THE FUTURE OF JEWISH LIBERALISM
Rabbi
Randall Falk - Sunday, March 28, 2004
Vanderbilt
University - Nashville, Tennessee
It used to be a kind of stock phrase, maybe almost a redundancy: New York Jewish liberal. "Jews are the most liberal group in the country," wrote the sociologist Nathan Glazer over 40 years ago, in a statement with which few even today would have occasion to contest. I mean, if there was anything that defined the American Jewish community in the last century, and especially the first two-thirds of the last century, it was our political and social liberalism. I am almost tempted to say that when I grew into college age in the late 1960's, Jewish liberalism was something like the civil religion of the Jews. The word “tikkun” may not have been part of Jewish street English, but the concept was certainly alive and well. It is just hard to imagine the radical 60's, the SDS, the Yippies, the Chicago Seven, even the Civil Rights movement without Jews or at least a significant Jewish presence.
But the 60's and 70's were then and we are now and this talk is about the future. My mission is to talk about what can be said of this wonderful blend of Jewish ethnicity and liberal politics that created secular American Jewish Civil Religion as we enter deeper into the 21st century? Before proceeding, let me make my standard disclaimer. Prediction about American Judaism is always dangerous, especially as such predictions address the future. I still remember as a high school student going to a TOFTY leadership conference one summer in the early sixties in which the topic was, I kid you not, “The Vanishing American Jew.” We, the young leaders of the next Jewish generation were told in no uncertain terms that we were likely to be leading the last generation of American Jews. It is with this memory of grossly false prediction still seared in my mind that I, with trepidation, wade into the swamp of predicting the future of American Jewish Liberalism. Keeping in mind that if I state my conclusions now many of you will see no need to hear the rest of what I have to say, let me tip my hand slightly and say my prognosis is not good. Jews and Judaism will still be around. We have been dying out for thousands of years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. But Jewish liberalism is, I think, a thing of a particular time and place and we, as a Jewish community, are moving on.
i
Since I am an academic, I feel a compelling urge to start off with definitions of terms and a review of the scholarly literature over the last 200 years. I resist and will spare you. But I do need to lay down some, I think fairly obvious, groundwork. First let me stipulate just for the record that “Liberalism” is not innate in Jews; there is no “Democratic Party” or “Socialist” gene in our blood. If I had to choose been nature and nurture on this issue, I would have to say our liberal tradition is more one of nurture than of nature. In other words, I submit, American Jewish liberalism grew out of a specific constellation of political/social conditions. These conditions were the results of the peculiar; we might even say anomalous, politics of Jewish existence in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. I have in mind here, in particular, the political and social implications of the Enlightenment and Jewish Emancipation. I will come back to these in a few minutes. My thesis is that it was the Jewish response to these movements in early modernity that shaped “Jewish liberalism.” It is interesting that nowadays, when the Enlightenment has played it self out and Jewish legal emancipation is a fact of life, the liberal tradition among Jews has continued to be a defining characteristic of Jews in the West, and esp. of progressive Judaisms like Reform. I mean, here we are in a post-Enlightenment, even post-Modern and even a post-post-Modern world, and yet Jews are still overwhelmingly seen, and see themselves, as Enlightenment liberals. This has, weirdly, persisted for the last two centuries and this certainly says something about the comfortable fit of modern Western Jewry and liberal values. But my larger point is that the continuity of this political tradition can not and should not be taken for granted. It is in fact already fraying around the edges before our very eyes. While it does not look like Jews will abandon liberalism altogether, it certainly will become less defining of Jewish identity. It is not hard for me to imagine our children, or grandchildren, looking back at the “New York Jewish Liberalism” of the twentieth century as a sort of quaint historical phenomenon, like pleated skirts or paisley ties.
