Dr. Ian Christopher Levy

 

Lexington Theological Seminary

631 South Limestone Street

Lexington, KY 40508

ilevy@lextheo.edu

 

            MEDIEVAL COMMENTING ON ROMANS FOUR: OLD AND NEW LAW

 

            Medieval biblical commentators were very keen on distinguishing the three ages of law under which the human race has lived: Natural, Written, and that of Grace. Of special interest, most notably beginning in the twelfth century, is the relationship between the sacraments God had assigned to the Jewish people and those to Christians. The fourth chapter of Romans provides commentators an opportunity to examine questions of law and sacraments, for it is here that Paul recounts Abraham's justification by faith prior to the reception of circumcision. Many interesting discussions emerge on what it means to believe God; the distinction between iniquities and sins; that where there is no law there is no trespass; and the difference between a sign and seal. There are also the larger questions of circumcision's relationship to baptism and their relative functions with respect to the blotting out of sin and the reception of grace. As mentioned, the twelfth-century commentators prove perhaps the most interesting, for it is at this time that sacramental theology is really taking shape as a matter of doctrine and law, from Hugh of St. Victor's Sacraments of the Christian Faith (1137) to Gratian's Decretum (1142), and Peter Lombard's Sentences (1155). This paper will focus on twelfth-century commentaries in this context, thereby including such commentators as Peter Abelard, William of St. Thierry, Peter Lombard, and the Glossa Ordinaria of the Laon school. We will also have a look at some of the earliest commentators on Romans, like Origen and Ambrosiaster, with an eye on the impact of St Augustine. Finally, some space is allotted to Thomas Aquinas's thirteenth-century commentary and Summa so as to provide some perspective on where the questions were leading in the high middle ages.

 

                                               

 

 

PART ONE: THE COMMENTATORS

 

                                                            Romans 4:3-5

                        "Quid enim scriptura dicit, 'credit Abraham Deo et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam.' Ei autem qui operatur merces non imputatur secundum gratiam sed secundum debitum. Ei vero qui non operatur credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium reputatur fides eius ad iusitiam."

            Romans 4:3-5, in which Paul recounts Abraham's willingness to trust, or believe, God stirred comments on just what it means to believe (credere). In Romans 4:3 Paul, quoting Genesis, states that Abraham believed God (credidit Deo) and it was reckoned to him as righteousness. And then in Romans 4:5 Paul says that faith is reckoned as righteousness to the one who believes in him (credenti autem in eum) who justifies the impious. This may be considered pertinent to our topic inasmuch as these verses will spawn discussions about the various levels of belief in relation to Natural Law, Written Law, and Grace.

Here (as elsewhere) we begin with one of the earliest and most influential Latin commentators, active between 366-384, known to us now as Ambrosiaster. While generally believed throughout the middle ages to have been St Ambrose, Erasmus concluded in the sixteenth century that this was not Bishop of Milan, but some otherwise unknown entity, thus christened 'Ambrosiaster.'[1] For Ambrosiaster the aforementioned distinctions of belief are not yet in place. Abraham did not have glory before God because he was circumcised or had abstained from iniquity, but because he believed. Ambrosiaster places the emphasis squarely on human free will here. To believe or not to believe is a matter of will. No one can be compelled to believe what is not manifest, he says, but only invited to believe. The justification of the impious refers to the gentiles who believe in Christ apart from the works of the law; by faith alone they are righteous before God.[2]

Augustine's comments on Romans were quite brief, the product of his early career.[3] His own remarks on Romans 4:3-5 conclude that God grants grace to sinners so that through faith they might live justly, which is to say that they might work well. That people can work well is itself the result of having received grace and so must be attributed to God. Augustine makes no mention here of different sorts of belief.[4] And yet observations scattered in other works proved to have a significant affect on medieval commenting on Romans Chapter Four. In fact, it was Augustine's commentary on the Gospel of John that set the tone for many later comments on Romans 4:3-5. When commenting on John 7:17, Augustine established what became a classic distinction regarding the different forms of belief. Here he argues that resolving to do the will of God refers to believing: "This is the work of God, that you might believe in him (credatis in eum) whom he sent (Jn 6:29)." It is one thing to believe God (credere ei), says Augustine, and another to believe in God (credere in eum). Even the demons believe God, but they do not believe in him. Simply to believe God amounts to believing that what he says is true, while to believe in God means that by believing one loves him (amare), cherishes him (diligere) and enters into him so as to be incorporated into his mystical body. And because Augustine says that this is what Paul means by belief in Romans 4:5, so the definition finds its way into later commentaries on that Epistle. Moreover, Augustine states that this is the faith which God requires of us, and only finds among us because he has first given it. It is the same faith which Paul is speaking of in Galatians 5:6, namely a faith which works through love.[5] It should be noted that a sermon on the Creed attributed to Augustine lays out a three-fold definition which will also be incorporated in later Romans commentaries, whereby credere illi means to believe what God says is true; credere illum is to believe that God exists; and credere in illum is to love God.[6] The Venerable Bede (673-735) will follow this three-fold distinction in his commentary on the Epistle of James.[7]

