SBL November 2004,
Romans through History and Cultures Seminar
Levinas, the Jewish Philosopher meets Paul, the
Jewish Apostle:
Reading Romans ‘in the Face of the Other’
I. Introduction
Before I
start this daring project a few issues need to be clarified:
To begin
with (section II) I will summarize general aspects of LevinasÂ’s thinking which
to me seem most relevant for the purpose of our ‘reading of Romans in the face
of the other’, and will then analyse
briefly how these resonate with aspects of the history of interpretation of the
letter.
In the
second part (section III) I will take up the role of interpretation or
‘scriptural reasoning’ in Levinas’s work, particularly in his Talmud readings,
proposing the thesis that with fresh inspiration from Levinas, Romans could be
read as an example of Pauline scriptural reasoning.
In the
third part (section IV) I will focus on the emphasis on the priority of ethics which
Levinas advocates throughout his entire work. I will advocate the thesis that
similar  to Levinas and in accordance
with Jewish tradition and in distinction from many Pauline scholars, Paul throughout Romans
prioritizes ethics, the relationship with the other, over against doctrine. The
argument of Romans throughout chapters 1-15, not only in chapters 12-15, is
inherently driven by ethical concerns, that is, concerns for the other in
his/her abiding difference.
Particular
attention will be paid to LevinasÂ’s focus on the other as the call to
unconditional responsibility, and also on the perceived as the locus of the
in-breaking of transcendence; this will be compared with PaulÂ’s emphasis on
Christ as the focus of the relationship of  believers to the God of Israel as there are
aspects, similar and yet distinct, resonating in the emphasis of both.
II Levinas, the Jewish philosopher and Paul the
first ‘Christian’ Theologian – in Confrontation or Conversation ?
Â
 Levinas’s thinking cannot be described easily.
It resists and is intended to resist any systematization that is not developed
in a systematic form following traditional (philosophical) ways of reasoning.
It is a thinking which could be described as unfolding in ever new ways
variations of basic issues. This is by no means incidental, as we shall elaborate
later in this paper, but it is rather consistent with what LevinasÂ’s
philosophizing is all about. Philosophical thinking is not free from pre-philosophical
presuppositions and Levinas did not perceive his philosophical approach as a means
in and for itself but as related to life and experience prior to and beyond
philosophical reflection. Any philosophical approach presupposes
pre-philosophical experience. LevinasÂ’s own approach is rooted in Jewish life
and thought. He himself is aware that it was in Jewish thinking that he had
found ethics to be the primary experience. [4]
 Levinas is both personally and
philosophically deeply influenced by his living through the Shoah.
2.1.
Levinas and Universalizing Ontology
One of his
main concerns is the distortion violence imposes on humans and by which their
identity is destroyed. He is concerned about totalitarian tendencies which he
regards as inherent in the Western philosophical tradition and its emphasis on
universalism.[5] Â In approaches which are trying to grasp the
totality of being in systems of cognition Levinas uncovers and thus exposes the
notion of assimilating the other to the already known, that is to become the
same. This process thus leads to annihilating the other into the same. In the
Western philosophical tradition the process of knowing is essentially perceived
as being attached to ‘being’ – to that which it is acquiring knowledge about.
Inherent to the concept of ‘Being’ there is the form of knowledge to apprehend
it. Knowing then is the coalescence of my thinking/reasoning with the form of
being – or as Hegel has formulated ‘Erkenntnis ist die Uebereinstimmung des
Geistes mit sich selbst’ – ‘the process of knowing is the movement of being
itselfÂ’.[6]
Knowing is thus a process of identification. The ‘I’ ends up identifying that
which is different/the other with myself or with something already known. Thus
whatever exists in the world even though not yet known by me, could become part
of my knowledge of the world, could be integrated by me, it could become my
possession.[7] Â Knowing is a self-centred process, an
‘egologie’. Levinas describes this process not merely in negative terms. To
live life in this world is to live from something. To live means to be in need
of something – breathing and nourishment. To live means to depend on that which
we are not. Distinct from others Levinas perceives this dependency not as an
enslavement or as lacking something. He sees it as the source of enjoyment. He
states
The life that is life from something is happiness. Life is
affectivity and
sentiment; to live is to enjoy life.
To despair of life makes sense only
because originally life is
happiness. Suffering is a failing of happiness;
it is not correct to say that
happiness is an absence of suffering.
Happiness is made up not of an
absence of needs, whose tyranny and
imposed character one denounces, but
of the satisfaction of all needs.[8]
Nevertheless
this ‘living from something’, this integrating of aspects of ‘the world’ into
‘my world’ is not yet life itself.
This egocentric
enjoyment, whereas crucial to life as one particular aspect,is the source of
dehumanizing violence when it is applied to other humans, that is, when it is
universalized and made into the general principle of knowing. To recognize and
respect the other and his needs on the basis of the analogy that he/she is the
same as I am, is based on the assumption of knowledge. Knowing the other on the
presupposition that he/she is similar to me means, according to Levinas, to
grasp he/her, reducing him/her to the same. To integrate the other into my life
means to assimilate him/her to myself, into my world. This, according to
Levinas is a form of violence against the other not in teaching violence but in
trying to ‘know’/understand the world in assimilating it to the same, to the
already known, to myself. Â To know
something means to grasp it totally, that is to assimilate it to the already
known. The alterity of the other is assimilated into the same, the identical. For
Levinas the process of knowing as a process of identification is enclosing the
other into the totality of the same, and as such the source of violence.[9]Â He states
           Western philosophy has most often
been an ontology: a reduction of the other
to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures
the
comprehension of being. This primacy of the same was SocratesÂ’ teaching:
to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity
I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside – to receive nothing,
or to be free. Â…Â…Cognition is the deployment of this identity: it is freedomÂ….The
neutralization of the other who becomes a theme, an object – appearing, that
is, taking its place in the light – is precisely his reduction to the same…….To
know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing,
removing from it its alterity.[10]
This
implies that the other is not seen or encountered as the other in his/her
alterity but reduced and assimilated to the same. Reducing the other to
sameness is a means of adapting difference and particularity to concepts of
universal meaning. Universalism is achieved by suppressing diversity. Ontology,
according to Levinas is thus perceived as a philosophy of power and injustice.[11]
2.2 Levinas
and the other
Over
against the totalizing tendency of universalizing ontology Levinas formulates
his famous emphasis of the radical alterity of the other – an alterity which he
perceives as so radical that he uses the term ‘metaphysics’ for it.  Nothing links me to the other, he/she is the
stranger who interrupts my life, “disturbs my being at home with myself”[12].