Before moving forward, let me take a step back for a moment. I just said that given the choice between nature and nurture for explaining Jewish liberalism I would pick nurture. I then went on to cite the Enlightenment and Emancipation as the sources of this nurture. But I owe it to you to point out that many scholars do not see it quite so simply. There has been a sustained tradition especially in Jewish liberal circles, that Jewish liberalism is nurture alright, but it is nurture not of the Enlightenment and the Emancipation, but of the Jewish religious and halachic tradition itself. That is, according to this view, it is our Talmudic heritage of validating argumentation and our theological openness and universalism – not only Jews “go to heaven” but anybody who obeys general moral norms (say the Noahide Laws) has a portion of the hereafter– that have nurtured Jews to be liberal. According to this argument, the liberalism of Jews expressed in the nineteenth and twentieth century is a not a direct result of Enlightenment thinking and political emancipation. Rather it is an inherent part of our tradition, and only received public expression in the wake of the Emancipation because only then did Jews in Europe have access to public discourse. But this view has not fared well when subjected to closer scrutiny. This is not the time or place to become entangled in the rather technical controversy as to whether the Halachah is really liberal in our modern sense. The question itself is somewhat misplaced, applying a modern political concept – “Liberalism” to a medieval legal tradition. But just to at least make a gesture to dealing with this issue, let me cite to you what I think is a compelling argument in this regard made by two very well-known Jewish sociologists: Steven M. Cohen and Charles Liebman,. These two researches conducted a joint study on precisely our topic, namely, the origins of Jewish liberalism. Their results and conclusions were published in Public Opinion Quarterly. (1) They said in part, and I will read here a substantial excerpt from their work because they say it so well:
“Researchers have advanced several explanations for the liberalism of American Jews. Two of them - universalized compassion and argumentative individualism - posit the impact of values attributed to the Jewish tradition. Other theories focus on historical circumstance, minority group interests, and religious modernism. To examine these five theories, the authors analyze twenty National Opinion Research Center General Social Surveys from 1972 to 1994 (N = 32,380) amalgamated so as to obtain a sufficient number of Jewish respondents (N = 784).
Jews are indeed substantially more liberal than non-Jews in almost all issue areas. However, after socio-demographic and other controls are introduced, substantial gaps between Jews and others remain in just four areas: political self-identification (as Democrats and liberals), church-state separation (school prayer), social codes (largely issues relating to sex), and domestic spending. In contrast, Jews are not particularly liberal with respect to civil liberties, government intervention for the poor and ill, sympathy with African Americans, or opposition to capital punishment. In addition, contrary to the expectations of the argumentative individualism explanation, Jews with intermediate levels of attendance at religious services are not particularly liberal. None of the results supports the two explanations based on traditional Judaic values. The three other explanations help explain Jewish liberalism in those discrete issue areas where Jews are indeed particularly liberal.
In short, according to Cohen and Lieberman, the claim that Jews are liberal because of their religious and legal tradition does not hold up to close scrutiny. What does hold up is the argument that Jewish liberalism is a by-product of social and political circumstance.
I don’t want to belabor the point. But let me refer you to one other study that was just published three years ago. I have in mind Marc Dollinger’s, Quest for Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America (Princeton Univ. Press, 2000). In this study, one of the most comprehensive looks at the Jewish liberal phenomenon published to that point, Dollinger wrote that Jews have ranked as the most liberal white ethnic group in American politics, from the New Deal right up through the civil rights movement. He also notes that this is true even today, when most Jews continue to vote in violation of the supposed political law that links voting patterns to wealth. For Dollinger, what accounts for this persistence of liberal voting patterns in the face of socio-economic factors that militate against such liberalism, is the drive for a more tolerant, pluralistic, and egalitarian nation, not for its own sake so much as to insure Jewish inclusion in the larger non-Jewish society. In short; self-interest, not any innate characteristic of Jews or of Judaism.
Dollinger in fact points to a rather interesting contradiction to illustrate his point. One review on the Princeton University Press site that advertizes his book, summarizes his argument this way:
The politics of acculturation, the process by which Jews championed unpopular social causes to ease their adaptation to American life, established them as the guardians of liberal America. But, according to Dollinger, it also erected barriers to Jewish liberal success. Faced with a conflict between liberal politics and their own acculturation, Jews almost always chose the latter. Few Jewish leaders, for example, condemned the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, and most southern Jews refused to join their northern co-religionists in public civil rights protests. When liberals advocated race-based affirmative action programs and busing to desegregate public schools, most Jews dissented. In chronicling the successes, limits, and failures of Jewish liberalism, Dollinger offers a nuance yet wide-ranging political history, one intended for liberal activists, conservatives curious about the creation of neo-conservatism, and anyone interested in Jewish communal life.
