Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation:
How Country Numbers Matter
Working Paper No. 08-W02
Francis Bloch and Ben Zissimos
ABSTRACT [article]
This paper presents a North-South model of international
trade in which (i) there is a relatively small number of countries in the
North and (ii) the North is relatively abundant in capital while the South
is relatively abundant in labor. Using new methods in monotone comparative
statics, the effect of changes in country numbers on the outcome of a
"tariff war" is studied. It is shown that terms-of-trade and welfare in
the North are greater the larger the number of countries in the South and
vice versa. The paper also studies the relationship between the number of
countries in the world market and its performance in terms of efficiency.
It is shown that, as the world economy is replicated, the equilibrium in a
tariff war converges monotonically towards the competitive equilibrium of
free trade.
Keywords and Phrases: Comparative statics, efficiency, North-South, tariff war,
terms of trade
JEL Classification Numbers: E2, E6, H2, O4