On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory
Working Paper No. 05-W18R
John A. Weymark
ABSTRACT [article]
Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle"
says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible
set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be
justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate
counterfactual choice situations. Kolm's principle does not identify the
relevant counterfactuals. In this article, it is argued that the appropriate
counterfactuals to justify an impartial social choice are all of the choice
situations that a moral agent behind a veil of ignorance might think is the
actual choice situation outside the veil.
Keywords and Phrases: Arrovian social choice, counterfactual
choice, veil of ignorance, impartial observer, universal prescriptivism
JEL Classification Numbers: B40, D71