In short, Jews, and Jews in America in particular, are liberal when it serves their ends and can be just as easily conservatives when being conservative serves their ends. The existence of so many Jews among the contemporary so-called “neo-cons” is good evidence of this. So is the electoral success of parties like Likud in Israel. This rise of right-wing nationalism in Israel is a whole other topic. But it does go along with my argument so far that “New York Jewish Liberalism” and being Jewish are not intrinsically linked.
ii
I hope I have convinced you at least to some extent that a good argument can be made that Jews are not liberal by blood nor by virtue of the inherent nature of our tradition, but rather are liberal because of ethnic self-interest and by social conditions, especially in Europe and America, over the course of the last two centuries or so. Let me flesh out this last point a bit. To be overly-brief and so overly simplistic I think it is fair to say that the political emancipation of the Jewish in Europe as this took shape between the middle of the eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century firmly put the Jews in the liberal camp. After all, the emancipation of Jews in Europe and their inclusion as equals in society was pushed by, and served the interests of, a number of non-Jewish constituencies in the early modern period. In particular, liberalism served those sectors of European society interested in changing the established political and social order, especially overturning the established aristocratic and religious elites and opening up power to heretofore excluded social groups. The intellectual foundation for this political movement was the Enlightenment, which argued for rationality and reason over tradition. In rough outline this meant that notion that all men (and it was largely men at first, although the logic eventually extended to women as well) were created equal, that they all had certain inalienable rights, etc. and that what should govern the body politic was not privilege or birth or “divine right” but rather merit and reason. This was of course part of the basic ideology of the American revolution and shortly thereafter of the French revolution. In both these revolutions, and in the evolutions toward these same ends in the other areas of Western and Central Europe, the Jews obviously had a huge stake. It meant freedom to leave the ghetto, the freedom to go to public schools and universities, freedom to enter careers and professions of their choice, freedom to marry whom they wanted (even if the intended was not Jewish!) , freedom from special taxes and restrictions and so on and so forth. Opposed to these changes were of course the traditional power-holders: monarchists, the local aristocracies, the Church, and so on. These later made up the “conservative” forces. Given this deployment of political power, it is hardly surprising that Jews lines up almost completely in the liberal column. To be sure there were Jews who wanted to maintain the old way – they were afraid Jews would give up Torah and the Halachah and become assimilated into the godless secularism of modernity. Even though they were perfectly correct in their prognostications, they were very decidedly a minority voice. Most Jews given the choice of the traditional set up or leaving the ghetto, chose the later; they couldn’t get out of the ghetto fast enough.
As the struggle for Jewish emancipation progressed, it also became more radical. Perhaps the textbook case is late Tsarist Russia, in which the Jews eventually were drawn to socialist and communist movements of various sorts and flavors because these were the only movements that seemed to have a coherent ideology that offered a program not only for overthrowing the Tzar but for reconstructing a truly moral and equal society afterwards. I think it hardly needs further elaboration to understand that the Jews who left Russia for America between 1881 and 1924, when emigration restrictions were imposed, were left-wing socialists and communists and not right-wing Russian nationalists or monarchists.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the “Russian” Jews finding their way to America were more and more deeply imbued in the leftist politics of the embryonic revolution. They left Russia because they had given up hope there, and often because they were fleeing the tsarist police. When they came to America they brought these idealistic socialist ideas with them. If they could not change Russia, they seemed to think, they could at least change America. I hardly need, I think, to go to any length to illustrate the large, even overwhelming role these Jewish radicals played in leftist social actions in this country. This was manifest in everything from the kosher meat boycott of 1902 protesting price increases to early labor organization and unions. It is in fact hard to find an early labor movement or proto-union that was not at least heavily laden with Jewish leaders, if not completely dominated by them. By the way, I guess it is worthwhile to point out that many of the targets of these socialist, liberal labor actions were, just as in Europe, aimed at the established monied and social aristocratic class. The only difference was that over there, the owners and “oppressors” were Russian nationalists while over here they were as likely as not to be German Jews. So even in 1902 it was possible to be Jewish in this country and conservative. So much for innate Jewish liberalism.
iii
What I have done up to now very quickly is try to limn out the rootedness of Jewish liberalism in the social and political conditions of the past. I now want to turn to the present. Where are we now? Since we are all in the now and witnesses to it, I don’t feel I need to spend a whole lot of time describing the situation. You know it as well as I do. But the norms of scholarly discourse dictate that I must say something. Let me cite for you some material from a study just published by Steven Windmueller, entitled, “Are American Jews Becoming Republican?: Insights into Jewish Political Behavior”. (2) The study quantifies what you probably know but would like to suppress (or at least some of you would like to suppress).