But the face of the other is nevertheless the radical call to responsibility. The
relation to the other cannot consist in grasping or knowing. To know the other
is to enter into a relationship, to encounter the other is prior and beyond any
knowing. To relate to the other always already means to be called, to be called
into responsibility for the other, for the otherÂ’s life. Thus ethics is prior
to anything else. Ethics is the first philosophy. [13]This
responsibility has nothing to do with assimilating the other to myself, but to
enter a relationship to absolute alterity, the other transcends myself in this
encounter. He/she is always more than I can expect, can encompass. Richard A.
Cohen notes that
For Levinas the breakthrough of the other into the self is so
fundamentally and so essentially out of order that it is “otherwise than being
or beyond essence.” The other is always more than the self bargains for, more
than the self wants, more than what the self can handle. [14]
The other
is delimiting my limitations. She/he encounters myself in a way which exceeds ‘the idea of the other in me’[15] . Any images or
analogies that are already formed in me are destroyed at the moment of
immediate encounter. The face of the other overflows any image – it expresses itself. [16]
The other is breaking into the totality of a world I can encompass via
knowledge, it renders totality in fact impossible as in its alterity it refers
to the idea of infinity. ‘..the existent breaks through all the envelopings and
generalities of Being to spread out in its ‘form’ the totality of its
‘content’, finally abolishing the distinction between form and content.’ [17]
To encounter the other implies to receive something from outside, from beyond
myself. This disturbs and uproots myself in any totality of knowledge or
experience. I have nothing that comes merely from within and of myself.
In rendering
the idea of totality impossible the emphasis of the radical alterity of the
other also questions the notion of universalism. Radical alterity implies
particularity. To meet the other face to face can only mean to meet him in
her/his particularity. There is no general ‘other’ in this terrestrial
existence, there is in fact nothing ‘general’ or ‘universal’ existing in this
sensible world. I can meet the other only as a particular human being at a
specific moment in time in a particular place. Thus history cannot be ‘…the
privileged plane where Being disengaged from the particularism of points of
viewÂ…..is manifested.Â’[18]
To integrate everyone into universal concepts (e.g. a universal spirit
unfolding itself in the course of human history) actually means to ignore the
alterity of the other, that is the other him/herself. Integration into a
general universal humanity is, according to Levinas, an act of cruelty and
injustice. [19]
2.3.
Levinas and Communicating with the other
The
relation with the other, the encounter face to face is not only a disruption of
my being at home with myself, it is a call and as such it is already discourse.[20]
The face of the other calls me. I am chosen to respond, into responsibility. I
am inescapably responsible for the other. Not because he/she is of the same
genus as I am but because he/she is precisely different. As such ‘the face of
the neighbour signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding my
consent, every pact, every contract.Â’[21]
As the face
of the other calls me and I am called to respond, a discourse is established.
In as much
as the other is not assimilated to me in relating to me, language establishes and transcends the difference
between me and the other. Language does not presuppose sameness or generality
but rather presupposes difference, it presupposes interlocutors which are and
remain different, it presupposes the separation of terms, that is, language
presupposes plurality. A discourse is interaction between others constituting
community rather than presupposing it. It is the experience of something
unknown or as Levinas formulates traumatism
of astonishment. It is the means via which I can respond to the call of the
other, by which I can give to the other. In speaking I and the other are
creating a common world.[22]
This
‘perception’ of humans and human society derives not exclusively but primarily
from the Jewish traditions Levinas sees himself rooted in.[23]
For Levinas, as Cohen has expressed it ‘ …..each human being, regardless of
differences…….is “created” in “the image and likeness of God.” Humanity would be
constituted not by the embrace of a unitary idea or hidden substructure, but
across encounter – face-to-face. Though it may be incomprehensible, the trace
of transcendence passes here through the very heart of humanity.Â’[24]
As Jewish traditions first of all are scriptural traditions the necessity of
interpretation is a given. Interpretation is not to be equated with
explanation. Explanation is an objectifying approach to life, appropriate in a
scientific perception, whereas understanding aims at self-understanding , a
focus which humanities and religion share. Far from advocating a literalist or
fundamentalist reading of the Scriptures Levinas does not reject rational
critical approaches in interpretation but heÂ
emphasizes that these cannot be exhaustive. [25]
(Levinas even sees a similar naïveté in both fundamentalist and literalist as
well as in critical readings of the Scriptures[26])
Distinguishing between pure criticism and exegesis, Levinas perceives Jewish
spirituality as exegetical. There is no Judaism without Scriptures and vice
versa. But it is never Scriptures pure that is encountered but always Scriptures
interpreted. Reading Scriptures is a continual process of interpretation and
reinterpretation of multiple readers and readings, a process of negotiation and
renegotiating meaning in life.[27]Â
2.4 Levinas
and Universalization in Pauline Interpretation
These
emphases of LevinasÂ’s philosophizing stand in stark contrast to an image of
Paul which views him as the first Christian theologian who freed Christianity
from the narrow bonds of Judaism and its reliance on good works to enable it to
attain its true self-understanding as the religion of the pure spirit and grace,
as F.C.Baur depicted it. This image though criticized in the last three decades
from various perspectives which may be summarized under the heading of the ‘New
PerspectiveÂ’[28] is still having
significant impact in Pauline interpretation and has experienced a revival in recent scholarship which is
reacting against approaches in the vein of the New Perspective.[29]
Scholars such as Westerholm and Barclay emphasize that the emphasis on ethics,
on the doing of the will of God in Judaism actually stands in irreconcilable
contrast to PaulÂ’s emphasis on salvation by grace which can only accessed to by
faith in Christ irrespective of works of the law. Jewish identity is thus an
obstacle to being in Christ and has to be given up. In Christ the
particularities of specific identities are overcome and thus should be
obliterated. Christ then is the model to be imitated,[30]
a model which is perceived as something absolutely new which has no relation to
anything terrestrial, being exclusively determined by the revelation of God. To
be one in Christ implies to be the same in Christ. Moreover, faith  is perceived as something that has to be
believed in – a system of doctrine one has to believe in in order to be saved.
