) NS	NP1C
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	SGL1
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el manejo de los fondos por parte de su municipalidad? (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6

CRMURC1 Hoy en día es frecuente escuchar en distintos medios a personas hablar sobre rendición de cuentas por parte de funcionarios públicos. Para usted, ¿Qué significa rendir cuentas?	CRMURC1
ANOTAR RESPUESTA _____	
98. NS (Pase a JC1)	
CRMURC2 Y, de acuerdo con ese significado que tiene para usted, ¿Diría que su municipalidad rinde cuentas al pueblo, siempre, casi siempre, casi nunca o nunca?	CRMURC2
1. Siempre 2. Casi siempre 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS/NR	
CRMURC3 Y, en comparación con las instituciones del gobierno y la Asamblea Legislativa, ¿Diría que su municipalidad acostumbra rendir cuentas al pueblo más que esas otras instituciones?	CRMURC3
1. Más la municipalidad 2. Más las instituciones del gobierno (NO LEER) 3. Las dos rinden cuentas más o menos igual 8. NS/NR	
4. Ninguna de las dos rinden cuentas	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado.

JC1. Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	
JC1A. En resumen, ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	(1) Si podría haber razón	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8) NS	JC1A	

VIC1. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?	VIC1
(1) Sí [sigua] (2) No [Pasar a CRSE1] (8) NS	
VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? [No lea las alternativas]	VIC2
(1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)	
AOJ1. [Si responde "Sí" a VIC1] ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?	AOJ1
(1) Sí [sigua] (2) No lo denunció [Pasar a AOJ1B] (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	
AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? [marcar una sola alternativa y pase a CRSE1]	AOJ1A
(1) OIJ (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8) NS (9) Inap (no víctima)	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [no leer alternativas]	AOJ1B
(1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	

	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CRSE1 En los últimos años, ¿cuáles de las siguientes medidas de protección se han tomado en su familia? No dejar nunca la casa sola	1	2	8	CRSE1	
CRSE2 Dejar de ir a actividades sociales por temor	1	2	8	CRSE2	
CRSE3 Mejorar la seguridad de la casa, por ejemplo, mediante la compra de alarmas, alambre navaja	1	2	8	CRSE3	
CRSE4 Adquirir, comprada o prestada un arma de fuego	1	2	8	CRSE4	
CRSE5 Pagar servicio de seguridad privada permanente para la casa, cuadra o el barrio (guarda o empresa)?	1	2	8	CRSE5	

De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? (**REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA**)

	MUY SATISFECHO	ALGO SATISFECHO	ALGO INSATISFECHO	MUY INSATISFECHO	NO HIZO TRAMITES	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. El OIJ	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La municipalidad	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?	(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS	AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?	(1) Muy seguro (2) algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	AOJ11	
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?	(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?	(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?	(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	AOJ17	
CRAOJ20 ¿Con qué frecuencia Usted evita pasar por algunas zonas del vecindario por considerarlas peligrosas? ¿Siempre, a veces, rara vez o nunca?	(NO LEER) 0. En el barrio no hay zonas peligrosas (1) Siempre (2) a veces (3) rara vez (4) nunca (8) NS/NR	CRAOJ20	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**



Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Costa Rica garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.		B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Costa Rica?		B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político costarricense?		B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político costarricense?		B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político costarricense?		B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones?		B11	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Asamblea Legislativa?		B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría de los Habitantes?		B17	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?		B18	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República?		B19	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		B32	
CRB1 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el ICE, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad?		CRB1	
CRB2 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social?		CRB2	
CRB3 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el INS, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros?		CRB3	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser costarricense?		B43	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48	

[NO RECOJER TARJETA "A"]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Nada							Mucho	No sabe	
Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Pacheco (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)								Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
N1. Combate la pobreza.								N1	
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.								N3	
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.								N9	

[Recoja tarjeta "A"]

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Muy en desacuerdo							Muy de acuerdo	No sabe	
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?								ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los costarricenses tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?								PN2	

Ahora, siempre usando la tarjeta B, quiero que me dé su opinión sobre las acciones del Presidente cuando el país tiene serias dificultades. Digame, si el país tiene serias dificultades, hasta qué punto estaría Ud. de acuerdo con que el Presidente (LEER) (USE LA TARJETA POR FAVOR)