The study notes that as of now (that is 2003), and I quote “According to data collected over the past several years, an overwhelming majority of Jews - 73 percent - describe themselves as moderate or liberal; 23 percent label themselves as conservative. By contrast, 42 percent of American Protestants and 34 percent of Catholics identify themselves as conservative.”
Let’s parse these numbers for a moment. The percentage of Jews who say they are conservatives is strikingly small when compared to other religious groups. Here are the numbers again: Protestants, 42%; Catholics 34%; Jews 23%. In other words, proportionally only half as many Jews are conservatives as are Protestants and only two-thirds as compared to Catholics. So yes, we are still a strikingly liberal community. But note the raw number – 23% of Jews are conservatives according to this poll. That is about 1 in 4. Not huge, but hardly insignificant either.
There are a number of indicators today that may impact on future elections. For example, there is some evidence that younger Jews do not hold the same degree of loyalty to the Democratic Party and, as a result, are more likely to register as Independent or Republican. Thus, the Republican Party may have a better chance of picking up the Jewish vote in the towns inhabited by young professionals in northern New Jersey than in the retirement communities of southern Florida. While these numbers do not indicate a definitive generational trend, it does appear that both Orthodox Jews and Jews who are from more secular backgrounds tend to vote Republican more frequently than do other Jewish constituencies, clearly for different ideological, political, and cultural reasons.
Why this shift? A number of reasons can be offered. One line of argumentation for explaining this shift is saying in essence that Jewish voting patterns are finally catching up with the socio-economic status of the Jewish voters. To begin with, to paraphrase the title of Karen Brodkin’s book, Jews have become white folk. We just don’t see signs anymore that say things like “No Hebrew clientele.” Jews are really part of the establishment, in business, in professions, in the arts, in politics, in the academy etc, etc. We no longer are fighting the elite to gain entry; we are in fact part of the elite to which others want to gain entry. To be sure we remember our struggle and still work to help those behind us, but the dynamic is different. We are liberal, to be sure, but not so liberal as to jeopardize our own positions. And of course, one quarter of us are not liberal at all any more.
Let me phrase this argument in a slightly different way. Jews are securely in the middle or even upper-middle class. If I want to know what the latest lines of SUV’s are I don’t have to go on the web or to local car dealers. I need merely to show up at the hook-up line after religious school at “The Temple” in Beachwood, OH. If there is a labor action, Jews are much more likely to be among the attorneys and the management than among the laborers. Again, we do remember the struggle of our ancestors and we do overwhelmingly still work to help those who are now facing that same struggle, but, again, the dynamics are different. Maybe the change is best summed up by Daniel Elazar of Jerusalem Center for Public Policy. He noted at one point in his Assimilation and Authenticity: The Problem of the American Jewish Community, “Socialism as a solution to the "Jewish problem" served only part of the Jewish immigrant population and was a temporary phenomenon on the American Jewish scene, at that, sponsored and supported by immigrant socialists for barely a generation.” (3) In short, the leftist/ socialist movements which animated earlier generations of especially eastern European Jews at the beginning of the last century are just not our experienced social realities nowadays.