Ethics is an outcome of this affirmation
or knowing and accepting of doctrines of faith. Romans in perspectiveÂ’s such as
WesterholmÂ’s and BarclayÂ’s then once again as in Bornkamm comes close to be
perceived despite being a real letter, as ‘Paul’s last will and testament’[31]
an outline of his almost ‘systematic theology’. There could hardly be a
stronger contrast to LevinasÂ’s philosophizing than this image of Paul.[32]
The
perception of Paul as the champion of universalism at the expense of
particularity, and as the theologian for whom ethics is an appendix to the
right faith, needs Judaism in a derogatory way as a negative foil in order to formulate the new
faith in Christ positively. Paul is seen as having separated or being in the
process of separating himself from his ancestral faith and practice in his
interpretation of the Christ event. The Christ event and first century Judaism
are perceived as being in an opposition to each other which is mutually exclusive.
For Paul, in this perception, there is only room for one and the same way of faith
and life in relation to the one God, that is through Christ, and this means at
the expense of historic Israel. There is no room for difference, no room for
the other. The alterity of the other is deplored as a defect which has to be extinguished
as it threatens the oneness of being in Christ and the universal truth of
Christ. Perceived in this way it is difficult if not impossible to read Paul
and his letter to the Romans in particular in the face of the other without
violent implications. It is difficult to enter a dialogue with the other when
his/her alterity and thus integrity is not respected. A dialogue necessarily fails
when there is only the option of either me or the other. This not only applies
to the relationship of Christ believers and Jews. But the relationship between
Jews and gentiles in Christ and between Christ believers and non Christ
believing Jews in the first century has a paradigmatic character for a Christ
defined and, for what was later to become, ‘Christian’ identity and its
relation to the other who remains and
wants to
remain different. This relationship is the testing case for the openness of Christianity
not only to Jews, to Jews first, but to other ‘others’, to alterity which
cannot be integrated into the totality of any system. PaulÂ’s letters, and
Romans in particular, are pertinently addressing the issue of this relationship.
Romans is actually of crucial significance for Christian
self-definition/understanding since it is the only place where Jews as Jews
(and not merely as Christ believers) are seriously discussed in relation to the
gospel. Â Â
But as
scholars of and beyond the New Perspective have demonstrated, the
universalistic and thus exclusivist reading is not the only possible reading of
the Pauline letters, including Romans.[33]
There is ample historical and sociological evidence that it can well be argued
that faith in Christ and being rooted in his ancestral faith and culture were
not perceived as being incompatible by Paul. Not only this, there is also sound
reason to argue that Paul strongly emphasized the inherent necessity of the
relatedness of faith in Christ to Judaism and its Scriptures. [34]
This may even be viewed as being the main issue in his argumentation in Romans.
Paul is seen as being deeply rooted in first century Judaism, his life,
thoughts and activity as interwoven with the traditions and practices of his
ancestors and contemporaries which was based on the Scriptures.[35]
The perception of PaulÂ’s life and activity as being rooted entirely within the
symbolic universe of first century Judaism (which was not uniform but
encompassed differing groups even though the contemporary term pluralism might
not be quite appropriate) and thus as not using Judaism or the ‘Other’ as a
negative foil for ‘faith in Christ’ opens up the option of reading Paul/Romans
in the face of the other. Levinas, the
Jewish philosopher and Paul, the Jewish Apostle could actually be related in a
dialogue over their shared tradition, as ‘others’, who are and remain
different, but are nevertheless related via this tradition.
III Romans and Scriptural Reasoning
Read from
this perspective there are a number of themes and issues of LevinasÂ’s approach which
resonate with Romans all of which cannot be addressed within a paper of this
length. I will focus on some aspects I consider relevant without claiming to
address even these exhaustively. Taking Levinas seriously this claim is neither
an aim worth trying to achieve nor is it actually possible to achieve since he
emphasized that to encounter the other means to respond, to be responsible to
the other rather than trying to understand him/her in the categories of my own
experience or thinking. To discuss a theme or issue exhaustively would imply
the enclosing within an closed system, the closed system of my own thought and
experience, thus not respecting the alterity of the other but assimilating it
to the already known. As Levinas has formulated it ‘Knowledge as a perception,
concept, comprehension refers back to an act of graspingÂ…Â…..Knowledge is
re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain other to it.Â’[36]
A virtual encounter between Paul and Levinas cannot claim to deal with the issues
addressed exhaustively. It is a conversation which hopefully in answering some
questions at the same time raises new questions which keep the conversation
open and lively.