CRDE01 Ponga orden por la fuerza	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE01
CRDE02 Controle los medios de comunicación	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE02
CRDE03 Pase por encima de ciertas leyes	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE03
CRDE04 Deje de lado a la Asamblea Legislativa	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE04
CRDE05 No tome en cuenta a los partidos políticos	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE05

Siempre con la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está Ud. de acuerdo con que:

CRDE06 Un gobierno no democrático llegaría al poder si pudiera resolver los problemas económicos	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE06
CRDE07 La democracia permite que se solucionen los problemas del país	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE07
CRDE08 Puede haber democracia sin Asamblea Legislativa	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE08
CRDE09 Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			CRDE09
CRCO1 Finalmente, y en relación con otro tema, digame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: No me importaría que un Presidente se aproveche de su puesto con tal de que resuelva los problemas del país				CRCO1

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

[No recoge tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente			No sabe		
D37. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?					Anotar 1-10,88= NS			D37		

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Costa Rica. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [si que tarjeta C].

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88		
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?		D5	

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos:	(1) Muy poca	(2) Suficiente	(3) Demasiada...	
LIB1. Libertad de prensa	(1) Muy poca	(2) Suficiente	(3) Demasiada	(8) NS
LIB2. Libertad de opinión	(1) Muy poca	(2) Suficiente	(3) Demasiada	(8) NS
LIB3. Participación política	(1) Muy poca	(2) Suficiente	(3) Demasiada	(8) NS
LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos	(1) Muy poco	(2) Suficiente	(3) Demasiado	(8) NS

ENTREGUE TARJETA C-1.

En esta tarjeta aparecen tres afirmaciones. Las vamos a leer y luego quiero que Ud. me diga el número de la opción que más se ajusta a su forma de pensar.

(ENTREGAR TARJETA, LEER PAUSADAMENTE LAS OPCIONES, ESPERE LA RESPUESTA DEL ENREVISTADO Y LUEGO MARQUE EL CODIGO DEBIDO, SI DUDA LEER DE NUEVO)

ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor digame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión:	ACR1	
(1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o...		
(2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o....		
(3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.		
(8) NS		

PN4. En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Costa Rica?	PN4	
(1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR		
PN5. En su opinión Costa Rica es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?	PN5	
(1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS		
PN6. Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, Costa Rica se ha vuelto mas democrática, igual de democrática o menos democrática?	PN6	
(1) muy democrática (2) igual de democrática (3) menos democrática (8) NS/NR		

ENTREGUE TARJETA C-2.

En esta tarjeta aparecen tres afirmaciones. Las vamos a leer y luego quiero que Ud. me diga el número de la opción que más se ajusta a su forma de pensar.

(ENTREGAR TARJETA, LEER PAUSADAMENTE LAS OPCIONES, ESPERE LA RESPUESTA DEL ENREVISTADO Y LUEGO MARQUE EL CODIGO DEBIDO, SI DUDA LEER DE NUEVO)

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:	DEM2	
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.		
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.		
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.		
(8) NS/NR		

DEM6. Ahora le voy a leer un par de frases sobre la democracia. Por favor, digame con cual está más de acuerdo: (1) En general, y a pesar de algunos problemas, la democracia es la mejor forma de gobierno (2) Hay otras formas de gobierno que pueden ser tan buenas o mejores que la democracia (8) No sabe	DEM6
CRDE10 Si usted tuviera que escoger entre la democracia y el desarrollo económico, Ud. diría que (LEER OPCIONES) (1) El desarrollo económico es lo más importante (2) La democracia es lo más importante (NO LEER) (3) Ambas son igualmente importantes. (8). NS/NR	CRDE10

ENTREGUE TARJETA D

CRDE11 En esta tarjeta aparecen cuatro afirmaciones. Las vamos a leer y luego quiero que Ud. me diga el número de la opción que más se ajusta a su forma de pensar. (ENTREGAR TARJETA, LEER PAUSADAMENTE LAS OPCIONES, ESPERE LA RESPUESTA DEL ENREVISTADO Y LUEGO MARQUE EL CODIGO DEBIDO, SI DUDA LEER DE NUEVO) 1. La democracia es indispensable para llegar a ser un país desarrollado 2. No es indispensable pero es el mejor medio para llegar a ser un país desarrollado, 3. En realidad, pueden haber mejores medios que la democracia para llegar a ser un país desarrollado 4. Creo que un sistema de gobierno no democrático es indispensable para llegar a ser un país desarrollado	CRDE11
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RECOJA LA TARJETA D