A second set of reasons for the shift away from Jewish liberalism has to do with what we might call the death of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment took for granted that human reason could really solve all our problems – political, social, economic, medical, whatever – if just applied long enough and with sufficient rigor. In fact, the systematic application of reason and rationality to the world’s problems was going to produce for us a sort of secular messianic utopia. This magnificent vision was often coupled with the corollary that such stupid and out-dated things as superstitions, religion, nationalism, etc. would wither away. When John William Draper. M.D., LL. D. wrote his History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science in 1875 he had something like this in mind. (4) Science and religion were in conflict, and in the cold light of reason, religion was going to lose, in fact was already on the ropes. But then came World War I with its incredible slaughter, and the harnessing of new technology to increase the slaughter. If nothing else, World War II showed that even Homo Enlightenmentus was capable of quite considerable barbarities. Nonetheless, Jewish enchantment with the Enlightenment continued because it still was the only political game in town that offered us a promise of social equality. But this afterglow of the Enlightenment among the Jewish community fell away in the wake of World War II and the Holocaust. It took, it seems to me, a while for the reality to sink in, but certainly by the 1960's, a sea-change in American Jewish attitudes was beginning to make itself felt. Not only were American Jews no longer fighting for emancipation, but the Enlightenment was shown to be bankrupt. The very heartlands of the Enlightenment, France and Germany, were shown to be deeply, even radically, evil. Jews still were overwhelming liberal in the 1970's, 80's, 90's and so on, but my sense is that the twin engines of Enlightenment and Emancipation had stopped supplying new energy. We were running on inertia, or to use the Hebrew word, minhag.
Part of this change has reflected itself in a return to pre-Enlightenment forms of Judaism. To be sure much of this is post-Enlightenment fantasy and romanticism about the “glories” of pre-Enlightenment Judaism, but the move is real nonetheless. It can be seen in the re-appropriation in Reform Judaism to older, once abandoned practices – like Hebrew in the service and the wearing of Kippot. It can be seen in how many liberal synagogues have classes on of all things Hassidut or Kabbalah. My point here is not to advocate or condemn these moves, but to point them out as a sociological fact that represents, in my view, a moving away from the Enlightenment and to a kind of retro-future.
I do have to add a third influence that is leading to a shift away from liberalism and that is the tension, split, cleavage and then chasm between the left and Israel. There were already some rumblings to this effect in the late 60's and early 70's ,as I recall, but Israel was still, after all, a socialist country and its conflict with the Arabs was very pale on most activists radar screen, especially with Viet Nam, the military-industrial complex and pollution demanding attention. But, I think I hardly need to mention, this has profoundly changed. For much of the mainstream left right now, Israel, and by extension “the Jews” are often davka the enemy, in fact, often the quintessential enemy. Israel not only abandoned the socialist cause, but is a textbook example of nationalism, colonialism, capitalistic oppression of workers, etc. and so forth. This view is hardly monolithic and is often more nuanced than it sounds, but for many Jews, the left just is not that comfortable anymore. It is shot through with anti-Israelism, anti-Zionism and even anti-Semitism. It is in fact as often as not, quite threatening. It is leftists, after all, who are now equating Zionism with Nazism. So contemporary Jews are not merely being pulled away from liberalism by their socio-economic status, but are actually being in some sense pushed away.
This brings to mind the remark of Midge Dector that a "neo-conservative" is a liberal who is mugged by reality. Jonathan Tobin in “Politically Conservative and Jewish: Not an Oxymoron After All” cites this remark and then goes on to note, “ Along with friends like author Irving Kristol, Decter and Podhoretz were once not merely liberals, but leftists. But in the 1960s, they realized that the political left had abandoned American democratic values as well as Israel. With the passion of converts, the neo-cons assailed the sacred cows of the left and generally gave a lot better than they got in the wars of the intellectuals. The witty and combative Decter now says that she has dropped the ‘neo’ from her ideological label as she sees herself as no different from other conservatives. Indeed, her primary interest nowadays is the danger to American values that leftist multiculturalism poses.” (5)
As a final factor in this move towards greater conservatism in our community, maybe I should just add a nod to the influx of Russian Jews into our communities over the last two decades. Here are people who are true socialists, denizens of he great workers’ paradise. As many of you know, most of them could not get away from it fast enough. They may not all be Reagan republicans, but they certainly are not singing the praises of leftist socialist ideologies either.
So, to sum all this up: Between the “whiting” of the American Jewish community, the communities increasingly upper middle class status, the loss of faith in the Enlightenment, the radical anti-Zionism/anti-Semitism being articulated on the left, the return to more traditional religious values, and the disillusionment with socialist ideologies brought over by the recent Russian immigrants, the basis for American Jewish liberalism, is, again in my opinion, facing serious erosion. One set of statistics to make my point. In the article my Steven Mindmueller cited above, he makes the following bullet points, one of which I have already partially cited:
$ An overwhelming majority of American Jews - 73 percent - describe themselves as moderate or liberal; 23 percent label themselves as conservative. Only 19 percent voted for Bush in the 2000 elections, but there are indications that Jewish support for the Republican Party is on the rise.