The first
issue I will address is the issue of communication between ‘others’. A second
issue will be the reasoning or conversation over shared Scriptural tradition in
relation to contemporary problems and questions. Â
A third
issue will be the priority of ethics.
3.1 Letter
Writing as a Process of Mutual Communication
The fact
that Paul is writing letters to his communities demonstrates that he is
involved in an ongoing process of communication with them. This communication
usually had begun in a face to face encounter, when Paul and later Christ-believers
had first met. The relationship thus established and the communication thus
initiated continued and was nurtured through the means of letter writing. This
was the main function of PaulÂ’s letters as Eva-Maria Becker recently has
emphasized ‘ So the letter serves primarily as a substitute for an oral
communication, that is, for a conversation and thus claims no apostolic
authority but has above all a communicative that is an inter-communicative
function.Â’[37] Â The letters are thus perceived as being part of oral communication,
serving the purpose of maintaining the relationship. They are literary products[38]
only in so far as they were the only ways and means by which the oral
communication could be maintained. They could be described as ‘long distance oral
communicationÂ’.[39] Paul presupposes that his
letters on reception are presented to the group of Christ believers orally. His
letters thus address the recipients directly on the issues discussed, not in
the style of an abstract or more distanced essay. He is involved and wants to
involve the recipients in the conversation. He does not elaborate about something from an objective
perspective, but he is engaged in a
discussion with them concerning issues that really matter between them. Paul is
addressing real people, in a specific historical context and communicating with
them about issues arising from that relationship.[40]
Although communication through letters cannot have the same directness and
mutuality as immediate oral communication, letter writing nevertheless is the
only written form of communication which allows for dialogue and mutuality.
Letter writing is not a one way process but allows for real interaction in both
directions, especially since the letter bearer could elaborate on the contents
of the letter. Â [41]
Although a
number of suggestions have been made regarding the character of PaulÂ’s letter
to
PaulÂ’s
letters including Romans are indications of a concrete historical communication
process. In Levinasian terms this implies that those involved in this process
had established real relationships within which the other was not assimilated
to the same but the alterity of the other was maintained and respected
otherwise it would be no relationship at all. To meet the other without
assimilating him/her to the same means being already in communication. As noted
above Levinas, perceives the encounter face to face already as establishing a
discourse since the other as a face already speaks to me. He states ‘…..the
relation between the same and the other Â…..is language. For language
accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within this
relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains
transcendent to the same.Â’[44]
The function of Paul’s letters in the process of communication thus  indicates that those communicating with each
other did so as people who met the other as other without trying to assimilate
them to themselves. Levinas states ‘The fact that the face maintains a relation
with me by discourse does not range him in the same; he remains absolute within
the relation.Â’[45] Â This resonates moreover with his emphasis on discourse
as emerging in true encounter, an encounter where truth can arise, ‘ Truth
arises where a being separated from the other is not engulfed in him, but
speaks to him.Â’[46] The letters of Paul,
including Romans, are indicative of such a process between the apostle and his
addressees.
3.2. The
Hermeneutics of Negotiating Meaning in Romans
We will
come to another of Levinas’s issues – that is, his practice of interpretation
or as other’s have called it – his practice of scriptural reasoning.[47]
 It emerges from Levinas’s focus on the pluralism
of human society which he perceives as constitutive of it. Â Community and society do not presuppose
sameness but rather presuppose difference, the respect for and safeguarding of
the integrity of the other in his/her alterity.[48]
Pluralism is not only constitutive of society but of discourse at the same
time. As interlocutors necessarily have to be and remain different any
discourse presupposes plurality. A discourse over scriptural tradition thus
cannot but reflect this pluralism. Multiple readings, expressions, commentaries
then are not mere or unfortunate ambiguities but the necessary ‘manner’ and way
of interpretation.[49]
In Romans we
find an interpretative discourse of scriptural tradition. In none of PaulÂ’s
letters do we find as many obvious allusions to the Scriptural tradition as
here. We get glimpses of the process of the search for meaning in the aftermath
of the Christ event. It is a discourse which unfolds entirely within the
symbolic universe of the Scriptures of Israel and in close relation to others,
living within this same symbolic universe, Â that is Jews.
PaulÂ’s
reasoning is not only rooted in the Scriptures but is developed in association
with, and in the context of, contemporary Jewish thinking and exegesis. Paul
moves within the biblical thought world and uses its idiom and language but he
did not receive his Bible in a vacuum. Paul encountered the challenge of
Scripture through a Jewish filter. His thinking was directly influenced by the
Scriptures but it was also influenced by his familiarity with contemporary
Jewish reasoning. As B.Rosner notes ‘The signficance of many portions of the
Pauline paraenesis can only be appreciated by taking full account of Old
Testament background as well as the conceptual development of Old
Testament ideas in early Jewish paraenesis.Â’[50]
In my view this not only applies to the paraenetical sections of PaulÂ’s
letters but for his theologizing as such. Â This means that we must acknowledge and take
into account the fact that Paul shares common ground with fellow Jewish
exegetes, despite other differences from them. Gone then is the image of Paul,
the isolated exegete using the Old Testament for his own gospel purposes in a
manner which, whilst emphasizing his rootedness in Scriptures, simultaneously
suggests that his gospel hermeneutic radically distances him from all
contemporary Judaisms. To acknowledge PaulÂ’s relation to contemporary Jewish
thinking is merely to put Paul in his social context, to recognize the
sociality of his reading and reasoning.[51]
 For Paul’s gospel to be intelligible and
compelling to fellow Jews meant that he had to address them in terms they could
understand, that is through the traditions they shared. But since in
Romans he is not addressing Jews as
such then it is clear that the Jewish scriptures also have fundamental importance
for gentiles in Christ.Â
Moreover,
the hermeneutical significance of the fact that Paul devotes substantial space
in Romans to non-Christ believing Jews cannot be underestimated. Here is a
superb example of Paul taking the alterity of the other seriously into account. Â What
is significant is not merely the details of his opinions but rather the fact
that he addresses the theme at all. This is a clear indication that he shared
and lived in the symbolic universe, the ‘cultural-linguistic system’ of first
century Judaism[52] and thus he could he
could not envisage moving beyond it.[53]Â He is tied in with the future of his own
people and their identity even though they disagree concerning the Christ.