Despite its later influence, two Carolingian commentators ignore this distinction. The commentaries of Rabanus Maurus (780-856) are largely compilations of patristic sources. When commenting on Romans 4:3-5 he does not really concern himself with the nature of belief itself. He is content to follow Ambrosiaster and Augustine, and simply states that Abraham was justified because he believed.[8] Haimo of Auxerre (active 840-860) was more original and his work was widely read even into the twelfth century. Yet he was not concerned with this distinction either.[9] Abraham's belief refers to his obedience to God's commands, seeing as he left his homeland and believed God's promise about Isaac and then Christ. Abraham's justification, which Haimo equates with the remission of sins, occurred through the faith by which he believed. God justifies the impious not by works but by faith; before the foundation of the world [Eph 1:4] he decreed to save the human race apart from preceding merits.[10] By the tenth century Atto of Vercelli (d. 961) does follow Augustine's lead in his own Romans commentary. Because Paul does not want to give the impression that faith is reckoned as righteousness for everyone indiscriminately, he is clear about the sort of belief that leads to justification. Romans 4:5 is the key, for this promise applies only to those who believe in the one who justifies the impious (credenti in eum). Hence Atto points out that to believe God (credere Deo) means to adapt one's faith to his promises, while to believe in God (credere in Deum) is to invest all one's hope in him.[11] Bruno the Carthusian (1032-1101) the schoolman from Rheims,[12] finds that Paul 'proves' one cannot be justified through the law, but only through faith. Yet Bruno omits any talk of the two forms of belief. He simply states that Abraham deserved to be justified through the faith by which he believed God. At various times and places God promised this to him and he never doubted, but always believed. Having spoken to Abraham, God now applies this standard to all. Thus Romans 4:5 would seem to mean that if someone puts away the works of the law, and believes in the one who justifies the impious, then his faith will be reckoned as righteousness and he will be justified by faith alone apart from all merit. Bruno also offers an alternative reading, however, that will find later support. Perhaps Paul means that while justification does come by faith alone apart from the law, nevertheless the person who has time to work will not be rewarded simply by grace alone. Indeed he should be rewarded for the works he does henceforth since through their merit they serve to assist grace. Yet for those with no such time, like children who die soon after birth, then faith alone will suffice.[13]

To move to the twelfth century is to reckon with the Glossa Ordinaria, a product of the Laon school, which proved to have a lasting influence on medieval biblical commenting. Augustine's commentary on Romans and Galatians were employed by the Gloss, as well Jerome's work on Galatians, Ephesians, Titus and Philemon. But the source most relied upon for the Glossa Ordinaria's Pauline Epistles was Ambrosiaster, who had written the first complete commentary on the Epistles. Of the Carolingian authors, the Gloss makes ample use of Haimo of Auxerre.[14] The Gloss comments on Romans 4:3 and Romans 4:5 separately, and never remarks specifically on the disparity between the fact that Abraham credidit Deo, which is a lesser form of belief, and that God justifies the impious one who credit in eum. Presumably, Abraham embraces both forms, as he believes what God says is true and also enters into God through love. The marginal gloss on Romans 4:3 is reminiscent of Bruno. Belief itself was a sufficient cause of Abraham's justification and so too for others. But those who have time to work will not receive their reward by grace alone, but also as a debt due their work. And for people with no time faith alone will suffice for justification and thus for salvation in keeping with the grace established for all people generally as well as with what God had established for people living before the Law.[15] The comments in the marginal gloss on Roman 4:5 follow the three-fold distinction of belief, noting that Paul did not say credit ei, which simply means to believe that what the speaker is saying is true, something the wicked do as well. Nor did he use a phrase credit illum, for that is just to believe that God exists, which the demons also believe. But rather, following Augustine, credit in eum, thereby loving God and entering into him.[16] The Gloss sets the tone for the rest of the twelfth-century commentators.[17]

Peter Abelard (writing on Romans 1135-1139) also runs through the three types of belief, appealing directly to Augustine's commentary on John.[18] But he also expands upon the content and results of belief. Abraham believed the divine promises no matter how great and incredible, whether this involved leaving his homeland to multiply in another, or trusting in the promise of a son. In keeping with Augustine, Abelard speaks of this as the true faith which works through love. By believing, Abraham freely followed the commands of God. And this is the obedience of faith which makes a person righteous before God, not circumcision or the other corporeal observances which the written law would later command.[19]

For the Cistercian William of St. Thierry (writing on Romans 1138-1145), who also follows the three-fold distinction, to believe in God is itself the work of grace, though noting that Christ works in us and not apart from us. Abraham, he says, exhibited the perfect form of belief, offering himself in complete obedience to God such that his faith was reckoned as righteousness. Abraham credidit Deo when believing the promise about his seed, and credidit in Deum when he obediently went off into an unknown land or offered up his son.[20]

Peter Lombard first commented on the Epistles around 1140 and then revised his work in the later 1150s.[21] Here he also cites the three types of belief found in the Gloss Ordinaria. Following Augustine, the first sort is the faith God requires of us, the faith that justifies the impious. Works are only good when done for the sake of God. And so, faith must come first; for if they do not begin from that basis the work cannot have been done well. He also follows Augustine's own comments on Romans 4:4, that through grace God grants sinners the faith by which they might be justified, so that through faith the just might live, which means to work well.[22]

The monastic commentator, Herveus of Bourg-Dieu (1080-1150) elaborates on the basic principles found in the Glossa Ordinaria. On Romans 4:3 he notes that Abraham believed God who promised that his future seed would be manifold; and because he firmly believed it was reckoned as righteousness. In other words, says Herveus, through his trust Abraham was not only freed from original and actual sin, but was reckoned righteous by God. And if works had not preceded his faith they nevertheless would follow.[23] This leads Herveus into an attempt to reconcile Paul's words with James 2:14-26, which we will not pursue here. On Romans 4:5 he argues, in keeping with his reconciliation of Paul and James, that the person who is justified by faith must not thereafter grow lazy when it comes to doing good works. When a person does good works, after having been justified by the faith he freely received, he does not receive eternal recompense by grace, namely by faith alone, but in keeping what is owed his works. Hence when Paul says that it is not to the one who works he is referring to the who, following baptism, has no time to work or cannot do so owing to some infirmity. In other words, no can merit the initial gift of grace by way of works, for by definition, says Herveus, it is freely given. And in that sense faith is sufficient.[24] Then follows the standard three-fold distinction of belief as he notes that the impious man who does not believe rightly may indeed give to the poor, desire no one else's wife, and commit no fraud; but this is of no avail, since he does none of these things with the proper intention. Such works are not good, precisely because they do not proceed from a good root. Only the person one who is justified by faith performs works of piety and justice.[25]

Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) observes that the righteousness which God reckons to Abraham is not that of exterior works, but the interior faith of the heart which God alone sees. In this vein, he speaks of the act of faith (actus fidei) in keeping with the classic three-fold distinction of belief. Thus he points out that to believe in God refers to a faith that is properly ordered to its end, which it achieves through charity, since believing in God means to enter in to him and this is what charity accomplishes.[26] These distinct forms of belief would become a mainstay of medieval theology as the schoolmen came to distinguish between formed and unformed faith, namely between simple belief in the truths of the faith and a faith that is perfected by charity. An unformed faith can coincide with mortal sin, whereas a formed faith cannot. Similarly, the theologians made a distinction between credulitas and fiducia, the former being a merely intellectual assent and the latter a confidence in God to save.

 

                                                Romans 4:7-8

"Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum tecta sunt peccata. Beatus vir cui non imputabit Dominus peccatum."

Here Paul is quoting from Psalm 31:1-2 (Vulgate). It is worth repeating the passage in order to highlight the key terms which will elicit much commentary. "Happy are those whose iniquities (iniquitates) are forgiven (remissae), and whose sins (peccata) are covered (tecta); blessed is the man against whom the Lord will not impute (imputabit) sin."

Origen (185-254) sees here an internal ordering of the soul. The conversion of the soul begins with its abandonment of evil with the result that it merits the forgiveness of iniquities. It then begins to do the good, thereby covering its previous sins with good works. When it will finally reach perfection, so as to cut off every root of evil such that no trace can be found, then it will find blessedness when the Lord can impute no sin.[27]

Ambrosiaster argues that to forgive, to cover, and not to impute, all amount to same thing. Yet by speaking in this way Paul is displaying the richness of God's mercy, for when God covers he forgives, and when he forgives he does not impute. And given the variety of sins, Paul speaks of three grades. The first is iniquity or impiety when one fails to acknowledge God; the second refers to a grave sin in works; and the third to a light sin in works. Yet all three are obliterated in baptism.[28] Ambrosiaster specifically rejects the notion that this passage could refer to penitence, inasmuch as it speaks of the happy person (beatus), though penitents labor for the forgiveness of sins with much distress. Nor could it apply to martyrs, seeing as they acquire glory through suffering. Rather, says Ambrosiaster, the prophet foresees the happy age that will arrive with the coming of Christ, and announces to the blessed a time when, without toil and works, their sins will be forgiven through baptism, meaning that they will be covered and not imputed. Yet now, the Apostle, in the fullness of time, filled with more grace than the prophets, speaks of baptism where there is not only remission of sins, but also justification.[29]

Pelagius's Romans commentary came down to the medieval commentators in an interpolated version attributed to Jerome.[30] According to pseudo-Jerome/Pelagius, what is repented of is not retained, and what is covered does not appear, and thus is never imputed. He then distinguishes between the three words. Some say sins are forgiven through baptism, covered by works of penance, and not imputed through martyrdom. Others say that, having forgiven sins through baptism, one must increase in charity towards God which will then cover a multitude of sins, so that henceforth they are not imputed, while by daily good works past evils are overcome.[31] He does not himself opt for one reading or the other.

Gregory the Great (540-604), commenting on Psalm 31, seems to have influenced future Romans commentators when he made the case that the iniquities forgiven are the 'original iniquities' cleansed through baptism; while the sins covered are those 'actual sins' which occur after baptism. Like Origen, he also says that sins are covered when one superimposes good works upon the evil.[32]

Haimo likely has Gregory's comments in mind when he says that "Happy are those whose iniquities are forgiven," refers to all sins (peccata) forgiven in baptism, while "those whose sins are covered," refers to those forgiven through penance after baptism. He may also be following Gregory and/or Origen when he notes that a thing is covered when it is not seen, and in that sense we hide our sins when superimposing the good works of righteousness upon evil deeds by way of a worthy penance. Haimo points out that some authors say that iniquity (iniquitas) refers to what comes before the law, while sin (peccatum) refers to what comes after; or that iniquity belongs to thoughts and sin to deeds. And then, likely appealing to Origen's comments on Romans 4:15 (see below), he notes that some others say that iniquity is committed against the law and sin against nature and conscience. But Haimo seems reluctant to follow this strict divide and observes that one term is very often substituted for the other.[33]

Atto observes that the Psalmist is speaking of three things here: to forgive iniquities, cover sins, and not impute sin. He notes that some say iniquities are forgiven through penitence and not imputed in martyrdom. But one must remember, says Atto, that the text does not say, 'in whom sins are not found,' but rather: 'whose sins are covered.' Thus he chooses to follow Gregory's position that sins can be covered not only through confession, but by superimposing good works, such that God will not notice them, which is to say that he will not punish them. This is what the Psalmist meant when he said: "Turn away your face from my sins (Ps 50:11)." And we should believe that all this occurs in baptism, for there can be no greater happiness than to labor free from penitence and attain the remission of all one's sins.[34]