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	AUT1
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PP1. Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? (lea las alternativas) (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	PP1
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? (1) Si trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	PP2
ABS5. ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR	ABS5

M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Pacheco es: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR	M1
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En la vida diaria, pasan muchas cosas. Me gustaría que me diga su opinión en los siguientes casos:	
CRC1 Supongamos que hay muchos atrasos y trámites excesivos en una oficina pública y una persona paga una propina o da un regalo a un funcionario para que salga rápido el asunto que necesita. CRC1A Hablando de la persona que paga la propina. Usted diría que esa persona (LEER OPCIONES)	CRC1A
1. No actúa mal, simplemente resuelve su problema 2. Actúa mal, pero se justifica 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigada	
CRC1B. Y pensando ahora en el funcionario que recibió la propina. Ud diría que el funcionario: 1. No actúa mal, ayuda a resolver un problema 2. Actúa mal, pero no es falta grave 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigado	CRC1B

CRC2 Una persona paga un poco menos impuestos de lo que debía pero es descubierto por un funcionario de Tributación Directa. Para evitar un fuerte castigo, le da una propina. CRC2A Hablando de la persona que paga la propina. Usted diría que esa persona (LEER OPCIONES) 1. No actúa mal, simplemente resuelve su problema 2. Actúa mal, pero se justifica 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigada	CRC2A
CRC2B. Y pensando ahora en el funcionario que recibió la propina. Ud diría que el funcionario (LEER OPCIONES): 1. No actúa mal, evita un castigo excesivo 2. Actúa mal, pero no es falta grave 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigado	CRC2B
CRC3 La empresa que construyó bien y a tiempo una carretera que el país necesitaba urgentemente, infló el costo para pagar a un ministro porque si no, no le daban el contrato CRC3A Hablando de la empresa que pagó al ministro. Usted diría que esa empresa (LEER OPCIONES) 1. No actúa mal, simplemente resuelve un problema nacional 2. Actúa mal, pero se justifica 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigada	CRC3A
CRC3B. Y pensando ahora en el ministro que recibió el dinero. Ud diría que el funcionario (LEER OPCIONES): 1. No actúa mal, ayuda a resolver un problema nacional 2. Actúa mal, pero no es falta grave 3. Actúa mal y debiera ser castigado	CRC3B

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	No	Si	NS	INAP	
EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC1
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC11
EXC13. ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, hizo algún trámite con los juzgados, incluyendo juicios de tránsito? [Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Tuvo que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida o bilombo?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC15
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice "no" marcar 9 si dice "sí" preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC16

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...?	EXC7	
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada(4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR		
Ahora me puede decir...	GI1	
GI1. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George W. Bush]	GI1	
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)		
GI3. ¿Recuerda usted cuantas provincias tiene Costa Rica? [No leer, 7]	GI3	
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)		
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el periodo presidencial en Costa Rica? [No leer, cuatro años]	GI4	
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)		
GI5. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [No leer, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva; acepta "Lula"]	GI5	
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)		

Hablando de otra cosa, el tema de los nicaragüenses en Costa Rica

CRMI01 En su opinión, qué debería hacer el Gobierno con los nicaragüenses que están ilegalmente en el país (LEER)	CRMI01	
1. Deportarlos tan pronto los descubran		
2. Investigarlos y dejar aquí a los que no tienen antecedentes penales		
3. Facilitarles los procedimientos para darles la residencia y puedan quedarse en el país		
8. NS/NR		
CRMI02 En general, los nicaragüenses que vienen a trabajar al país:	CRMI02	
1. Hacen los trabajos que los costarricenses ya no quieren hacer, o		
2. Le quitan el trabajo a los costarricenses.		
8. NS/NR		
CRMI03 Los nicaragüenses que vienen a vivir y a trabajar a Costa Rica, ¿reciben menos beneficios, reciben lo que merecen, o reciben demasiados beneficios?	CRMI03	
1. Reciben menos beneficios,		
2. Reciben lo que merecen,		
3. Reciben demasiados beneficios		
8. NS/NR		
CRMI04 En su opinión, los nicaragüenses que vienen a vivir a Costa Rica, ¿tienen malas costumbres o tienen costumbres diferentes, pero no peor o mejor que los ticos?	CRMI04	
1. Peor		
2. Diferentes, pero no peor		
3. (NO LEER) Algunos peor y otros no.		
8. NS/NR		

