A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness
for Single-Peaked Preferences
Working Paper No. 11-W01
John A. Weymark
ABSTRACT [article]
This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On
strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980),
31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social
choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of
single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line.
Two results are established that show that the median of 2n+1 numbers
can be expressed using a combination of minimization and maximization
operations applied to subsets of these numbers when either these
subsets or the numbers themselves are restricted in a particular
way. These results are used to show how Moulin's characterizations
of generalized median social choice functions can be obtained as
corollaries of his characterization of min-max social choice
functions.
Keywords and Phrases: generalized median social choice functions, Moulin
min-max rules, single-peaked
preferences, strategy-proofness
JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D82