For Bruno, the whole Psalm cited by Paul is meant to commend the grace of God, thus proving that no one can be justified except through grace. Here the Rheims master will draw a distinction between concupiscence, actual sin, and original sin. In fact, the question of original sin and its consequences received increased attention by the late eleventh century and would become a mainstay among the commentators. Indeed, one might argue that the scholastic doctrine of original sin was developed within the tradition of biblical commenting. Bruno argues that the iniquities which are forgiven refer to the tinder of sin (fomes peccati), namely the inborn concupiscence, or inclination to actual sin. This is forgiven and debilitated so that it cannot pass into action, provided that the baptized use their strengthened free will. But just because concupiscence is forgiven this does not suffice for salvation unless the past sins are also forgiven. Bruno thus offers his own annotated reading such that Paul speaks of those "whose [actual] sins are covered" in baptism, which means that the Lord does not see them to punish. And finally: "Happy is the one to whom the Lord will not impute [original] sin."[35]

In the Glossa Ordinaria the marginal gloss states that iniquities refer to original sin (peccatum originale), explicitly equated here with the fomes peccati, which can be called concupiscence, the law of the members, or the weakness of nature. Here we also get a more thorough treatment of the effects of baptism in relation to original sin. Prior to baptism there exists both guilt (culpa) and punishment (poena), while afterwards there is only punishment. The Gloss informs the reader that it is called original sin because it is contracted from the corrupt condition of our origin, and because we are conceived under the corrupt law of concupiscence derived from the sin of the first man.[36] The Gloss will follow Ambrosiaster, though without attribution, in delineating the three grades: the iniquitous failure to acknowledge the creator, sins in works, and the lighter sins which are not imputed.[37]

Abelard finds that Paul is speaking generally here about both Jews and gentiles. He too will distinguish between the various terms employed. Iniquity is forgiven when its punishment (poena) is pardoned through grace, which could otherwise have been exacted according to justice. And this grace, says Abelard, is the foundation upon which the salvific edifice is built. Sins are forgiven through the tears of penitence when the sinner is reconciled to God and liberated from the pains of gehenna. Thereupon the sins are covered when satisfaction follows penance in this lifetime, though this satisfaction may also be said to extinguish the purgatorial pains of the age to come. Abelard ponders the change in number from Beati quorum to Beatus vir. The Blessed Man is none other than the man who is united to God in the one person of Jesus Christ. He is the Blessed Man of Psalm 1:1 who does not stray into the counsel of the wicked, having never contracted any debilitation from the corruption of sin. Thus he is the one to whom the Lord imputes no sin, for he was neither conceived in sin nor did he commit any sin. The blessedness achieved can refer to the three classes of the saved: children saved in baptism and saints through martyrdom; penitents who correct their sins through condign satisfaction; and lastly the Savior alone. When Paul speaks of those whose iniquities are forgiven he is referring to children who, according to the Psalmist (Ps 50:7) are conceived in iniquity and yet are saved from incurring the damnation of original sin. As for the others, they have covered their past sins by the satisfaction of good works.[38]

Unlike the scholastic twelfth-century commentators, William the Cistercian monk, is not interested in the question of original sin here, and instead emphasizes that these verses speak to grace apart from all merit; the remission of sins is freely given. Like Origen, he observes the order by which iniquities are first forgiven and then sins covered. In conversion there is the relinquishing of evil which merits the remission of past evils; and thereupon the individual evils are covered over by more and more good deeds. William will also follow Origen in noting that iniquity is anomia in Greek, thus referring to what is against the law, while sin is committed against nature.[39]

The other monastic commentator, Herveus, also avoids the whole question of original sin. He too is content to follow Origen in saying that iniquity refers to working against or outside the law, and so in Greek is called anomia. Sin, on the other hand, refers to working against what nature teaches and lapsing from what conscience dictates. In this way iniquity pertains to the Jews and sin to the gentiles. Herveus admits, however, that in one sense iniquity could also apply to the gentiles since they were without the law, and thus anomia. He concludes that in baptism iniquities are forgiven, meaning blotted out, and sins are covered, since they are no longer looked upon with respect to punishment.[40]

For Lombard, like the Gloss, the iniquities refer to original sin, understood as concupiscence. Adults will continue to be moved by concupiscence even when they are regenerate, but it will not reckoned as sin (peccatum). Nevertheless, following Augustine, their offspring are born fettered by original sin.[41] Lombard too notes that it is called original sin because it is contracted from the corrupt condition of our origin. Because we are descended from Adam through the propagation of the flesh we are bound by sin.[42]

Aquinas breaks sin down into three categories: original sin, actual mortal sin and actual venial sin. The iniquity refers to original sin because it is the lack of original righteousness. It was through this equanimity that human reason was subjected to God, the inferior powers of man subjected to his reason, and his body to the soul. This equanimity is lost through original sin with the result that reason is no longer subject to God, the lower powers rebel against reason, and the body is led from obedience to the soul into corruption and death. Original sin is said to be forgiven, says Aquinas, in the sense that by grace it will not be punished, even though it does remain throughout this life in the form of concupiscence. Actual mortal sins are covered from the divine gaze such that God does not see them to punish. And while venial sins are light they still manage to keep people apart from God.[43]

 

                                                            Romans 4:11

            "Et signum accepit circumcisionis signaculum iustitae fidei quae est in praeputio."