Y siempre sobre el mismo tema,

	Si	No	NS/NR	INAP	
CRMI05 En los últimos cinco años ¿tiene o ha tenido de vecino cercano a un nicaragüense?	1	2	8		CRMI05
CRMI06 ¿Tiene o ha tenido de amistad a un nicaragüense residente en Costa Rica?	1	2	8		CRMI06
CRMI07 ¿Tiene o ha tenido como compañero de trabajo a un nicaragüense?	1	2	8	9	CRMI07
CRMI08 ¿Tiene o ha tenido contratada a una empleada doméstica u otro trabajador nicaragüense?	1	2	8		CRMI08
CRMI09 ¿Tiene o ha tenido en su barrio, casa o cuadra guarda de seguridad nicaragüense?	1	2	8		CRMI09

L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA "E": Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de Izquierda a derecha. Hoy en dia mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias politicas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la Izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "Izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1 (NS=88)	
Izquierda										Derecha	

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. ¿Tiene cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales, en febrero de 2002? (1) Si votó [pase a CRVB3] (2) No votó [Siga] (8) NS	VB2	
VB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en esas elecciones? [anotar una sola respuesta Y PASAR A CRVB5] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato/partido (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07) No se encontró en el padrón electoral (10) No tener edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar Otro _____ (88) NS/NR 99. No aplica	VB4	
CRVB3. Siempre hablando de esa primera vuelta ¿por cuál partido votó para Presidente?	CRVB3	
01 Unidad (PUSC) 02. Liberación Nacional (PLN) 03. PAC 04. Otro _____		
05 Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR 99. Inap (No votó)		
CRVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado a la Asamblea Legislativa?	CRVB7	
01. Unidad (PUSC) 02. Liberación Nacional (PLN) 03. PAC 04. Movimiento Libertario 05. Otro _____		
06. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no votó)		
CRVB5. Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las elecciones para elegir alcaldes en diciembre del 2002?	CRVB5	
(1) Si [siga] (2) No [PASE a CRVB1] (9) Aún no tenía edad (Inap) (8) NS/NR		

CRVB6. ¿Por cuál partido votó para Alcalde en esas elecciones?	CRVB6	
1. PONER NOMBRE _____		
2. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR		
99. Inap (No votó)		

CRVB1 ¿Puede decirme si en algunas de estas elecciones de las que hablamos, alguien lo presionó, o Ud. recibió algo a cambio por votar de cierta manera o no votar?	CRVB1	
1. Si 2. No 9. Aún no tenía edad (Inap) 8. NS/NR		

Hoy en día se habla mucho sobre reformas electorales. Me interesa conocer sus opiniones sobre las siguientes reformas. Vamos a usar otra vez la tarjeta "C". [Entregue la tarjeta "C"].

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		No sabe

CREREF1. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que a la hora de votar, las personas puedan escoger diputados entre distintos partidos y no por lista de partidos como ahora ?[Léame el numero]	CREREF1	
CREREF2. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que las asociaciones y otros grupos puedan inscribir candidatos a diputados y no solo los partidos como ahora?	CREREF2	
CREREF3. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que se amplie el número de diputados en la Asamblea Legislativa? ¿Hasta qué punto aprobaría o desaprobaría?	CREREF3	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encestador: llenar:] Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un círculo alrededor del número que corresponde]

Nivel	Años de estudio						ED
	(00)	1	2	3	4	5	
00. Ninguno	(00)						
1. Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
2. Secundaria	1	2	3	4	5+		
3. Educación superior	1	2	3	4	5+		
88. No sabe/no responde	(88)						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Q2	_____
Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?	Q3	
(1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar		

Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado?	Q4	
(1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca		

