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[Note, comments in parentheses will probably not be read out due to time constraints.]

I am deeply grateful to Prof. Arichea for his paper, which raises a number of quite fascinating issues.

May I suggest at the outset that, while his discussion seems to focus by way of its title and much of its opening analysis on the dikaio- word group in Romans, most of his difficulties are actually with a particular soteriology that Romans is widely held to undergird. It is known in NT circles as the Lutheran reading,[1] although this designation is rather unfair to Luther,[2] and also oversimplifies subsequent history. But in order to avoid confusion I will refer in what follows to 'neo-Lutheran' considerations. The model's central soteriological principle is of course justification through faith alone, and not through works of law. And this theory is justified itself largely by a particular reading of certain texts in Romans, especially chapters one through four.[3] I would suggest that it is the nature and outworkings of this particular model that create most of the difficulties that Prof. Arichea points to throughout his paper in relation to the impact of Romans in South-east Asia. But in order to demonstrate this suggestion, we must first quickly reprise his concerns.

Prof. Arichea details nine issues in his paper--and he is especially concerned with the last four:

(1) the use of Romans for evangelistic proof-texting (specifically 3.23, 6.23, 10.9[4]);

(4) the skewed NT distribution of dikaio- terminology, which is dominated by Paul and, within his corpus, by Romans[7];

(5) the translation possibilities (the verb and noun phrase arguably overlap in terms of God 'making something right'); however,

(6) the standard translation conundrum still exists between formal correspondent and dynamic or functional equivalents;

(7) the individualism of much of the Protestant missionary movement, which jars with Asian culture's strong emphasis on the group and especially on the family, and the consequences of this individualism, notably theological dualism, that mutes any constructive Christian impact on culture--this has also elicited various, partly reactionary, indigenous, or alternative theological, programmes by way of response[8];

(8) the strong implication of judgment, and allied attitudes of condemnation, to outsiders that promote Christian arrogance and undermine inter-Faith co-operation[9]; and

(9) the complementary undermining of a humble and non-violent ethic towards outsiders.

It will be clearest to begin our more detailed demonstration with Prof. Arichea's final issues, i.e., seven through nine (and these comprise three of his four major concerns in any case).

The neo-Lutheran model of salvation is inherently individualist. It focusses throughout on an essentially rational individual who deduces a number of very important points from the cosmos, concludes on the basis of these that she is in very deep trouble with God, and consequently makes the decision to appropriate the generous, and apparently quite manageable, Christian offer of salvation through faith alone. This journey, from dawning theological awareness, through the mounting awareness of sin, to the climactic point of decision and conversion, is necessarily individualist throughout. And it is the basis of all Christian existence. Hence this, I would suggest, namely, the central dynamic of neo-Lutheran soteriology, is clearly one powerful source of the individualism that Prof. Arichea finds so problematic in the South-east Asian context.

I also found his aside in this connection concerning Dualism especially interesting. Prof. Arichea characterises this as a response to the tensions created by reconciling an individualist model with an irreducibly social and familial context--and I am sure he is right to point to this. But Dualism is also an inherent propensity within the neo-Lutheran model. The individual who makes her reflective journey to salvation is also struggling throughout with the horrors of repeated transgression--it is this dark reality that drives much of the journey. Hence some form of Dualism really must be introduced to safeguard the intellectual purity of this journey from the contamination of sin--if the individual's rational faculties are fundamentally distorted, she will be unable to undertake the appropriate rational steps, and the model will not work; the journey will not take place. In short, a neo-Lutheran alliance between semi-Pelagian soteriology and Dualism is entirely predictable.[10]

We turn then to the second of Prof. Arichea's major difficulties, with a set of problematic attitudes in the Christian posture towards outsiders.

And here it needs to be recognised that the neo-Lutheran model is also inherently judgmental, although the precise nature of this judgment must be noted carefully. As we have just seen, this model emphasises the rational and moral journey of the individual to Christian salvation strongly, hence it can place quite considerable rhetorical pressures on the individual within the pre-Christian phase to convert--this is one of the model's apparent strengths. It is, quite simply, the correct rational and moral decision to choose salvation, because conversion will result in the forgiveness of sins and the avoidance of eternal punishment. However, it follows necessarily from this argument that those who resist this decision are immoral and irrational--that is, essentially, the recalcitrant are stupid and dissolute.