This verse also bears repeating: "He received the sign (signum) of circumcision as a seal (signaculum) of the righteousness of faith which he had while still uncircumcised." Origen drew what would become a popular distinction between the sign and the seal. The sign refers to an instance when one things appears and another is indicated, an example being Christ's words about Jonah in Matthew 12:39, as well as what Simeon said of Christ in Luke 2:34.[44] Carnal circumcision, therefore, was a sign of spiritual circumcision. Something is called a seal, however, when a protective guard is set in place in order to preserve a thing for a period of time, and may not be unsealed except the person who impressed it. Thus the seal signified the righteousness of faith which Abraham deserved to receive even when as yet uncircumcised, as well as the promise that he would be the father of many nations. And this could only be unsealed after the fullness of gentiles has come in and all Israel is saved (Rom 11:25-26).[45]

Ambrosiaster does not refer to Origen's distinction, but he does note that the power of circumcision has no dignity in itself, thus functioning only as a sign. Believers are called to accept the sign so that they might imitate the faith of Abraham.[46] Nor does Pseudo-Jerome refer to Origen's distinction. He simply remarks that circumcision is not superfluous, seeing as it is a sign of righteousness, though it cannot increase it.[47]

We noted that Augustine never produced a really extensive exposition of Romans, and what he did produce was not indicative of his more mature thought. Hence his influence on later Romans commentators could be felt through separate works. In fact, Augustine set the tone for much medieval commentary regarding the purpose and effectiveness of circumcision when arguing for the reality of original sin in his debate with the Pelagian bishop, Julian of Eclanum. In his oft-quoted On Marriage and Desire, Augustine asks how one accounts for the institution of circumcision on the eighth day, the neglect of which is so severely punished (Gen 17:14), if there really were no original sin. Circumcision was instituted among the people of God as the seal (signaculum) of the righteousness of faith (Rom 4:11), thereby signifying the cleansing from sin and functioning as baptism does today. Abraham is proof that there was justification by faith prior to circumcision. And very important for later discussions, Augustine makes it clear that the ancients were justified by the same faith in Christ. Thus the eighth day is a symbol (sacramentum) of the eternal eighth day, or age, when the ancient righteous will be saved in Christ.[48] Augustine's equation of the stone knife used in circumcision with Christ the rock who cuts away sins, posed in a sermon on Philippians 3:3-16 (nos enim sumus circumcisio), would be taken up by Bede and then by many future Romans commentators.[49] Also of lasting influence was Augustine's argument in the City of God that it would indeed seem unjust for an infant to be condemned simply for having broken the covenant of circumcision (seeing as he had no control over this) were it not for the fact that he was already guilty of having broken the original covenant by having sinned in Adam.[50] Hence one finds that the Glossa Ordinaria's comments on Genesis 17:4 are indebted to Augustine when answering the question why a child should perish when his parents neglect to circumcise him. The answer being that the covenant is not based upon works, but upon the its origin in the first man which children have rendered void, since all sinned in Adam. Indeed, all are born sinners and so all perish if not liberated through regeneration.[51] This comment, albeit not on Romans but on Genesis, marks what will be the consensus among twelfth-century theologians and lawyers.

Other Church Fathers proved influential on this subject as well, even as their remarks are not drawn from Romans commentaries. Gregory established that what the water of baptism does for Christians so among the ancient gentiles faith alone accomplished for children, and power of sacrifice for adults. For the race of Abraham this was accomplished through mystery of circumcision.[52] In this vein, Bede would betray the influence of Augustine, offering what became a classic means of distinguishing the relative effectiveness of circumcision and baptism. In a homily written for the celebration of Christ's circumcision (Lk 2:21) he argued that circumcision was the cure for the wound of original sin during the time of the Law, just as baptism is in the age of grace. And yet because circumcision could not open the gates of heaven prior to Christ's passion, the faithful Israelites would have to wait in peaceful expectation for their entrance into glory. Moreover, he ties the strict stipulations of the covenant in Genesis 17:14 to Christ's words to Nicodemus in John 3:5 on the necessity of being born again through water and the Spirit.[53] Thus each age had its initiatory sacrament which proved a sine qua non for salvation.

As for the medieval commentators, Haimo (like Ambrosiaster) will accept that circumcision is a sign of righteousness, but not a means of increase. It is meant to signify the righteousness of Christ which comes by faith. He also recites Origen's position on the sign and the seal. And following Augustine, he notes that it takes place on the eighth day, thereby signifying the Lord's resurrection. It had to remain as a type and figure until it was truly completed with the coming of Christ, at which point the seal of carnal circumcision under which it lay covered could be wholly abolished.[54] Atto also recounts Origen's distinction, noting that all the gentiles who follow in the footsteps of Abraham's faith will becomes his sons, having been circumcised in the heart rather than the flesh.[55] Bruno does not cite Origen's position explicitly and just notes that the seal, like the wax into which a seal is imprinted, contains within it what does not outwardly appear. Thus the circumcision of the flesh was a sign of interior righteousness, which few Jews would heed. The seal of the righteousness of faith is that righteousness which comes through faith.[56]

The Glossa Ordinaria also follows Origen, likely via Haimo, on the distinction between sign and seal. Like Augustine, the eighth day signifies the end of the age when all the oldness of guilt and punishment will be taken away. The Gloss offers five reasons for the institution of circumcision: for the sake of obedience; as a sign of Abraham's great faith; to differentiate the Israelites from other nations; to demonstrate charity of mind and bodily modesty; and because there could be no better way to signify that Christ removes original sin. That it occurs on the eighth day by means of a stone knife signifies that eighth age when the elect will rise and all their bodily and spiritual corruption will be cut away by Christ the rock (1 Cor 10:4). Moreover, this sacrament has a two-fold reality (res), namely the circumcision from present sins and the removal of all corruption in the future. Like Bede, the Gloss notes that circumcision was the remedy for original sin in its own time as baptism is now. And following Gregory, baptism avails for Christians as sacrifices and faith did for the gentiles, and circumcision for the Jews. As for the change of sacraments, the Gloss contends that this occurred because baptism is more perfect, more common, more full of grace, and open to women as well. Indeed, baptism not only forgives sins as circumcision does, but also augments virtues by conferring cooperating grace.[57]

