Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves
Working Paper No. 02-W04
Quan Wen
ABSTRACT [article]
This paper studies a class of dynamic games, called repeated games with asynchronous moves, where not all players may revise their
actions in every period. With state-dependent backwards induction,
we introduce the concept of effective minimax in repeated games
with asynchronous moves. A player's effective minimax value
crucially depends on the asynchronous move structure in the
repeated game, but not on the player's minimax or effective minimax
value in the stage game. Any player's equilibrium payoffs are
bounded below by his effective minimax value. We establish a folk
theorem: when players are sufficiently patient, any feasible payoff
vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax
value can be approximated by a perfect equilibrium in the repeated
game with asynchronous moves. This folk theorem integrates
Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) folk theorem for standard repeated
games, Lagunoff and Matsui's (1997) anti-folk theorem for repeated
pure coordination game with asynchronous moves, and Wen's (2002)
folk theorem for repeated sequential games.
Keywords and Phrases: Folk Theorem, repeated games, asynchronous moves,
effective minimax
JEL Classification Number: C72, C73