Now I do not want ultimately to deny that some sense of judgment vis-a-vis outsiders will arise from Paul's writings (although this needs to be carefully debated, and it must be still more carefully considered if he is being absolutely consistent in so arguing[11]). Nevertheless we ought to distinguish between the dynamic that arises from a strong judgment of culpability that derives from one's fundamental theological position, as in the neo-Lutheran model, over against a mitigated judgment that is the reflex of a fundamentally non-judgmental position established by grace. If one's fundamental posture is conditioned by grace, then one's basic attitude towards outsiders is solidarity, not condemnation--in George Whitefield's famous phrase, 'there but, for the grace of God, go I'. Ongoing recalcitrance by some is then a tragedy more than anything else. However, the neo-Lutheran model delivers a strongly condemning message towards outsiders; they are directly culpable for their failure to convert--'theirs is a mistake that we Christians have not made', it says.

So I would suggest that Prof. Arichea's various difficulties with the attitudes of Christians towards outsiders are also explicable in large measure in terms of the neo-Lutheran model. Firstly, as we have just seen, it is inherent in this model to condemn outsiders in strong terms. Concomitantly, there are few resources present that generate solidarity with outsiders (as well as, arguably, any related sense of humility). Secondly, the model also offers few (or no!) checks on the endorsement of violence against outsiders. It suggests that the recalcitrant deserve punishment, and are also ultimately destined for punishment, so present violence against them, justly conceived, is not really offensive in theological terms.[12] And again, concomitantly, few if any resources are provided for the potentially highly costly endorsement of a non-violent and even actively loving response to outsiders. Indeed, the very connection within the model between conversion and a Christian ethic of self-sacrifice is notoriously difficult to establish or discern. While even granting its establishment, it does not in and of itself directly empower Christians to pursue it. This ethic requires the resources of the Spirit; something the neo-Lutheran model initially necessarily excludes, and later includes only by way of an optional extra. So, once again, neo-Lutheran soteriology seems to lie behind Prof. Arichea's difficulties.

If Prof. Arichea's main concerns--with individualism, dualism, judgmentalism, and arrogance, over against benevolent ethical action--all turn out to be difficulties inherent within neo-Lutheran soteriology, what of his more narrowly lexicographical questions?

Prof. Arichea argues, I think correctly, for a dynamic or functional approach to translation. However, this approach places a premium on context. Hence the construal of the surrounding argument will clearly now be even more important for the translation of the individual dikaio- terms that stud its progressions than it was previously within a formal correspondent approach. And indeed the influence of the neo-Lutheran model on the dynamic Indonesian translations he lists is plainly apparent (and it is not absent from his list of formal translations either, but there it exerts its influence--rather typically--via the selection of stems). Similarly, the overlapping translations that he selects earlier on for dikaiosÊnh YeoË and dikaiÒv also clearly reflect a neo-Lutheran agenda.[13] (And note that the very designation of these signifiers as strategic or critical is a consequence of neo-Lutheran concerns!) Once again then the influence of the model seems paramount.

This influence also clearly explains why certain key verses from Romans end up proof-texting evangelistic systems so frequently, as well as why certain commentators suggest that the theme of righteousness (or some closely related notion) can structure the argument of the letter as a whole--it is entirely predictable that advocates of neo-Lutheran soteriology would attempt to extend the control of their model from its key texts over the arguments of the rest of the letter.[14]

Hence, as far as I can tell, only one of Prof. Arichea's nine concerns, the avoidance of Romans by translators--and even then only arguably[15]--remains unexplained by the influence of neo-Lutheran soteriology.

I hope that it is also quite clear by now that I am wholly in agreement with Prof. Arichea's suggestions that neo-Lutheran soteriology possesses a number of deeply problematic aspects.

But we need now to press our analysis in some further, rather intriguing, directions, again following Prof. Arichea's lead, in particular, what roles do the cross-cultural perspective, and the cultural dimension, play here?