For Abelard, circumcision is a sign of one thing and a seal of another. It is a sign of the carnal sons of Abraham and a seal of the spiritual sons, since he is both father of Jews according to the flesh and gentiles through faith. Abelard too recites Origen's theory, though he is explicitly reliant upon Haimo's commentary for it. He notes that a signaculum is like a sigillum which is impressed upon a thing that it might be hidden, and so refers to the invisible spiritual sons of Abraham who were yet to come. The sign of circumcision is a sign of the carnal Israel by means of which that people may be distinguished from the rest, while the seal of the righteousness of faith is the sacrament of the spiritual circumcision which only the faithful gentiles possess. But Abelard also finds another difference between the sign and the seal. The former is a large sign in the flesh comprising all the good and bad alike, while the seal is small and thus a sign of the righteousness of Abraham, since his heirs through righteousness are few in number. The one is exterior and refers to many and the other symbolizes the righteousness of just a few.[58]

Abelard has a good bit to say about circumcision. He follows Augustine and Gregory in saying that circumcision was for the ancients what baptism is for Christians.[59] He accepts Bede's position that circumcision forgiven the sins of the ancients, even as the gate of heaven remained closed. Likewise, those who had been baptized with Christ's baptism could not yet enter heaven prior to his passion. The circumcision of the flesh is a sign of the interior circumcision of the soul, just as the washing of the exterior baptism is a sign of the inner washing of the soul through the remission of sins. He also notes the fittingness of choosing this bodily member, since it is the means of transmitting sin to one's offspring. Following the first transgression the woman was not afflicted with a penalty like circumcision, for she would experience enough pain in her genitals, through which sin is likewise transmitted. Hence the pain of childbirth (Gen 3:16) would serve as the remedy for her original sin, just as circumcision did for men. It is also possible that male circumcision specifically signifies the blessed man (Christ) who alone was conceived without concupiscence, taking up a pure flesh wholly free from the foreskin of uncleanness. Abelard adopts the traditional position that circumcision takes place on the eighth day, thereby signifying the splendidness and beatitude of that day promised to the saints, to those alone who have lived innocently like children (Matt 18:3). It also signifies the day of resurrection when flesh will be resumed without the added corruption of sin, as that will be the true circumcision in the spoliation of the old man, now free from all carnal concupiscence.[60]

Abelard then proceeds to tackle the question as to whether infants who die before the eighth day would be damned inasmuch as they have not yet received the commanded circumcision (Gen 17:4), nor have had sacrifices offered on their behalf prior to the maternal purification on the fortieth day. This was clearly a topic of much discussion at the time. For his part, Abelard admits that it seems cruel to damn such children, seeing as they are prohibited from being circumcised until that eighth day. After all, the rite is obligatory and yet when they were in fact ready to receive it they had to wait until the appointed time. Nevertheless, Abelard points out that the Savior cannot institute anything which would stand in the way of salvation, nor enervate a remedy which would benefit so many people. Here he draws a parallel with the Christian sacrament of baptism, which underscores his rejection of the so-called baptism by desire. Some people will have to go without baptism when there is no water, since it was by water alone that the Lord instituted the sacrament. And in this case they cannot be saved unless martyrdom intervenes. Thus we enter the realm of the divine mystery: God alone knows why he elects and why he reprobates and would not allow the elect to die without the requisite sacrament. Based upon the authority of Scripture, which we hold to be unshakeable, says Abelard, we are not bold enough to assert that anyone of Abraham's seed was saved without circumcision once it had been instituted, unless perhaps they were killed on behalf of the Lord, as with the Holy Innocents (Matt 2:16-18). This would only apply to the seed of Abraham, however, since some of the faithful gentiles who lived after the institution of circumcision, though before the coming of Christ, died uncircumcised and yet were saved. By the rites of sacrifice which Job offered up for his sons their actual and original sin was expiated (Job 1:5), and so too for Abel and Noah (Rom 2:14). He looks to Isidore of Seville who had pointed out that the Jews were not alone in awaiting the coming of Christ. There were many holy people among the gentiles possessed of the gift of prophecy to whom Christ was revealed through the Holy Spirit.[61]

To better grasp Abelard's position a word should be said about his rather controversial view on the effects of the Fall dealt with in the context of Romans 5:12-19. For Abelard, sin strictly speaking means guilt (culpa); while more broadly it can mean punishment (poena). Thus, when reading the Latin of Romans 5:12 which speaks of Adam "in whom all people sinned (in quo omnes peccaverunt)," Abelard takes it to mean that all incurred the punishment for sin (poenam peccati incurrerunt).[62] Infants, he says, bear the punishment (poena) though not the guilt (culpa). And yet, since they are conceived in the sin (peccatum) of carnal concupiscence, which their parents incurred from the first transgression, they are need of the absolution of baptism. They are under the obligation of another's sin, just as they are under the faith of their godparents' intercessory confession. The one born under the obligation of sin is not yet able to make satisfaction for himself, but is cleansed by the sacrament of divine grace. One should not be surprised that what is forgiven the parents is still demanded of the children, however, since the vicious generation of carnal concupiscence transmits sin (peccatum) and thus deserves wrath. Hence Ephesians 2:3 refers to the wrath from which the First Parents were freed by their own satisfaction. Abelard offers the example of the poor man who may subjugate himself and his children to a lord, and then later acquire freedom for himself by some price or virtuous deed, while not acquiring the same freedom for his children. In this vein, the sanctified parents can bear sinful children just as the grain cleansed of chaff brings still forth tainted wheat.[63]