Romans as
the letter with numerous scriptural citations and allusions particularly demonstrates
PaulÂ’s entrenchedness within his ancestral tradition. It is not something he
refers to or deals with – he is living it – in his interpretation of the Christ
event.
Moreover,
he apparently presupposes his addressees to be familiar with the Jewish Scriptures,
( cf Rom 1:2 Â o] proephggei,lato dia. tw/n profhtw/n auvtou/ evn
grafai/j a`gi,aij; 7:1 "H avgnoei/te(
avdelfoi,( ginw,skousin ga.r no,mon lalw/( o[ti o` no,moj kurieu,ei tou/
avnqrw,pou evfV o[son cro,non zh/|È) [54] even though he explicitly
addresses only gentiles in this letter.[55]
He sees no need to explain to them why he is referring to the Jewish Scriptures
as this apparently is self-evident to both. From this I conclude that the
incoming of the gentiles through Christ
meant to root them in this scriptural symbolic universe. Paul takes it for
granted that the authority of Scripture extends to his gentile Christ
communities and that it should be formative for their identity in Christ.  As
 3.3 Scriptural Reasoning in Romans
To say that
Paul lived in and with the Scriptures indicates that these are not ‘used’ to
prove a previous argument or add more authority to it. It rather views the
apostle as living, thinking and acting from within this symbolic universe
whilst working out the implications of life in Christ for his gentile
communities. The authority of the Scriptures as that which shapes his
perception of the world is thus presupposed in this perception of PaulÂ’s way of
reasoning.[59]
Â
In order to
demonstrate the difference scriptural reasoning makes in the interpretation of Romans we will first
consider the list of seemingly arbitrary proof texts in Rom 3:9 ff. and then
later proceed to a discussion of Rom 9:24ff.. Â
Â
Â
3.3.1 Scriptural
Reasoning in Romans 3:9 ff.
Most
interpreters read the sequence of scriptural verses as being introduced by Paul
here to prove the accusation which all are charged with in 1:18-3:8, that is gentiles
(1:18-32) as well as Jews (2:1-29) are all ‘under sin’ (3:9).[60]
The verb proh|tiasa,meqa then is read as referring back
in a sequential sense to what Paul has stated previously. But as some scholars have pointed
out this does not really fit PaulÂ’s prior argumentation.[61]
It certainly seems strange that Paul would have to introduce such a long and
heavy scriptural ‘proof’ for something he himself had already elaborated on at
such length before. Thorsteinsson in his
study on Romans 2, in my view convincingly, demonstrates that proh|tiasa,meqa is more likely referring to the literary sequence
following in 3:10f, reading the pro- Â in a
temporal sense thus meaning ‘what has been demonstrated at an earlier
period in timeÂ’. It then introduces a new sequence in the text rather than
being the conclusion or summary of what immediately preceeds,
The scriptural references are describing the effects
‘sin’ has on the life of people who have no option but to live under its rule. The
references should not be taken as citations Paul arbitrarily picked up to prove
his case. Referring to these verses implied that the literary as well as some
supposed historical context would resonate with these. It is significant then to
take into account that the verses referred to are lamentations of oppressed
Conversely a reading in the vein of scriptural
reasoning takes the resonating of the original context of the Psalm verses
seriously into account (which by the way means also to the take the text as
other – in its alterity – seriously as a partner in conversation). To read the
Psalm verses in the first instance as lamentations of
It is possible that Paul here is arguing here against
a gentile misconception that by becoming Jews they could escape from this
domination of sin. Paul is demonstrating to them that there is no escape from
this domination, not even through doing the works of Torah. (This also might be
a gentile misconception of Judaism and not a Jewish misunderstanding !) And for
them now to find a way out of this tragedy is not in becoming Jews and taking
on the Torah as Jews  but through Christ.[67]
If we presuppose that Paul here is addressing gentiles then he is opening their
eyes to the tragedy they live in. The Torah cannot be a means to get out of
this – but it is the means via which one can come to the recognition of sin –
the Torah reveals the true nature of the rulers of this kosmos, the all
pervasive power of sin.
We have here an example of PaulÂ’s dealing with
Scriptures which moves beyond a mere use of Scripture as proof text or addition
to something already said or as proof that what he says is in accordance with
the authoritative source of faith. He is thus not proving accusations against
universal sinners previously made. Â Instead
of simply accumulating a list of varied proof texts as additional support for
previous arguments, Paul is rather elaborating for his gentile audience the
tragedy of living under sin. This then refers to the rule of the Pax Romana and
the function of the Torah in revealing the true nature of this system of
violence contrary to its own claims for universal peace. In parallel to Levinas
we see Paul arguing from within and with Scriptures[68],
closely relating them to contemporary constraints and vice versa, thus
illuminating both. In distinction from Levinas one could say that in a way Paul
is teaching gentiles in Christ scriptural reasoning in the light of the Christ
event.