Prof. Arichea's paper highlights clearly that culture is a critical dimension within this whole, deeply problematic, dynamic. Six brief, related, points in my view flow from this basic observation.

1. The neo-Lutheran model is western in the specific sense of being European and directly post-European--it is also almost certainly distinctively post-Renaissance and hence modern.

2. This can lead to reciprocal endorsement between the model and the western culture of modernity.

3. This can also lead to western interpretative myopia regarding its difficulties and problems.

5. The model's problems are not, however, limited either to the east or the west--bad theology is universally destructive, irrespective of its specific cultural point of release.

6. In seeking a solution, the western intellectual tradition does, however, offer resources, and may therefore possibly be able to make some reparations.

(Time unfortunately precludes further progress down this avenue to a more detailed consideration of the revisionist strategies on offer [point seven].)

(1) It needs to be admitted that the neo-Lutheran model is characteristically western, and also distinctly modern, in that it came into being specifically in the early sixteenth century, shortly after the first stirrings of European modernity.[16] (At its heart is a God of retributive justice who endorses a universe structured in terms of law; arguably a distinctively mediaeval Catholic conception of society.) Salvation is an agreement--in effect, a contract--between God and humanity, although one that passes through two forms. The first is strict and difficult and leads inevitably to failure.[17] Fortunately, the second, rather easier, contract, offered by the church's preachers is effective (and here the model tends to depart from its Catholic antecedents). It is, moreover, directed towards an individual who chooses to embrace it on the basis of their own deductions. And this entire system is defended by its protagonists on the basis of their own investigation of the Scriptures in which they decide for themselves, if necessary against the church, what those authoritative writings mean.

These emphases on the autonomy of the individual and their investigations suggest to me especially that this model is a post-Renaissance, European, one (and one also deeply indebted to Humanism, although not identical with that movement). Hence the language of contract and consent--and even of rights--if not intrinsic to it, does carry its sense forward accurately.[18] And this distinctive marriage creates certain important dynamics for the model's later reception by western scholars.

(2) Clearly a reciprocal endorsement between the model and certain aspects of western culture can take place. We should note in particular the way the model reinforces the West's typical critique of monarchical tyranny, as overriding individual rights and consent. Indeed, a form of this critique is often deployed against those who propose an alternative to neo-Lutheran soteriology, as if the only alternative to neo-Lutheranism is divine despotism! (One suspects that there are other alternatives, in the case of God.)

Symmetrical to this potential cultural endorsement (which always has a vicious potential) is (3) the increased difficulty many western scholars have recognising the problems within the model, because this is tantamount to recognising problems within one's most cherished cultural commitments. It is at times to seem--for example--anti-American, or some such. Hence one might expect a degree of myopia in relation to the model's difficulties for interpreters located in the West. (Consequently, we might say that a hermeneutic of generosity exists towards the model's validations, but a hermeneutic of suspicion concerning any putative difficulties or problems.)

Hence (4) I would suggest that one of the most significant contributions of a cross-cultural interrogation like Prof. Arichea's is to expose some of these difficulties by standing (partly) outside the main cultural equation (that is, insofar as this is really possible in an increasingly westernised world, and the latter especially where higher education is concerned). We see our own western difficulties more clearly when this process is aided by non-western eyes.

But (5) his paper also suggests that it would be a mistake to go on to assume that this model's particular difficulties, which are caused in part by its distinctively western commitments, are therefore culturally limited as well. Unfortunately, it would seem that this model causes damage wherever it goes, whether east or west. So, Christian condemnation of the unsaved as stupid and immoral tends to cause difficulties in some sense wherever it is suggested. Put bluntly, bad theology is destructive of humanity per se, although doubtless with cultural differences of emphasis (and this clearly irrespective of a model's exact cultural origins).