William follows Augustine in holding that all the righteous ancients were justified by the very same faith in Christ. While Christians believe in what was past, the faithful Hebrews believed in what was to come, revealed as it was to them by the Holy Spirit so that they might be saved. He notes that the circumcision of Abraham, like Christian baptism, was suited for its time, a seal of faith signifying the circumcision of the heart or the cleansing of one's conscience. Yet as the circumcised beget the uncircumcised and the baptized the unbaptized, so both sorts of parents transmit original sin (vitium originis). As such, were anyone to be saved he would require circumcision then just as one now needs baptism. William also recites Origen's position on the sign and the seal.[64]

Lombard notes that circumcision was merely a sign which demonstrated that Abraham already was righteous; it could not actually bring righteousness about. Circumcision had no great dignity unto itself, but was an exterior sign of inner circumcision, possessing a likeness to the thing signified. Just as the lust of the flesh is removed through circumcision, so the soul is stripped of all the defilement stemming from the first birth. Circumcision was thus received as a sign of justification by faith. He follows Origen on the seal hiding a mystery from enemies and preserved for friends, in this case the faithful. Circumcision was first proposed to Abraham so that it might be commanded under the law, and God tested him to see whether he would abide by it or not. Just as Adam received the commandment that he would not eat of the tree and thus prove his obedience, so circumcision was given to Abraham and his seed.[65] Lombard gives five reasons for the bestowal of circumcision, similar to those in the Glossa Ordinaria. First, so that by obedience Abraham might please God. Second, as a sign of Abraham's great faith, for he believed that he was going to have a son in whom all the gentiles would be blessed by faith, and through which spiritual circumcision might be fulfilled. Third, so that the Hebrew people might be distinguished from the rest of the nations. Fourth, that circumcision be applied to the male member through which mortal creatures are generated, and in which the libido usually dominates, thereby indicating that impudence must also be cut off. And fifth, because nothing could better signify that original sin is abolished by Christ. Every man is born with foreskin and with original sin; just as the circumcised one cuts off the foreskin of his origin, so the baptized one casts off the guilt of his origin and is thus liberated.[66]

Like Augustine, the Lombard notes that circumcision was instituted as a remedy against original sin which we contract from our parents, conceived as we are in concupiscence which dominates the generative member. And because in that member the first man knew the guilt of disobedience, so it was fitting that this member accept obedience. Following the standard line, it is to be done on the eighth day with a stone knife, because after the seventh day of this life all the elect will rise up into the eighth day when the corruption of spirit and flesh will be cut off by Christ the rock and we will be liberated from the servitude of corruption (1 Cor 10:4). And it is through Christ's resurrection which occurs on the eighth day that the souls of all the believers will be circumcised from their sins. Lombard follows the Glossa Ordinaria in saying that the sacrament/mystery (sacramentum) of circumcision signifies two realties (res), namely the circumcision from sin in the present age and the circumcision from all corruption in the age to come. He follows Bede (via the Gloss) on circumcision's ability to forgive sin without opening up the gates of heaven. And he takes after Gregory (via the Gloss) that what the water of baptism accomplishes for Christians, faith alone did for the ancients and their children. He must also address a question taken up as well by the Gloss: if circumcision brought about the remission of sins, just as baptism does, then what was the point of instituting this new sacrament? His answer follows the Gloss almost verbatim. Like the Gloss he says that baptism was more perfect, more common, and more full of grace. But where the Gloss continues to speak of what baptism can do, Lombard phrases the distinction in terms of circumcision could not do. It could only forgive sins; it did not confer the grace necessary for good works, nor did it even bestow, let alone increase, virtues.[67] Noteworthy is that Lombard refers to circumcision as a sacramentum here in his Romans commentary, while in his Sentences he will argue that it cannot be a sacrament in the strict sense of the word, since it could not confer grace. Perhaps he is using the word sacramentum more broadly here in the sense of 'mystery.' At all events, he does make it clear that the rite of circumcision was inferior to baptism because it could only forgive sins and not confer grace. This point will be repeated in his Sentences and later contested by Thomas Aquinas (as we shall see).

Aquinas incorporates Origen's reading without mentioning him. But he does not draw the distinction between the signum and the signaculum so clearly as Origen and the other medieval commentators. He notes that circumcision is called a signaculum for two reasons. In the first place it is like an expressed signum which has a likeness to the thing signified (Ezek 28:12). Thus circumcision had such a likeness to the faith of Abraham, first with respect to the thing believed; for as he believed in the multiplication of his seed, so it is fitting that he would receive the sign in the member of generation. Second, it pertains to the effect of this faith, which is the removal of guilt signified by the removal of the superfluous foreskin. But it is also called a signaculum because it is a signum of something now hidden which will be revealed later to friends. Closed up under the seal of circumcision was the secret of Christ's incarnation from the seed of Abraham.[68]

Like the rest of the ceremonial law, circumcision was instituted for two reasons, says Aquinas. And here we see the sort of precise classifications typical of thirteenth-century scholasticism, though the contents are not really new. First of all, it was instituted for the sake of divine worship to which ceremonies of this sort dispose people. There is then a sub-class of three reasons for circumcision, the first of which being that it signifies the faith and obedience by which Abraham subjected himself to God, such that those who accepted that circumcision would observe that same faith and obedience. That is why it was done in his generative member so as to signify the faith he had in his future offspring. Second, it expresses in a bodily sign what must be done spiritually. For just as from the member of generation, which principally serves concupiscence, the superfluous foreskin is cut off, so the superfluous concupiscence is removed from the human heart. Third, it was through this sign that the people who worshipped God would be distinguished from all the rest. The second main reason for circumcision, and all the other ceremonial rites, is that it functions in comparison to Christ as a figure is compared to truth, and a shadow to the body (Col 2:17). And so it is that bodily circumcision signifies the spiritual circumcision that must take place through Christ. Secondly, it signifies the resurrected body of the elect from whom passibility and mortality will be removed. Following Augustine, that it took place on the eighth day signifies the eighth age of the resurrection, for in the seventh age they rest in Christ. And finally, the stone knife signified that the spiritual circumcision occurs through Christ the rock (1 Cor 10:4).[69]