3.3.2
Scriptural Reasoning in Romans
The second example we
will consider is Rom 9:24ff. This demonstrates with a string of scriptural
citations the mercy of God on those whom he has called not from the Jews only
but also from the gentiles. Paul begins by citing Hosea 2:25 ‘Kale,sw to.n ouv lao,n mou lao,n mou kai. th.n ouvk
hvgaphme,nhn hvgaphme,nhn\Â’ Because this citation seems designed to support
an argument for the inclusion of gentiles as well as Jews, scholars have
claimed that Paul now applies Scriptures that originally referred to Israel to
believing gentiles. The ‘not my people’
are seen as the gentiles and Paul thus seems to adjust scriptural meanings to
suit his own purposes. Dodd voices the sentiments of many commentators when he
states ‘It is rather strange that Paul has not observed that this prophecy
referred to Israel, rejected for its sins, but destined to be restored –
strange because it would have fitted so admirably the doctrine of the
restoration of Israel which he is to
expound in ch.11.Â’ [69]
However, this citation is not what it might seem to be. It can be shown that
the primary concern in this chapter (Rom 9) is with the historic people of God
and their apparent lack of faith in Christ (rather than the inclusion of
gentiles which at this point is brought in more as an aside). The inclusion of
Gentiles has already been established in Rom 3-4 (and of course in PaulÂ’s
earlier letter to the Galatians).
When we
consider the context more carefully we note that this citation is followed by
two others which clearly can refer only to
Most likely therefore Paul does not
primarily use the Hosea citation to refer to gentiles. The primary reference is
still to
In
this passage we have seen Paul at work in his scriptural world. He moves within
innumerable citations to illuminate and develop his argument step by step with
major and minor scriptural premises; but he uses these creatively not in
opposition to their original content and context but primarily to refer to
IV The Epiphany of the other/Other and the
Primacy of Ethics
The primacy
of ethics is a vast topic in Levinas and as I will argue, also in Paul. It
cannot be dealt with substantially in this paper, so I will only give some
brief sketch as to where a more detailed consideration of this aspect would
lead to.
The respect
for the alterity of the other and thus the primacy of ethics for Levinas are
constitutive of human life and community. These do not follow from insights or
cognition about some universal human condition but from the encounter with the
other face to face. He maintains ‘…responsibility for the other pre-exists any
self-consciousness, so that from the beginning of any face to face, the
question of being involves the right to beÂ…Â…Â…I do not grasp the other in order
to dominate, I respond instead to the faceÂ’s epiphany.Â’[73]
Inherent to this epiphany of the otherÂ’s face, Levinas perceives a transcendent
dimension. In this epiphany and the response to the call transcendence breaks
in, the Other per se. The primacy of ethics and transcendence are not separate
dimensions but go hand in hand.[74]
The fact that PaulÂ’s letter to
Paul in chapters 9-11 tries to understand and come to terms with GodÂ’s
ways with the other, that is, his fellow Jews who are not ‘in Christ’.  He finds some viable explanation in his
reading of Hosea as well as in his olive tree metaphor. In both he strongly
emphasizes the faithfulness of God and his promises towards
To continue here with explicitly ethical issues indicates that for Paul
to respond to the other, and to the transcendent Other cannot be separated. To
encounter  the other/Other means to be
responsible. Ethical living is thus not an addition to being in Christ but
inherent in and integral to the call to respond in discipleship. We here find a
primacy of ethics which though not identical is still similar to LevinasÂ’s
perception.[76] Thus the sequence of
PaulÂ’s argument in the transition from
V. Conclusion –
Sharing Traditions in Difference
The flow of PaulÂ’s scriptural reasoning in Romans thus can be described
as being driven by the responsibility for the other/Other,that is, by ethics.
In this primacy of ethics - and thus his advocating for the respect for
the alterity and integrity of the other - Paul is in keeping with the
traditions of his ancestors which are also basic for LevinasÂ’s philosophical
approach. This does not render Paul the Jewish Apostle and Levinas, the Jewish
philosopher the same. PaulÂ’s scriptural reasoning and prioritizing of ethics
differs from Levinas not only but basically in the fact that he does so in the
light of the Christ event. But they both are rooted in the same scriptural
tradition, they are both engaged in a vivid and open and pluralistic process of
interpretation which is driven by the primacy of ethics. They thus both can be
perceived as participating in the process of negotiating meaning for their respective
time and situation from within a tradition they share.  They contribute to an ‘exegetical pluralism
[which] is a product of and tribute to the pluralism constitutive of human
society[and] thus it is a reflection of lived ethics, the pluralism of the
face-to-face.Â’[78]Â Â Â
Â
 Â
[1] See my paper ‘Let
Everyone be Convinced in his/her Own Mind: Derrida and the Deconstruction of
PaulinismÂ’ in SBL Seminar Papers ,
[2] On the function of informed imagination
or‚depth historiography’ see Peter Ochs in his Forword to David Weiss Halivni’s
Revelation Restored: Divine Writ and
Critical Responses.London: SCM Press 2001, pp. xvi f.
[3] On this see my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged: Feminism
and the New Perspective on Paul.
[4] Cf an interview with Christian Deschamps in Entretiens avec le Monde,
[5] Cf his preface to Totality and Infinity, trans.Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 8th edition 1992, ‘…violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating
persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which
they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments
but their own substance…..’ and ‘The visage of being that shows itself in war
is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy.Â’ p.21
[6] Cf. Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind,
[7] Cf. Levinas ‘But in knowledge there also
appears the notion of an intellectual activity or of a reasoning will – a way
of doing something which consists precisely of thinking through knowing, of
seizing something and making it oneÂ’s own, of reducing to presence and
representing the difference of being, an activity which appropriates and grasps the
otherness of the knownÂ…Â…..Knowledge as perception, concept, comprehension
refers back to an act of grasping.’ In ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’in Sean
Hand, ed. The Levinas Reader.Oxford:
Blackwell 1989, pp. 75-87, p. 76.
