Strategy in the Morte D'Arthur

Sadly, strategic modeling fails the knights in the end, as they are unable withstand the "slander and strife" that grows within their ranks. The decline and fall of the Round Table mirrors the findings of game theoretical models to a startling degree, so it will be worth looking at some important turning points in Malory's Morte D'Arthur.

Slander and Strife

Bringing the Arthurian legends to a full circle from their roots in classical epic, Lancelot's affair with Guinevere is the beginning of the end for Camelot. Through the exemplary and sophisticated chivalric behavior of knights like Gareth, the Round Table swelled its ranks. Nevertheless, Arthur's fraternal deference for the knights turns his chivalric reciprocation to simply cooperative behavior in one fatal instance: the king balks at avenging himself on Lancelot and Guinevere fo r their defection. Their adultery, and the negligence of the king in retaliating for the offence, sets in motion a grim trigger. Economist Prajit Dutta notes that "The trigger is grim in the sense that once the punishment phase is initiated, it is never revoked" (229). Simply put, the grim trigger sets off a downward spiral of reciprocating defections from which none of the knights can extricate the court. As noted above, the effectiveness of strategies like tit-for-tat and Pavlov arises from their ca pacity to respond to changes in the strategies of other players. Because Arthur has spent a lifetime chivalrously cooperating with Lancelot, it appears that he has allowed his strategic outlook to change to one of constant cooperation (All-C). Gawain al so initially recommends forbearance. But as the prisoner's dilemma demonstrates, cooperation in the face of defection earns only repeated punishments. Arthur's allies and Lancelot's foes are eager for Arthur to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy and retaliate for the defection against the court, society, and religion that is embodied in the adulterous affair. Arthur's and Gawain's stubborn cooperation in the face of defection within their ranks, allows the pressure for a defection to build, until it explodes in the confrontation of Lancelot at the queen's chamber. Lancelot slays twelve knights, and the enmities build apace. It might seem, at this juncture, that Camelot's prospects for peace are at an end, but as game theorists have suggested, cooperation, although by no means ubiquitous or insuperable, may emerge in the most unlikely circumstances. 

Things do not go well for the divided court, and Arthur soon finds himself at war with Lancelot. When Gawain then learns of the accidental death of his brother Gareth at Lancelot's hands, he changes strategy completely to All-D, an d forces the subsequent battles that obliterate the kingdom: "I shal make you a promyse whych I shall holde be my knyghthode, that from thys day forewarde I shall never fayle sir Launcelot untyll that one of us have slayne that other" (687, 1-3). Neverth eless, when Gawain's rage forces the newly divided court to war, peace breaks out in the thick of the battle. 

Peace Breaks Out

Axelrod cites a notable example of a similar dynamic in trench warfare during World War One that became known as the 'live-and-let-live' system. In his treatment, the front lines comprised prisoner's dilemma situations, with optio ns of killing or not killing. Long periods of inter-battalion anti-aggression could be established because "at the national level, World War I approximated a zero-sum game in which losses for one side represented gains for the other side. But at the loc al level, along the front line, mutual restraint was much preferred to mutual punishment" (Axelrod 74, 75-76). When Lancelot finds himself in battle against king Arthur, "ever was kynge Arthur aboute sir Launcelot to have slayne him, and ever sir Launcel ot suffird hym and wolde nat stryke agayne . . . 'For I woll never se than moste noble kynge that made me knight nother slayne nor shamed" (691, 9-18). 

Lancelot's behavior has the same effects among his comrades, however, attributed to commanding authorities in WWI: "The high commands of the British, French, and German armies all wanted to put a stop to tacit truces; all were afra id that they sapped the morale of their men, and all believed throughout the war that a ceaseless policy of offense was the only way to victory" (81). Lancelot's comrades have a similar reaction, when they realize that he is holding back: 

"Than sir Lavayne and sir Urré prayed sir Launcelot to do hys payne and feyght as they do: 'For we se that ye forebeare and spare, and that doth us much harme. And therefore we pray you spare nat youre enemyes no more that they do y ou.'
'Alas seyde sir Launcelot, 'I have no harte to fyght ayenste my lorde Arthur, for ever mesemyth I do nat as me ought to do.' (692, 3-8) 

The cessation of hostilities that might be afforded by an accord between Lancelot and Arthur, would presumably offer the calm necessary to let cooler heads prevail. 
Arthur also recognizes the untenable extremity of Gawain's strategy of relentless attack, and the dangers of escalating conflict. When Lancelot complains that Arthur has not yet displayed forbearance in his attack, Arthur "rod hys way and myght no longe r beholde him" (691, 29-30). This establishes a prospective live-and-let-live dynamic for their forces, which is hindered primarily by Gawain's blind rage: "'Alas' seyde sir Lucan 'my noble lorde Arthure wolde accorde with sir Launcelot, but sir Gawayne woll nat suffir hym.'" (701, 27-8). Gawain's rage demands the same full-scale aggression as Lancelot's cohorts request of him, perpetuating the battles until Gawain himself is punished with wounds so severe that he must break off his attack. Only in dea th from a reopening of the wound that Lancelot inflicts does Gawain repent of his strategy. Gawain recognizes that he has "sought my dethe . . . thorow . . . myne owne sekynge" (710, 11-12). His message of repentance will reach Lancelot too late to aver t the final set of defections that destroy the Round Table.

Things Fall Apart

Meanwhile, back in Camelot, Arthur's son Mordred has exploited the power vacuum and staged a coup. Mordred's defection pits him against his father the King, and the two set their forces against each other in the final round of confl icts precipitated by Lancelot's and Guinevere's affair. Finally, the opposing forces are reduced to father and son, neither of whom can break out of the grim cycle of mutual defection. Arthur may certainly be read as having returned to something like ch ivalric strategy, playing tit-for-tat against the multiple defectors around him. But he cannot break out of the cycle of defection and reciprocal aggression the way that Bertilak's Pavlov strategy demonstrates in SGGK, nor can Arthur practice the restrai nt modeled by sir Gareth and turn his rage to better ends. A last hope for peace is thwarted when a live-and-let-live arrangement, in which Mordred would relinquish authority until Arthur's death, is broken when a knight draws his sword to kill a snake a nd mistakenly provokes a battle. This cycle of defections literally destroys both armies, down to the very last combatants, a father and son who are unable to find room for cooperation. Arthur charges at Mordred, in their final abandonment of chivalry. "Traytoure," he cries, lunging at his son, "now ys thy dethe-day com!" (714, 3). Both are punished as their mutual defection ends their lives.

Click here for game dynamics in Sir Gareth.