            Aquinas approvingly cites Bede via the Glossa Ordinaria that circumcision provided the assistance against the wound of original sin in the time of the law, just as baptism does now in the age of grace.[70] But he notes that some (Peter Lombard) say grace was not conferred in circumcision. For the grace of God cannot abide without righteousness, and if righteousness were through the law then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21). Aquinas admits that this line of thinking does present a problem, for if justifying grace came by way of circumcision then Christ died in vain. On the other hand, Aquinas is sure that there is never remission of sins without grace (Rom 5:1). If that is the case then there must be some way by which grace was conferred via circumcision. He then cites those who say that the grace given in circumcision pertained to the privative effects, namely the removal of guilt, not to the positive effects such as the operation of righteousness. Aquinas rejects this solution, however, on the grounds that in the order of nature the positive effects of any form precede the privative effects. As light does not dispel darkness except through that which it illuminates, so then grace expels guilt by justifying. Thus it is better to say that circumcision as a work performed in itself (ex ipso opere operato) did not possess an effective power either for the removal of guilt or for the operation of righteousness; it was only a sign of righteousness. Rather, it was through the faith of Christ, of which circumcision is a sign, that original sin was taken away and the help of grace conferred to bring about righteous conduct. And that is why circumcision had to be abolished, since it was but a sign of what was to come. The same sign cannot apply to the present, the past, and the future. Baptism, therefore, is a sign of present grace which has a more abundant effect of grace, because the nearer and more present the agent is, the more effectively it operates.[71] In other words, the ancient Hebrews who accepted circumcision as a sign of the coming grace of Christ were indeed justified by grace, though not through the rite of circumcision itself, but rather through their faith in what that rite signified.

 

                                                            Romans 4:15

            "Lex enim iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex nec praevaricatio."

We have seen that Origen's comments on Romans 4:15 were employed by commentators on Romans 4:7-8. For he noted that iniquity (iniquitas) is that which is committed against the law, and so in Greek it is called anomios, meaning 'without the law.' Sin (peccatum), however, is committed against what nature teaches and conscience refutes.[72] Ambrosiaster does not refer to Origen here, nor does he make any distinction between Jew and gentile as later commentators would. He is more concerned with contrasting law and faith. The law was given so that it might render delinquents guilty. But faith is a gift of God's mercy, so that having been made guilty through the law, they would find pardon. Hence faith brings about joy. Paul is not speaking against the law here, says Ambrosiaster, but rather places faith before it, since those who could not be saved by the law are saved by the grace of God through faith. Punishment is generated through the wrath of the law and wrath is born of sin. Thus Paul wants to leave the law behind and flee to faith which forgives sins in order to save. As for Augustine, in his Romans commentary he simply states that this pertains to the punishment meted out to whomever is under the law, but does not elaborate on the status of gentiles.[73]

For Haimo this verse can be taken in two ways. It can mean that where there is no natural law there is no transgression of this law. Or it could be that where there is no Mosaic law, then even if someone sins (peccet) there is still no transgression (praevaricatio); nor is it imputed to him who does not have this law. Hence where precepts of the law exist there is an occasion for transgression, and where there is transgression then greater the wrath of God. And yet it can also mean that where there is no Evangelical Law, as among the pagans, there is no transgression, although they were still not immune from the wrath of God, since they could know the creator through the created order (Rom 1:20). Along these lines, Haimo accepts the idea that there was no transgression among the gentiles who lived without the law of Moses.[74]

The Glossa Ordinaria follows Ambrosiaster in saying that the law works wrath in rendering delinquents guilty, yet notes that this is not because it is the efficient cause of wrath, but rather because it cannot provide the assistance of grace. The Gloss also follows Origen in saying that there can only be transgression where there is law. Paul does not say there is no iniquity, since every iniquitous person does indeed fail to keep the law. And while it is true that those people who did not receive the law can be called iniquitous, they cannot be called transgressors.[75] Abelard too says this refers to those who did not receive the legal precepts, and specifically notes that praevaricatio means transgressio. These people incur no guilt, seeing as they do not voluntarily obey such precepts.[76] William reckons transgression to be a double sin. Without the law there is simply sin (peccatum). But within the confines of the law there is sin as well as transgression of the commandment, and so wrath falls upon the transgressor. As such, there can be no inheritance from the law seeing as it only brings wrath.[77] Lombard follows the common line that those who did not receive the law can be called iniquitous, but not transgressors.[78] Herveus also finds that those without the law can be called iniquitous, not transgressors. Both groups are judged according to their merits, but the wrath of God is greater among the transgressors who knew the law and sinned anyway.[79]

Aquinas points out that some might think that the wrath which the law works applies to observation of the ceremonial law during the time of grace (Gal 5:1-6). But, he says, it may also apply to the moral law; not that precepts of the moral law command anything that would bring down the wrath of God upon those who worthily observe it, but because it does not furnish the grace to fulfill what it commands (2 Cor 3:6). For it is the Spirit which helps our inner weakness. What Paul means is that, although someone who has not received the law could sin (peccare) by doing something contrary to what is naturally just, he is a not a transgressor unless he specifically transgresses the law. Yet every sinner can be called a transgressor if he transgresses the natural law. And because it is more serious to transgress the natural and written law than the law of nature alone, so when the law was given without assisting grace it increased transgression, thereby prompting greater wrath.[80]

 

                                                Romans 4:18

"Qui contra spem in spem credidit ut fieret pater multarum gentium secundum quod dictum est