[8] Totality and Infinity,p.115
[9] Cf also Derrida,
‘Violence and Metaphysics’, in Writing
and Difference.
[10] Totality and Infinity, p.43
[11] Totality and Infinity, p. 46
[12] Totality and Infinity, p. 39
[13] Cf. e.g. Totality
and Infinity,Section III.B. ‘Ethics and the Face’, pp. 194-219 also his
essay ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ in Hand, Levinas
Reader,pp.76-87.
[14] Ethics,
Exegesis and Philosophy. p. 194.
[15] Totality and Infinity, p. 50
[16] Totality and Infinity, p. 51
[17] Totality and Infinity,p. 51
[18] Totality and Infinity, p.52
[19] He states that ‘Totalization is accomplished
only in history – the history of the historiographers, that is among survivors.
It rest on the affirmation and the conviction that the chronological order of
the history of the historians outlines the plot of being in itself, analogous
to nature. The time of universal history remains as the ontological ground in
which particular existences are lost.Â’, Totality
and Infinity,p. 55
[20] Totality and Infinity, p. 66 ‘The face is a living
presence, it is expressionÂ…..The face speaks. The
manifestation is already discourse.’ Also his  Schwierige
Freiheit: Versuch ueber das Judentum, Frankfurt a.M.: Juedischer Verlag
1992, p. 17.
[21] Otherwise Than Being,
Or Beyond Essence,
trans. Alphonso Lingis.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981 ,p. 87
[22] Totality and Infinity. 76.
[23] Cf. ‘On the Jewish
[24] Cohen, Ethics,
Exegesis and Philosophy.p.219
[25] Levinas is influenced by Rosenzweig here cf.
Levinas ‘The State of
[26] See his New
Talmudic Readings,
[27] I am indebted to Richard A.CohenÂ’s excellent
analysis of LevinasÂ’s approach to reading Scriptures, cf. especially chapter 7
‘Humanism and the right of exegesis’ in his Ethics,
Exegesis and Philosophy, pp.216-265.
[28] The term is now applied to a number of distinct
approaches which emerged after E.P.Sanders Paul
and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion,
[29] See e.g. John M.G.Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story:
Theology as TestimonyÂ’, in Bruce W. Longenecker, ed. Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment.
[30] On this see myÂ
‘Be Imitators of Me as I am of Christ:Â
A Hidden Discourse of Power and Domination in Paul ?Â’
[31] Guenther Bornkamm, ‘The Letter to the Romans as
PaulÂ’s Last Will and TestamentÂ’. Australian
Bible Review 11, 1963, pp.2-14.
[32] Cf. his Vier Talmud-Lesungen.Frankfurt
a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik 1993, p. 154.
[33] Cf the overview in my That We May Be Mutually Encouraged, pp.123-160.
[34] See W.S. Campbell,
‘The Contribution of Traditions to Paul’s Theology’, in Hay David M. (ed.), Pauline Theology, Vol II,1 & 2
Corinthians.
Mark D. Nanos, 'The Jewish Context of the Gentile Audience Addressed in
Paul's Letter to the Romans', in Catholic Biblical Quarterly Vol 61, No
2, April 1999. Neil Elliott, ‘The Apostle’s Self-Presentation as Anti-Imperial
PerformanceÂ’ in Richard A. Horsley ed. Paul
and the Roman Imperial Order, Harrosburg, PA: Trinity Press International
2004, pp. 67-88,Neil Elliott, 'Paul and the Politics of the Empire'Â in Horsley Richard A. (ed.), Paul and
Politics:
[35] See my That
We May Be Mutually Encouraged, pp 142ff.
[36] ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ in Sean Hand ed., The Levinas Reader, p.76 and 77.
[37] My translation of the German 'So dient der Brief zunaechst als Ersatz
fuer eine muendliche Kommunikation,d.h. fuer ein Gespraech, und beansprucht
keine apostolische Autoritaet, sondern hat primaer eine kommunikative bzw.
interkommunikative Funktion.Â’ Schreiben
und Verstehen: Paulinische Briefhermeneutik im Zweiten Kointherbrief.Tuebingen,
Basel: Francke Verlag 2002, p.271.
[38] As such they also show certain
signs of literary construction, which in a secondary sense have to be taken
into account. I am concentrating here on the oral dimension. For more on both
aspects see Becker, Schreiben und
Verstehen, pp.132ff. also Carolyn Osiek, ‘The Oral World of Early
Christianity in
First-Century
[39] Cf. Bernhard Oestreich, ‘Leseanweisungen in Briefen als Mittel der Gestaltung von Beziehungen
 (1 Thess 5:27) in NTS 50, pp.224-45, p. 224.
[40] Cf.Luther Stirwalt Jr. Paul the Letterwriter.
[41] Cf. ‚Briefe stellen
inidrekte, medial bzw. schriftlich vermittelte kommunikative Prozesse dar,
denen die Unmittelbarkeit und Wechselseitigkeit muendlicher Kommunikation
fehlt. Dennoch ist die briefliche Kommunikation die einzige schriftliche
Kommunikationsform, in der ein Richtungswechsel und damit eine dialogische
Kommunikation ohne Schwierigkeiten moeglich ist.Â’ Becker, Schreiben und Verstehen, p. 121
[42] Cf e.g. W.S.Campbell, PaulÂ’s Gospel in an Intercultural Context,
Jew and Gentile in The Letter to the Romans.
[43] Cf. Stanley K Stowers. The Diatribe and PaulÂ’s Letter to the Romans,
.Chico,CA: SBL Dissertation Series 57, 1981, pp.75f.
[44] Totality and Infinity, p. 39
[45] Totality and Infinity, p. 195
[46] Totality and Infinity, p.62.