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? <i>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F]</i>	Q10	
(0) Ningún ingreso (1) Menos de 40 mil colones (2) Entre 40 mil – 79 mil colones (3) Entre 80 mil – 119 mil colones (4) Entre 120 mil – 159 mil colones (5) Entre 160 mil – 199 mil colones (6) Entre 200 mil – 239 mil colones (7) Entre 240 mil – 279 mil colones (8) Entre 280 mil – 319 mil colones (9) Entre 320 mil – 399 mil colones (10) 400 mil colones y más (88) NS		
Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia dineros que envían parientes desde del exterior? (1) Si [siga] (2) No [saltar a Q11] (8) NS/NR	Q10A	
Q10B. ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de esos dineros? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR	Q10B	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <i>[no leer alternativas]</i> (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos vivos tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)	Q12	
CRQ13. ¿Cuántos hijos debería tener una persona como usted en toda la vida? _____	CRQ13	_____
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS	Q14	
Q15. ¿Vivió Ud. en los EEUU en los últimos tres años? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS/NR	Q15	

CRETID. ¿Pertenece usted a la cultura.....?	CRETID	
(1) Indígena (2) Afrocostarricense o negra (3) China (4) Ninguna de las anteriores (8) NS/NR		

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: *[leer todos]*

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera]	(0) No			(1) Si	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional no celular	(0) No			(1) Si	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Si	R4A	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Si	R6	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Si	R7	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Si		R12	
R14. Servicio sanitario dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Si		R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No		(1) Si		R15	

OCUP1. Cuál es su ocupación principal?	OCUP1	
1. Profesional, directivo 2. Oficinista 3. Vendedor, comerciante 4. Campesino 5. Peón agrícola 6. Servicio Doméstico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializado 11. Obrero no especializado 12. Estudiante 13. Ama de casa 14. Pensionado rentista 15. Otro: _____ 88. NS		
OCUP1A En esta ocupación Usted es:	OCUP1A	
1. Asalariado del gobierno o autónoma? 2. Asalariado sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa de menos de 5 empleados? 4. Patrono o socio de empresa de 5 o más empleados? 5. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 6. Trabajador no remunerado 8. NS		
DESOC1. ¿Ha estado desempleado (desocupado) durante el último año?	DESOC1	
(1) Sí (2) No		

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Firma del codificador _____

Comentarios: _____

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta "A"



Tarjeta "B"



Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta C-1.

1. La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios.
2. Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas.
3. Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.

Tarjeta C-2.

1. A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.
2. La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.
3. En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.

Tarjeta "D"

1. La democracia es indispensable para llegar a ser un país desarrollado
2. No es indispensable pero es el mejor medio para llegar a ser un país desarrollado.
3. En realidad, pueden haber mejores medios que la democracia para llegar a ser un país desarrollado
4. Creo que un sistema de gobierno no democrático es indispensable para llegar a ser un país desarrollado

Tarjeta “E”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta “F”

Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 40 mil
- (02) Entre 40 mil – 79 mil
- (03) 80 mil-119 mil
- (04) 120 mil-159 mil
- (05) 160 mil-199 mil
- (06) 200 mil-239 mil
- (07) 240 mil-279 mil
- (08) 280 mil-319 mil
- (09) 320 mil-399 mil
- (10) 400 mil y más.

Appendix E: Road Map

HOJA DE RUTA

AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA

MAPA 11501113

Provincia	1	Segmento	113
Cantón	15	Compacto	1
Distrito	01	Estrato	AMsj

ID	Viv #	Nombre (Mayores de 18 años)	Edad	Cuota				Entrev 1. Realiz 2. Pend 3. Rech	Observaciones		
				Elegible							
				Hombre	Hombre 30 o más	Mujer ama / casa	Mujer estud / trab				
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											
6											
7											
8											
9											
10											
11											
12											
13											
14											
15											
16											
17											
18											
19											
20											
21											

Appendix F: IRB Approval



University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board

Exempt and Expedited Reviews
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

3500 Fifth Avenue
Suite 105
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Phone: 412.383.1480
Fax: 412.383.1146
e-mail: irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu

TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.
FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*
DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

Approval Date: 01/12/2004
Renewal Date: 01/12/2007

CR:ky

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**