$ The growing Orthodox communities in the New York metropolitan area and elsewhere are distinctively Republican. In addition, Jews raised in households with a non-Jewish parent and who identify nominally with Judaism also tend to vote Republican.
$ Among Jewish voters polled during the 2002 New York governor's race, 47 percent indicated they would consider supporting George W. Bush. A Luntz Research Poll in April 2003 showed that 48 percent of Jews surveyed said they would consider voting for Bush in 2004.
To sum up: “New York Jewish Liberalism”, is still alive,
but not necessarily well. While it is
far from being an oxymoron, it is also not all that obviously redundant either. American Jewish liberalism, as I said
earlier, is fraying around the edges.
This conclusion is explicitly made and investigated in a new book by
Michael E. Staub, published Columbia University Press
in 2002. It title is cleverly entitled, Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish
Liberalism in Postwar America.
iv
Having addressed the past and the present, let me end with a few remarks about the future. Where does all this leave us as we stumble into the future? Most significantly, I think that in the long run we will continue to see a slow but steady drift of the American Jewish electorate in the direction of its socio-economic mainstream that is to more conservative attitudes. That does not mean that most Jews will necessarily become die-hard core Republicans, although some certainly will, and already have become so. But Jews will be in the future tending to vote more and more on the basis of economic and social interests not necessarily only on “liberal” grounds. This process will be helped along by a number of trends both in the short term and in the long term, it seems to me. In the what I hope is short term, the continuing struggle in Israel will continue to polarize the left and the right, and Jews will find themselves less and less comfortable with the left’s attacks on Israel. In a sense we may begin to find ourselves in the inverse position of our ancestors over the last few centuries. They found they had to align with the left in order to secure their existence against the anti-Semitism of the right. We are finding, at least for right now, that we are having to align with the right to secure our existence, and the legitimacy of the State of Israel, against the anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism of the left. Whether this is a long-term reality or just an epiphenomenon of the current stage of the Israeli-Palestinian problem is hard to know. But in all events for right now, the security of the Jewish community and of Israel seem to be more compatible with the right than with the left.
There is also a demographic dimension here. If you have looked at the results of the recent Nation Jewish Population Study, you know that the Jewish community is becoming more and more assimilated into the American community at large. The number of “pure” Jewish families according to the traditional definition is in definite decline, while the number of people in Jewish households, that is in which one partner or the other is Jewish, has grown dramatically. But this melding of populations also means the dilution of a distinctly Jewish voting pattern. The Jewish voting pattern is becoming more and more like the general American voting pattern because the Jewish population is becoming more and more like the general population socially, economically, genetically, and so politically.
There is maybe a larger historical frame we can construct to see all of this. The era of the great “New York Jewish Liberalism” was the result of a kind of social “perfect storm” – it grew out of certain needs of a certain population in a certain place at a certain time. As our Jewish population Americanizes and faces different ethnic, social and religious needs, as it becomes more intermarried and so less distinct, as it spreads out across America, the special confluence that created the New York Jewish liberal will dissipate as well. Whether this is good or bad is of course another question entirely. But what is certain is that American Judaism is a living work-in-progress, and as such is changing.
I opened my talk by saying, “It is just hard to imagine the radical 60's, the SDS, the Yippies, the Chicago Seven, even the Civil Rights movement, and so forth without Jews.” I think to understand where we are going we have to consider not the SDS but the GOP, not the yippies but the yuppies, not the Chicago seven but the G-7, and not Civil Rights, but the supposed “war of civilizations”. I know I oversimplify here; but the question is how much are these later factors starting to overwhelm the former? My sense is that the movement is substantial and sustainable. The period of New York Jewish liberalism appears to me to be dying a slow but inevitable death. But, of course, only the future can tell.
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ENDNOTES
1. Public Opinion Quarterly 61(3) , January 1997, pp. 405-430.
2. Jerusalem Viewpoints No. 509: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 December 2003.
3. The citation can be found at www.jcpa.org/dje/books/cp2-ch1.htm.
4. Published by D. Appleton, New York, 1875.
5. Jewish World Review April 30, 1999 /14 Iyar 5759; available at www.newsandopinion.com/cols/tobin043099.asp#top.