[47] The term ‘Scriptural Reasoning’ has come to
prominence in postcritical theologies as expressed in the series Radical
Traditions: Theology in a Postcritical Key edited by Peter Ochs and Stanley
Hauweras. What is being proposed is a return to scriptural traditions, ‘with
the hope of retrieving resources long ignored, depreciated, and in many cases
ideologically suppressed by modern habits of thought.Â’ It is in the first
instance a movement that began as an offshoot of the study of Judaism but
parallel to this movement of Jewish thinkers there has now developed a movement
that invites Jewish, Christian and Islamic theologians back to the texts of
their respective traditions, recovering and rearticulating modes of ‘scriptural
reasoningÂ’. The movement is driven by questions concerning the place of
theology and, more specifically, of scriptural faith in contemporary life.
Significantly, the participants of this discourse locate themselves at home
both within their respective faith communities as well as in Western
universities. The move towards Scriptures does not imply a naïve return to some
‘original’ pure text or original truth, but neither is it an uncritical
application of so-called ‘rational’ forms of thinking and reasoning in the
Western philosophical tradition. The
movement finds significant affinities between Jewish forms of reading and
reasoning and postmodern thought. It challenges the notion of there being just one single discourse of reasoning and
rationality, that is, that of Western science and logic, as the valid model for
the ‘right’ way of thinking. Cf. Peter
Ochs and Nancy Levene eds., Textual Reasonings: Jewish Philosophy and Text
Study at the End of the Twentieth Century.Grand Rapids,
[48] See Emmanuel Levinas, Zwischen
uns:Versuche ueberDenken an den Anderen. Muenchen:Hanser Verlag 1995, p. 258ff. German
translation of Entre nous: Essais sure le
penser-a-lÂ’autre.Paris: Grasset&Fasquelle 1991.Also Emmanuel Levinas,Of God Who Comes To Mind.
[49] Cf. Cohen, Ethics,
Exegesis and Philosophy, p.248
[50] Paul, Scripture and Ethics, A Study of 1 Corinthians 5-7.Leiden:
Brill 1994, p.181.
[51] Cf. David Ford, “Responding to
textual reasoning: What might Christians learn?” in Textual Reasonings:
Jewish Philosophy and Text Study at the End of the Twentieth Century. Ed.
Peter Ochs and Nancy Levene.
[52] I am aware that this paradigm is
only partly adequate to describe a religious tradition. It presupposes a static
view of culture and religion, taking rules, terms, symbols and narratives as
set. It does not account sufficiently for the fact that traditions are living
networks which are constantly negotiated in continous conversations.Cf. Reasoning
after Revelation,p.26f.
[53] Although being in Christ for Paul transforms
his Jewish thought world it did not obliterate it.
[54] Cf. Runnar M. Thorsteinsson, PaulÂ’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function
and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography.
[55] I cannot elaborate on the problem of the
composition of the Christ believing groups in
[56] Paul and the Language of Scripture,p. 338.
[57] Cf. Nanos, who sees PaulÂ’s
discussions about the status and conduct of his gentile congregations as part
of the Jewish debates about the relationship of gentiles with Jews. The
Mysteryof Romans: The Jewish Context of PaulÂ’s Letter to the Romans,
[59] This resonates with LevinasÂ’s interpretation of
scriptural tradition as Annette Aronowicz has stated, ‘It is quite obvious that
Levinas has already decided Â…..that a meaning existed , a meaning for usÂ…Â…Â…This
decision made before the act of interpretating itself, lies at the heart of
Levinas’s hermeneutic.’ ‘The Little Man with the Burned Thighs: Levinas’s
Biblical HermeneuticÂ’, in Tamara Cohn Eskenazi et.al eds.,Levinas and Biblical Studies.Semeia 43,
[60] So among many James D.G.Dunn, Commentary on Romans 1-8,
[61] Cf. Jouette M.Bassler, ‘Divine Impartiality in
PaulÂ’s Letter to the RomansÂ’, Novum
Testamentum ,26,1984, 43-58, also
[62] Thorsstein, PaulÂ’s
Interlocutor,p.235-36.
[63] Cf. e.g. Neil Elliott, ‘Paul and Politics of
EmpireÂ’ in Richard A. Horsley ed., Paul
and Politics, pp.17-39.
[64] I am following ThorssteinÂ’s view that the first
pers.pl. here indicates a reference to the Scriptural tradition rather than to
a group or individual, PaulÂ’s
Interlocutor,p. 235.
[65] Romans, 1-8, p. 148
[66] Romans 1-8,p.147
[68] The parallel with Levinas is that he
distinguishes between Talmudic reasoning and using Scripture as proof text. See
his Vier Talmud-Lesungen,p.41.
[69] Romans, 1932, p.160.
[70] Cf. W.S.Campbell, ‘Divergent Images
of Paul and his
[71] Elsa B.Brown, ‚What Has Happened
HereÂ’, in Linda Nicholson ed., The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory
[72] Cf. Also Ford, ‚Responding’ in Textual
Reasoning,p. 259.
[73] ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’, p. 75.
[74] Emmanuel Levinas, Schwierige
Freiheit: Versuch ueber das Judentum.
[75]
[76]It is worth noting here that whereas
in Levinas to encounter the other has a transcendent dimension open to the
wholly Other, in Paul this transcendent dimension is found in the encounter
with Christ. This is a difference between Levinas, the Jewish philosopher and
Paul, the Jewish Apostle, which nevertheless does not set them in contradiction
to each other as e.g. Mt 25:31ff. demonstrates.
[77] Cf. My article ‘Let Everyone Be Convinced in
His/Her Own Mind: Derrida and the Deconstruction of PaulinismÂ’,SBL Seminar Papers,
[78] Cohen, Ethics,
Exegesis and Philosophy,p.248.