Sixthly, and finally, it is a further intriguing dimension of his paper that Prof. Arichea, in an act of supreme charity, appeals for help to several of the classic western critiques of neo-Lutheranism, which propose different ways forward in relation to the key texts.[19] And indeed a long tradition of dissent against the neo-Lutheran reading of Paul is discernible in the West. Hence I would suggest following Prof. Arichea's lead once again in considering first whether these alternative western resources can assist us with our difficulties. Unfortunately, time precludes any detailed interaction with these resources here, and much as I would like to pursue this. (This is a complex question in its own right[20]). But at least we sense from this appeal the perception within some in the East that the West might ultimately be able to contribute to the healing of the theological and social damage it has inflicted on the church, and on the world, through its neo-Lutheran offspring, and so make a degree of reparation, however long overdue.

Arichea, Daniel. 2002. 'Reading Romans in Southeast Asia: Righteousness and its Implications for the Christian Community and Other Faith Communities'. Paper presented to the Romans Through History and Cultures Seminar, SBL/AAR General Meeting, Toronto (18 pp.) [http://www. vanderbilt.edu/AnS/religious_studies/Romans.htm].

Braaten, C. E., and Jenson, R. W. (ed.). 1998. Union with Christ. The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Campbell, Douglas A. 1993. 'Response to John de Gruchy [at 'Christ and Context' (Knox Theological Hall, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1991)]'. In Christ and Context: The Confrontation between Gospel and Culture, 159-76. Ed. H. Regan and A. J. Torrance; Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Dabourne, Wendy. 1999. Purpose and Cause in Pauline Exegesis: Romans 1.16-4.25 and a new approach to the letters. SNTSMS 104; Cambridge: University Press.

De Boer, Martinus. 1999. 'Paul and Apocalyptic Eschatology'. In The Encyclopaedia of Apocalypticism. Volume 1: The Origins of Apocalypticism in Judaism and Christianity, 345-83. Ed. J. J. Collins; New York: Continuum.

Donaldson, Terence L. 1997. Paul and the Gentiles: remapping the Apostle's convictional world. Minneapolis: Fortress.

1992. 'The Justice of God: A Renewed Perspective on Justification by Faith', JTS 43: 1-22.

1998. The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Edinburgh: T & T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Elliott, Neil. 1990. The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul's Dialogue with Judaism. JSNTS 45; Sheffield: JSOT.

Guerra, Anthony J. 1995. Romans and the apologetic tradition. SNTSMS 81; Cambridge: University Press.

Lockwood-O'Donovan, J. 1996. 'Historical prolegomena to a theological review of "human rights"'. Studies in Christian Ethics 9.2: 52-65.

1997. 'The poverty of Christ and non-proprietary community'. Paper presented to 'Theology and Ethics', a conference held at King's College London, 28-30 April, 1997 (MS 15 pp.).

Longenecker, Bruce. 1991. Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11, JSNTS 57; Sheffield: JSOT.

MacPherson, C. B. 1962. The political theory of possessive individualism. Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon.

Moores, John D. 1995. Wrestling with rationality in Paul: Romans 1-8 in a new perspective. SNTSMS 82; Cambridge: University Press.

Räisänen, Heikki. 1983. Paul and the Law. WUNT 29; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Stendahl, Krister. 1963. 'The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West.' HTR 56: 199-215.

Stowers, Stanley K. 1994. A rereading of Romans: justice, Jews, and Gentiles. London & New Haven: Yale University.

Stuhlmacher, Peter. 1989. Der Brief an die Römer. Göttingen & Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (ET 1994 S. Hafemann; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox).

Torrance, Alan J. 1993. 'Response to Jürgen Moltmann [at 'Christ and Context' (Knox Theological Hall, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1991)]'. In Christ and Context: The Confrontation between Gospel and Culture, 192-200. Ed. H. Regan and A. J. Torrance; Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Torrance, James B. 1970. 'Covenant and Contract, a study of the theological background of worship in seventeenth-century Scotland'. Scottish Journal of Theology 23: 51-76.

1973. 'The Contribution of McLeod Campbell to Scottish Theology'. Scottish Journal of Theology 26: 295-311.

1996. 'Introduction'. In J. McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement, 1-16. Edinburgh: Handsel [1856].

Wright, N. Thomas. 1991. The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology. Edinburgh: T & T Clark (1992, Minneapolis: Fortress).

1995. 'Romans and the Theology of Paul'. In Pauline Theology. Volume III: Romans, 30-67. Ed. D. M. Hay and E. E. Johnson; Minneapolis: Fortress.

2002. 'Romans'. In The New Interpreter's Bible 10: 395-770. Abingdon: Nashville.

[1] Terminology popularised especially by Stendahl 1963/1976.

[2] Cp. Braaten and Jenson 1998.

[3] Specifically 1.16-5.1; but we should note also esp. ch. 10, specifically 9.30-10.17(ish).

[4] He also observes that these are combined with Acts 2.38, 16.30 and Jn 3.16 (2002: 1).

[5] Along with 1 Peter (2002: 1).

[6]Prof. Arichea specifically cites the commentaries of Stuhlmacher 1989/1994, and Schreiner 1998 (2002: 2).

[7] Citing evidence collated by Dunn 1998: 341 (2002: 3).

[8] Specifically, Min-Jung and Dalit theology, and an emphasis on the historical Jesus as a moral exemplar in the work of scholars like Abesamis and Sugirtharajah (2002: 7-9).

[9] Concrete expressions of the latter in the South-east Asian context are the peace efforts, and the inter-religious socio-economic programmes and dialogues, currently taking place in Mindanao (the southern part of the Philippines) (2002: 12-13).

[10] In the light of Dualism's notorious social ineffectiveness, it is also hardly surprising to encounter the further reactions that Prof. Arichea speaks of like Min-Jung and Dalit theology that have already been mentioned. But the argument of Romans, correctly construed, may ultimately not be especially sympathetic to any foundational reification of indigenous perspectives, eastern or western, although it should warmly endorse incarnational theological responses, and especially where these involve interrelational or interpersonal as against either individual or corporate and collective visions. Similarly, any flight from Paul to the ethics of Jesus, as if these two perspectives are both fundamentally different and happily separable, is also ill-advised (2002: 9, esp. n. 11). Unfortunately now is not the time to address these particular questions in detail--for some further brief but apposite remarks, see A. J. Torrance 1993; perhaps also Campbell 1993.

[11] See esp. De Boer's insightful study (1999: esp. 371-75).

[12] Arguably the model contains other potentially violent components and endorsements as well, although it must be appreciated that I am not arguing that the model itself is inherently committed to violence; I am suggesting that it provides few or no safeguards against it.

[13] Arichea 2002: 4-7.

[14] However, note also that while this is easy enough to claim in terms of some summary structure, it is a more difficult thing to demonstrate in relation to the actual texts at the crucial argumentative points of transition, notably into chapters five, nine, and twelve.

[15]That is, is it the deep unpalatability of some of the model's theological consequences that leads, at least in part, to this?, a phenomenon allied perhaps with the difficulty of grasping in detail how this model does shift into the arguments of chapters five, nine, and twelve following?

[16] Stendahl in my view did not help us at this point, that is, the model's relationship with Augustine is not direct and possibly even antithetical.

[17] However, no-one, whether Christian or not, is released from the ethical demands of this contract and its consequences, hence non-Christians are still bound by the rule of law; a useful point in relation to political society.

[18] See here in particular two seminal essays by James B. Torrance (1970, 1973--usefully reprised also in 1996); see also two fascinating analyses by Lockwood O'Donovan (1996, 1997); cp. also MacPherson 1962.

[19] Specifically he cites Stendahl 1963/1976 and 1995, Sanders 1977, Dunn 1992, 1998, and Käsemann 1969: 168-82. Many more studies could be added here, perhaps most notably, Räisänen 1983, Dunn 1988a, 1988b, Elliott 1990, Longenecker 1991, Stowers 1994, Moores 1995, Guerra 1995, Donaldson 1997, Wright 1990, 1995, 2002, and Dabourne 1999 (although can one sense a tailing off of interest in these questions in recent years, Wright excepted?).

[20] These and all the related issues that Prof. Arichea's paper, and my response, touch on, will be rehearsed in full in a forthcoming study tentatively entitled The Individualist Reading of Paul: towards an account of the neo-Lutheran paradigm's structure, problems, and displacement.